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Abstract 
 
This PhD Thesis By Publication poses two concepts — ‘cultures of governance’ and 
the ‘governance of culture’ — as tropes by which to analyse the contemporary condition 
of Indigenous governance. The thesis publications enable a theoretical understanding of 
Indigenous governance as being a culturally self-referential field of meshed nodal 
networks, and as also influentially shaped by its intercultural articulation with the 
governmentality of the Australian state. In doing so, concepts of governance, 
governmentality, field, power, agency, legitimacy, network, culture and intercultural are 
investigated and theoretically refined.  
Eight published papers are presented which have valuable synergies between them. 
They are laid out under five Parts which focus on particular aspects of governance and 
governmentality. The publications provide extensive ethnographic evidence and 
analyses derived from long-term fieldwork undertaken over a period of 37 years in 
rural, urban and remote Indigenous locations across Australia, as well as with 
governments and their departments. These provide the bases upon which a cohesive 
theoretical framework is newly developed by way of the thesis Conclusion. On a more 
pragmatic level, the Conclusion also highlights the significance of that framework for 
the ongoing relationship between Indigenous Australians and the state, and their 
practices of governance and governmentality. 
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 3  Introduction 
Introduction: Indigenous Governance, State 
Governmentality and Their Intercultural Articulation  
— Research Scope, Problems and Layout 
 
Introduction — A Professional Turning Point  
Late in 1972, as an undergraduate in my final year of studies at the University of 
Queensland, I had the good fortune to be employed over the summer by the Aboriginal 
Cultural Foundation.1 My job was to work with Mirriwung-Gajerrong Aboriginal 
people living on the newly-created Mirima Reserve2 on the outskirts of Kununurra, 
Western Australia, and assist them in hosting a bungall, or ‘dance festival’, attended by 
Aboriginal groups from surrounding Kimberley communities.  
Over the course of working for three months with Aboriginal residents of the reserve, 
I witnessed what I then concluded to be a peculiar process of misguided good intentions 
mixed with misunderstanding. Three years earlier, a local Catholic priest and welfare 
officer3 living in Kununurra had created a new ‘Aboriginal organisation’ — the Mirima 
Council — to represent the growing reserve population. The organisation was based 
entirely on western organisational structures, democratic decision-making processes and 
norms of accountability. The priest and government officer selected Aboriginal people 
to hold the positions of secretary, treasurer and chairman; though the organisation was 
effectively directed by the priest.  
From my short period of participant observation it seemed apparent that Aboriginal 
people on the reserve had their own ways of organising and ordering their lives; 
something we now call ‘governance’. People appeared to get things done, collectively 
and individually. Issues were discussed, disagreements and alternatives considered, 
problems settled and sometimes not, and action taken or not. The Aboriginal members 
of the visiting dance groups were quickly incorporated as ‘family’ into local kin and 
social networks. In the context of organising the bungall, several men and women took 
on visibly prominent leadership and decision-making roles. As one old man succinctly 
put it to me: ‘We all have our own bosses who tell us what to do’ (von Sturmer (nee 
Smith) 1976: 186).  
Yet this Aboriginal arena of networked relationship and authority remained largely 
invisible to external government and church officials. They carried out their local 
administration of Aboriginal life ‘barely touching an underground movement … an 
4  Introduction 
“other life” continuing within the Aboriginal groups … of Aboriginal decisions and 
leadership’. I concluded at the time that there literally seemed to be ‘two worlds [which] 
remain mutually, and often deliberately, unintelligible’ (ibid: 200). In  many ways, this 
current PhD thesis by publication represents the research outcomes of my ongoing 
professional investigation of these distinctive ways of governing, and the consequences 
of their  mutual incommensurability. 
That experience provoked me to write an Honours Thesis in 1974 (von Sturmer (nee 
Smith) 1976) in which I used Kununurra as a case study to investigate Aboriginal 
modes of leadership and decision-making, and the colonial and academic conditions 
contributing to their illegibility to outsiders.  I concluded, in part, that the case study 
highlighted: 
the grave dangers of imposing European structures and mechanisms on 
Aboriginal situations. [Noting that] decision making powers, once highly 
personalised and operating within the context of distinct, autonomous local 
groups, have become submerged and depersonalised under the bureaucracy 
of various European-administered or dominated life situations (von Sturmer 
(nee Smith) 1976): 199).  
I also suggested that one consequence of such submergence was that: 
In the midst of an imposed European organisation, the Aboriginal men of 
authority remained silent [and] … when the priest left town, the Council 
virtually ceased to exist (ibid: 172). 
Not surprisingly, I had more questions than answers to provide at that time. I made 
several suggestions for refining methodological practice for an anthropology of 
leadership and decision making.4 And I rather grandly declared that part of the analytic 
difficulties for anthropologists lay in the blind spots perpetuated by their ‘lingering 
assumptions of European social-evolutionist paradigms’ (ibid: 4). That colonial 
paradigm had cast Australian Indigenous societies as a museum of primeval humanity, 
lawless and leaderless. It is a paradigm that continues to remain influential today.5  
The Kununurra experience was a professional turning point for me; of the kind 
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) associate with agency and events that give direction to 
one’s life, and which Andrew Abbott (2001: 250, 258) perceptively referred to as ‘those 
rare transitions that take us between different probability regimes … a random, but 
major disturbance intervening in the life course’.6 After that experience I went on to 
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carry out numerous research projects which continued to question the ways in which the 
lives of Indigenous Australians and their modes of governance were being intimately 
shaped by the Australian state.
7
 Such research investigations have encompassed 
Indigenous systems of land-tenure, social organisation, land rights and native title, 
socioeconomic status and development, family life and developmental cycles, women’s 
roles and responsibilities, and the formation and operation of specialist Indigenous 
organisations (see Appendix A for a full list of my professional publications on these 
topics).  
Woven through each project has been the warp thread of ethnographic investigation 
and anthropological analyses of Indigenous leadership, power and authority, decision 
making, dispute resolution, compensation, the cultures and effectiveness of 
organisations, identity politics, and the relevance of cultural geographies to rural, 
remote and urban Indigenous groups. These are arguably all elements of what I now 
refer to more holistically as ‘Indigenous governance’; a concept which lies at the heart 
of this thesis and which is problematised and elaborated in the remainder of this 
Introduction.  
The weft thread woven through my research projects has been the investigation of 
the Australian state’s encounters with Indigenous Australians and their cultures of 
governance. To follow that thread, I have undertaken extensive ethnographic fieldwork 
over several decades in the corridors of the Australian state, observing its technologies 
of power, policy formulation and implementation processes, bureaucratic cultures, 
rationales, languages and institutions. These are aspects of what I refer to below as the 
Australian state’s ‘governmentality’; a concept which is also problematised and 
elaborated on below. 
Research Scope and Layout  
It is the warp and weft of articulation between Indigenous governance and the 
Australian state’s governmentality, and the consequences of that for all involved, with 
which this thesis is most centrally concerned. The fabric of that articulation is not a 
natural or seamless one; despite the efforts of some actors to naturalise preferred power 
relations, modes of interaction and kinds of relationship as the accepted conditions of 
articulation.  
To better elucidate the pattern of that interwoven fabric, the thesis poses two 
concepts — ‘cultures of governance’ and the ‘governance of culture’ — as tropes by 
which to analyse the contemporary condition of Indigenous governance as being a self-
6  Introduction 
referential field of social order-organisation, as well as influentially shaped by its 
intercultural articulation with the governmentality of the Australia state. 
As suggested in the preliminary “Statement of Authorship”, the layout of a “Thesis 
by Publication” is more complicated than that of a standard PhD thesis. An 
Introduction, five short Thematic Overviews and a Conclusion have been newly written 
for the purposes of contextualisation, evaluation of research contribution, and the 
coherent advancement of an overall theoretical argument. 
Eight original papers have been selected for inclusion as the ‘thesis by publication’.8 
They cover a 13 year period between 1995 and 2008,
 
and understandably, in a collection 
written over such a period there is some overlap in the ethnography and literature 
reviewed. Nevertheless, each paper stands on its own, providing a vantage point from 
which to more closely examine different aspects of Indigenous governance, state 
governmentality, and their articulation. The papers represent a much smaller subset of a 
significant body of the anthropological field research and analyses I have undertaken 
and published on this broad topic. (My complete Curriculum Vitae is attached at 
Appendix A where approximately 60 publications have been highlighted that directly 
deal with issues of Indigenous governance and state governmentality.) However the 
selected papers reflect my evolving theoretical consideration of this subject that spans a 
longer period of more than three decades. 
The published papers have been chosen because there are valuable analytic synergies 
between them. To further elaborate on those, particular papers are located together 
under five Thematic Parts, each of which addresses a component of the overall thesis 
analysis. This arrangement enables a finer analysis of issues within each theme, at the 
same time as facilitating the progressive development of a broader thesis argument.  
A new Thematic Overview sits at the beginning of each Theme. These have been 
written in order to contextualise the research content and draw out the specific 
contribution of each paper to the particular thematic issues being examined and to the 
overall thesis argument. 
The five Thematic Parts are: 
• Theme One: Researching Governance — Methodological and  Conceptual           
Foundations 
• Theme Two: The Australian State in Indigenous Affairs 
• Theme Three: Seeing Indigenous Cultures of Governance 
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• Theme Four: A Society of Organisations 
• Theme Five: Governance and Governmentality in the Intercultural Space.  
It is worth noting here that while individual papers have been placed under different 
themes, each is directly relevant to the broader issues discussed in other themes. This 
overlap is not a disadvantage. Often an insight from one period of field research and its 
related publications has been re-examined in subsequent research and papers. Some of 
these investigative journeys have led to research hypotheses being abandoned; others 
have revealed ‘swarms of possibilities’ that have led to further insights and 
understandings (Ingham 2009).
9
 
But perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this ‘thesis by publication’, the 
theoretical implications of the combined papers and their thematic analyses are greater 
than their individual research parts. The combined evidence and analyses provide a 
unique platform from which to synthesise an overarching theoretical and conceptual 
meta-framework — one which affords a more integrated orientation to the varied 
approaches and vantage points of the themes and their papers.  
This meta-framework is provided in the newly written Conclusion which sits, in 
more standard fashion, at the very end of the thesis. The framework does not assert an 
all-encompassing normative theory of governance. Rather, the Conclusion progressively 
lays out a set of more abstracted comprehensions that are designed to explain the 
phenomenon of Indigenous governance, state governmentality, their underlying 
conditions and intercultural articulation — abstractions which not only have internal 
consistency, but demonstrate a high degree of external consistency with the long-term 
and diverse field observations and examples laid out in the thesis publications. On a 
more pragmatic level, the Conclusion also highlights the significance of that framework 
for the ongoing governance relationship between Indigenous Australians and the state. 
The Research Problematic 
Several interrelated research problems and concepts lie at the heart of the thesis 
publications. These are summarised below and are subsequently investigated in greater 
ethnographic detail and from different vantage points in the selected publications. They 
are as follows: 
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Problematising governance 
At the heart of the collected works lie the general problem of understanding how 
‘governance’ as rule and order are organised over time within Indigenous Australian 
societies, and conversely, how disorder and decay are conceived of and managed. How 
do things get done collectively and individually in groups? Is there a specificity to 
Indigenous governance? Does it evidence an internal cultural logic in the way it is 
constituted, represented and practised? Is it uniform or heterogeneous in its mode of 
practice? How can the position of Indigenous governance and organisations be 
understood in the context of the surrounding governance environment within which they 
are now encompassed?
10 
The published papers, their Thematic Overviews and the thesis 
Conclusion indicate how such questions might be addressed. 
Problematising governmentality 
The second research problem addressed by the publications is that of understanding 
the Australian state’s own ‘governmentality’; that is, its organised institutions, practices, 
modes of power and regulation used to govern a society. For analytic purposes, the 
papers locate this specialist field of state-work within what is variously known as 
‘Aboriginal affairs’, ‘Indigenous affairs’ and the ‘Aboriginal industry’.
11
 The papers 
collectively argue that an ongoing project of the Australian state, pursued via its various 
policy and political guises over several decades, has been to shape and direct Indigenous 
culture and its governance in distinctive ways.  
Under the ethnographic lens provided by the papers, Michel Foucault’s (1991: 87–
104) concept of governmentality will be critically evaluated and refined. For instance, is 
the concept of governmentality sufficient to explain the Australian state’s conduct of 
Indigenous affairs? How is the state’s governmentality configured, represented and 
practised? To what extent does the concept differ from ‘governance’? The thesis papers, 
Thematic Overviews and Conclusion indicate how such questions can be addressed.  
A problem with culture? 
A common analytical thread running through the two research problems above is the 
question of culture; a problem which anthropologists have been, on the whole, 
ambivalent towards (see Fischer 2007). I take culture to mean the ways in which a 
group of people imagine and give practical effect to their collective lives, including their 
ideas and modes of thought, the different ways in which those are externalised or made 
accessible to them, and the social distribution, shared practice and representations of 
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those ideas and meanings across the group.12 In short, the complexity of culture resides 
not only in the head and heart, but also in grounded individual and collective practice 
(Kirsch 2001: 179).  
While research studies of Indigenous societies are replete with considerations of 
culture, the post-modernist persuasion in anthropology has seen culture rejected as 
hopelessly subjective and indeterminate, and thereby relegated to the closet like an 
embarrassing family relative. Theories about the state have tended to detour around 
culture, more commonly looking to institutional, economic, political and global-systems 
analyses. But, as is its wont, culture keeps creeping out of the theoretical closet, 
insisting on our attention.13 
In this context, Nicolas Peterson’s recent criticism of trends in Australian 
anthropology holds equally true for the profession’s approach to Indigenous governance 
and statist governmentality; namely, 
social relations, social institutions, social organisation and social context 
have all come to be relatively neglected by many field workers … [who] 
overlook the significance of structures and norms in all societies, as well as 
beliefs and feelings, for both the people themselves as well as for the 
institutions of the Australian nation-state  (Peterson 2008: 194-5).  
Accordingly, the third research problem addressed by the thesis involves treating the 
issue of culture as a phenomenon to be explained and integrated into a broader analysis 
of the Australian state and its governmentality of Indigenous affairs; not simply 
relegated to an exoticised Indigenous sideline. This implies that researching the state’s 
governmentality should be productively receptive to ethnographic methodologies and 
analyses, and lend insight into the nexus of state-culture and Indigenous-culture and 
their articulation with each other.  
Such an approach highlights several related research problems that need to be 
interrogated. On the one hand, the papers report that many Indigenous people perceive 
and assert they have a distinctive and autonomous Indigenous way of being, doing and 
thinking; which includes their way of governing. Cultural difference is valued and 
reinforced — in relation to both neighbouring Indigenous groups and other Australians 
— and markers of difference are used as designators of distinctive Indigenous group 
identities.  
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Over the past 20–30 years, Australian anthropologists have recognised Indigenous 
perceptions of difference (both internally, and in respect to other Australians) through 
the trope of ‘domain’; that is, that there is a distinctive and heterogeneous Indigenous 
sphere of knowledge, thought and action.14 And yet there is also a widespread 
Indigenous recognition of there being valued commonalities underlying their own 
internally diverse cultures; a recognition that is often succinctly expressed by 
Indigenous people as ‘we all the same but different’. 
How then is Indigenous cultural difference and commonality, and Indigenous 
autonomy and relatedness to be understood given the seemingly dense penetration by 
Australian culture and the state’s governmentality into Indigenous lives? And what are 
the implications for Indigenous modes of governance? Not surprisingly, the analytic 
shortcomings of the concept of a neatly bounded and separate Indigenous ‘domain’ have 
been reassessed in recent years by Francesca Merlan (1997, 1998, 2005), Melinda 
Hinkson and Ben Smith (2005) and Janet Hunt et al (2008). The work of Merlan, and 
Hinkson and Smith in particular, has promoted a conceptual move away from the term 
‘domain’ to that of the ‘intercultural’.  
My own papers presented in this thesis record a similar conceptual journey away 
from ‘domain’, albeit a journey that has led me to a slightly different analytic 
conclusion. In summary, the thesis position argues that while the anthropological turn to 
the intercultural is welcome as a more nuanced conceptualisation of entangled lives, the 
scholarly move away from the understandings captured by the concept of ‘domain’ risks 
losing the ethnographic insight and weight flowing from Indigenous self-perceptions of 
there actually being ‘a difference’ between Indigenous and other Australian cultures 
(and especially between their modes of governing). For example, the published papers 
provide robust ethnographic documentation that not only is there an intimate 
entanglement of cultural differences that routinely occurs in the intercultural encounters 
between Indigenous governance and state governmentality, there is also a distinctive 
cultural logic to Indigenous arrangements.  
To introduce greater clarity of language at this early point, this Introduction 
conceptually poses both Indigenous governance and statist governmentality as fields; 
and specifically as self-referential and self-organising fields. These characteristic 
conditions are explored by the thesis papers. The ethnographic data provided in the 
publications indicate that an elaborated concept of ‘field’ holds more analytic value and 
application than the term ‘domain’, which remains vague in respect to issues of internal 
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Indigenous contestation and negotiation of its own boundaries of difference. 
Furthermore, the concept of ‘field’ enables a more nuanced consideration of the 
interplay between culture and the intercultural. Specifically, the ethnographic evidence 
requires us to treat Indigenous and statist fields as cultural formations constituted 
through a body of learned beliefs, institutions (rules of the game) and values, with a 
repertoire of practices and capital and, as a consequence, preferred ways of organising 
social order and exercising power and agency. 
This approach enables refinements to be made to Pierre Bourdieu and Loic 
Wacquant’s concept of field as a system of agents and their social positions internally 
structured by power relationships, hierarchy and associated forms of capital (Bourdieu 
1993, 1999; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 100, 104, 1993: 72, 1999). As cultural 
formations, fields are not only social positions, but also have organisational, political, 
symbolic and economic positionality that need to be unpacked as part of an analysis of 
governance and governmentality. Importantly, the evidence of the thesis papers suggests 
that any field must be conceived of not only as a terrain of contestation and hierarchy, 
but as also encompassing potential rapprochement, alignment and transformation. 
The challenge taken up by this thesis is that our current terminology and theoretical 
frames appear inadequate to the task of accounting for the complex entanglement and 
strain towards autonomy of such cultural fields. 
Problematising the intercultural 
This leads to the fourth research problem addressed by the thesis papers. If 
Indigenous governance and state governmentality can be posed as culturally configured 
fields, how might we account for their intercultural articulation and self-referential 
autonomy? The concept of the ‘intercultural’ is particularly under-developed and in 
need of ethnographic and theoretical elaboration. This thesis draws on the benefit of the 
ethnographic depth and timeframe of the published papers to address this gap and 
develop a conclusion that affords a more cohesive conceptual and theoretical account.  
The papers show that the intercultural can be conceptualised as an emergent, 
adaptive space of articulation. The emergent quality of the intercultural moment does 
not mean it is ever-present in people’s lived experience, or even perceived to be present. 
Furthermore, the cultural specificity of the fields of governance and governmentality 
does not negate their capacity for relationality in an intercultural space, nor the struggle 
that may be required of each to protect that specificity or negotiate potential alignments 
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across the fields. Accordingly, the papers suggest that distinctive fields and the 
intercultural space can be viewed as being in dialectic tension, part of an emergent 
continuum rather than an oppositional dualism.  
In which case, the thesis papers can be read as elucidating that continuum of 
unfolding moments when boundaries of difference and similarity, engagement and 
aversion are made manifest, interpreted and acted upon. In this way, the papers 
collectively unpack the concepts of ‘culture’ and the ‘intercultural’; albeit without 
wanting to reify either as sine qua non determinants of the fields of Indigenous 
governance and statist governmentality.  
Problematising power and agency 
In many contemporary accounts of the state, concepts such as power and 
governmentality are invariably posed in counterpoint to those of local resistance and 
disadvantage. This has led to Indigenous society being characterised (and contained) in 
terms of oppositional dualisms; for example, continuity/loss, individualism/ 
collectivism, tradition/modernity, and functional/dysfunctional. Such dualisms situate 
Indigenous people in contradictory ways that are beyond their limits; as the powerless 
objects of victimisation or intervention by a punitive state; as dependent and 
dysfunctional subjects experiencing overwhelming ‘suffering’ through their own 
inability to enter into modernity; or as heroic agents engaged in defiant practices of 
resistance and self-determination. In all such representations, their condition is reduced 
to the consequence either of unassailable power differentials, or the cultural failure of 
their own modes of agency. 
However, culture is treated in the published papers as consequential — a thing of 
power and agency that affects weighty individual and collective issues. From this 
vantage point, it is not surprising that in the encounters between Indigenous and statist 
fields, culture itself becomes a subject of contestation over meaning, value and power. 
While power differentials are properly part of the analytic meat of investigation into 
such encounters, the ethnographies presented in the thesis publications suggest that a 
preoccupation with power differentials serves to hide occasions when the supposedly 
powerless are simply ungovernable, remove themselves from scrutiny, or use cultural 
difference as a buffer to ward off the intrusive state.  
Numerous occasions are described in the papers when Indigenous people exercise 
their exit option, performing ‘the art of not being governed’ (Scott 2009; see also 
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Peterson 2009, 2010) and ‘keeping the state away’ (Shah 2007; Pierre & Peters 
200:208). But the papers also document occasions when Indigenous people deliberately 
and strategically engage, asserting what could be called their niche agency and power; 
for example, as forms of ‘grassroots’ and cultural politics, and more recently through 
policy debates about culture carried out in the public media.15 
The consequences of these varied forms of Indigenous agency are of the same kind 
identified by James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002); namely, they inadvertently call 
into question the ability of the state to sufficiently spatialise its authority over 
Indigenous people. The state’s power may be substantial, but it is not always present or 
effective in Indigenous lives. 
Accordingly, part of the project of this thesis is to problematise power and agency 
within and across the two fields. The issue of agency is interrogated by the thesis papers 
not only in terms of people’s ability and willingness to accomplish things in the world 
they inhabit, but also in terms of the conditions and constraints acting upon them, 
including their relative and differently configured power. The papers describe processes 
and events where there are mutual efforts on the part of the state and Indigenous 
Australians to govern each other in subtle and insinuating ways not always apparent to 
the other. In such ways, both may be transformed in unexpected ways, at multiple points 
over time.  
This is not to suggest that the conditions and practise of Indigenous governance and 
the Australian state’s governmentality are of the same kind. Rather, that we need to 
rehabilitate the complex nexus between power and agency, and their particularistic 
cultural moorings and range, back into our analyses of the intercultural.  
What Kind of Anthropology Do We Need? 
The research problems summarised above raise the question of what kind of 
anthropology is sufficient to the research. In following my own admonition from 1973 
to stay close to the insights afforded by Indigenous self-representations and 
ethnographic evidence, the question can be reframed accordingly: Can abstracted 
comprehensions (theory) be developed through what Veena Das (2008: 248–9) calls ‘a 
descent into the everyday’,16 as the ground from which we can then move towards the 
sites of state power and governmentality, Indigenous power and governance, and their 
intercultural articulation?  
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The collected papers arguably confirm that we cannot provide an intercultural 
account of Indigenous governance without ethnographically mapping and understanding 
the state’s own cultural field of governmentality in Indigenous affairs; and vice versa. 
Hence the papers call for an anthropology of ‘being there’ as the foundation stone of 
robust theory.  
This means pursuing a fine balance (ethical and intellectual) between what Loic 
Wacquant (2001: 3) appropriately refers to as the ‘cool’ analysis of ‘hot’ experience. 
More than that, the anthropological position espoused in the papers is that theory and 
ethnography are, and should be, intimately interwoven. In order to model Indigenous 
and statist intercultural encounters, we must realign our ethnographic and analytic 
pathways so that field research becomes, minimally, an equal order (not lower-order) 
ground upon which our abstract understandings develop, ‘continue to be refined and 
empirically tested, and made intelligible to others’ (Smith 1997: 10). The Conclusion to 
this thesis of publications acts upon that position, developing an integrated set of 
abstracted understandings that nevertheless remain firmly rooted in Indigenous realities 
and documented ethnographic observations. 
Summary 
In pursuing these insights and research problems, the papers selected for this thesis 
elaborate my professional stance developed over many years; namely, of keeping 
analytically open the future of Indigenous Australians in the context of a purportedly 
post-colonial Australian state in which both Australian and Indigenous cultures are 
deeply mythologised. It is a stance which, above all, neither tries to reconstruct the 
ethnographic pastoral (Clifford 1986) of a romanticised cultural form of Indigenous 
governance or altruistic agency, nor reduce Indigenous life to one of terminal suffering, 
fragmentation or corruption. Rather, the collected papers highlight the encultured 
agency of Indigenous people in constituting and interpreting (consciously and 
unconsciously; productively and destructively) the meaningful conditions of their own 
self-governance. Those insights are then extended into the intercultural space where 
Indigenous agency and power are challenged and contested.  
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Overview of Theme One: Researching Governance and 
Governmentality: Methodological and Conceptual 
Foundations 
Paper 1: D.E. Smith, 2005. ‘Researching Australian Indigenous governance: A 
methodological and conceptual framework’, CAEPR Working Paper No. 29, 
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The Australian National 
University, Canberra. 36pp. 
The research problems outlined in the Introduction are ambitious and raise 
significant issues of research practice. This challenge, combined with the relatively 
under-theorised nature of governance, has encouraged an experimental methodology, 
the elements of which have been drawn together in Paper 1. The paper was written to 
provide an overarching framework for a major Australian research project on 
Indigenous Community Governance (ICG) which I was instrumental in instigating and 
subsequently coordinating.17 The other published papers that are included in this thesis 
consider particular conceptual and methodological aspects of that framework, from 
different vantage points. Their insights are also integrated into the thematic overview 
below. 
The currently small body of anthropological literature on Indigenous governance is 
reviewed in Paper 1. The paper highlights the lack of in-depth discussion of the 
methodological question of how one actually ‘studies’ governance. This is similarly 
evident in the growing anthropological literature on the governmentality of the modern 
state. Paper 1 sought to address that gap for the purposes of the ICG Project which was 
national in its coverage and long-term in its field research by a multi-disciplinary team 
who investigated: 
1. the diverse conditions of governance — cultural, social, economic, legal, 
institutional and historical — of governance in local organisations, communities 
and across regions; 
2. the various models of governance (established and emerging), and the institutions, 
leadership, decision-making processes, structures, powers and capacities involved; 
3. the factors determining the cultural legitimacy of governance arrangements; 
4. the assets and gaps in community governance capital; and 
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5. the nature and impacts of the wider ‘governance environments’, including the role 
of governments, the private sector and so on. 
Between 2003-2008, ICG Project researchers conducted ongoing field research with 
12 Indigenous communities and their leaders, with Indigenous representative and 
service delivery organisations, and also with governments and their departments 
(including the Australian, State, Territory and local governments) (See Map 1). 
Map 1: Fieldwork Locations of the Indigenous Community Governance Project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a Chief Investigator of the ICG Project, I also undertook extensive field research 
of my own with remote, rural and urban Indigenous communities, their leadership, 
service-delivery and enterprise organisations, and related public sector stakeholders. I 
carried out long-term fieldwork with the Yarnteen Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Corporation in Newcastle, New South Wales (see Paper 8 and also Smith 1996); with 
Aboriginal leaders, communities and organisations in West Arnhem Land, Northern 
Territory (NT) (see Paper 9 and also Smith 2007); and with the NT and Australian 
Governments (see Paper 9 and also Smith 2004, 2008).  
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My research coordination role included supervision of PhD students and other 
members of the research team, as well as undertaking comparative analyses of the 
project’s diverse fieldwork data. Alongside published papers, I also produced an 
extremely large body of reports, case studies, evaluation and policy papers, conference 
and seminar presentations under the project (both as sole author and collaboratively). 
These publications are available on Project website at: 
http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/projects/governance.php. The final edited publication from 
the ICG Project, Contested Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous 
Australia (Hunt, J. & Smith, D.E et al 2008) has been particularly influential. It is 
published by the Australian National University’s EPress and to date there have been 
over 50,000 electronic downloads of the entire book. 
The ICG Project utilised a participatory approach and ensured the findings were 
widely communicated. As part of that approach I authored and collated a substantial 
body of practical governance tools, best-practice examples and information in order to 
develop the Indigenous Governance Toolkit; a web-based resource that is hosted by 
Reconciliation Australia at: www.reconciliation.org.au/governance.18 
Conceptual Innovations: Governance 
The parameters for reconceptualising several foundational terms that lie at the heart 
of the thesis papers are examined in Paper 1. The search for a cohesive definition of 
governance has bred its own academic debate, leading to a plethora of definitions 
oriented to particularistic modes and contexts, but with only a small sub-set considering 
its Indigenous forms.19 The definition of governance that emerges from the thesis papers 
(set out in detail in Paper 1) is that of a dynamic system of order, control and power by 
which people collectively organise themselves to accomplish their desired ends and 
negotiate their rights and interests with others.  
The governance of Indigenous Australians must also contend with influential 
conditions and agents within the wider environment. When writing Paper 1 for the ICG 
Project, I coined the term ‘governance environment’ to refer to that surrounding 
combination of things, agents, conditions, institutions, influences, networks and 
relationships within which Indigenous governance is situated and encapsulated. 
In Australia, this wider governance environment contains a shifting multiplicity of 
overlapping, powerful fields of governmentality and governance; both Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous. Appendix B provides a partial snapshot of such an environment in 
Central Australia. It is not surprising that Indigenous people often identify this 
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conglomeration en masse as all being ‘government people’, ‘from government’.20 In 
respect to the place and standing of Indigenous governance within this wider 
environment, the papers document both its culturally self-referential modes of power 
and agency, and its encompassed positionality that is especially shaped by the meta-
governance capital and powers of the Australian state.  
The concept of the governance environment has important implications. First it is a 
powerful methodological injunction that local expressions of governance and 
governmentality cannot be adequately analysed without being alert to the wider set of 
conditions, agents and practices. Second, it provides added assurance that important 
governance factors and processes are not overlooked. Third, it highlights the multiple 
sources of power, agency and meaning involved. Fourth, it makes clear that the state is 
not apical and removed ‘up there’, but spatialised and dispersed across the governance 
environment. This in turn highlights the wider front of the state’s encounters with 
Indigenous peoples.  
Importantly, the concept also points to the dispersal (albeit uneven) of Indigenous 
people throughout the layers of the state’s governmentality. Indigenous individuals 
appear, for example, as bureaucrats employed by government departments and agencies; 
as elected representatives of statutory authorities established under government 
legislation; as Indigenous leaders sitting on government committees, tribunals, 
commissions and inquiries; and as experts providing an Indigenous perspective into 
government. This constitutes a significant intercultural penetration by Indigenous 
people into the body of the state; an issue addressed in several of the published papers. 
Paper 1 demonstrates that this extended conceptualisation of governance provides a 
valuable frame of reference enabling a more cohesive analysis. Firstly, the concept of 
governance pinpoints important historical and global issues influencing Indigenous 
Australians’ encounters with the state; issues which have previously been tackled in a 
piecemeal manner.21 Second, it encourages a coming to grips with the relational, 
interactional and diversely imagined modes of governing power and agency involved. 
Third, it serves as an alert to the cultural standards and values invoked by people to 
assess the legitimacy of governance arrangements and outcomes. Fourth, it identifies the 
need to consider the end issues at stake and the consequences for real people in their 
lives of the exercise of both governance and state governmentality. Finally, the 
ethnographic evidence in the thesis papers confirms the need for a more nuanced 
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concept of governing power and agency so as to discern not only their heterogeneous 
forms, but also their negotiated limits and shifting constraints. 
This more sophisticated approach to governance is examined from various vantage 
points throughout the thesis papers and is summarised below. 
Conceptual Innovations: Governmentality 
A common concern throughout all the papers is the investigation of Indigenous 
governance as a site for the ongoing business of contesting and negotiating relationships 
of power and identity between Indigenous Australians and the Australian state. In that 
respect, Paper 1 argues that the term ‘governance’ is not synonymous with 
‘government’ or ‘governmentality’.  
Michel Foucault’s (1991) influential concept of ‘governmentality’ is generally 
understood as the ensemble of organised institutions, practices, tactics and technologies 
of power and regulation which states deploy to render a society (constructed as a 
‘population’) governable. The concept is taken to be constituted by the linking of 
governing (gouverner) and modes of thought (mentalite) (Lemke 2001: 2, 2004). 
However, Foucault’s conceptualisation has been overly determined by its association 
with the historical emergence of the European nation-state. This does not fit well with 
either colonised minorities, or the purported ‘hollowing out’ (Jessop 1994, 1999) and 
de-bordering of the nation state’s territorial sovereignty as a more recent consequence of 
globalisation and the transnational flows of capital.  
Collectively, the ethnographic evidence and analyses of the thesis publications 
promote a conceptual refinement of ‘governmentality’ to encompass a broader, 
threefold meaning: 
Firstly, the governmentality of the Australian state is shown to imply its govern-
mentality. As with Foucault, this comprises its rationales, logics, and ways of thinking 
(see also Smith 1993a, 1993b, 2002a, 2002b).  
Secondly, the term is also shown to infer the Australian state’s organisation of 
governing as government-ality. This highlights the progressive government-alisation of 
the state through its particular modes of structural power, administrative technologies, 
bureaucracies, institutions and hierarchies. For example in Australia, the state, 
parliamentary democracy, federalism and its jurisdictional modes of governmentality 
are now arguably coexistent and co-dependent (see also Smith 1992a, 1992b, 2002a). 
22  Theme 1 
Thirdly, the term necessarily implies a dimension that has not been commonly 
recognised under the concept of governmentality; namely, the state’s own internal 
‘governance of government’ wherein it governs its own conduct of others’ conduct. The 
state’s own self-governance is comprised of a distinctive internal culture, relations, 
networks, values, ways of making decisions and holding itself accountable (see also 
Smith 2004, 2008).  
This conceptual and theoretical insight argues that governance matters for 
governmentality. It matters not only in respect to the state’s own need for self-
governance, but also to its exercise of power. While researchers such as George 
Steinmetz (1999: 11) are correct in concluding that globally the state is hardly 
‘withering away’, the papers demonstrate that the coherence of its governmentality (and 
hence of the Australian state itself) is vulnerable to the growing dispersal of statist 
powers and responsibilities to other agents within the wider governance environment. 
This trend has significant ramifications for Indigenous governance.  
Innovative Methodological Practice 
Research into Indigenous governance, state governmentality and their articulation 
requires innovative methodology. Paper 1 describes such an approach used for the ICG 
Project, and the subsequent thesis papers also contain examples. This Thematic 
Overview summarises the key elements of an overall methodological framework that 
has enabled a robust research approach to this complex topic.  
Multi-sited ethnography 
The thesis papers document one of my central methodological strategies; namely, the 
multi-sited investigation of Indigenous governance and state governmentality. Similar to 
the approach advocated by James Clifford (1997) and George Marcus (1995, 1998), 
mine has had the advantage of many years of fieldwork and an extensive coverage of 
‘field’ sites spanning Indigenous cultural geographies as well as political and 
jurisdictional scale (see also Dodson & Smith 2003; Smith 2004, 2007, 2008). The 
considerable benefits include affording multiple vantage points from which to examine 
encounters between Indigenous governance and the Australian state. For example, the 
thesis papers document examples of my research: 
1. ‘studying with’ Indigenous Australians (undertaking participant observation of, 
and living with, Indigenous families and groups in a wide range of settings); 
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2. ‘studying up’ (by undertaking anthropological and applied field research in the 
corridors of government, and through observant participation (Nader 1972; 
Wacquant 2001) as a member of official government inquiries, commissions, 
tribunals, and committees); and through 
3. ‘studying in’ (by undertaking paid employment in Indigenous organisations and 
government departments and statutory authorities, and carrying out Indigenous-
commissioned internal reviews and evaluations of their organisations).  
I have treated all of these as fieldwork sites where each has benefitted from the use of 
anthropological research tools and analysis. 
A comparative and longitudinal approach 
Anthropological research in Australia has commonly been through one-off case 
studies, usually as fieldwork with a single community, or a sub-group within it. As 
Paper 1 notes, while such research can be valuable in the description and analyses of 
local issues, it tends to lack broader application because of a lack of any comparative 
methodology. As a result, the conclusions of research in a single location or with one 
group are rarely seen to be valid for others.  
Earlier comparative work by Australian colonial researchers was hampered by naive 
social Darwinian assumptions and simplistic implementation (see Herzfeld 2001; Moore 
2005). The marginalisation of comparative approaches has also inadvertently been 
reinforced by the analytic primacy given to the cultural heterogeneity of Indigenous 
societies; i.e. they are purportedly too different to be compared.
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In recent decades there has been a renewed interest in comparative methodologies 
(Marcus 1995; Moore 1987). An important aspect of my research has been the design of 
methodological strategies to promote greater validity of comparative analysis and 
insights across diverse sites. Key components of that approach are described in the 
thesis papers and summarised here.  
Firstly, an Indigenous Governance Field Manual
23
 was developed for use by the ICG 
Project research team (see Paper 1: 8, 28-9; and also Hunt & Smith 2006, 2007). The 
manual laid out a comprehensive set of research questions that were investigated by all 
researchers during repeated fieldwork. It proved an invaluable tool for facilitating 
comparative validity across the several case studies which were diverse in their 
governance histories, scale, arrangements and location. 
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Secondly, I also developed, tested and administered standardised interview and 
survey questionnaires which were repeated at intervals with similarly sampled 
populations and groups in different locations (see also Smith 1996, 2001a & 2001b). 
Another valuable source of comparative data I have used are time-series quantitative 
data; e.g. for organisations, communities and aggregate individual-level across different 
locations (see Hunter & Smith 2000; Smith 2001b, 1994a 1995b, & 1995c).
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Longitudinal case studies have proven especially useful for documenting the 
‘governance histories’ of different Indigenous communities, organisations and 
government departments; their changing patterns of leadership and decision-making 
processes; as well as the longer-term developmental cycles of organisations, networks 
and government departments. 
Fourthly, important insights have been obtained by mapping the genealogies of 
government discourse, institutional architecture and bureaucratic language in 
Indigenous affairs, including their slow shifts and dramatic turnarounds (Papers 2 & 4). 
Lastly, the ethnographic documentation of chains of related events as they unfold over 
time has provided rich insights into the influential factors, rationales and agendas at play 
in intercultural encounters (Papers 8 & 9, Smith 1993a, 1993b, 1996). 
These techniques have facilitated what Sally Falk-Moore calls a ‘time conscious 
anthropology’ (1987, 2005:3). It enables comparative analyses to be refined over time 
and provides greater assurance that short-term conditions are contextualised within 
broader developments and debates, and not inflated above their importance.  
A focus on governance events  
A shared concern of the thesis papers is to discern and understand the intercultural 
moments of articulation between Indigenous governance and state governmentality; 
moments where, as Alberto Jimenez (n.d.: 27) eloquently puts it in The Form of the 
Relation, there is an ‘unveiling [of] the processes through which the invisible reveals 
itself’. At such moments hidden worlds of value, meaning and interpretation collide, 
setting off different trajectories. The papers document and analyse many such unfolding 
moments which, rather less eloquently, I refer to as governance events.  
Marshall Sahlins (1985: 153; 1990) suggested that an event is not just ‘a happening 
in the world’, but a relation between a certain happening and a given symbolic system. 
An event ‘is the empirical form of system’. Furthermore, as Harold Garfinkel (1967) 
reminds us, knowledge is occasioned, it is the outcome of a social situation and 
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interaction. Governance events therefore are performed and observable interactions, 
revealing governance knowledge and expertise in particular situations, and exposing 
incommensurable meanings, values and representations. Not surprisingly governance 
events in the intercultural space can foreground contestation over preferred kinds of 
power and agency. It is through observation of such close-quarter events that persistent 
efforts to control persons and processes can be detected.  
The thesis papers demonstrate that particular kinds of events are important sources of 
diagnostic information about the intercultural articulation of governance and 
governmentality. They include acts of decision-making and consensus-moulding; public 
disputes and their management; negotiation and mediation processes; public acts of 
compensation; elections; land claim hearings; board, council and departmental 
meetings; meetings between Indigenous leaders and government bureaucrats; 
interventions on the ground by governments; as well as public ‘performances’ by 
leaders, politicians and Ministers.  
I have been able to follow chains of such governance events over many years, and 
across organisational and political layers of the governance environment. Several are 
analysed in the thesis papers. 
The art of governance 
An overlooked methodological tool is the artistic depiction of Indigenous fields of 
governance. With apologies to Claude Levy-Strauss and Dundiwuy 2 Mununggurr’s 
similarly elegant phrasing of this insight — art is not just beautiful to look at, it is also 
beautiful to think with: 
In the old days Yolngu people lived within the pattern of laws which were 
passed down through the generations and are still with us today. The 
patterns that go through songs, dances, art, ceremonial and sculpture all 
relate to each other. Pattern is the beginning, middle & end of Yolngu life. 
Patterns can be Yolngu or Balanda e.g. stripes, dots, lines, curves, 
rectangles, diamonds, squares, circles. But our Yolngu law patterns tell us a 
story. … My [art] print is about the various patterns that we Yolngu use in 
our art. Dundiwuy 2 Mununggurr, Yolngu artist talking about his painting 
Miny'tji  (See:  
http://www.yirrkala.com/prints/gallery/index.php?cp=30&mxnr=89). 
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Indigenous Australian art often provides a highly sophisticated exposition of 
governance in Indigenous terms. Dundiwuy notes when talking about his painting 
Miny’tji (Yolngu Patterns) that there is a pattern to Yolngu ‘law’, to its governance. 
Where there is a pattern of social order there is a system of rules, relationships, 
knowledge, practice, meaning and values. Such patterns can be comprehended, created 
and mobilised by people.
25
 Documentation of Indigenous peoples’ visual depictions of 
their governance arrangements is used as a methodological tool throughout my thesis 
and other published papers. My own diagrammatic efforts also provide a way of 
rendering the underlying governance patterns of Indigenous organisations (see examples 
in Appendix C).  
Summary 
The methodological ensemble summarised above is uncommon in Australian 
anthropology and makes a valuable contribution to the study of governance. 
Importantly, it has enabled not only the internal differences but also the commonalities 
underlying Indigenous governance to be identified more clearly, and their implications 
considered. The thesis papers argue that particular governance commonalities are 
broadly relevant across Indigenous Australia as a whole. This argument is further 
investigated in the subsequent themes and their papers. 
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Paper 1:  Researching Australian Indigenous 
Governance — A Methodological and Conceptual 
Framework 
D.E. Smith, 2005. 
Originally published as Centre for Aboriginal Policy Research Working Paper No. 29, 
CAEPR, The Australian national University, Canberra. 36pp. 
 
Introduction 
This paper sets out the methodological and conceptual framework for the Indigenous 
Community Governance (ICG) Project on Understanding, Building and Sustaining 
Effective Governance in Rural, Remote and Urban Indigenous Communities.  
Researching governance is challenging because of its complex nature, overlapping 
dimensions, different cross-cultural meanings and expressions, and the multiple agents 
involved. Given these characteristics, and the paucity of comparative research on 
Indigenous governance in Australia1, this methodological framework is itself 
experimental. The framework is likely to be refined over the course of the research—
through ongoing guidance from the ICG Project Advisory Committee, from the 
participation of community organisations and research collaborators, and through the 
input of government and non-government agencies engaged with the Project. 
The methodological approach is designed to: 
• elicit valid and meaningful information about the diverse conditions and attributes 
of Australian Indigenous community governance arrangements; 
• help elucidate the culturally-based foundations of Indigenous governance; 
• promote comparative analysis and insights across different community locations 
and governance arrangements; and  
• support the applied contribution of the research by generating broadly relevant 
principles of what constitutes effective, legitimate Indigenous governance, and by 
identifying transferable lessons and innovative Indigenous practice. 
The methodological framework draws on the multi-disciplinary expertise of ICG 
Project team members and community research collaborators, in areas of anthropology, 
political science, demography, policy and legal studies, linguistics, and community 
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development. The benefit of such an approach is to counter what Rowse (2001: 111) has 
called an ‘unfortunate discipline-based division of labour in studies of Indigenous 
Australian’s political activism’. 
Project Research Aims and Questions 
The focus of research 
At the heart of the Project is a focus on:  
• the key governing bodies operating within ‘communities’; 
• the cultural systems within which Indigenous governance is embedded; and 
• the wider ‘governance environment’ (local, regional, state, territory and 
national) within which Indigenous governance operates.  
Key research issues and questions 
Over a period of several years at different locations across Australia, the Project aims 
to investigate the following issues and questions: 
(a)  The concept of governance. If the concept of ‘governance’ is to be a useful 
organising perspective for bringing together core issues and dimensions for 
analysis, then its many different meanings and uses need to be clearly articulated. 
For example; is ‘governance’ a cross-cultural category? What is the language of 
governance being used in policy contexts, and in Indigenous contexts? What do 
the terms ‘community governance’, ‘regional governance’, and the ‘governance 
environment’ mean? How are ‘cultural legitimacy’, and ideas of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
governance being conceptualised, both in Australia and in the international 
governance literature? The aim here is to unpack the conceptual underpinnings of 
the Indigenous and non-Indigenous categories and, if possible, extricate more 
universal principles. 
(b)  The diversity of governance arrangements at the community level. This will 
involve investigating the specific circumstances of community governance 
arrangements, including their different cultural, political, social, economic, 
demographic, legal, policy and service delivery settings. The ‘governance 
histories’ of each participating Indigenous organisation and its community will be 
documented. Important research questions here are: What are the specific 
dimensions and attributes of governance on the ground? What are the influential 
conditions, relationships, institutions, and processes involved? What is the form 
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and role of local leadership? How do these influence governance effectiveness and 
legitimacy? What works and what doesn’t work? What conditions facilitate or 
impede the practice of governance on the ground?  
(c)  Emerging models of governance. What kinds of organisational structures and 
systems of representation have been established or are emerging in communities? 
Are there underlying principles which inform different governance solutions? To 
what extent are these emerging models based on protecting localised autonomy or 
exploring governance structures at a greater regional scale? What issues of scale 
emerge as organisations struggle to develop and maintain effective capacity, 
continuity of staffing, and to deliver outcomes for their members? Are there ways 
of simultaneously addressing and balancing issues of autonomy and scale (e.g. 
through aggregation, dispersed subsidiarity, or decentralisation)? How are some 
organisations and communities achieving such a balance? Is it possible to expand 
the scale of governance beyond the local, by particular mechanisms of 
representation and accountability? 
(d)  Cultural foundations, geography and match. The current form and role of 
traditional systems of Indigenous governance in local, community and regional 
arrangements. How do organisations operate across inter-cultural governance 
domains? Are there areas of match or mismatch? What does the concept of 
‘cultural match’ mean for Indigenous Australians and others engaged in practical 
efforts to design governance arrangements? What processes do Indigenous 
organisations have in place to deliver both culturally-based internal accountability, 
and external accountability to other stakeholders? How are Indigenous governance 
structures and processes responding to the culturally heterogeneous composition 
of many contemporary communities?  
Another central research question here is what are, or what might constitute, the 
most effective and relevant Indigenous units for community governance? In other 
words, who constitutes the ‘self’ in self-determination at the local level? What are 
the Indigenous bases of collective identity, relevant boundaries and units for 
governance? Does a cultural geography of governance facilitate or impede 
political representivity? The project will explore this ‘cultural geography’ of 
governance in each community, including its scale, relationships, institutions, 
values and logic. 
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(e)  Scope of control and power. What is the extent of Indigenous self-determination at 
the community and organisational level? What sources and forms of jurisdiction, 
power, authority, and control do governing bodies have to make and exercise laws, 
resolve disputes, or carry on public administration and community development? 
What types of dependence and independence do they exhibit? To what extent is 
the organisation or group actually exercising power and control at the local level 
and ‘calling the shots’ in wider environments (e.g. regional, state or federal)? To 
what extent can they assert and exercise informed choice? 
What forms of Indigenous leadership operate in organisations and in the 
community? What kinds of power do they exercise? How have leaders been 
chosen? Are there contending expectations of Indigenous leaders? What impact do 
government policy, service delivery, funding and prevailing jurisdictional 
arrangements have on the scope of Indigenous governance control and power at 
the community level? 
(f)  Institutional form and effect. What institutional ‘rules of the game’—values, 
norms, traditions, regulations, rules, codes of conduct, constitutions, policies, 
etc.—support Indigenous governance at the community level? Are there 
contending expectations of these? What is the extent of constituents’ and 
outsiders’ confidence in and support of these? What is the extent of constituents’ 
participation and voice in community governance arrangements? To what extent 
do the institutional modes used by organisations reflect local culturally-based 
ideas of what constitutes legitimate or ‘proper’ governance. To what extent do 
institutional modes facilitate practical capability and outcomes? Do they 
contribute to, or impede, Indigenous peoples’ capacity to self-determine? 
(g)  Resources and resource governance. What cultural, human, technological, 
economic, financial and natural resources or assets do communities and their 
organisations have at their command? What resources are absent or under-
developed? How are resources made available or delivered to the community? 
How are resources managed and used?  
In conjunction with this, the project will test a related hypothesis—namely, that 
sustainable economic performance within communities and regions is a 
governance issue. To what extent do governance arrangements contribute to, or 
impede, sustainable economic development in each community? What kinds of 
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governance instruments might be established in order to capture community and 
regional development aspirations in all their diversity. 
(h)  The nature and impact of the ‘governance environment’. Indigenous governance 
operates within a complex environment that stretches across community, regional, 
state, territory and federal levels. Power, authority, resources and decision-making 
are distributed unevenly across these layers of the governance environment. What 
is the position of Indigenous organisations and communities within this wider 
governance environment? What are the influential relationships, networks, 
organisations, agents and stakeholders which have an impact upon local 
Indigenous governance arrangements? Do they support or hinder community 
governance? Do Indigenous groups and organisations have mechanisms for 
managing those impacts, and for resolving conflict with external entities?  
How does the ‘governance of governments’ affect Indigenous governance 
arrangements on the ground? For example, what is the nature and impact of 
state/territory and federal government policy and funding frameworks? What is 
the relationship between government service delivery arrangements, and the 
effectiveness of community governance? Do governments have ‘downward’ 
accountability, communication and agreement-making mechanisms which support 
Indigenous governance-building on the ground? Are there government policy, 
funding and service delivery frameworks which might better support Indigenous 
governance initiatives? 
(i)  Effectiveness of governance. A central research issue concerns the effectiveness of 
governance arrangements in meeting Indigenous peoples’ objectives, in 
facilitating representation, participation and legitimacy, and in meeting external 
demands. How can the effectiveness of Indigenous governance be evaluated? 
What might constitute valid and meaningful measures (qualitative and 
quantitative), and from whose perspective?  
The following questions are examples of this issue. Is the governing body an 
effective deliverer of services to its constituents? Has it contributed to improving 
social, economic, and cultural resources and outcomes for its constituents? How 
effectively does it obtain and use government funds, and use its own resources? 
What is the breadth of ownership, commitment and responsibility throughout the 
organisation? Has it played a significant role in changes (positive or negative) to 
local or regional control over resources, and in strategic decisions? Do members of 
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the community view the governing body as an effective vehicle for community 
management and self-determination? Are there differences between the internal 
and external perceptions of effectiveness? Are some governance structures and 
processes more effective in some places, or for certain functions, than others? And 
what are the ‘costs’ to communities of ‘ineffective’ governance? 
(j)  Governance capacity development. A central hypothesis here is that building and 
sustaining strong, legitimate Indigenous governance needs to be founded on both 
clear power authority and practical capability. The first requirement raises issues 
of jurisdictional devolution and resourcing. The second involves developing the 
human, institutional, organisational and resource capacities of Indigenous groups 
for genuine self-determination. This will require a long-term commitment to 
community development for governance.  
What do the terms ‘capacity-development for governance’ and ‘governance 
building’ mean? What kinds of powers and responsibilities, jurisdiction, and 
resources are required to support Indigenous governance-building initiatives? 
What community skills and assets are already available and required to support the 
process? How can these be strategically mobilised? If the critical community and 
regional capacities for governance are not well-developed, how can they be? And 
how is governance to be conducted in the meantime? What tangible commitments 
and policy approaches are required from governments, non-government 
organisations (NGOs), and the private sector in order to support governance-
building at the local level?  
Where are innovative experiments in local and regional governance happening? 
Are there broad principles of Indigenous governance which might have relevance 
for application by different types of communities and cultural circumstances? 
How can these principles and lessons assist other communities, organisations, 
leaders and policy makers in their efforts to support Indigenous governance-
building? 
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The Methodological Framework 
The underlying concerns 
The methodological framework is designed to promote research that meets 
community-based, scholarly and policy concerns.  
On the scholarly side, Project researchers are interested in understanding how 
Indigenous governance operates in all its diversity at the local level—its cultural 
foundations and principles, what is working, what is not, and why. One goal is to instil 
greater analytical rigour and content into academic and public debate in Australia. The 
research team wants to better understand the relationship between the effectiveness of 
governing arrangements in communities and issues of institutional form, scale, power, 
autonomy, legitimacy, representation, and accountability.  
On the policy side, the methodological approach is based on the conviction that high-
quality research can have significant value to Indigenous agencies and governments 
concerned with supporting community ‘governance building’. A comparative approach 
forms the basis of the Project methodology. This should enable broad principles and 
transferable lessons to be identified, which may in turn inform the development of more 
enabling government policy and service delivery frameworks. 
On the community side, the project is applied and collaborative—it aims to make 
research ‘count’ on the ground. The methodological framework is designed to support a 
collaborative community-based approach which includes working with and training 
(where appropriate) community researchers. The Project will work on practical 
initiatives with organisations and leaders to identify the shortfalls and assets in 
governance power, resources and capabilities, and to identify successful experiences for 
wider dissemination.  
Indigenous collaboration and action research 
The researchers and partners in the ICG Project are sensitive to the history of western 
research, whereby research sometimes became an adjunct of colonisation, with little 
knowledge exchange or consideration of local capability-development. This has served 
to marginalise local Indigenous knowledge by external parties controlling, defining and 
thus owning it.  
The impact on Indigenous peoples of this epistemological paradigm has been 
discussed by several scholars (Arbon 1992; Bin-Sallik 1990; Rigney 1997; Taylor 2005; 
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Tuhawa‘i-Smith 2001). The innovative methodology designed for the ICG Project 
recognises this history and attempts to implement an alternative approach—namely, a 
collaborative research partnership at the local level, which makes a practical 
contribution.  
A core component of the research methodology is Indigenous collaboration and 
participation. This goes beyond consultation, where Indigenous community members 
and leaders are merely the informants. For the purposes of the Project, ‘participation’ is 
defined as the mobilisation of individuals, families, groups, and representative 
community organisations to take an active role in the planning, conduct and application 
of the research being carried out in their community (Rahnema 1999; Rifkin 1986). In 
the Project, participating organisations and groups are research partners and research 
facilitators, driving the specific research questions that are relevant to their particular 
community and region. Project researchers are also collaborating with individual 
Indigenous research counterparts, who are working as co-authors on surveys as linguists 
and interpreters, and in the documentation and analysis of data. 
This does not discount a key element of the ICG Project’s research agenda that seeks 
hard, independent baseline data across field sites for comparative purposes, and to 
generate broad principles of governance across communities. The collaborative 
framework for the research asks the partners to work together in an ongoing discussion 
about the local research agenda, about what kinds of data are needed, how that data can 
best be obtained, about ownership of data, and how application of research findings can 
add value to local governance initiatives. The engagement of Indigenous collaborators 
in defining the research issues in each case study acknowledges the critical importance 
of Indigenous people exercising their authority to make decisions and develop solutions.  
The ICG Project Advisory Committee adds another dimension to the research 
partnership. Indigenous members of the Committee provide strong guidance for the 
overall research direction and key research questions. They also act as advocates of 
Indigenous governance initiatives, and of the Project research findings with 
governments and communities. 
The iterative research approach to engaging Indigenous collaborators is informed by 
international approaches to social and community development, the basic purpose of 
which is to enlarge people’s choices and empowerment. Fundamental to this is building 
human capabilities—the range of things that people can do, or be, in life. One of the 
most basic of these capabilities is to be able to participate in the life of the community 
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in all its diverse forms. In this sense, effective community participation ultimately 
underpins effective Indigenous governance. The Project aims to add value locally 
through such a collaborative and practical research partnership.  
Key components of the methodology 
To meet these fairly ambitious goals, the ICG Project has created an overarching 
methodological framework to provide common guidance to all researchers.  
The framework has the following key components: 
(a)  Case studies of participating Indigenous communities and organisations. These 
will be undertaken in a sample of different ‘types’ of Indigenous ‘communities’ in 
urban, rural and remote locations. Researchers will work with the same 
communities and organisations over several years so that the dynamic and unique 
aspects of local governance can be documented over time. 
(b)  Case studies of the ‘governance environment’. A sub-set of case studies will focus 
more widely on the governance environment of particular communities and their 
organisations. These will identify key players, factors and relationships which 
impinge directly on Indigenous governance legitimacy, effectiveness and 
outcomes. 
(c)  Case studies of the ‘governance of government’. A sub-set of case studies will 
focus on the changing policy, service delivery and funding strategies operating 
across different levels of government. The goals and rationale of strategies which 
target Indigenous governance will be analysed and their impacts on the ground 
investigated.  
(d)  Comparative analysis of the case studies. This will be based on a set of core 
research questions and issues. This will enable the Project to test the hypotheses 
identified above, and to generate insights into the general principles and factors at 
work in contemporary Indigenous governance.  
(e)  Identifying and testing meaningful criteria and principles for evaluating what 
constitutes ‘effective/ineffective’, ‘poor’, ‘good’, and ‘legitimate’ Indigenous 
governance in Australia. 
(f)  Identifying innovative practice and transferable lessons to be disseminated widely 
to Indigenous communities and others.  
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(g)  A community research collaboration strategy. This aims to engage Indigenous 
organisations and community residents as active researchers in the case studies. 
(h)  A communication and reporting strategy. This is designed to disseminate the 
research findings within communities, to governing bodies and leaders; as well as 
to government policy makers, service deliverers, and other researchers. 
To support these components of the methodology, the ICG Project has built up a 
multi-disciplinary team, bringing together researchers with professional expertise in 
political science, anthropology, demography, geography, development studies, and 
economics. Project researchers will work alongside community research collaborators 
with expertise in local culture, business development, social organisation, language, 
history and local politics.  
The research techniques 
The ICG Project’s empirical tools need to be flexible to suit different community 
environments and research foci, while at the same time enabling valid comparative 
analysis and the generation of policy and practical conclusions. 
In order to deliver on the Project’s multiple aims, a variety of research techniques are 
being employed by researchers, including:  
(a)  Data review, consolidation and analysis. This involves the collation of available 
community and regional demographic and socioeconomic indicator data. These 
profiles will provide an information baseline for analyses over subsequent years. 
(b)  Mapping the governance environment. This involves the identification of the 
surrounding organisations and agents (Indigenous, non-Indigenous, government, 
private sector, NGOs) within which community governing bodies operate, and the 
cross-cutting relationships, powers, functions, networks and alliances creating that 
environment. 
(c)  Ethnographic techniques. These include participation observation, language 
analysis, documentation of decision-making and other governance events, 
structural and institutional analysis. These will be used to document the culturally-
based Indigenous concepts, world views, norms, behaviours, relationships and 
gender issues underlying Indigenous systems of governance and contemporary 
governance practice. These techniques emphasise an emic approach (i.e., looking 
at things from the point of view and values of a range of ‘insiders’). These same 
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ethnographic techniques will also be employed to document the cultural values, 
logic, behaviour and language of ‘insiders’ within government. 
(d)  Governance histories. These will be recorded for key governing bodies and 
communities, and will include timelines and influential individuals and events 
(statutory, political, cultural, leadership, strategic and developmental). 
(e)  Governance profiles of organisations. These will uniformly document the goals, 
structures, institutions, functions and operation, corporate dimension, decision-
making, accountability and representation processes, planning and outcomes for 
individual organisations. 
(f)  Leadership life histories. These will track individual leaders’ development, 
experiences and roles (for both men and women); identify individual ideas and 
practices of leadership; and document the impact of changes in leadership and 
succession on the life cycles of organisations and their governance effectiveness. 
(g)  Governance strategic risk assessment. This tool will map the governance assets, 
resources and capabilities that are available and being exercised, and any 
shortfalls; the internal and external priorities and demands; and the fit between an 
organisation’s strategic goals and its governance capacities. It will facilitate the 
generation of potential criteria of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘legitimacy’ (elaborating 
both Indigenous and non-Indigenous views). 
(h)  Policy and service delivery assessment. This maps the goals, logic and 
implementation of government policy and service delivery frameworks. It will 
facilitate assessment of the extent to which frameworks facilitate or impede the 
development of effective, legitimate governance. 
(i)  The Research Field Manual. This provides researchers with a checklist of common 
issues and broad questions about Indigenous governance. All Project researchers 
will investigate these common issues. The manual will enable a more uniform, 
consistent approach to the collection of core governance data, and provide the 
basis for the comparative analysis of issues across all participating communities. 
(j)  Field interviews. Informal interviews will be carried out with the wide range of 
people involved with, served by, or supporting community governing bodies, and 
will include people involved in the wider ‘governance environment’ at regional, 
state, territory and national levels. 
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(k)  Small-group surveys, community meetings and focus groups. These techniques 
will elicit local perceptions, views, and solutions about governance arrangements. 
Governance—A Concept in Need of Critical Investigation 
The many meanings of ‘governance’ 
The etymology of the term ‘governance’ can be traced to the classical Latin and 
ancient Greek words for the ‘helmsman’ and the ‘steering of boats’. Over time this 
meaning has been applied to societies and political systems where it has been defined as 
the ‘art of steering societies and organisations’.  
The search for a clearly articulated concept of ‘governance’ has only recently begun 
in Australia. While the term has rapidly transferred into bureaucratic thinking, 
government policy making, service delivery, and Indigenous political agenda, there is a 
lack of critical analyses and hard evidence about it, and confusion over its actual 
meaning. Unrealistic expectations are being generated that ‘governance’ will be the 
‘quick fix’ for all problems at the community level. Some stakeholders expect improved 
service delivery and local accountability, while ignoring the issues of jurisdictional 
power and self-determination. As a result, there is something of a fashionable backlash, 
with the term being described as a ‘buzzword’ or little more than ‘pouring old wine into 
a new bottle’. It is a cause for concern that these varied views are becoming entrenched 
without sufficient Australian content having been applied to the concept.  
The term ‘governance’ has been in common use in the world of international aid, 
banking, and third-world development for some time. In this context it has become 
synonymous with western democratic, neo-liberal ideas of what is supposed to 
constitute ‘good’ governance. Today, the concept is ‘used by groups with very different 
ideological persuasions, for a number of different and often contradictory ends’ (de 
Alcantara 1998: 106).  
There have been numerous definitions and approaches to governance, which are 
usefully reviewed by Kooiman (2003). However, to date, there are only a few field 
research case studies focused on the concept of ‘Indigenous governance’ (see Cornell et 
al. 2000; de Alcantara 1998; Dodson and Smith 2003; Hylton 1999; Jones 2002; Kalt 
1996; Plumptre & Graham 19992). 
The ICG Project aims to investigate the concept under Australian conditions. To 
commence that process, some of the meanings of the term ‘governance’ already 
employed in the international arena are summarised below (see Kaufmann, Recanatini 
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& Biletsky 2002; Kooiman 2003; also Stoker 1998 for more detailed definitional 
analyses). 
(a) ‘Governance’ is not the same as ‘government’, although governance is certainly 
an aspect of how governments operate. Rather, the concept of governance blurs 
the boundaries between and within the public and private sectors (Stoker 1998). In 
politics, the concept of ‘government’ is usually predicated on some related 
concept of ‘the state’ and a degree of centralisation of power and decision-making. 
‘Governance’ focuses our attention outside the more formal realm of government, 
onto the wider set of actors and networks—those individuals, agents, 
organisations, private sector interests, and non-government organisations involved 
in delivering services, representing groups and negotiating resource allocation. 
The term ‘governance’ directs our attention to the interaction of self-organising 
networks at many different levels, and to the relative power and relationships 
between them, and between these networks and governments.  
The Institute of Governance (IOG) in Canada suggests that confusing the term 
‘governance’ with ‘government’ has constrained the way in which problems with 
policy and practice are conceived and addressed (Plumptre & Graham 1999). For 
example, the confusion in terminology leads to policy issues being defined 
implicitly as a problem of government, with the onus for fixing them seen to rest 
with the government. This can restrict the range of strategies that seem to be 
available to deal with problems—generating a ‘top-down’ approach to reform. In 
short, definitional confusion related to governance has important practical and 
political consequences. 
(b) Self-government and sovereignty. ‘Self-government’ is taken to mean having 
jurisdictional control and a mandate (i.e., having the constitutional or judicial 
right, power, and authority to administer the law by hearing and determining 
controversies, and by exercising those powers over the members of a group, its 
land and resources. ‘Governance’ is about having the processes and institutional 
capacity in place to be able to exercise that jurisdiction through sound decision-
making, representation and internal accountability (Sterritt 2002).  
‘Jurisdictional authority’ can be exercised over public institutions, territory, 
expenditure and revenue-raising capacity, and over policy and functional areas 
such as tax, law-making, health, education, housing, essential services, social 
security, and economic development. In Australia, Indigenous self-government is 
40  Theme 1 
absent as a unified cohesive form of jurisdictional authority (Sanders 2002; Smith 
2002). Nevertheless, Indigenous Australians involved in local government do have 
access to a form of jurisdiction. A number of commentators have also noted that 
there are jurisdictional aspects to the Indigenous rights and interest recognised 
under the Aboriginal Land Rights (NT) Act 1976 and Native Title Act 1993 (see 
Langton 2002; Pearson 1997; Reynolds 1998). In Australia, the policy of ‘self-
determination’ could have provided a foundation for self-regulating local 
governance. However, it appears to have been relegated to highly constrained 
forms of decision-making over discrete service delivery and administrative 
functions (Smith 2002). 
(c) Governance as the ‘minimal ‘state’. This use of the term ‘governance’ emphasises 
the potential for self-regulation in society, and for the establishment of systems of 
decentralised jurisdictions. Here the concept is used politically, to redefine and 
limit the potential scope and form of public intervention and action by the state. 
This meaning of the term is often employed in conjunction with the idea of 
‘participatory governance’ where a plurality of local actors and constituents 
engage more directly in the establishment and exercise of decentralised or 
dispersed governance. Often this is linked to the exercise of multi-level 
governance, and raises issues of subsidiarity and jurisdictional devolution (Smith 
2004; Westbury & Sanders 2000). 
(d) Corporate governance. Increasingly, the concept of governance is being used in 
new public management theories referring to private sector ways of operating in 
the public sector. The importance of corporate governance is often emphasised in 
these theories, referring to modalities of organisation and management of 
economic, statutory and administrative functions. In Australia, there has been a 
tendency to focus on this aspect of Indigenous governance. 
(e) Resource governance. An allied meaning is expressed in the term ‘resource 
governance’, referring to ‘the principles, institutions and practices a society and its 
members employ to use shared resources’ (Caulfield 2003: 121). This is an aspect 
of governance which has been reasonably well researched amongst some 
Indigenous Australian groups.  
(f) Global governance. More recently, with the creation of the European Economic 
Union and the establishment of free-trade agreements and other international 
conventions, there are issues of global governance in international relations. The 
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technological tools required for global governance (such as ‘eGovernance’ and 
telecommunications) are emerging as issues with implications at the sub-national, 
regional and community levels. 
(g) Indigenous governance. In recent times there has been a growing recognition of 
the specific qualities and conditions of Indigenous governance throughout the 
world. Innovative forms of governance are being designed and established by 
different Indigenous groups in many countries. These have been given impetus by 
land rights struggles, treaty negotiations, self-determination policies and 
legislation, and through arenas such as the United Nations World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples. Some contemporary international Indigenous governance 
arrangements have statutory and jurisdictional bases, although many do not. 
The commonalities underlying the different meanings  
The term ‘governance’ is multivalent—at times it is used as an analytic concept, a 
theoretical proposition, or a normative concept, to refer to a specific policy, a process, to 
structures, or to a political environment. But these different meanings and uses have 
important commonalities. In each, there is: 
• consideration of the main institutional spheres (the state, market, and community) 
as being interconnected, rather than neatly separated and spatialised; 
• a focus on the wider field of players and relationships, not simply on 
‘government’; 
• the idea of some form of cooperation as a mechanism of legitimisation and a 
guarantee of effectiveness; 
• the attention to concrete systems of action and decision making;  
• the foregrounding of power and choice;  
• the idea that governance effectiveness can be evaluated against benchmarks and 
principles; and 
• a slowly growing recognition that governance, and evaluations of its effectiveness, 
are the product of culturally-based values, systems and traditions. 
The ICG Project will explore the extent to which these commonalities inform the 
operation of Indigenous governance in Australia. 
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The normative dimension of governance 
The operation of governance has a direct impact on the wellbeing of individuals, 
groups and communities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the concept of ‘governance’ 
has increasingly been framed in terms of a normative assessment of its effectiveness. In 
other words, governance functionality is evaluated as ‘bad’, ‘good’, ‘effective’, 
‘ineffective’, ‘corrupt’ etc. The World Bank was an early international instigator of this 
approach, proposing universal indicators of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ governance which it used 
to evaluate the performance of third-world governments (World Bank 1994). 
The downside of that approach is that it promotes the term ‘governance’ as a tool for 
imposing western ideals of democracy, participation, representation and accountability. 
Those ideals are not easy for western democracies to attain, let alone societies with very 
different political and world views. In multi-cultural and minority populations, imposed 
concepts and processes of governance can have profound destructive consequences.  
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (n.d.) has developed the 
following set of principles for good governance which are claimed to have universal 
recognition, but which will have local solutions. 
(a)  Legitimacy and voice (or participation)—where all men and women should have a 
voice in decision-making either directly, or through the legitimate institutions that 
represent their intention. Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a 
broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the group. 
(b)  Fairness—where all men and women should have opportunities to maintain and 
improve their well-being, and have their human rights respected. Legal 
frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially. Everyone should be entitled 
to a hearing. 
(c)  Accountability—where decision-makers in government are accountable to their 
members, as well as to the public and institutional stakeholder. Governance 
processes, information and policies should be transparent (i.e., directly accessible 
to those concerned together with enough information to understand and monitor 
decision-making arrangements). 
(d)  Direction—where leaders and constituents have a broad and long-term perspective 
of their cultural, social and economic development and a sense of what is needed 
for such development. This strategic direction is developed with an understanding 
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of cultural and historical complexities. Governance-building is a journey requiring 
both short-term and long-term approaches. 
(e)  Performance—good governance systems produce goods, services and outcomes 
that meet the needs of their constituents. The institutions and processes of 
governance try to be responsive to constituents and stakeholders, and produce 
results while making the best use of resources. 
Importantly, governance is not culture-neutral. Assessments or principles of what 
constitutes ‘good’, ‘strong’ or ‘legitimate’ governance, ‘ineffective or ‘bad’ governance, 
are informed by culturally-based values and traditions. In other words, there are cultural 
determinants of leadership, of what constitutes representation, participation and 
accountability. The rule of law for Indigenous people is grounded in traditional law and 
values. There is a ‘two-way’ accountability for Indigenous organisations—internally to 
their members and community residents, and externally to government funding bodies. 
The IOG has argued that ‘there is plenty of room for different traditions and values to 
be accommodated in the definition of ‘good governance’ (IOG n.d.). If ‘good 
governance is about achieving desired results and achieving them in the right way’ 
(IOG n.d.), then the ‘right way’ is largely shaped by the cultural norms and values of the 
organisation or society.  
For Indigenous groups, however, their governance power and jurisdictional control is 
also subject to many external conditions imposed by the wider societies in which they 
live. The conditions for both poor and good governance can therefore be perpetuated 
from within and from without.  
Furthermore, a growing body of international research suggests that recognising the 
culturally-based parameters of good governance should not be taken as a bland 
acceptance of cultural relativism. There may be universal principles of ‘good’ 
governance that do apply across cultural boundaries (see IOG n.d.; Cornell et al. 2000; 
Cornell & Begay 2003; Dodson & Smith 2003; Sterritt 2002; UNDP n.d.). As a 
consequence, the question of ‘whose values and norms take precedence in determining 
what constitutes the ‘right way’ to govern?’ has become an area of considerable 
contestation. 
The attributes of strong Indigenous governance  
There is a small body of research in Australia that investigates the interaction 
between ‘traditional’ Indigenous and ‘settler society’ systems of governance
3
. More 
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recently, there has been a growing body of international evidence which identifies a set 
of prerequisite conditions needed for strong Indigenous governance in contemporary 
contexts. 
In a presentation to the first national Indigenous Governance Conference, convened 
by Reconciliation Australia in Canberra, Neil Sterritt (2001, 2002), a Gitxsan leader 
from Canada, characterised strong Indigenous governance as having four main 
attributes or dimensions: 
(a)  Legitimacy—the way structures of governance are created and leaders chosen, and 
the extent of constituents’ confidence in and support of them; 
(b)  Power—the extent of acknowledged legal, jurisdictional and cultural authority and 
capacity to make and exercise laws, resolve disputes and carry on public 
administration;  
(c)  Resources—the economic, cultural, human, technological and natural resources 
needed for the establishment and implementation of governance structures; and 
(d)  Accountability—the extent to which those in power must justify, substantiate and 
make known their actions and decisions.  
Evidence to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) in Canada 
suggests that these four attributes are expressed through First Nations institutions and 
processes such as the centrality of land, individual autonomy and shared responsibility, 
the role of women, the role of elders, the role of family and clan, leadership and 
traditional accountability, and consensus in decision-making (RCAP 1996). 
The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development (Cornell 1993; 
Cornell & Kalt 1995) identified a similar set of prerequisites to that of Sterritt. On the 
basis of long-term research amongst over 60 Native American Indian tribal 
governments in the United States of America, the Harvard project researchers identified 
three overarching preconditions for strong Indigenous governance: 
(a)  ‘De facto sovereignty’ or ‘self-rule’: genuine decision-making power where the 
tribal government effectively held the reins of power over strategic decisions, the 
allocation of resources, and related governing processes. 
(b)  Effective governing institutions: de facto sovereignty or decision-making power is 
not sufficient by itself. Groups must also be able to exercise their authority 
effectively. To do this they must be able to put in place non-politicised 
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representation and dispute-resolution mechanisms, constrain corruption and 
opportunistic behaviour by politicians and leaders, build capable bureaucracies, 
and so on. 
(c) ‘Cultural match’: for governing institutions to be effective, they must be legitimate 
in the eyes of the people they serve. To be legitimate they must wield power and 
authority in conformity to Indigenous conceptions, shared beliefs, and agreed 
rules. And importantly, the form those rules take must be based on Indigenous 
choice and informed consent. 
In summary, the available research proposes four preconditions for strong and 
effective Indigenous governance: 
(a)  power (de facto sovereignty or self-rule); 
(b)  resources; 
(c)  effective governing institutions and accountability; 
(d)  legitimacy and culture match. 
‘Poor’ governance, on the other hand, has been reported to be generally characterised 
by ‘corruption, favouritism, nepotism, apathy, neglect, red tape, selective representation, 
and self-serving political leaders and public officials’ (Knight et al. 2002). For 
Indigenous societies, ‘poor’ or ‘ineffective’ governance is likely to occur where some or 
all of these preconditions are missing, under-developed or ill-matched. 
These prerequisites for strong governance which have been identified in international 
Indigenous contexts, have implications for researching Indigenous Australian 
governance arrangements. For example, to what extent are such preconditions relevant 
here? What are the constraints on their growth amongst Indigenous Australian groups? 
What other attributes or conditions of governance might be locally relevant in 
Australia?  
This body of research conclusions and associated questions informs the research 
approach of the ICG Project. 
The ICG Project’s Approach to ‘Governance’ 
The ICG Project adopts the term ‘governance’ as a central concept that needs to be 
problematised and systematically investigated. The complexity of the term is difficult to 
capture in a simple definition. The Project has developed a preliminary operational 
definition that links its internal social dimensions to the wider political environment. 
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Governance as an internal process 
For the purposes of the ICG Project ‘governance’ means the dynamic processes, 
relationships, institutions and structures by which a group of people, community or 
society organises to collectively represent themselves, negotiate their rights and 
interests, and make decisions about: 
• how they are constituted as a group—who is the ‘self’ in self governance;  
• how they are going to manage their affairs and negotiate with outsiders; 
• who will have authority within their group, and about what; 
• what their agreed rules will be to ensure authority is exercised properly; 
• who will enforce the decisions they make;  
• how their decision-makers will be held accountable; and 
• what arrangements and entities will be the most effective for implementing their 
decisions and accomplishing their ends. 
Governance is as much about people, relationships and process, as it is about 
structures.  
Many small Indigenous groups have informal processes of governance which are not 
exercised through externalised organisations. But if a group of people is too large to 
make all the necessary decisions, they may create organisational structures, hierarchical 
systems or other arrangements to facilitate decision making. This might include 
delegating some areas of decision-making and responsibilities to an entity, whilst 
retaining other aspects of governance under their immediate social control.  
From this definitional perspective, we can see that Indigenous community councils 
and organisations have governance; extended Indigenous families and clans have 
governance systems; Indigenous law and ceremony is about governance; local 
community health clinics and stores have governance; homeland associations, women’s 
councils and land councils have governance; native title claimant groups and traditional 
owners have governance; and Indigenous businesses and regional service delivery 
organisations have governance.  
The ICG Project places this definition of governance within a political context. 
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Fig. 1: The concept of governance. 
Governance is about power 
Social systems, groups and organisations do not exist in isolation. In every society, 
power and control are distributed across many layers and multiple actors. Some of those 
individuals and groups are more powerful than others. The uneven dispersal of power 
involves jurisdictional, statutory, historical, human rights, resource, capacity, age and 
gender dimensions.  
In other words, the governance of an organisation or group of people involves 
addressing influential factors that have their source in the wider governance 
environment, not just within its own internal arrangements. 
Fundamentally governance is about power, jurisdiction, control and choice—its 
about the relative scope and extent of power, who has influence, who makes the 
decisions and ‘calls the shots’, and how decision-makers are held accountable, both 
internally and externally (Plumptre & Graham 1999).  
Western models of the state usually assign governments superordinate public power 
and jurisdiction within a territorial boundary. In Australia, Indigenous systems of 
governance have their own political processes, and Indigenous groups have sought to 
negotiate a space for these within the complex jurisdictions of federalism. 
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The Project aims to investigate the wider dimensions of power, legitimacy, resources 
and accountability at work in the exercise of Indigenous governance (Fig. 1). 
Governance ‘institutions’ and ‘organisations’ 
Governance processes are exercised through organisations and institutions. The ICG 
Project adapts a widely-used definition of the term ‘institution’ provided in Cheema 
(1997): 
Institutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and 
activities that provide stability and meaning to social [cultural and political] 
behaviour (Cheema 1997: 13). 
Cornell (2002) describes institutions as the ‘rules of the game’; ‘the way things are, 
and are to be done’. Examples of institutions include the legal and judicial system, 
political systems, constitutions, policies, regulations, taboos, kinship systems, 
behavioural and gender norms, religious beliefs, and ceremonial systems and values.  
Institutions are often longer-lasting and more influential on people’s behaviour than 
organisations. They are especially influential in determining the extent to which the 
organisation of governance is judged to be proper and legitimate. 
‘Organisations’ … ‘are composed of groups of individuals who come together 
to pursue agreed objectives that would otherwise be unattainable, or that 
would be attainable but only with significantly reduced efficiency and 
effectiveness’ (Cheema 1997: 14). 
Formal organisations are structured, meaning that they involve a division of labour, 
and the allocation of functions and resources into different units of different size, 
composition and hierarchical order. 
The ICG Project approach to governance encompasses both its institutional and 
organisational dimensions, and how these are reproduced and given legitimacy within 
different cultural systems. 
The ‘governance environment’ and ‘subsidiarity’ 
The concept of the governance environment refers to the aggregate of surrounding 
things, agents, conditions, influences, networks and relationships within which 
Indigenous governance arrangements operate. Indigenous governance can be said to 
operate not only within a community governance environment, but also within a wider 
  
49 Methodological and Conceptual Framework 
regional governance environment and, in turn, within State and Federal governance 
environments.  
The principle of subsidiarity is used to capture the nature of the relationships 
between the layers of the governance environment. Subsidiarity means that particular 
issues, functions and procedures should be handled by the most competent and 
appropriate authority available (Smith 2004: 17). This means, for example, that no 
higher centralised level or scale of political aggregation should undertake functions or 
tasks which can be performed more effectively at an immediate or local level. 
Conversely, centralised forms of government should undertake initiatives which exceed 
the capacity of individuals or communities acting independently. Subsidiarity is ideally, 
or in principle, one of the features of Australian federalism. 
Subsidiarity also informs Indigenous Australians’ traditional governance 
arrangements. In Indigenous societies, different forms of power, authority and decision-
making are dispersed across social, gender, age, religious, land-owning and political 
categories. Individuals and groups negotiate their governance arrangements across these 
complex sets of overlapping rights, interests and alliances.  
(a) At the community level.  
Extended families form the backbone of communities. They are not simply visible as 
domestic and economic units, but are also ‘families of polity’—that is, jural constructs 
of ‘enduring and central importance to the conduct of Aboriginal business’ (Sutton 
1998: 60).  
The governance ‘business’ of extended families includes the transmission of land 
ownership, leadership, cultural property rights, group knowledge and collective identity. 
The senior members of some extended families are closely identified with the 
establishment and operation of incorporated community organisations, thereby linking 
familial descent-group identity to organisational identities and political representation.  
In other words, extended families not only have a form of internal governance, they 
also permeate other layers and aggregations of governance at the community level. 
Some Indigenous community organisations have jurisdictional status as forms of local 
government under state or territory legislation. Others operate under different statutory 
program frameworks established to facilitate the delivery of a range of services.  
The result is that communities have different layers of formal and informal 
governance arrangements, representing sometimes distinct, sometimes overlapping 
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constituencies. The efflorescence of community organisations owes much to Indigenous 
preference for highly localised forms of representation, but arguably a negative impact 
has been to distort the already fragmented polity that characterises traditional 
Indigenous governance systems (Pearson 1997; Yu 2002). 
(b) At the regional level. 
This complex picture of community governance is situated within a wider regional 
environment that consists of other communities, organisations, agencies and actors. 
These have different program, financial, service delivery, social and developmental 
links into communities. Some have offices and agents located within major ‘hub’ 
communities. Others have officers who travel to communities for visits and meetings. 
Some implement services and program funding according to state and federal 
government policies. Others deliver regionally customised services to communities.  
Families from particular communities are often related to families in other 
communities, forming regional networks. Larger clan groups and ‘companies’ of related 
groups also mobilise themselves regionally for ceremony, trade, funerals, and 
negotiations at regional levels (see Ah Kit 2003; Morphy 1999). Some senior 
community residents are also members of the governing boards of influential regional 
organisations (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous). These connections and 
relationships create a complex genealogy of governance between families, groups, 
communities and regions (Smith 2004: 17–8). 
(c) At the State and Federal levels.  
Indigenous community governance is directly affected by state and territory 
jurisdictional and administrative boundaries, and by different government statutory and 
policy frameworks. Services are delivered by a multiplicity of government departments, 
delivering a range of programs into communities which often overlap but are tied to 
separate funding and reporting arrangements. The ‘state’, in the form of territory, state 
and federal governments, is tangibly present on the ground—in the form of government 
officers, agency offices, and often through direct program and funding delivery to 
community organisations.  
The consequence for community-based governance is that organisations are linked to 
programs, policies and funding arrangements administered by multiple government 
departments which retain financial authority, and determine accountability conditions 
and implementation. In 1997 for example, Queensland’s Joint Committee of Public 
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Accounts (JCPA) reviewed the financial accountability requirements for Indigenous 
Community Councils in that state, and reported that some Councils had to deal with 
upwards of 40–50 different grants (JCPA 1997: 27; see also Australia Institute 2000). 
In reality these layers are not neatly bounded, exclusive environments. Rather they 
are permeable and penetrate each other. Actors and organisations are networked into 
webs of cross-cutting relationships, alliances and opposition. Some decision-making 
processes and systems of representation extend across the layers. Accordingly, it is 
more accurate to speak of an overarching ‘governance environment’ with fluid, 
interacting dimensions. This wider governance environment affects the operation of 
community organisations on a daily basis, and poses substantial challenges for 
Indigenous governance at the local level. The ICG Project aims to map out the 
dimensions and connections within the governance environment, and investigate its 
impacts on community governance. 
Governance evolves 
Governance is not static. Every society has a right to change—to develop its 
institutions, values and rules in a manner it regards as internally legitimate, and to do so 
according to its own informed choice. Governance arrangements need to evolve to meet 
changing conditions and challenges; whether internally or externally instigated.  
Building governance is essentially a developmental issue; it is about institution 
building, and mobilising the leadership, knowledge, skills and resources of a group of 
people. What appears to matter for outcomes from ‘governance building’ is that it is 
under Indigenous control, and is a product of informed Indigenous choice and design. 
Legitimacy and culture match 
Governance is a product of culture—different societies build different systems of 
governance.  
When systems of governance interact, competing values and expectations arise. A 
central focus of the Project methodology is the investigation and analysis of Indigenous 
principles, values and concepts underlying their systems of governance. Indigenous 
people are designing and testing different organisational models to represent their rights 
and inertest within the wider governance environment, and in doing so are having to 
consider questions of legitimacy and cultural match.  
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The concept of ‘cultural match’ has recently been introduced into Australian debates 
by the Harvard Project research team (see Cornell 1993, 2002; Begay, Cornell & Kalt 
1998; Kalt 1996). It has found both resonance and resistance in Australian debates about 
the complex issues of legitimacy, culture, and power relations.  
According to the Harvard team, cultural match means institutions that: 
… embody values that Indigenous peoples feel are important; reflect their 
contemporary conceptions of how authority should be organised and 
exercised; are generated through Indigenous efforts; and therefore have the 
support of those they govern …  
It is not an appeal to tradition; it is an appeal for legitimacy … In some cases, this 
may mean Indigenous communities have to rethink their ideas of how to govern and 
invent new ways that better meet their needs … What matters is not that things be done 
in the old ways. It is that things be done in ways—old or new—that win the support, 
participation and trust of the people, and can get things done. Some will be old. Some 
will be new (Cornell & Begay 2003: PowerPoint presentation; author’s italics). 
Sterritt (2002) characterised ‘legitimacy’ as consisting of the way structures of 
governance are created and chosen, and the extent of constituents’ confidence in and 
support of them. Clearly, amongst Indigenous groups, legitimacy will depend on the 
whether a cultural match has been achieved. But legitimacy also has external 
dimensions. It can be undermined or endorsed according to the extent to which those in 
power must justify and make known their actions to those ‘outside’ (Coles 1999, 2004; 
Martin & Finlayson 1996). 
For Indigenous groups, legitimacy will require the design of inter-cultural 
institutions, based on a ‘two way process of adaptation and innovation’ (Smith 2004: 
26). It will be derived from two authorising environments—that is, from the Indigenous 
and the non-Indigenous systems of governance in which community organisations are 
immersed. In other words, an organisation must not only have a cultural mandate and 
support, it must also be able to get the job done. 
The relevance of cultural match in Australia 
The concept of ‘cultural match’ is poorly understood in Australia, and its potential 
usefulness in local conditions has received only preliminary attention (see Martin 2004; 
Martin & Finlayson 1996; Smith 2004; Westbury & Sanders 2000).  
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The Harvard research has been undertaken primarily with Native American Indian 
populations whose reservations are largely culturally homogeneous (although there are 
some Indian nations who have been forced to live and work together on the same 
reservation lands). ‘Cultural match’ in the Australian context will need to address 
significantly different cultural, political and historical contexts to those in the United 
States of America. Indigenous Australian communities are more culturally 
heterogeneous in their residential populations than many Native American Indian 
reservation groups and New Zealand Maori. There may be more relevant parallels to be 
found with some Canadian and Alaskan communities, where there are similar ‘multi-
layered sets of institutions in which decision-making power, governing functions and 
economic activities are dispersed among diverse entities’ (Cornell et al. 2000: 6).  
There are a number of factors to be considered. Importantly, culture match is not a 
matter of force-fitting one system or structure of governance into another. Nor is it the 
same as being ‘culturally appropriate’. It will not be achieved by trying to resurrect a 
romanticised vision of past governance. There may be aspects of Indigenous culture that 
are not amenable to, or easily integrated into the ‘culture’ of western corporate 
governance. Democratic principles of representation and participation, which emphasise 
the individual over the collective do not resonate well with Indigenous concepts of 
social and territorial organisation (see Martin & Finlayson 1996; Rowse 2001; Smith 
1976).  
In Australia, early colonial officials, researchers and commentators attempted to 
‘force-fit’ the relatively fluid systems of Indigenous governance into formal structures 
based on Victorian English social-evolutionist concepts of government and law. Under 
that prevailing thinking, Indigenous Australian societies were characterised as being at 
the lowest point of civilisation, entirely lacking in law and order, leaders, systems of 
arbitration and dispute resolution, land ownership and so on (see Smith 1976). They 
were effectively consigned to the governance equivalence of terra nullius. Not 
surprisingly, Indigenous groups rarely regarded the foreign structures and concepts of 
governance imposed by the British colonists as being legitimate. 
Today, a wealth of Australian research can be analysed to reveal several core 
principles of Indigenous systems of governance. These can be summarised as follows: 
• inalienable traditional jurisdiction over land, resources and cultural property; 
• a cultural geography of governance—evident in territorial, political and 
ceremonial communities; 
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• spiritually-based system of law and authority—no separation between religion and 
governance; 
• a dispersed, fragmented polity—informed by a subsidiarity of power, authority, 
and decision-making; 
• dispersed accountability—with both collective and individual dimensions; 
• collective resource governance—linked to systems of law and subsidiarity; 
• flexible processes of aggregation and disaggregation of scale (people and 
territory); 
• hierarchically-based authority and knowledge systems—with controlled 
acquisition and dissemination of information; 
• asymmetrical age- and gender-based participation and authority;  
• a localised focus on extended families of polity—with overlapping networks, 
rights, interest and responsibilities; 
• a ‘relational autonomy’ of governance—where demands of kin relatedness versus 
personal and group autonomy are in dialectic tension; 
• leadership as stewardship and context specific—emphasising a processual and 
relational approach to politics; 
• consensual decision-making—evolutionary and open-ended; and 
• institutions based on the value of ‘radical conservatism’—where innovation and 
creativity are couched in terms of continuity and religious agency. 
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Fig. 2: Indigenous community organisations—Inter-cultural brokers with different 
authorising environments. 
 
 
Today, Indigenous governance in Australia is the product of attempts to mesh these 
culturally-based guiding principles, with the need for organisational structures that 
deliver services, administer programs and grants, and satisfy external demands for 
financial accountability. Most Indigenous organisations operate as inter-cultural brokers 
and look to two different authorising environments (Fig. 2). 
The bottom line for Indigenous governance is the need to create both culturally-
legitimate and practical arrangements. Getting to a cultural match that has both internal 
and external legitimacy is not easy. It will require time, hard-headed decisions, and will 
not come about through externally imposed solutions. Initial models will need to be 
monitored and refined over time.  
The ICG Project’s focus on detailed case study research and comparative analysis 
will encourage a more systematic exploration of the process and models emerging. 
Governance—an organising perspective 
The concept of governance pinpoints some important historical and contemporary 
issues facing Indigenous Australians, issues which until now have been tackled in a 
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piecemeal manner. There has been considerable research and policy consideration of 
issues such as Indigenous community financial management, the role of community 
boards and committees, corporate practice, the role of traditional law, political 
representation, accountability, property rights, funding mechanisms, resource 
management, service delivery, enterprise development, and so on. More often than not, 
these have been treated as largely disconnected matters, or as location-specific 
conclusions, when in fact they are inter-related aspects of the much bigger governance 
picture.  
The concept of governance could provide us with a valuable organising perspective, 
or frame of reference for bringing together related issues into a more cohesive, 
insightful analysis providing it is given some research rigour (see Judge, Stoker & 
Wolman 1995; Stoker 1998).  
The value of the concept in Australia derives from its focus on the wider field of 
players in the ‘governance environment’, not simply on ‘government’. It emphasises 
that the main institutional spheres (e.g. state, market and community) are 
interconnected, not neatly separated. It enables us to think holistically about the nature 
and impact of the wider governance environment on the everyday operation of 
community governance.  
Used rigorously, the concept of governance should assist practical action, precisely 
because it integrates within a single analytic framework what were previously 
compartmentalised dimensions of Indigenous political life. Its power as a concept 
derives from its focus on issues of power and choice, and attention to concrete actions 
and decision-making events. It enables us to better explore the different cultural 
geographies of Indigenous identity, representation and authority. It encourages us to 
analyse the Australian complexities underlying the question: ‘Who constitutes the ‘self’ 
in Indigenous self-governance?’ 
Governance is useful as an organising perspective because it highlights the need for 
‘governments’ to develop a more integrated approach to their policy making, service 
delivery and funding roles in this wider field of governance. The concept prompts us to 
develop a policy-relevant language with which to discuss community and regional 
governance. It also focuses on methods of evaluating the quality of governance and the 
need to design relevant indicators or measures of effectiveness and legitimacy. The 
concept of governance affords a connection between theoretical propositions about 
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inherent rights to self-determination, and the hard practice of achieving it in workable 
form on the ground. 
Assessing Governance 
One of the aims of the ICG Project is to investigate what constitutes effective and 
legitimate governance. The issue is fraught with problems of interpretation and practical 
implementation. There are many different meanings given to the concept of governance, 
and different modes of discourse about it, often using incommensurable language. 
Alongside the policy discourse about governance, there is a statutory, corporate, 
management, and Indigenous discourse—each with its own logic, principles and 
criteria. When these discourses about governance engage, competing views and 
priorities quickly emerge. 
Just as governance is a culturally-based concept, so too are the criteria, indicators and 
measures of what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘poor’ governance. However, a growing body 
of international research also warns that recognising cultural difference should not be 
reduced to a crass cultural relativism—there may be universal principles of good 
governance that apply across all societies; albeit with local solutions. 
Many Indigenous organisations now have a sense that governance matters, and 
especially the significant ramifications of poor governance. Some organisations are 
starting to evaluate their own arrangements and performance, but have trouble 
improving on their existing approach, and assessing the merits of their efforts and 
arrangements.  
Principles and indicators 
To assist these endeavours, the Project will investigate and test what might constitute 
meaningful and valid principles, or descriptors, of the quality of governance, in the hope 
that they might prove useful in governance capacity development. There is considerable 
international literature on methods of evaluating the quality of governance, and the 
validity, usefulness, and cultural relevance of indicators (Cheema 1997; Jabes 2002; 
Kaufmann, Recanatini & Biletsky 2002; Knack & Kugler 2002; World Bank various 
years).  
The ICG Project has drawn on this literature, but its methodological approach for 
assessing governance is based on the following important parameters in developing and 
using principles and criteria of good governance: 
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• they are not a magic checklist, but an ideal that people can work towards; 
• no society or government in the world has fully attained them; 
• they have important cultural foundations that will determine how they play out in 
practice; 
• they overlap and sometimes reinforce each other; 
• judgement and balance need to be used in their application; 
• they require both qualitative and quantitative evidence; 
• Indigenous and non-Indigenous views and expectations need to be investigated; 
and 
• practical, simple measures need to be identified that can be used by leaders, 
organisations and governments. 
With these parameters in mind, the Project proposes to focus on eliciting possible 
principles and criteria which capture the following key dimensions of governance, and 
provide a starting point for assessing governance in practice: 
(a)  Power—its scope and exercise; 
(b)  Cultural geography and legitimacy—how workable cultural legitimacy is 
designed, refined and sustained; 
(c)  Leadership—how leaders and decision-makers (male and female) are selected, 
monitored, held accountable and replaced; 
(d)  Decision-making—processes, consensus orientation, events and outcomes; 
(e)  Organisational performance—how governance structures and goals are established 
and reviewed, organisational capacity to formulate and deliver policies and 
services to meet need for transparency, and for stability, innovation and risk 
management; 
(f)  Strategic direction—how communities and organisations develop long-term 
perspective of their social, economic and cultural development along with a sense 
of what is needed for such development; 
(g)  Participation and voice—the extent of involvement in decision-making; the 
respect of Indigenous constituents and of the state, for Indigenous governance 
institutions;  
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(h)  Accountability—internal and external, including the control of corruption and 
rent-seeking behaviour; 
(i)  Resource governance—the extent and management of resources and economic 
development; 
(j)  The ‘governance of government’—government’s capacity to formulate and 
implement enabling policy and service delivery frameworks; funding mechanisms; 
downwards accountability; 
(k) The governance environment—the relationships with external parties, impact of 
wider regional, state and national environment; and 
(l)  Governance capacity development—processes for, relevance and outcomes. 
The diversity of Indigenous Australian culture, and the different historical, statutory 
and economic circumstances of communities, suggests there will not be a ‘one size fits 
all’ model of ‘good Indigenous governance’. At the same time, Indigenous Australians 
share many cultural traits, face common structural obstacles, and experience similar 
high levels of disadvantage. In other words, while the local solutions will be different, 
there might be common underlying guiding principles of how to build effective 
governance. This means that the different models of governance might all be assisted by 
identifying common underlying principles that are relevant in Australian conditions. 
The ICG Project’s Approach to ‘Community’ and ‘Regions’ 
Why focus on communities? 
In the absence of what Bern and Dodds (2000: 164) termed ‘a compelling model of 
political representation’ in Indigenous Australia, there continues to be heated debate 
amongst about who constitutes the ‘self’ in self-determination and governance at the 
local level. Suggestions range from individuals, to extended families, clans and 
collectivities of clans, geographically-based communities and their representative 
organisations, regional networks of organisations, and traditional alliances and 
networks. All these different units of governance have been developed and funded in 
Australia, but in a haphazard and poorly coordinated manner. As a consequence, 
competing representative voices have been created on the ground. 
For many reasons, Indigenous ‘communities’ are a logical starting point for thinking 
about the local practices and outcomes of Indigenous governance in Australia. There 
are, however, conceptual and analytic problems with term ‘community’. Many 
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geographically-based communities are artificial constructions of colonisation to which 
different Indigenous groups were sometimes forcibly relocated. Most are not culturally 
homogeneous or politically cohesive. Many communities are a complex mix of 
residents with different cultural and historical ties, and include traditional owners and 
claimants of the land on which the community has been physically built, people married 
to traditional owners, other Indigenous groups who have no land ownership ties but 
strong residential attachment to the place, and non-Indigenous residents. These groups 
have different, often overlapping rights and interests. High rates of mobility amongst 
some also make for a changing balance in the composition of communities. 
Indigenous issues of legitimacy and constituency can be highly fraught in such 
circumstances. The people identified as having the traditional ‘right’ to exercise 
authority (e.g. to ‘talk for’ land, to ‘speak for’ different family groups) may not be the 
same people who are the elected authorities representing a whole community. How 
leaders and organisations are to be held accountable by a mixed constituency poses 
considerable difficulties (see Ross 2003). Nevertheless, communities have also become, 
as Peters-Little (2000) writes, ‘an integral part of… people’s heritage and are 
fundamental to Aboriginality’. Many Indigenous Australians now identify their family 
ties, personal histories and political affiliations with individual communities, or 
regionally-linked communities. Certain families are now attached to particular 
community organisations. By these means, family and kinship institutions become 
entangled in community governance structures. 
Importantly, community populations (and therefore communities themselves) do not 
operate in isolation; they are enmeshed in wider regional networks and alliances. 
Regional representative organisations have been established on the bases of links 
between such connected communities. And major ‘hub’ communities have developed to 
deliver services to outlying smaller ‘satellite’ communities. Increasingly, smaller 
communities are facing funding and resource difficulties in sustaining separate systems 
of governance at a small scale.  
Indigenous leaders are increasingly questioning the scale at which governance can be 
effectively and legitimately developed. The ICG Project has decided to focus on 
systems of governance (both informal and formal) operating within ‘communities’, and 
on the wider governance environment (local, regional state and national) within which 
community governance operates. 
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A fundamental question for the Project has been how to approach the concept of 
‘community’ itself, given these historical and cultural complexities. A related issue has 
been how to establish a valid sample of ‘communities’ for the purposes of the research 
project. 
What is a community? 
The ICG Project defines a ‘community’ as a network of people and organisations 
linked together by a web of personal relationships, cultural and political connections 
and identities, networks of support, traditions and institutions, shared socioeconomic 
conditions or common understandings and interests.  
The term ‘community’ can therefore refer to: 
(a)  A discrete geographic location—comprising, for example, a spatial territory or 
residential location such as a neighbourhood, city, rural town or district, an 
outstation, or discrete remote settlement. 
(b)  A ‘community of interest’ or ‘community of identity’—comprising a network of 
people or organisations whose membership might be cultural or historical rather 
than geographic. For example, a clan, language group or urban group might be 
residentially dispersed but nevertheless share a strong collective identity and form 
a ‘community of identity’, as will a set of genealogically or ceremonially linked 
outstations which are spread out across a region. A voluntary collaboration or 
union, or a set of organisations which together represent the interests of a broad set 
of people, form what might be called a ‘community of interest’. 
(c)  A political, policy or administrative community—comprising, for example, a state 
authority or a federation; a service population or electoral ward, or a policy 
network of individuals. 
Communities are more than just residential locations, interpersonal networks, or 
collective identities. They take on social patterns, roles, functions and organisational 
structure (Loomis 2002; Sutton 1998), and assume particular forms through interaction 
with their constituent populations, other communities and the surrounding environment. 
Communities can be composed of diverse groups, competing interests and rights; but 
they can also be reasonably homogeneous.  
The ‘cultural geography of governance’ refers to these wider sociological aspects of 
‘community’. This term has been developed by the Project in order to widen our 
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research focus beyond the obvious geographic boundaries of discrete communities, to 
include the cultural units and more permeable social collectivities which are often 
viewed by Indigenous people as being the more legitimate bases for the ‘self’ in ‘self-
governance’. These cultural and social forms of Indigenous community are evident 
across remote, rural and urban locations. 
According to Community Housing and Infrastructure Needs Survey (CHINS) data, 
there are approximately 1,300 discrete Indigenous communities in Australia. Of these, 
80 are located within larger non-Indigenous population centres and the remainder are 
geographically separate from other population centres. Only 149 have a population of 
200 people or more (there are only 30 discrete Indigenous communities in Australia 
with populations over 500 people). The majority—close to 80 per cent—have 
populations of less than 50 people. Approximately one-third of Indigenous Australians 
live in remote or very remote locations in these discrete communities. The remainder 
are scattered across urban and metropolitan locations forming Indigenous ‘communities 
of identity’ (see Peters-Little 2000: 412; Sutton 1998). These urbanised and regionalised 
‘communities of identity’ retain strong cultural and historical identities. 
Arguments for collective self-governance are often felt to be most persuasive where 
Indigenous people are concentrated geographically (Hawkes 2001: 156). But these 
situations do not exhaust the realities and possibilities of governance in Australia. Other 
types of Indigenous ‘communities of identity’ have demonstrated the desire for 
devolved jurisdictions and greater self-rule for a membership which is not defined by 
residence in one location. 
The ICG Project aims to carry out research in a range of ‘community’ types in order 
to identify the diversity of governance arrangements which Indigenous people are 
designing and have established. This sampling of community types will also facilitate 
investigating what constitutes meaningful units, boundaries and assessments of 
governance under different conditions. 
The community case-study approach 
To obtain culturally-informed and accurate empirical data on these diverse aspects of 
Indigenous governance, the Project has adopted a case-study method, using a sample of 
community types.  
Case studies consist of field-based research in different types of communities, with a 
focus on key governing organisations and their cultural contexts. But certain case 
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studies will also focus in more detail on the relationships between community 
organisations in a regional context, and on case studies of government policy and 
service delivery frameworks. 
In-depth field research in several communities will enable Project researchers to: 
(a)  drill down and unpack specific governance histories and arrangements; 
(b)  investigate the commonalities and differences in governance on the ground; 
(c) focus on a particular aspect of governance that appears especially significant in 
one community (e.g. resource governance, leadership, law and order, regionalised 
governance, urban governance); and 
(d)  identify underlying attributes and influential causal factors.  
For that purpose, Project researchers will each carry out periods of fieldwork with 
the same community, over a two or three year period. Using an ethnographic case-study 
approach and a range of research techniques outlined earlier, a research baseline will be 
established in the first year which is ‘thick’ in description and understanding. This 
baseline will then be built on over subsequent years.  
There are a number of advantages in the case study approach. It enables researchers 
to focus on the micro-dimensions of governance, on its social and cultural processes, 
and on its actual practice, and thereby build a deeper understanding of a particular 
instance of governance (General Accounting Office 1990: 79). A case study conducted 
over the longer-term will provide greater assurance as to which factors have more 
traction in building effective governance. Important conditions, consequences and 
causal relationships are less likely to be overlooked when they have been widely 
canvassed with different groups and interests.  
Selection of community case studies for the Project has been determined by a 
combination of variables: 
(a) Community self-selection. Firstly, case-study research is time consuming and 
resource intensive. It needs significant engagement and support from community 
leaders and governing organisations, as well as from the researchers. Communities 
have to see, and receive, value from participating in the research. The success of 
the applied research rests on the active engagement and collaboration of 
communities and their leaders. The Project has therefore been responsive to 
community organisations and leaders who have expressed an interest in 
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participating in the Project over a period of time. To that extent, there is a degree 
of self-selection from communities themselves.  
Researchers have also had ongoing discussions about the research with 
community organisations and leaders, and have been negotiating permission, 
clearances, roles and responsibilities, and issues of confidentiality with them. This 
preliminary negotiation phase has been fundamental to the rest of the Project and 
could not be rushed. All Project researchers must have ethical clearance from their 
respective university research ethics committees, and the informed consent of 
participating community governing bodies before proceeding. 
(b)  Existing relationships with communities. Some Project researchers have long-
standing relationships with specific communities, organisations and leaders. Given 
that the research focuses on sensitive issues, the Project requires a high level of 
trust between researchers and community governing bodies. There are clear 
benefits in working with communities where researchers have already have built 
up relationships of trust and culturally-informed communication.  
There may be a ‘familiarity effect’ at work in such established relationships. This 
could promote a sampling bias, or a certain ‘protectiveness’ or blinkered view on 
the part of the researcher in their analysis. Overall, however, the potential 
methodological difficulties of ‘long familiarity’ are outweighed by the depth of 
knowledge, relationships and understanding which some Project researchers have 
with particular communities.  
(c)  Representative ‘types’ of communities. In order to fully explore the diversity of 
conditions of Indigenous governances, and generate broadly relevant research 
conclusions, the Project has sought to include a sample of community types. The 
communities included are ‘representative’ of particular political, economic, 
statutory and cultural conditions, and display important governance variations. 
Another variable considered in this sampling has been the need to include 
communities from remote, rural and urban locations in the sample.  
Communities participating in the research are representative of an important set of 
these variables. For example, case studies include communities: 
• that are urban ‘communities of identity’ (see above);  
• of different population size; 
• operating in a ‘hub and spokes’ or regionally-linked relationship;  
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• which are more and less culturally homogeneous;  
• with different land-tenures, and resource rights and interests;  
• which are representative of a ‘special governance interest’; such as local 
government or dispersed regionalism; 
• where organisations are long-established, or an emerging governance model;  
• where ‘extreme’ outcomes are evident; for example of both best- and worse-case 
practices; and 
• where the impact of the wider governance environment, and government policy 
and service delivery, are particularly evident. 
(d)  Advice and recommendation. Suggestions about potential community case studies 
were also provided by the Project’s research partners, by Indigenous leaders and 
organisations, and government officers.  
As a consequence of the considerations above, the Project currently anticipates 
working with several communities and organisations which have a range of 
characteristics, as indicated below:  
• Wadeye (Northern Territory)—large remote community and outstations; 
Aboriginal Northern Territory Land Trust; a new regional governance structure 
with jurisdiction as a local government; 
• Anmatjerre (Northern Territory)—small remote community and outlying camps; 
some Northern Territory Land Trust; Indigenous and non-Indigenous governance 
issues; 
• Yirrkala (Northern Territory)—well-established homelands and representative 
associations, large hub community and nearby mining town of Nhulunbuy; 
Aboriginal Northern Territory Land Trust; history of major political and 
governance initiatives; 
• Maningrida (Northern Territory)—large remote community; multiple influential 
representative organisations; large network of outstations; Aboriginal Northern 
Territory Land Trust; governance training established; 
• Fitzroy Crossing (Western Australia)—remote town; influential economic 
development organisations; culturally heterogenous; native title issues; 
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• Noongar (Western Australia)—metropolitan and rural town-based population; 
regionally dispersed community of identity; emerging regionalised governance 
arrangements; native title claim negotiations; 
• Wiluna—remote community; shire-based governance; major mining 
developments, major service delivery and community development issues; 
• Coen (Queensland)—rural town; shire council arrangements; developing 
Indigenous organisational bases for governance; native title and park management 
issues; 
• Newcastle (New South Wales)—metropolitan and regionally networked 
Indigenous population; major economic development initiatives; established 
organisations with stable governance arrangements; 
• Torres Strait Islands—regional authority governance; culturally-based island 
organisations; major cultural groupings; and 
• ‘Policy and administrative communities’—within the Western Australia, Northern 
Territory and Federal governments. 
The Comparative Framework for Analysis 
The main approach to researching Indigenous issues in Australia to date has been 
through case studies—usually as one-off exercises and from a single disciplinary 
perspective. Case-studies have tended to consist of in-depth fieldwork with a single 
community, a residential outlier or, more often, a sub-group within a community. There 
have been a few exceptions, where larger numbers of case studies have been undertaken 
under the umbrella of a single research project.  
However, while past research findings from detailed ethnographic case studies have 
often been insightful in regard to local issues, they have lacked comparative validity and 
broader application for policy purposes. The conclusions of research in one community 
or with one group are rarely seen to be relevant or valid for other types of communities 
and groups.  
The Project has therefore adopted a comparative methodological approach, in tandem 
with its case studies, in order to overcome the perceived limitations of the case-study 
approach for policy application. The conduct of multiple case studies will provide in-
depth description and analyses of important differences between Indigenous cultures 
across the country. However, a key hypothesis of the Project is that there are also 
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important common structural, political, cultural and economic conditions experienced 
by all Indigenous groups. A related hypothesis is that there might also be common 
underlying principles and criteria for building and assessing effective governance, and 
that these could be broadly relevant to all Indigenous governing bodies—no matter 
where they are located. Through a comparative approach, the Project aims to identify 
these underlying principles and extrapolate transferable lessons. 
The development of a comparative approach to analysis is particularly challenging in 
a governance environment that is as complex and diverse as that of Indigenous 
Australia. In order to promote a valid basis for comparison across communities, a field 
manual of core ‘headline’ dimensions and attributes of governance has been developed 
by the Project team. This field manual builds on Project researchers’ previous 
experience, and draws on the national and international literature. Each researcher will 
report annually on their findings. The field manual will probably be refined as the 
Project progresses.  
Each Project researcher will investigate the issues listed in the field manual, along 
with their own community-specific lines of inquiry. The purpose of the manual is to:  
(a)  facilitate the collection of information on a standard set of governance issues 
across different communities; 
(b) promote a reasonably consistent approach by researchers to identifying influential 
‘differences’ and commonalities’ in factors and conditions across those 
communities;  
(c) enable analysis of the extent to which there are shared causal relationships 
between different governance arrangements and development outcomes; and  
(d)  test possible valid benchmarks and principles of governance effectiveness. 
The field manual directs the collection of research data under the following headings 
(under each there are a subset of questions and issues): 
• the research process; 
• the conditions of community governance; 
• dimensions and impacts of the governance environment; 
• the dimensions of organisational governance; 
• governance concepts and perspectives in the community; 
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• scope of the organisations control and power; 
• leadership and succession; 
• who is the ‘self’ in community self-governance; 
• governance legitimacy; 
• relations with, and participation of members; 
• Institutional modes of governance; 
• corporate governance and decision making processes; 
• sources of conflict and dispute resolution; 
• organisational resources and socioeconomic development; 
• overall effectiveness and evaluation of governance; 
• governance capacity and development; 
• transferable lessons, principles and better-practice; and 
• implications for government policy, funding and service delivery. 
Research Dissemination 
Governance building is a formidable challenge. Comparative case study research 
offers a link between rigorous research analysis on the one hand, and the formulation of 
recommendations and options for practical follow up on the other. The ICG Project not 
only aims to undertake high-quality research—it aims to make the research ‘count’ by 
informing the work of Indigenous organisations, leaders and government agencies in 
their practical efforts to build more effective governance.  
To ensure the Project serves the needs of Indigenous communities on the ground, 
ICG Project researchers will undertake regular meetings and consultation with 
Indigenous leaders and organisations, other researchers, and senior government 
representatives. The guidance of the Project’s Advisory Committee is critical to these 
efforts. 
The Project intends to progressively disseminate its research findings in a range of 
accessible formats—to the participating Indigenous organisations, leaders, governments, 
research partners and other parties. Strategies for dissemination include not only written 
reports, but also face-to-face community meetings, briefings, workshops, and 
discussions. To facilitate this strategy: 
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(a) the Project has produced an information flier which provides an overview of the 
research process and contact details for researchers; 
(b)  CAEPR has devoted a section of its web page to the Project. This will enable 
people to access all Project publications and current news in one location; 
(c) a Community Governance Newsletter has been initiated to provide regular updates 
and ideas to participating communities and more widely. The Newsletter includes 
reports from community research collaborators and organisations; 
(d)  the Project publishes a series of ICG Project Papers which can be accessed on the 
CAEPR website. Published papers, reports and seminars prepared by the Project 
team will be made available in this manner; 
(e)  the Project team presents public seminars and papers, and conducts specialist 
workshops in communities and with other stakeholders; and 
(f) the Project regularly reports to its collaborating Indigenous organisations, to its 
international Advisory Committee and to its funding sponsors. 
Building ‘governance’ is essentially a developmental issue—it is not just about 
getting the structure right. The best research in the world will have little value on the 
ground unless there is a preparedness to commit to follow-up action by organisations, 
leaders and government agencies.  
A significant barrier in Australia is the lack of meaningful governance training and 
experienced trainers, and the lack of a developmental approach to ‘governance 
building’. Apart from the Australian Indigenous Leadership Centre, there is no national 
Indigenous organisation which delivers governance training and capacity building to 
communities and their organisations on the ground. There is no coordinated government 
approach to Indigenous governance training at either the national or state and territory 
levels. These are major gaps which will significantly hinder progress.  
Just as Indigenous capacity for governance is a critical issue, so too is the capacity of 
Australian governments to deliver coordinated policy, funding and program support that 
will support community efforts to build stronger governance. New approaches to 
Indigenous governance will require governments to re-think the way they carry out 
community development and capacity building for governance. 
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Notes: Paper 1 
1. While there are several excellent ethnographic accounts of Indigenous traditional 
governance systems operating in particular communities and regions, there are 
very few comparative studies (see, for example, Nettheim, Meyers & Craig 2002; 
Sullivan 1995; Wolfe 1989). 
2 See also papers from the ‘Building Effective Indigenous Governance’ conference 
held in November 2003 available from 
<http://www.governanceconference.nt.gov.au>. 
3 For Australia, see Berndt 1965; Hiatt 1986; Meggitt 1964; Myers 1986; Sharp 
1958; Stanner 1965; Sutton & Rigsby 1982; Williams 1987; and the review by 
Keen 1989.  
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Overview of Theme Two:  The State of the Australian 
State in Indigenous Affairs 
Paper 2: D.E. Smith, 1996. ‘From cultural diversity to regionalism: The political 
culture of difference in ATSIC’, in P. Sullivan (ed.) Shooting The Banker: 
Essays on ATSIC and Self-Determination, North Australian Research Unit, 
Darwin, pp. 17-41.  
Paper 3: D.E. Smith, 2008. ‘From collaboration to coercion: A story of governance 
failure, success and opportunity in Australian Indigenous affairs’, in J. 
O’Flynn and J. Wanna (eds) Collaborative Governance. A New Era in 
Public Policy in Australia? Australian and New Zealand School of 
Government and ANU E Press, pp. 75–91. 
The published papers in Theme Two draw upon my extensive long-term 
ethnographic fieldwork spent ‘studying up’, in order to elucidate the Australian state’s 
distinctive culture of governmentality as an observable field in Indigenous affairs. 
Written 12 years apart, Papers 2 and 3 support the conceptual refinement of 
governmentality posed earlier in the Introduction, as one encompassing a threefold 
reference; namely, that of govern-mentality, government-ality and the governance of 
government. 
The State’s Culture of Governmentality 
The Australian state’s field of governmentality has its own distinctive cultural 
configuration structured around a political geography of ministerial and ‘tribal’ parties, 
a federalised dispersal of political power, hub-and-spokes administrative architecture, 
and policy and bureaucratic networks. These are founded on enduring hierarchies, 
institutionalised modes of behaviour, specialist knowledge and expertise. It is a 
heterogeneous field having characteristic sub-cultures and silos of powers (associated, 
for example, with jurisdictional federalism, ministerial offices, and government 
departments). Neither coherent nor coordinated, at times these sub-cultures operate in 
ways antithetical to the state’s overall stated policy and political objectives in 
Indigenous affairs. 
Papers 2 and 3 analyse examples of the institutional agency of state where power is 
exercised through diverse agents in order to mould Indigenous conduct. A particularly 
powerful tool of the state in this regard is highlighted throughout the papers; namely, 
the formulation and implementation of policy. Policy statements reveal an emic self-
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representation by the state of its conduct of Indigenous affairs — where the state asserts 
its preferred rules, rationales, ideological aims and practical goals. The process of 
formulating policy is publicly represented by governments as a progressive evolution, 
involving consideration of future directions based on best-practice evidence and lessons 
learned from past implementation. From this perspective, policy statements can be 
viewed as the state’s authorising texts for action; the bureaucrats’ own version of a 
‘Dreaming’ (and one that is similarly couched in terms of continuity and immutable 
law, but one also reliant upon human interpretation and customisation).  
In reality, the papers show policy making and implementation to be a circuitous 
messy process; one which appears to have become especially turbulent in recent years. 
A related yet neglected feature of the modern Australian state — which is analysed from 
different vantage points in the two papers — is its pervasive reliance on a changing and 
always incomplete store of knowledge. This flows through circuitous pathways and 
shifting bureaucratic receptiveness to be selectively transformed into ‘evidence’ to 
promote or undermine particular initiatives and outcomes. However, the practical 
implementation of policy ‘Dreamings’ reveals a significant disjuncture with the state’s 
representation of its own motivation, and raises serious questions about the state’s 
capacity and self-governance within Indigenous affairs. 
Collectively, the thesis papers indicate an ever-increasing turnover of policy 
strategies and institutional structures in Indigenous affairs.
26
 These are created at 
breakneck speed as brokered compromises responsive to ministerial mood and opinion 
polls as much as to evidence, and are highly susceptible to the agency of powerful 
individual bureaucrats and influential ‘old boys’ networks which cut across 
departmental boundaries.  
The current environment of rapid institutional change in Indigenous affairs means 
that policy and program implementation appear increasingly beyond the capabilities of 
an ill-equipped, sometimes overwhelmed bureaucracy. Indeed, it is arguable that the 
state’s field of governmentality in Indigenous affairs is now so complexly layered that it 
operates in much the same way as the global financial system in its recent crisis mode; 
namely, where its dense entanglement, fluidity and complexity is such that dispersed 
people and entities act in isolation and in ways that amplify ripple effects, but no one 
person or entity understands the whole system or can discern cause and effect.27 
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The Bureaucratic Field 
Papers 2 and 3 demonstrate the need to see the state as comprised of people, not 
disembodied systems of institutionalised power and instruments. And even more 
importantly, the papers report that when people gravitate to particular sites of power and 
activate related modes of agency over prolonged periods of time, they generate sub-
fields  within the governmentality of the state. 
In this respect, the power of the bureaucratic field looms large in Indigenous affairs. 
Attached to the defence of departmental territories are vast bureaucratic networks which 
are both instruments and wielders of statist power (Heyman 2004; Perrow 1986). In 
Pierre Bourdieu’s sense (1999: 69), bureaucrats are both agents and recipients of the 
state’s ideological rationale which creates a conformist modus operandi amongst them. 
Importantly, the papers testify to the fact that the Indigenous affairs bureaucracy is 
neither homogeneous nor cohesive. It has its own internal sub-cultures, networks of 
support and factionalism, elite cadres, age and gender hierarchies, ritual performances, 
valued forms of governance capital, and a specialist language (see also Paper 4 and 
Smith 2002b). It includes influential departmental mandarins, and individual officers 
who sometimes work with considerable autonomy on the ground with Indigenous 
communities and organisations. Some government officers deliberately position 
themselves as the local face of government, using that authority to customise policy 
implementation and funding on the ground. For Indigenous people these are highly 
personalised encounters with the state whose ‘power is experienced close to the skin’ 
(Aretxaga 2003: 395). Individual bureaucrats invent local exceptions to government 
rules (thereby instilling a sense of necessary Indigenous indebtedness), and use their 
control over access to resources to curry local favour or secure preferred outcomes.  
These practices can alter and undercut government goals, but also make policy 
implementation more workable under diverse community conditions. Not surprisingly, 
as this pattern of engagement repeats over time, Indigenous people judge that the 
exception is the rule. In other words, they correctly surmise that there really aren’t any 
binding government rules or guidelines, except those that visiting government officers 
and ministers say there are at any particular time.28 
On the other hand, the papers reinforce the importance of not pathologising or over-
generalising the state’s bureaucracies. For example, Papers 3 and 8 report the 
sympathetic engagement of government officers working closely with Indigenous 
communities over long periods. They slowly build close relationships and trust, and 
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acquire a reservoir of local ‘field’ knowledge enabling them to act as facilitative ‘go-
betweens’ or intercultural brokers (Dillon & Westbury 2007; Gerritson 1989; Wolf 
1956). However, the value of their niche position and knowledge is highly vulnerable to 
the changing rationales of the state’s governmentality. During phases when the state 
derides Indigenous cultures of governance, such officers may be seen as too aligned 
with Indigenous concerns, and so find themselves professionally marginalised to the 
fringes of bureaucratic influence.  
Today, with public servants hidden behind the key-coded locked doors of 
departments, many become distant from the practical realities of Indigenous life, and 
insulated from peoples’ expectation of ‘downwards’ accountability. Indigenous 
representations of this particular form of dis-engagement emphasise abandonment by 
the enabling state, as much as its impersonal disregard and impunity.  
The field of Indigenous functionaries 
A particularly important development reported by the collective published papers is 
the infiltration of Indigenous people into the cultural field of the state’s own 
governmentality; for example, as government bureaucrats, policy makers and advisors, 
Ministers and politicians, and as government-appointed members of committees, 
tribunals, statutory authorities, commissions and boards. During ATSIC’s operation, 
there appeared to be what could only be described as an Indigenisation of the state’s 
bureaucracy, creating and reinforcing powerful Indigenous political and leadership 
networks across the country. However Indigenous people occupy an ambiguous position 
within government. They are functionaries of the state, but also act strategically as 
advocates promoting Indigenous priorities, rights and interests. In certain important 
respects they operate as a unique intercultural sub-field within both Indigenous 
governance and state governmentality; a position that comes with the attendant 
competing pressures and demands, and contested legitimacy. 
State Representations of Indigenous Cultures of Governance 
The two papers highlight the uneasy line trodden by the Australian state in its 
governmentality, between two narratives of Indigenous culture. Both have implications 
for the state’s own agency in Indigenous affairs, and for Indigenous governance. One 
narrative is to do with the purported ongoing and imminent complete loss of Indigenous 
culture. This justifies the state stepping in to replace supposedly fading Indigenous 
governance with modern democratic forms. The other narrative is the imminent re-
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emergence of the ungovernable primitive savage, with a culture in need of ‘good’ 
governance and control by the state. In both narratives the state represents and engages 
with Indigenous people in terms of a politicised model of temporality where their 
governance is treated as pre-modern — a gubernare nullius empty of ordered rule onto 
which can be written the language, norms and institutions of western statecraft.  
The ironic consequence of both interventionist narratives is to exacerbate the 
vulnerability of Indigenous governance by refashioning it into a form which few nation 
states themselves have ever successfully achieved. This includes good governance 
characterised by benchmarks of representative and stable leadership, democratic 
decision making, full corporate and fiscal transparency and accountability, active 
citizenship participation and voice, and equality before the law. It is through such 
contrary narratives and their embodiment in institutional practice that the cultural field 
of state governmentality is dispersed into the lifeblood of Indigenous families, 
communities and organisations, where it generates its own impacts.  
The Governmentality of Indigenous Cultures of Governance 
The state’s governmentality has adopted changing guises that follow (and in turn 
promote) the particular trajectories of its ambivalent representations and agency at 
different points in time. Nevertheless, one recurrent point of focus by the state has been 
its characterisation of governance as primarily being about service delivery and 
financial accountability; a matter of good corporate governance in order to secure 
desired policy outcomes on the ground. A great deal of state effort goes into trying to 
meet the challenges of implementing and improving the delivery of services to 
Indigenous people. Very often this effort is concentrated on the establishment, operation 
and termination of Indigenous organisations.  
A number of my professional publications have documented the nature and impact of 
the state’s governmentality of Indigenous service delivery across a wide variety of 
sectors, including employment, welfare, family life and child-care, enterprise and 
resource development, land management, tourism, and arts and crafts (see Appendix A). 
The two papers in this theme highlight many of the issues discussed in that wider 
corpus. Paper 2 examines the establishment in 1989 by the Australian Government of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), arguing that its creation 
marked a radical reorientation in the state’s governmentality of Indigenous affairs. Here 
we see the state moving away from its earlier comfortable habitus of the pater familias 
of Indigenous assimilation and integration towards Indigenous self-determination.  
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The paper demonstrates that the creation of ATSIC constituted a fundamentally 
different phase of engagement by the state with Indigenous culture. Specifically, ATSIC 
gave structural and institutional recognition to Indigenous cultural diversity. This 
formed the basis for transferring significant power and responsibilities (for policy, 
service delivery and funding) to a statutorily enshrined network of national and regional 
elected Indigenous representatives. In this way, a reshaped version of Indigenous 
cultural heterogeneity was directly incorporated by the state into its own 
governmentality (see also Smith 1993a, 1993b).  
However, at the very point of ingestion, Paper 2 shows how the newly-influential 
paradigm of cultural diversity and elected representation became ‘hotly contested’ both 
by Indigenous people and the Australian state. Being neither fully Indigenous, nor fully 
of the state, ATSIC became the focus of Indigenous and government complaint, 
growing bureaucratic surveillance and ministerial intervention. Its eventual abolition by 
the Australian Coalition Government in April 2004 (see Papers 3 & 8) was, in large 
part, the culmination of ATSIC’s flawed intercultural role being made the subject of 
highly charged public politics by the Australian state. The outcome was a radical 
ejection and rejection by the state of Indigenous culture as an acceptable basis for 
designing contemporary forms of Indigenous representation and governance.29 
Paper 3 was written in 2008, four years after the abolition of both ATSIC and the 
abandonment of the policy of self-determination. The paper documents a growing 
reassertion by the Australian state of its unilateral sovereign voice and power over 
Indigenous cultures of governance. This mode of state governmentality was justified by 
a renewed pathologising of Indigenous culture and the purported failure of Indigenous 
governance.  
Together, the two papers (supported by those in subsequent themes) demonstrate the 
ways in which the Australian state has worked to graft the concepts, structures and 
institutions of its own field of governmentality onto Indigenous governance; sometimes 
subtly and cooperatively, sometimes overtly and unilaterally. Various examples are 
provided throughout the thesis papers, in the form of: 
• legal requirements on Indigenous people to identify stable representative leaders 
for entire communities (see Paper 4 and Smith 1997b); 
• encouraging (and sometimes requiring) social groups to form themselves into 
incorporated organisations in order to receive funds (see Paper 8; and also Altman 
& Smith 1994, 1995, 1999); 
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• the mandatory creation by governments of visible cultural geographies or 
administrative boundaries via statutory and regulatory conditions (see Papers 2 & 
9, and Smith 2007); 
• encouraging (and sometimes requiring) the use of democratic election, decision-
making and voting systems (see Paper 3 & 9, and Smith 2002a, 2004); 
• asserting the primacy of individual citizenship over collective Indigenous rights 
and interests (see Smith 2001, 2002b); and 
• the statutory creation of newly-named categories of people, on whom are 
bestowed special decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority by the state 
(see Papers 4, 6 & 7 and Smith 1998). 
The papers also document a parallel trend where the state relegates Indigenous 
leaders and organisations to an advisory rather than decision-making role in their 
engagements with the state. 
Summary 
An important contribution of the two papers is that they overcome the reification of 
‘the state’ as unitary, coherent, rational and apical. Their ethnographic evidence 
(supported by subsequent papers) reveals the state to be experienced by its own agents 
and Indigenous people as having heterogeneous guises, multiple motivations and 
contradictory agendas. Over the past 30–40 years the state has sometimes appeared 
distant and imaginary; sometimes incapable and uncertain; at other times all-powerful, 
interventionist and punitive; or intimately engaged and enabling. And on many 
occasions, these have been enacted simultaneously. 
These guises are commonly seen as a linear sequence of discursive predispositions 
towards Indigenous Australians and their cultures of governance — to which 
Indigenous people then respond or resist. However the thesis papers testify to something 
more polycentric than centralised, more multi- than uni-directional, more contradictory 
and diffuse than cohesive.  
Importantly, the timeframe encompassed by the collective thesis papers reveals the 
current hyper-fluidity and turbulence of the Australian state in Indigenous affairs to be 
part of a cyclical pattern of governmentality; one gravitating along a continuum between 
modes of inclusion, recognition, marginalisation, exclusion, and reshaping of 
Indigenous governance. This cycle reveals much about the state’s own problematic self-
governance and self-representation in Indigenous affairs. Significantly, the papers 
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indicate that the state has always been sorely challenged by its own capacity and the 
complexity within Indigenous affairs, and remains deeply vulnerable to the 
transformative practices and representations of Indigenous people themselves.  
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Paper 2:  From Cultural Diversity to Regionalism: The 
Political Culture of Difference in ATSIC 
D. E. Smith, 1996. 
Originally published in P. Sullivan (ed), Shooting the Bankers: Essays on ATSIC and 
Self-Determination, North Australian Research Unit, Darwin, pp 17-41. 
Introduction 
On 2 November 1989 the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Act 1989 (the Act) which established, in March 1990, the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) to replace the Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) and the Aboriginal Development Commission (ADC). 
Hailed as a milestone in Australian Government administration, ATSIC is a unique 
structure, combining administrative and representative Indigenous arms in one statutory 
body.  
ATSIC operates within a complex political and policy environment; one which is 
characterised by numerous interest groups, multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, a 
high degree of politicisation and difficulties in cross-cultural communication (Dillon 
1992: 91). This paper argues that the Indigenous representative arm is the outcome of 
Commonwealth Government attempts to comprehend and incorporate Indigenous 
cultural diversity into a national organisational framework. The particular administrative 
and political processes by which this has occurred are described; and the limitations and 
implications of the incorporation of cultural diversity are raised. In particular, it is 
argued that the politics of diversity continue to generate key tensions within ATSIC that 
are critical to its ongoing policy and funding decisions, and to its capacity to operate 
strategically in the wider public policy environment. 
Aboriginal Cultural Diversity 
Cultural diversity within the Aboriginal population is taken to mean many things in 
the public policy arena. It is understood to be marked by a variety of cultural styles 
across the country, with local groups emphasising the importance of differences in 
spoken languages, social organisation, the organisation of land-owning groups, 
ceremonial and ritual affiliations, art styles, material culture and so on. While this 
cultural diversity exists within an inclusive commonality of Aboriginal identity, key 
differences continue to be asserted by groups wanting to emphasise distinctive local 
identities.  
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The localisation of Aboriginal identity has been further underscored by the historical 
experience of colonisation, and the socioeconomic impacts of residence at a variety of 
localities. Aboriginal people today live at remote settlements formed through the 
imposed phases of mission and government supervision; on small outstations and 
pastoral excisions; on the outskirts of rural towns; and in inner city and suburban 
metropolitan areas. In such settings, there are not only cultural differences evident, but 
marked variation in the socioeconomic circumstances of individuals and families 
according to their residence in remote, rural or urban areas (see Taylor 1993a). In turn, 
socioeconomic differences are apparent at even finer-grained population levels within 
types of geographical location. For example, the category of ‘urban’ can be dissected to 
reveal important variations in economic well-being between particular urban 
communities in metropolitan areas (Smith 1995). This national and regional diversity is 
also mirrored within single communities where one finds significant micro-economic 
and cultural differences between residential groups. 
At a broader population level, a key area of cultural diversity is that evident between 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The growing political significance of, and 
emphasis on, this difference has lead to the transformation of the Torres Strait Islander 
Regional Council into a separate Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA) within 
ATSIC, having its own budget line and substantial policy and program independence 
(Sanders 1994). More recently, influential Islanders have urged the Prime Minister to 
extend this institutional expression of the cultural differences between the two 
Indigenous populations, by transforming the TSRA into a Commission separate from 
ATSIC.
1
 While the emphasis in this paper is on Aboriginal cultural diversity, it is 
against the backdrop of this political and institutional negotiation of cultural difference 
being carried out between Islander and Aboriginal interests within ATSIC. Cultural 
diversity has become an influential paradigm within ATSIC, and one that is hotly 
contested, especially in the area of policy formulation, program funding and corporate 
direction.  
Cultural Diversity and the Bureaucratic Knowledge Base 
It is worth considering the context within which Aboriginal cultural diversity has 
become the subject of bureaucratic assessment and management by government. We 
need, so to speak, a view of the State room and its bureaucratic inhabitants. A neglected 
feature of the modern State is its pervasive reliance on a changing store of social and 
economic knowledge (Lacey and Furner 1993). For modern governments, selecting, 
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justifying and implementing policies and new institutional structures means finding 
defensible and workable grounds for them. Those grounds are often prepared on the 
basis of information sifted from the vortex of reports, inquiries, briefing papers and 
reviews which inform the knowledge base of the State’s bureaucracies.  
The changing content of bureaucratic knowledge feeds directly into government 
thinking - though there are circuitous paths and complex chronologies involved. The 
production of this knowledge base within government is a political as well as an 
intellectual activity, shaped as it is by the historical relationship between Aboriginal 
people and the State. Neither should it be thought of as a cohesive and tested set of 
understandings. Rather, it is characterised by incompleteness and relies on vast amounts 
of stylised information shaped by historical insights, adversarial interests, key 
individuals and changing government objectives. It is, in other words, a construct of 
both smoke and substance. Government reliance on, and bureaucracy’s contribution to, 
this changing knowledge base is evident in Aboriginal affairs.  
If the 1970s and early 1980s saw the policy construction by the State of an 
Aboriginal collectivity that was physically and conceptually sited in the ‘remote 
community’ (see Beckett 1988a; Morris 1988), then the period since has witnessed the 
insertion of cultural diversity into that perceived collectivity. Information about the 
cultural heterogeneity of the Aboriginal population has been added to the processes of 
bureaucratic and government decision-making. This is not to say that diversity has been 
systematically considered by government, or formalised as policy. Nevertheless, the 
idea of its importance was incorporated into the bureaucratic knowledge base and and 
became influential. 
As the policy and program implications of cultural differences within the Aboriginal 
population became more apparent, diversity itself became problematic for government 
and its bureaucracy. For example, the standardisation and mainstreaming of service 
delivery gradually gave way to pressure for ‘special’ DAA programs based on the 
culturally specific needs and circumstances of communities. Considerable time and 
money was been spent on ascertaining what those different needs and circumstances 
might be, and how DAA should respond to them. One result was that DAA developed 
an administrative database which divided Aboriginal communities into distinct 
categories according to variations in their location, settlement histories, population size 
and cultural characteristics. DAA attempted to develop particular programs for these 
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community types; to orient service delivery to them; and major policy initiatives were 
differently applied in relation to them. 
A series of government-initiated inquiries during the 1980s served to focus attention 
on the policy and planning impact of cultural diversity. The issue was influential in the 
Miller Committee’s review of Aboriginal employment and training programs, 
conducted between 1984-5. The Committee’s final report (Miller 1985: 5-6) argued 
strongly that the different cultural backgrounds and aspirations of Aboriginal people 
influenced the extent of their involvement in mainstream education, training and 
employment. Accordingly, when the Commonwealth established the Aboriginal 
Employment Development Policy in 1986, program strategies were devised in 
accordance with the ‘wide variety of economic and social circumstances of Aboriginal 
communities’ and the ‘different aspirations and employment needs of Aboriginal people 
arising from markedly different social circumstances and cultural values’ (ATSIC 1987: 
3, 5). Reports by the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
Affairs (HRSCAA) further highlighted the implications for government of the cultural 
and socioeconomic diversity evident within the Aboriginal population. One such inquiry 
into administrative and support services in Aboriginal communities in 1987-8, argued it 
was crucial that government policies and programs ‘be adapted to the differing needs 
and concerns of communities’ whose populations experience ‘differing historical 
experiences’ ... ‘differing socio-economic backgrounds, cultural beliefs and values and 
geographic situation’ (HRSCAA 1989: 3-4). Similarly, the Blanchard Report (1987) 
was influential in drawing attention to the implications of such diversity for service 
delivery to outstation populations in remote locations.  
The perceived need to cater for cultural diversity and localism presented dilemmas 
for the Federal Government in its desire to consult with, and gain the support of a 
single, representative ‘Aboriginal voice’. In particular, it faced the issue of how 
Aboriginal diversity could be welded to an organisational form of representative 
democracy. Government acknowledgment of the political implications of cultural 
diversity had been evident in its attempt, via the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC) 
structure, to establish a national body representative of those differences. The NAC was 
disbanded in July 1985 ostensibly because of its lack of such representativeness and 
because of its considerable internal factionalism. Coombs’ review of the NAC for the 
then Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, Clyde Holding, indicated that there was a clear 
rejection of the NAC by many Aboriginal organisations and communities in favour of 
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their own particularised interests (Coombs 1984; see also Rowse 1991; Weaver 1984). 
From the Government’s perspective, there appeared to be ample evidence not only of 
the importance, but of the ‘problem’ of cultural diversity and, therefore, the need to 
manage it. The crux of Coombs’ review had been his proposition for an alternative 
national Indigenous body that would not only include representatives elected at a 
regional level, but would also fully assume the existing policy and financial powers of 
the DAA. Coombs argued that such a national voice should be formed from its 
constituent Aboriginal parts; that the sheer cultural diversity of the Aboriginal 
population be the basis for a national body; and that national and regional 
representatives should be firmly linked to local Aboriginal organisations. However, the 
Labor Commonwealth Government and senior bureaucrats were unwilling to entertain 
such a wholesale Indigenous supplanting of DAA. Later, it was ATSIC which replaced 
the NAC, but with crucial differences: the new Indigenous structure was integrated into 
the existing Aboriginal affairs bureaucracy, rather than standing outside of the policy 
formulation process as the NAC had done. The existing bureaucracy (DAA and the 
ADC) was spliced onto a newly created Indigenous arm.  
Creating the ATSIC Structure: Incorporating Diversity 
By the time the ATSIC proposal was first being developed (during 1986-87), the 
nature and implications of Indigenous diversity were part of government deliberations. 
The earliest beginnings of ATSIC are contained in the exchanges of confidential 
Cabinet submissions, and so not available for public examination. Initial proposals were 
developed by an informal working party of consultants and staff from the office of the 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, in liaison with senior staff from portfolio agencies such 
as DAA. The working party drew upon existing bureaucratic knowledge, and a variety 
of reports and inquiries including the Coombs review (1984) and O’Donoghue’s (1986) 
revamping of his recommendations (see McMullan 1989: 71-2). The proposal for a new 
body was announced by Gerry Hand, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, in the lead-up to 
the Australian Bicentenary, and formally launched with the publication Foundations for 
the Future, on 10 December 1987. 
In Hand’s original proposal for ATSIC, 28 councils at a regional level were grouped 
into 6 zones covering the whole of Australia. Between January and March 1988, the 
Minister toured the country consulting with Indigenous people. Media releases made 
much of the fact that he participated in some 50 public meetings attended by over 6,000 
people. While criticisms have been made of the shortcomings in that consultative 
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process (see McMullan 1989), it was nevertheless the most extensive ever conducted by 
government.  
As a result of considerable criticism presented by Aboriginal groups during this 
consultative phase, and the need to gain broad Indigenous support, the Minister revised 
the proposal (in April 1988), substantially expanding the 28 regions to 56 and then 60, 
and the zones from 6 to 17.
2
 Importantly, the original administrative criteria for regional 
boundaries was dropped in favour of criteria based on cultural commonalities and 
differences, and related factors. Hand stated that the amended boundaries and expanded 
number of councils ‘reflect Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander requests and recognise 
historical, cultural, linguistic and other important factors’ (Hand 1988: 2177). While 
there is little information on public record indicating exactly how these regions were 
demarcated, Hand’s claims undoubtedly acknowledges Commonwealth Government 
attempts to recognise and strategically incorporate Aboriginal cultural diversity as the 
basis for ATSIC’s organisational framework, and so structurally manage its political 
impact. Inevitably, it was a limited translation of diversity, subject as it was to 
prevailing government concerns about the need for financial and administrative 
efficiency, and the sheer difficulties involved in translating complex Indigenous cultural 
differences into a nationally representative organisational framework. 
ATSIC was established as a statutory authority with legislative powers and functions 
extending across a bipartite, hierarchical of a nationally elected Indigenous 
representatives on the one hand, and an equally hierarchical administrative arm on the 
other (ATSIC 1992a, 1993a). ATSIC’s organisational structure was the subject of 
intense debate. Significant alterations were required to enable passage through the 
Senate (Dillon this volume; Sanders 1993). Also, the internal protocols and 
administrative mechanisms by which the organisation would actually operate were still 
to be defined. For this very reason, the domain of Indigenous diversity continued to be 
influential in ATSIC’s early development. Once cultural diversity had been given an 
institutional expression, it became the subject of strategic interpretation and intense 
negotiation. 
The Organisational Structure and Roles of the Indigenous Arm 
ATSIC’s Indigenous representative arm is divided into three components at the 
regional, zone and national levels. Initially, the base consisted of 60 regional councils as 
bounded geographic entities covering all of Australia (see Map 1). Each regional 
council has a set of Indigenous councillors and chairpersons elected for three years to 
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represent their particular regional population. In pushing through the ATSIC legislation, 
Hand (1987: 2) described the 60 councils as the ‘linchpin of the Commission’s future’. 
Legislative changes in 1993 reduced the number of regional councils from 60 to 36 (and 
to 35 after the creation of the TSRA) and councillor numbers from 800 to around 600. 
Regional council areas are grouped into 17 zones. Councillors for each zone elect a 
Commissioner to represent them on ATSIC’s Board of Commissioners. Along with 
these 17 Commissioners, the Board also has two other Commissioners appointed by the 
Federal Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, and a chairperson 
appointed by the Minister from among those 19 Commissioners.  
Regional councils are established as separate legal entities with a range of statutory 
functions, including: the formulation and revision of regional plans for improving the 
economic, social and cultural status of the Indigenous population within its boundaries; 
assisting and advising ATSIC and other Commonwealth and State government bodies in 
the implementation of that plan; and via the budgetary process, making proposals for 
expenditure within their own area.  
Regional councillors have executive responsibility for developing and monitoring all 
ATSIC policy and programs at the regional level (ATSIC 1990, 1992a), though it is not 
at all clear to what extent this occurs in practice. Councils do not directly receive or 
spend funds, rather they decide upon program funding allocations within their regions, 
and are legislatively required to do so on the basis of priorities laid out in their regional 
plans (ATSIC 1994: 26; see s.97(2)(a) of the Act). Prior to legislative amendments in 
1993, regional councillors had a more advisory role in funding decisions. Subsequently, 
the delegation of Commission powers to regional councils substantially increased their 
involvement in funding decisions.  
In the 1993 legislative amendments to ATSIC’s structure, it was proposed by the 
Commission that the Board of Commissioners should be responsible for electing its 
own chairperson. This move for greater autonomy was rejected. The accepted 
amendment resulted in ATSIC regional chairpersons and Commissioners being 
employed full-time, though not under the Australian Public Service Act. In order to 
assume full-time paid employment, Commissioners and regional Chairpersons are 
required to forgo other paid employment.  
Under the Act, the Board of 19 Commissioners has executive powers to set national 
policy, determine national financial priorities and develop draft budgets; formulate and 
monitor programs; and provide advice to the Commonwealth Government and the 
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Minister. ATSIC Commissioners thus have a representative role as individuals, as well 
as collective advocates for their respective constituencies within Aboriginal Australia.3 
The Board has significant decision-making responsibilities and is regarded by ATSIC as 
‘the main policy-making body in Indigenous affairs’ (ATSIC 1994: 8). Council 
chairpersons and State Advisory Committees negotiate the inter-regional division of 
funds within each State, and the latter Committees play a substantial role in decisions at 
the State level about inter-regional funding distribution. This ATSIC funding process is 
administratively complex and fraught with conflicts about the decision-making role of 
the councils relative to each other and to the Board, and relative to various echelons of 
the administrative arm (Smith 1993a). 
The Organisational Structure and Roles of the Administrative Arm 
ATSIC’s administrative arm is divided into three tiers at the central, State and 
regional office level (ATSIC 1993c). At the apex, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is 
a statutory officer appointed by the Minister. The CEO has authority for the daily 
administration of the organisation, and has to balance direct responsibility to the 
Minister in performing these duties with a legislative requirement to exercise powers in 
accordance with policies and directions given by the Indigenous Board of 
Commissioners. At the base of the administrative arm are 30 regional offices 
responsible for the administration and delivery of ATSIC programs. The reduction of 
regional councils to 36 effectively aligned them more closely to the regional office 
structure and the latter’s administrative oversight. Regional offices administer the funds 
allocated by regional councils to Aboriginal organisations and communities, as well as 
national program funds allocated by the Board of Commissioners. The regional offices 
are supported by State offices which co-ordinate grant administration and budget 
preparation, monitor programs and liaise with the Commissioners in their State, and 
with State Governments in relation to the provision of services (ATSIC 1993b: 11).  
The Office of Evaluation and Audit (OEA) was established by s.75 of the ATSIC Act 
and is headed by a statutory Director appointed by the Minister after consultation with 
the Board of Commissioners. OEA staff are ATSIC staff. The Office is expected to 
provide financial accountability to Parliament (Dillon 1992), and is in an ambiguous 
position between its accountability to the Minister and to the Indigenous and 
administrative arms of ATSIC. The Director is responsible to the Minister, not the CEO 
or Board, but can be requested to conduct audits by the Minister and the Board of 
Commissioners, and is required to report in writing to both. At the same time that 1993 
 97 The Australian State 
legislative attempts by the Commission failed to have the OEA placed more directly 
under Board control, its functions were expanded to include audit oversight of the 
regional councils. Indeed, every stage in the devolution of powers to ATSIC’s 
Indigenous arm has been met by increased requirements for public accountability 
measures (Sanders 1993). 
While ATSIC’s administrative arm was initially largely formed from existing staff of 
DAA and the ADC, the need to quickly establish financial and administrative linkages 
with the representative arm has required a major cultural change within the bureaucracy. 
The administration is described as having a ‘dual responsibility to both the 
representative arm and the government’ (ATSIC 1995: 6), requiring a fine balancing of 
interests between accountability to government and advocacy of its Indigenous 
priorities. The role of regional, State and central offices in respect to regional councils 
and Commissioners, and vice versa, is still evolving and remains subject to negotiation.  
The Institutional Politics of Diversity 
Cultural diversity is the unifying logic behind ATSIC’s representative Indigenous 
structure. The Aboriginal collectivity has been constituted ‘as a plurality of local 
interests’ and translated by government into the organisational guise of the Commission. 
This plurality has been sited in a representative structure that ‘recognises the culturally 
and politically heterogeneous nature of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
population’ (Dillon 1992: 91, 94). ATSIC’s decentralised character is deemed to be vital 
‘because Aboriginal Australia remains as it has been: dispersed, a network of localities’ 
... ‘where communities have different values and aspirations, different problems, 
according to their different cultures and histories’ (O’Donoghue 1991: 13, 1993: 8). 
ATSIC’s regional council structure is thus presented as a statutory expression of 
Indigenous diversity. A number of important consequences have followed upon this 
structural incorporation and containment of cultural difference. 
ATSIC’s most recent corporate plan affirms ‘the primary role of the representative 
members of ATSIC in setting the broad direction of the organisation at the national and 
regional level’ (ATSIC 1995: 8). Nevertheless, there is an underlying tension between 
the regional and central levels of the Indigenous arm in these areas of responsibility. 
The Board is expected to make decisions on the basis of ‘national priorities and 
budgets’. Regional councils, as representatives of regional expressions of cultural 
diversity, are expected to make decisions reflecting the local priorities and needs 
stipulated in their regional plans. In actual fact, the structural divisions of 
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responsibilities within the Indigenous arm are more ambiguous than that. First, 
Commissioners are also regional councillors, and regional councillors are often also 
members of other local Aboriginal organisations. Second, regional councils are being 
given increased control in response to their calls for greater devolution of funding 
powers. Third, it remains unclear by what processes the regional and national levels of 
policy formulation and funding distribution are linked and made consistent. As a result, 
policy and program funding decisions are subject to diverse and competing Indigenous 
interests. 
Protocols, legislative amendments and reviews have attempted to clarify the 
relationship between ATSIC’s constituent representative and administrative arms,. The 
budgetary process has been adapted to meet the progressive transfer of financial and 
other responsibilities to the Commissioners, and decentralisation to regional councils. 
Despite these efforts, ATSIC remains a contested structure. Its distinctive dual structure 
has been posed as a partnership between the Indigenous and administrative arms, but if 
this is the case, it is a partnership characterised by role conflict and an uncertain 
distribution of decision-making powers. These organisational tensions continue to be 
negotiated by interest groups, or constituencies, both within and outside the 
Commission which are aligned to competing views of its role. Indigenous cultural 
diversity is often employed as a policy and political tool by such constituencies to 
promote different directions. In the process, institutionalised diversity is becoming a 
feature of public Aboriginal authenticity.4  
Transforming Cultural Diversity into ATSIC Regionalism 
At the end of ATSIC’s first year, Rowse (1991: 12) suggested that it could be seen 
not only as reflective of a change in public policy formation
5
, but also as a new stage in 
the formation of Aboriginal cultural identity. He linked this possibility to the 
Commission’s potential impact on the ways Aboriginal people might perceive the 
boundaries between the State and themselves at the local level. In fact, public 
representations of an institutional Aboriginal identity are in the process of being 
generated within ATSIC, but at the national and regional levels. It is precisely not at the 
‘local’ or community level that cultural diversity has been structurally accommodated 
within ATSIC. Rather, a very specific reading of cultural diversity has occurred; one 
which structurally equates it with a regional expression and value. Regional councils 
have been created by the Commonwealth Government as the institutional face of 
diversity. This has produced another set of administrative boundaries and structures 
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within Aboriginal affairs, which have become the locus of an institutionally contested 
public Aboriginality.  
Regional councils are encouraged by ATSIC to undertake regional planning to 
document, amongst other things, the varying circumstances and priorities of the 
Indigenous communities and organisations within their boundaries. As is to be 
expected, there is little that is uniform or consistent about the planning documentation 
so far produced. Councils are encouraged to act as the consultative interface with local 
and State governments for the co-ordination of service and funding needs. Increasingly, 
they are also seen as the formulators of ATSIC regional policy directions. However, 
whether they can adequately reflect the wide range of Indigenous interests within their 
regions is yet to be established. Nevertheless, Aboriginal people have been exhorted by 
the current Minister to use the council structure to ‘exert the political clout needed to 
gain a fair share of available resources’ (Tickner 1993).  
As a consequence of ATSIC’s decentralisation policy, regional councils are locked 
into the management and control of an increasing percentage of program funds.6 Its 
legislation imposes two major program funding categories: regional programs operating 
under regional council discretion and administered by regional offices; and national 
programs allocated by the Board of Commissioners and administered by central office. 
The Act further specifies that certain national funding areas are excluded from regional 
council discretion, including State grants, administrative expenses, and funds for 
portfolio organisations and the Commercial Development Corporation (see Smith 
1993a). However, while it is the Board and central office which specifies the relative 
division of funds between these two broad program types, increasing areas of national 
program funding are being transferred to regional council discretion. The Commission’s 
total regional budget, over which regional councils have discretion, has increased from 
$79 million to $240 million during the three financial years, 1991-92 to 1993-94. 
Regional funds have risen from representing 12.6 per cent of ATSIC’s total program 
funds of $628.7 million in 1991-92, to accounting for 32.8 per cent of total program 
funds of $730.3 million in 1993-94. While some regional councils criticise the slow rate 
of financial decentralisation occurring, they are in fact steadily gaining substantial 
authority over ATSIC program funds.  
Inevitably, allocative decisions by regional councils are political decisions and a 
source of conflict. Councillors become the focus of local Indigenous competition over 
scarce regional funds, and local organisations question the objectivity and authority of 
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regional council members. To date, disputation has mainly centred on resource 
allocation decisions by the councils, but increasingly regional councils will be held 
accountable by government, the Commission’s central bureaucracy and by local 
communities, for their decisions and for program outcomes. To an extent, parochial 
politics at the regional and Board level have served to deflect attention away from the 
responsibilities of mainstream agencies and State and Territory Governments. 
Cultural diversity and organisational decentralisation have become firmly grounded 
in ATSIC regionalism. Regions, in turn, are equated by many in ATSIC (not only 
regional councillors), as the structural level at which ‘real’ self-determination in ATSIC 
lies; even over Commissioners who, after all, are firstly regional councillors. The 
ATSIC bureaucracy and Board attempt to manage the consequences of regionalism and 
decentralisation by trying to link regional council decisions to national policy 
frameworks and to financial accountability measures. At the same time, the councils 
push for greater autonomy and financial self-determination. Cultural diversity, 
translated in as regionalism and financial decentralisation, has become a key factor in 
ATSIC policy, program and funding directions.  
The Diverse Faces of ATSIC Regionalism 
The creation of geographically bounded ATSIC regions has generated further 
permutations of diversity between regional Aboriginal populations. At the most obvious 
level, the 36 regions (including the Torres Straits) differ considerably from one another 
in their populations, physical area, geographic location in rural, remote and urban areas, 
and the types of communities within each. But additional, more detailed indicators of 
inter-regional differences are now being documented and referred to in ATSIC 
planning. 
Over the last few years, an important piece of information has been added to 
ATSIC’s bureaucratic knowledge base. Namely, that while there are substantial 
differences in socioeconomic status between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
Australians; there are often greater variations in levels of socioeconomic disadvantage 
between regional council populations. ATSIC regional populations vary greatly in their 
demographic profiles, health characteristics, labour force participation rates, degree of 
involvement in the subsistence and mainstream economies, income levels, costs of 
living, educational attainment, and household and family characteristics. Regional 
council ‘economies’ vary considerably according to the nature of the mainstream labour 
market, the presence or absence of Aboriginal-owned land and related economic 
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development options, and the type and extent of government funding and transfer flows 
into the region (Khalidi 1992; Tesfaghiorghis 1991). Bureaucratic knowledge about 
these inter-regional variations is expanding as ATSIC obtains five-yearly census data 
disaggregated to the regional council level. Survey research available to ATSIC also 
reveals significant variations between ATSIC regions in infrastructure levels, housing 
and community amenities (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1994; Jones 1994). So that a 
range of additional socioeconomic differences are being mapped onto cultural diversity, 
creating a political economy of diversity at the regional level.  
Regional plans refer to the varying socioeconomic and cultural characteristics of 
each region, and assert different funding priorities. As a result, a more geographically-
based program structure is being advocated to cater to differing regional needs. There 
have been calls by some councils to have the allocation of program funds based on an 
assessment of these regional differences (see Smith 1993a, b). As a result, ATSIC 
commissioned a consultancy in 1994 to develop a formula, based on relative needs, for 
use in distributing funds between the regions. Competition and manoeuvring between 
the 35 regional councils over their relative share of funds is likely to grow more urgent 
and vocal as they attempt to establish a legitimacy with local Indigenous organisations. 
One consequence of this is that the conflict over resources is being firmly shifted into 
the Aboriginal, rather than the government and bureaucratic domain. In particular, 
attention has been focused on the funding decisions of ATSIC Commissioners and the 
regional councils. 
ATSIC: A Contested Structure 
ATSIC is often referred to as if it is a monolithic, unified structure. This is far from 
the case. There are different constituencies within the Indigenous arm, as there are 
within the administrative arm. Its representative structure has been based on government 
attempts to incorporate and manage Indigenous cultural diversity; albeit via a narrowly 
constructed regional reading of that diversity. Subsequent to the initial incorporation of 
cultural diversity as the basis for ATSIC’s representative structure, further elaborations 
of that diversity, rendered at the regional level, have been generated within the 
Commission. In this manner, diversity has become the organisational persona given to 
the Aboriginal collectivity; but one subject to contested interpretations. 
Regionalised diversity has subsequently manifested itself as competing parochial 
interests - often at the expense of national objectives and local program outcomes. The 
process of organisational and structural decentralisation within ATSIC has also been 
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met by demands for even finer-grained representation of Indigenous stakeholders within 
regions. The result is that diversity has been made a highly politicised domain mediated 
by constituencies within the Commission, and outside.  
The politics of cultural diversity are evident at a number of levels in ATSIC. On the 
one hand (and with a very broad stroke) a ‘centralist’ bureaucratic constituency 
emphasises incorporation of difference; mainstreaming; a functionally-based program 
structure; high levels of centrally supervised financial accountability; tied funding; and 
concern over the need to maintain national policy and program objectives. It also 
regards, perhaps somewhat uneasily, the Board of Commissioners as the senior 
decision-making group within the representative structure (though not perhaps, over the 
total organisation) and hence, as being the key organisational arbiters of self-
determination. 
On the other hand, a ‘regionalist’ constituency within ATSIC holds out the regional 
council structure as the key to the Commission’s future development. That constituency 
pushes for greater decentralisation of decision making; financial autonomy and control 
at the regional level; one-line funding arrangements; ‘culturally appropriate’ program 
outcomes; and geographically-based program structures. The influence of this 
constituency in ATSIC is evident in the continuing pressure to devolve substantial 
control over policy and program funding to regional councils. It is also apparent in 
support for the argument to have the ‘authority’ model of the TSRA emulated for the 
remaining 35 councils; that is, to transform the councils into more independent regional 
authorities (see Dillon, this volume).  
Not surprisingly, this division between regionalism and centralism is often equivalent 
to that between ATSIC’s representative and administrative arms. However, there are 
fluid boundaries between these two broad constituencies; interest groups overlap the 
two arms and competing interests operate within each. Nevertheless, the tension 
between the two is evident as a push and pull in all initiatives and strategies developed 
within ATSIC. 
The regional councils are a potentially significant political development in 
Aboriginal affairs and are central to the institutional versions of Aboriginal identity 
emanating from ATSIC. In these circumstances, one must question whose interests were 
served by the reduction in 1993 of council numbers from 60 to 36; a process achieved 
by the amalgamation of some councils and changes to boundaries. Ministerial and 
bureaucratic impetus for the change largely arose from the legitimate need for greater 
 103 The Australian State 
administrative ease in serving the large number of regions and councillors. The 
reduction has also been posed as creating ‘significantly increased levels of funding and 
powers and responsibilities for a smaller number of Councils’ (ATSIC 1993c: 25). The 
effective result is that complex diversity has been further rationalised and reduced in its 
organisational translation.  
There is no doubt that the administrative and financial complexities involved in 
servicing 60 councils was severely underestimated by government. The 
Commonwealth’s initial expansion from 28 to 60 was posed primarily as a 
responsiveness to Indigenous calls for greater recognition of cultural diversity; it also 
effectively marshalled the support of the Indigenous constituency behind the Minister 
and Labor Government in the face of a hostile Senate. Concern for diversity was no 
longer so politically relevant to government in 1993; though it remained so for a number 
of Aboriginal interests. In regard to the latter, in 1989 the Senate Select Committee on 
the Administration of Aboriginal Affairs, had reported the ‘strength of opposition’ by 
Aboriginal people to ‘large [ATSIC] regions having little traditional homogeneity’ 
(McMullan 1989: 40). Further, the 1993 ATSIC Review Committee which 
recommended the reduction, did so regardless of reporting that ‘Regional Councils ... 
supported the current number [60] ... ‘and no change’ (ATSIC 1993c: 25). Arguably, the 
reduction was as much about containing the political consequences of cultural diversity, 
and in particular, managing the impact of 60 regional councils erratically acting as 
independent advocates of their own local interests.  
Conclusions 
Government acknowledgement, albeit under Indigenous pressure, of the cultural 
heterogeneity of the Aboriginal population was a fundamental factor in developing the 
ATSIC structure. The nature of that diversity has continued to be constructed and 
renegotiated within and outside the Commission. As a consequence, ATSIC remains a 
contested structure. Indeed, the internal tensions generated by the structural 
incorporation of cultural diversity, and the politics surrounding its subsequent 
management, appear to be one of the Commission’s more critical defining features, 
creating a powerful dynamic for change. It is already apparent that the direction of that 
change is towards the greater authority of the Indigenous Commissioners and council 
Chairpersons, and to greater decentralisation of powers to regional councils.  
There remain then, a number of challenges for ATSIC arising from the nature of the 
articulation between its administrative and representative arms, and from the 
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implications of its decentralisation policy. Firstly, the incorporation of cultural diversity 
as the basis of its representative structure raises the issue of where Indigenous 
organisational authority is located. If ATSIC represents, as claimed, the institutional 
apex of the government’s self-determination policy to date, does the structural locale of 
self-determination lie within the regional councils as representatives of culturally 
diverse regional constituencies? Does it lay with the Board of Commissioners as the 
elected national voice of Indigenous Australia? Or does it lie entirely outside ATSIC, at 
the so-called ‘grass roots’ level of local communities, organisations and groups. In the 
short-term, the focus on politicking about this issue has its costs. Parochial interests 
within ATSIC can predominate, and the Commission’s ability to influence the national 
decision-making of government is not being maximised. These tensions are also not 
easily understood by government, and the public perception of ATSIC being an 
ineffective organisation predominate media coverage despite the inordinate 
requirements for its accountability.
7
 
Secondly, if regional councils are to be effective structures for implementing ATSIC 
policy and programs, then councillors must be able to gain and deliver the support of 
their Indigenous constituencies. However, while ATSIC regionalism is being 
constituted as a new public form of Aboriginal authenticity, criticisms have been made 
as to whether councils fairly represent the range of Aboriginal priorities and interests at 
the local level. ATSIC’s desire to respond positively to such criticism has seen it 
encourage greater devolution of powers to the regional level in order to reflect diverse 
local interests. But clearly there must be some bounds placed upon the structural 
recognition of Indigenous diversity. There are limits to the extent that localised and 
highly competitive Indigenous interests can be accommodated by the elected 
representatives, and in reality, neither ATSIC nor government can fund or service the 
complexity of Indigenous cultural diversity that exists. If national policy objectives and 
program coherence can be maintained, and regional councils held accountable to their 
constituencies, ATSIC regionalism may very well represent the most effective 
organisational structures by which ‘special’ government program funding can be 
implemented. 
Thirdly, while cultural diversity was used as a unifying device in the creation of 
ATSIC’s structure, it remains to be seen whether it will continue to act as a unifying 
factor. As part of the politics of diversity within ATSIC, a regional decision-making 
culture is arising and becoming influential in the competition between and within 
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regions over access to limited resources. There are also clear tensions between national 
policy and funding priorities set by the Board, and those asserted at the regional level by 
councils. The politics of diversity may yet be promoted by various constituencies in 
Aboriginal affairs to the detriment of ATSIC’s political and policy unity, and to its 
standing as a nationally representative body. 
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Notes: Paper 2 
1. In a speech to Torres Strait Islanders at Thursday Island, the Prime Minister Paul 
Keating responded to George Mye’s ‘fear ... that the Islander culture may be 
subsumed in the greater culture of Aboriginal Australia’, and the suggestion by 
Islander leaders that there be a separate Torres Strait Island Commission, by 
stating that the proposal would be considered by the Commonwealth. Keating 
assured the Islander audience that their interests and culture would not be 
‘subsumed in any other culture - Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal’ (Transcript of 
speech, 12 September 1995). 
2. The ATSIC Bill introduced in August 1988 ultimately listed sixty regions because 
some urban regions were detached from surrounding rural areas. 
3. The latter advocacy role was especially evident in the public involvement of the 
ATSIC Board Chairperson, along with other Aboriginal leaders, in the 
negotiations with the Commonwealth Government in the lead up to the passage of 
the Native Title Act 1993. 
4. See Beckett (1988a, b), Morris (1988), Rowse (1991) and Weaver (1984) for 
discussions of the public and private constructions of Aboriginality immediately 
pre-dating the establishment of ATSIC, and in particular, the part played in these 
by the official recognition of Aborigines as a collectivity within a multicultural 
Australian nation. 
5. Sanders (1993) speaks of a ‘renegotiated policy bargain’. 
6. ATSIC’s legislation imposed two major program funding categories: regional 
programs operating under regional council discretion and administered by regional 
offices; and national programs allocated by the Board of Commissioners and 
administered by central office. Though it is the Board and central office which 
specifies the relative division of funds between these two broad program types. 
The Act further specifies that certain national funding areas are excluded from 
regional council discretion, including the Community Development Employment 
Program (CDEP), State grants, administrative expenses, and funds for portfolio 
organisations and the Commercial Development Corporation (see Smith 1993a). 
Over the financial period 1992 - 1993, funding for the CDEP has increased from 
37 per cent to 45 per cent of its national program funds totalling $587.9 million in 
1993-94. CDEP scheme funds represent notional welfare-equivalent payments 
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made by ATSIC to Aboriginal communities which have volunteered to forego 
individual welfare entitlements. If CDEP funds for 1993-94 ($264.8 million) are 
deducted from the ATSIC’s centrally-allocated national program funds ($587.9 
million), then the remaining $323.1 million is only some $90 million above the 
total regional program funds of $231.2 million. 
7. The requirement for financial accountability that has, at times, engendered a ‘siege 
mentality’ within ATSIC (ATSIC 1993d: 4). No other government department or 
authority has within it an independent Office of Evaluation and Audit (OEA) with 
a charter to regularly evaluate its efficiency, programs and operations, reporting 
directly to the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs. It is 
asserted that more than 40 OEA and 20 Australian National Audit Office audits 
are conducted into the Commission’s operations each year (ATSIC 1993a: 4). 
Similarly, no other Commonwealth Government department has a counterpart 
policy office - the Office of Indigenous Affairs - separately located within the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, offering parallel advice to 
government, independently to that of ATSIC. 
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Paper 3:  From Collaboration to Coercion — A Story 
of Governance Failure, Success and Opportunity in 
Australian Indigenous Affairs  
D.E. Smith, 2008. 
Originally published in J. O’Flynn and J. Wanna (eds), Collaborative Governance. A 
New Era in Public Policy in Australia? Australian and New Zealand School of 
Government and ANU E Press, pp 75–91. 
In late June 2007, I was at the South Alligator River in Kakadu National Park 
attending a meeting of Indigenous leaders from local government councils and resource 
organisations representing communities throughout West Arnhem Land and the town of 
Jabiru in the Northern Territory (NT). They were meeting, as they had done regularly 
for the past three years, to plan the implementation of a local government shire covering 
the entire region of West Arnhem and Jabiru. Also present were senior officers from the 
NT and Federal Governments, who, under a bilateral agreement signed between the two 
governments in 2005, had been working closely with the Indigenous leaders on the 
transitional committee to facilitate the establishment of effective and culturally 
legitimate regionalised local government.1 
In 2003, Aboriginal (Bininj) leaders from West Arnhem Land saw the NT 
Government regionalisation policy as an opportunity to secure greater authority and 
control for Bininj people over the things that mattered to them, and to create a strong 
voice that could influence government funding and service delivery to the region: ‘We 
will get to say what we want in our communities, we will set the priorities’; ‘We have 
control over this project’; ‘We will create policies and strategies that achieve more local 
employment and better services’; ‘We will have a much stronger voice speaking as one 
to government’.  
Part and parcel of the regionalisation process has been the regular delivery, as an 
integral part of each committee meeting, of governance capacity development with the 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous members of the committee. This has been carried out by 
the same team of community-development officers from the NT Department of Local 
Government, with my research support, for more than three years (see Evans et al. 
2006; Smith 2005, 2007). The governance work included sessions on governing roles 
and responsibilities, separation of powers, systems of representation, organisational 
structures, codes of conduct and conflict of interest, meeting procedures, human-
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resource management and contract conditions, and so on. Each session culminates in the 
committee collectively developing new governing rules—for example, in the form of 
written policies, agreed procedures, resolutions and a future constitution and preamble.  
An important driving force behind these efforts has been the desire to create an 
effective regional organisation that will better reflect Bininj cultural values and 
institutions: ‘We will have a council that respects and works with our culture.’ As part 
of the governance capacity-building work, the Indigenous committee members routinely 
discuss the cultural issues involved in developing workable rules; they test proposed 
policies against potential community and cultural scenarios, and share practical ideas 
with government officers about how they might collectively and individually enforce 
their rules in a way that acknowledges the difficult challenges involved in working 
across cultures.  
The result is that the community leaders on the committee have developed strong 
governing capacity and confidence based on the experience of working together as a 
team to make and enforce collective decisions. They follow up difficult issues of 
representation and externally imposed change with tenacity and integrity, and their 
relationship with the NT and Federal Government partners continues to be frank and 
robust.  
Figure 9.1: Logo design for the proposed West Arnhem Shire, as endorsed by the 
Shire Transitional Committee, 2007.  
 
Note: The logo for the shire was designed by Ahmat Brahim, an Indigenous man with 
traditional ties to the region, whose father was a member of the Transitional Committee.  
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Collaborating for Good Governance  
The West Arnhem Shire logo endorsed by the committee demonstrates their real 
commitment to working as a ‘joined-up’ local government with the other levels of 
government in Australia for the benefit of Bininj and Balanda (non-Aboriginal) 
residents of the region. Their intention, written into their early constitution preamble 
and policies, is to use their traditional systems of culture and governance  
to strengthen the legitimacy of the Regional Authority [shire], and use the 
[shire] to strengthen traditional systems of governance. Through this vision 
and commitment we seek to maintain observance and respect for traditional 
values, and to join the responsibilities and structures of traditional authority 
with those of local government, to achieve a high quality of life and a wide 
range of opportunities and choices.  
We are developing our own rules that include our culture. In our own 
culture we have our own rules that are very strong and we are bringing this 
into the [regional local government].  
The collaboration between Bininj groups across the region, and with government, 
hasn’t all been smooth sailing by any means. The history of mutual suspicion is slowly 
shifting as a result of the trust and relationships being built up between the government 
community-development officers, community leaders and different clan groups, and as 
the committee members work with one another to resolve practical issues and develop 
shared approaches.  
As one member of the committee noted in a presentation to NT Government 
ministers in 2005:  
When we started, people were unsure of each other. People were only 
interested in their own group. We had our own ideas—at the beginning we 
were all different. We were not used to making decisions together. Now, 
people have a shared commitment to the whole region. We are all working 
towards the one goal. Now we work through issues and make an agreed 
decision.  
Major changes initiated in 2006 by the NT Government to its policy 
framework for local government have severely tested the partnership relationship. 
The foundation of governance capacity, however, trusted relationships with 
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particular government officers and the growing effectiveness of Bininj decision 
making within the committee have built resilience in the committee and the 
partnership. Also, the Bininj leaders remain strongly committed to achieving real 
outcomes on the ground. For that purpose they continue to collaborate with 
government to create workable solutions that will address the entrenched backlogs 
in infrastructure and essential services in the region.  
West Arnhem: From Collaboration to Coercion  
On the final day of the West Arnhem Shire committee meeting in late June 2007, the 
Federal Government issued a media release announcing that it was taking over the 
administration of some 60 NT Aboriginal communities, under compulsory lease 
acquisition, for an estimated period of five years. The release stated that government 
administrators, the Army and police would be placed into each community and children 
would be required to undertake mandatory health checks in an effort to identify and 
curb child abuse. All communities located on Aboriginal inalienable freehold land under 
the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) 1976 would have their permit systems revoked and 
be subject to Australian Government leasehold conditions.  
Government officers at the West Arnhem meeting were unable to shed any light on 
the media announcement—they had not been forewarned themselves and had to resort 
to the media release. Quick calls to their managers in Darwin and Canberra revealed 
that they were similarly uninformed.  
The next day, the front-page headline of the NT News read ‘Martial Law—Howard 
mobilises cops, military as he declares “national emergency” in NT communities’. The 
opening paragraph reported:  
The Federal Government yesterday seized control of the Territory’s 
Aboriginal communities in the most dramatic intervention in NT affairs 
since self-government. Canberra in effect declared martial law over the 44 
per cent of the Territory owned by Indigenous people. (Adlam and Gartrell 
2007)  
To say that the Bininj members of the West Arnhem committee were shell-shocked 
would be an understatement. In one day, without any consultation, their collaboration 
with the Federal Government had essentially been made null and void. Their role as the 
proposed local government for the entire region was thrown into question, their work in  
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the past three years ignored and their governance roles treated with disdain. A week 
after the media release, the Army, police and Federal Government officials entered two 
communities in the region.  
The West Arnhem group of Indigenous leaders had been working in partnership with 
the NT and Federal Governments for more than three years. Their sense of betrayal was 
intense, but not new. It took me back several years to 2001 when I worked with the 
Mutitjulu community at their request to develop a welfare-reform package for the whole 
community.  
Mutitjulu: A Litany of Broken Promises  
In 1991, the Ngaanyatjarra, Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (NPY) Women’s Council 
reported to government on the welfare of Indigenous (Anangu) children and families in 
the central Australian region that included the Mutitjulu community. The Aboriginal 
chairwoman of the council stated in her introduction to the report:  
We are telling this story strong about what we think about child 
protection… Women’s law, grandmothers’ law is really important one to 
us…It teaches us [the] right way for children to be looked after and taught.  
But a lot has changed for us on our communities. We are worried about 
losing our traditional means of controlling and caring for children. We are 
worried about our family structure breaking down. We are worried about 
grog and petrol sniffing and how that affects our families. And we are also 
worried that government and welfare mob don’t understand our way and our 
problems.  
We women have ideas about what to do to make it better. We want 
government and welfare mob to listen to what we say and our ideas. We 
want them to work with us and our organisations to get it right. (R. Forbes, 
NYP Women’s Council, 1991)  
Ten years later, after years of further inquiries and reports into their family living 
conditions—and little to show for it except band-aid responses from governments—the 
Anangu families and leaders of the Mutitjulu community had had enough.  
In response to the national welfare-reform agenda of the Federal Government in 
2000, the community council at Mutitjulu asked Centrelink, the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) and Families and Community Services (FACS) to 
work with them to develop a practical strategy to address welfare dependence and 
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related family problems in the community. Under a joint contract between ATSIC and 
the community council, I lived and worked in the community to ascertain what Anangu 
considered to be their priority welfare problems and their ideas for resolving them. In 
that time, I consulted with senior leaders and family members, young and old, all 
community organisations and service deliverers, as well as regional stakeholders and 
relevant government agencies (see Smith 2001).  
Not surprisingly, Anangu concerns had changed little since 1991:  
‘Sit-down money’ is killing our young people.  
When the welfare money came in, it really killed the work; people started 
slacking off. Now young ones don’t know work, they’re welfare trained.  
No more sit-down money, we gotta cut it out. Level ’m up, everyone gotta 
work.  
Push all those petrol sniffers into work. Young people make everything good for 
family. I like them to be helping more with all the community work.  
Out of the consultation process, the Mutitjulu Community Council and senior family 
leaders proposed a Community Participation and Partnership Agreement to be 
negotiated with the relevant Federal Government departments and key regional 
stakeholders. In 2001, it was a unique, innovative model; it came well before the 
Council of Australian Government (COAG) trials and before the Family Income 
Management pilot projects in Cape York.  
The Mutitjulu Community Participation and Partnership Agreement proposed an 
integrated package aimed at directly attacking welfare dependence and social 
dysfunction in its real-life community context. Key components included the following.  
• Community-wide coverage of all welfare recipients—what Anangu called the ‘all-
in’ approach—with breaching implemented in partnership with Centrelink.  
• A whole-of-community participation program based on Individual Participation 
Agreements that would require all welfare recipients to undertake some form of 
work selected from a menu of participation activities and training developed by 
the community.  
• Tying receipt of Youth Allowance to school attendance and work participation.  
• Providing intensive assistance and support to individuals to take up paid 
employment.  
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• Recognising the support role and social capital provided to families and children 
by older women, and creating mechanisms to ensure that welfare payments 
intended for the care of children were directed to the older women who invariably 
took care of them.  
• Government agencies working alongside the community to rebuild local 
governance processes and provide governance capacity building to Anangu 
leaders and councillors to enable them to actively participate in, and manage, the 
implementation process.  
The Mutitjulu Council proposed that the agreement should be further fleshed out and 
implemented in partnership with the Federal Government, FACS, Centrelink and 
ATSIC. Accordingly, it asked the government to:  
• provide a delegation to a community officer under the Social Security Act 1999 to 
enable the council (or other specific-purpose community organisations) to 
implement a whole-of-community approach to welfare reform  
• support them in developing local Anangu breaching and enforcement rules and 
appeals procedures with Centrelink  
• provide a consolidated block of welfare and related program funding, with a single 
reporting/acquittal package—what Anangu referred to as a ‘one-bucket’ funding 
strategy  
• provide families with financial literacy and budgeting training, and with local 
banking services. 
The community was not naive about the challenges for its side. Residents were 
adamant that they wanted a measured transition carried out in partnership with 
government, with sustained departmental facilitation on the ground.  
Senior officers from the Federal Government visited the community and attended 
council meetings at which they assured local leaders that the government was listening 
to their proposal and would support them. That was the last the community heard of 
them.  
What happened? Essentially, in 2001, the Federal Government and its departments 
walked away from Mutitjulu. Initially, the government departments involved argued 
that there needed to be further community consultation, and suggested that the 
community was in fact ‘too dysfunctional’ to participate in such a major reform process. 
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(In fact, continuing consultation was an integral part of the proposed implementation 
process.)  
In reality, the problem lay not in the community, but in Canberra. First, the key 
departments would not support an ‘all-in’ community model of welfare reform and 
would not support linking Youth Allowance with school attendance—even though these 
had been specifically requested by community members and their council. Second, 
Centrelink and FACS would not countenance an Indigenous community working with 
them to develop and implement locally relevant breaching rules. They also would not 
countenance a community organisation being provided with a delegation under the 
Social Security Act in order to do so (‘Over my dead body,’ declared one senior 
bureaucrat).  
Third, entrenched interdepartmental turf wars in Canberra meant that the departments 
concerned were unable to negotiate a common position. As a result, the process 
inevitably became bogged down by strategic bureaucratic behaviour that led to inertia. 
Finally, the Federal Government was unable or unwilling to reform the chaotic state of 
its departmental program funding in order to streamline the pooled funding and grant-
reporting arrangements that would have been required.  
In 2001, the Mutitjulu community had called out in desperation to the Federal 
Government. It wanted decisive action, but it also wanted to be a full partner in action to 
address local welfare dependence and governance dysfunction. At that point, the 
government turned its back on the community.  
As a result, it is arguable that significant responsibility for the horror of violence, 
abuse and despair that has since escalated at Mutitjulu can be laid fairly and squarely at 
the door of the Federal Government and its departments and, in more recent years, at the 
door of the NT Government as well.  
In late June 2007, the Federal Government announced that Mutitjulu would be the 
first community into which it activated national emergency measures. It would do so 
unilaterally, not in collaboration. Ministers and some media commentators have argued 
that, late though it is, at least action is now being taken at Mutitjulu. Two critical 
elements of the community’s earlier partnership proposal for welfare reform are, 
however, noticeably absent—namely, the implementation of a governance-building 
strategy right from the start, and the streamlining of related government program 
funding down to the community. 
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The New Intervention Policy  
Clearly, we are at a watershed in terms of where the Federal Government is taking 
Indigenous affairs policy and practice. No-one would deny the depth of problems 
experienced by Indigenous families and communities in this country; Indigenous people 
themselves have been calling for decisive action on a whole range of social, economic 
and human rights issues for several decades now. After years of government failure to 
address deeply entrenched structural disadvantage, however, should we think that the 
outcomes of this hasty intervention will be any better?  
The new policy approach will attempt substantial social engineering within 
Indigenous communities. The Federal Government appears to be undertaking another 
missionary phase in Indigenous affairs, one based on a well-intended desire to improve 
conditions for families and children, but unilaterally imposed by government using ‘the 
full weight of its coercive power’ (Scott 1998:5). The history of Indigenous affairs in 
Australia shows that coercion rarely leads to sustained positive outcomes. On the 
contrary, often it has led to unintended consequences that have exacerbated problems 
and created profound misery on the ground.  
Since the announcement of the ‘Howard–Brough–Pearson’ new intervention policy, 
we have heard a barrage of opinion—much of it partisan and ideologically driven, with 
many bold assertions uninformed by empirical evidence. My concern here is not with 
the causal grounds for the Federal Government’s action in the welfare arena, but with its 
logic and strategies for addressing the issues, predicated as they appear to be on a lack 
of analysis of why government policy has failed so badly to date, and on unproven 
assertions of a direct connection between the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (NT) 1976 
permit system, and child abuse. Unless these underlying issues are addressed, there is a 
real chance that the current intervention will simply repeat the debilitating mistakes of 
the past.  
Implicit in the Federal Government’s new intervention approach is an 
acknowledgment that its current whole-of-government policy has failed, even though 
that policy has been implemented only recently. Is this the case, and, if so, in what 
respects has it failed? Also, have there been any positive outcomes from that approach?  
In 2002–03, COAG trials began operating in eight Indigenous sites across Australia, 
in a whole-of-government, partnership policy framework and with an overarching 
emphasis on shared responsibility. The aim of the trials was twofold: first, to build 
Indigenous community capacity to more effectively deliver services; and second, to 
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strengthen the capacity of governments to work with each other in a coordinated way 
and deliver more streamlined funding to Indigenous communities. Important lessons for 
governments and communities can, and should, be derived from that practical 
experience. In a matter of one week, however, we seemed to go from a whole-of-
government policy approach to one of coercion, in which the power of the State 
enforced collaboration.  
To develop a more empirically informed consideration of these urgent matters, I 
want to describe some of the relevant research findings from a major project I have been 
involved with in the past four years.  
The Indigenous Community Governance Project  
The Indigenous Community Governance (ICG) Project is itself an innovative 
partnership between the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) at 
The Australian National University and Reconciliation Australia. It is being carried out 
in collaboration with 11 Indigenous communities across Australia, with funding from 
the Australian Research Council and the Federal, NT and West Australian (WA) 
Governments.  
The research is national in coverage and community focused. It covers a range of 
different types of ‘communities’ in remote, rural and urban locations. A team of 
multidisciplinary researchers has been working with the same community organisations, 
groups and leaders for the past three years.  
The project is investigating the complex dimensions of how communities are 
governed—not only their cultural foundations and complex histories, but the financial, 
legislative and policy frameworks under which they operate—and how these impact on 
their effectiveness and legitimacy.  
The methodology is rigorous and our research results are documented extensively on 
the CAEPR web site (see Hunt and Smith 2006, 2007; Smith 2005). Each researcher 
investigates the unique aspects of governance in the communities they are working 
with, and also provides extensive research data against a common project field manual 
that targets key governance issues and questions. The project has developed an 
innovative comparative analysis to identify more broadly relevant principles and 
common themes that appear to underlie Indigenous governance challenges and solutions 
across the communities.  
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The project is participatory and applied. Researchers work with community groups 
and organisations to explore best-practice solutions to their governance challenges. To 
assist that approach, the project is also currently working with Reconciliation Australia 
to develop a web-based tool kit of governance resources and diagnostic tools for use by 
Indigenous organisations and communities and agencies working with them. The 
project also aims to make the research count with governments. For that purpose, 
various policy, funding and program frameworks have been analysed and reported on.  
The research is now starting to tell us about what works, what doesn’t and why in 
Indigenous community governance in Australia. In particular, the evidence is 
consistently highlighting several conclusions that are directly relevant to the Federal 
Government’s new intervention policy.  
Project Research Implications for the New Intervention Policy  
The ICG Project has thoroughly investigated and analysed the factors underlying 
poor governance arrangements in Indigenous communities. These are discussed in 
reports and case studies on the CAEPR web site. Given the current government and 
public focus on Indigenous dysfunction and failure, however, it is important to 
remember that Indigenous communities can be successful in establishing good 
governance and that in doing so they are securing important social, cultural and 
economic outcomes.  
What is working  
First, the research overwhelmingly confirms that the exercise of practically effective, 
culturally legitimate governance in Indigenous communities is critical to providing a 
foundation for addressing and sustaining their social wellbeing and economic 
development. In other words, good governance delivers a development dividend for 
Indigenous communities.  
Second, lest we all succumb to the politics of despair about Indigenous Australia that 
seems to have hold of the nation at the moment, the research reports that amid the 
failures there are extraordinary successes in community governance.  
Around the country, we are seeing Indigenous people in their organisations and 
communities working to address complex internal relationships and representation 
issues in order to develop legitimate governing arrangements that win the support of 
their members (for example, the West Arnhem Land Transitional Committee is 
developing an innovative organisational structure with a layered network of 
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representation that will enable it to act regionally, but also recognise local community 
interests and decision making (Smith 2007).  
We are documenting Indigenous groups reassessing their cultural histories and 
geographies in order to promote greater legitimacy and accountability of leadership and 
decision making (for example, groups at Wadeye in the Northern Territory undertook an 
extensive community-wide reappraisal of the cultural underpinnings of their governance 
arrangements in order to create a more inclusive community council).  
Project researchers have reported innovative governing structures being designed to 
suit changing contemporary conditions (for example, the Layhnapuy Resource 
Association represents the interests of a number of interrelated outstations across East 
Arnhem Land and has recently restructured its governing board and management in 
order to better respond to changing government policy and economic opportunities for 
its member groups).  
We are seeing direct links between the effectiveness of an organisation’s governance 
arrangements and its ability to deliver sustained social and economic development 
outcomes (for example, Yarnteen Corporation in Newcastle has built up an outstanding 
governing board and management team who promote continuing governance training, 
professional development and youth mentoring. This has led to high credibility with the 
wider business community and investors, and has resulted in sustained success in 
enterprise development).  
The ICG Project’s research is also identifying a set of core ‘design principles’ that 
appears to underlie many of the different governance solutions on the ground. A 
particularly important principle is networked governance, which is applicable in remote, 
rural and urban communities. It is premised on a form of ‘bottom-up’ federalism with 
associated layers of power, roles and responsibilities (for example, the set of 
organisations and interrelated groups that now constitutes the Bunaba Corporation is a 
network designed to recognise the autonomy of particular groups and their economic 
interests, at the same time as sharing the benefits of collective representation and 
financial management). Models based on networked governance are seen in all the 
communities with which project’s researchers are working.  
Strong nodal leadership and succession planning are shown to make a significant 
contribution to the good governance of communities and organisations. Influential 
leaders become connecting points within networks to mobilise resources and opinions 
and get things done. Under their direction, the project has documented organisations 
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undertaking the hard work of reforming their governance, creating workable rules and 
procedures and enforcing those in the complex inter-cultural environments in which 
they operate.  
In particular, the research has documented innovative Indigenous processes of 
building practical governance capacity in the context of their daily work. When 
Indigenous people develop their own institutions rather than adopt externally created 
rules, their governance capacity and confidence appear to be significantly strengthened. 
In all the case studies, we are witnessing community groups and leaders using their 
cultural values and social relationships as assets to help them build stronger governance.  
What isn’t working  
Many of the intractable social and economic problems confronting Indigenous 
Australians are, in significant part, a function of the mutually reinforcing institutional 
constraints and failure of governance within governments themselves. The ICG Project 
has documented institutional failings in policy, implementation strategies, funding 
frameworks, public-sector capacity and the system of fiscal federalism itself (see 
Westbury and Dillon 2006).  
The way governments function directly affects Indigenous capacity to govern well 
and get things done in communities. In every case study, researchers are reporting that 
there is no single, whole-of-government policy approach; rather, there are several. 
Organisations and communities are routinely confronted with different whole-of-
government policies and strategies from different departments and jurisdictions.  
Departmental territorialism and inertia is rampant in Indigenous affairs. We have 
witnessed Indigenous initiatives to improve local governance undermined by the ‘go-it-
alone’ attitude of particularly influential departments, which protect their niche program 
role and funding power and resist the efforts of other agencies to collaboratively 
develop program and funding coordination. The point was highlighted at one COAG 
trial meeting by a perceptive community leader, who asked the various departmental 
officers the question: ‘Where is your thamarrurr?’ He was one of the local leaders 
involved in the time-consuming, difficult task of getting the different clans to work 
together under a single regional council modelled on a traditional principle of 
thamarrurr (‘coming together’). Why, he asked, couldn’t governments work with each 
other, and why couldn’t they get their departments to work together?  
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What hasn’t been recognised—at least by governments—but what has been 
documented by the ICG Project and numerous reports and inquiries, is the extent to 
which government funding arrangements have exacerbated community and 
organisational dysfunction and poor governance. As Westbury and Dillon (2006) 
succinctly note, for Indigenous communities, ‘accessing government program resources 
becomes a labyrinthine voyage through scores of separate programs and a sea of 
bureaucratic process’. This fundamentally diminishes the time, resources and capacity 
that community organisations can give to making their service delivery and governance 
more effective.  
Government policy in the past 30 years has not succeeded in addressing this internal 
institutional failure. On the contrary, programs seem to be multiplying and grant 
funding and acquittal processes are becoming more onerous. In one community, at the 
time it began participating in a COAG trial, its representative organisation was 
managing 50 different buckets of government program funding. For a small community 
of approximately 2300 people, that in itself constituted a major administrative workload 
that diverted scarce human resources away from critical community governance and 
service issues. After three years of the trial, the same organisation was managing more 
than 90 different buckets of program money.  
There continues to be, in Indigenous affairs, a fundamental disjunction between 
government policy goals and real implementation on the ground. This is  compounded 
by a failure of engagement by governments at all levels. When governments introduced 
self-determination policies in the 1970s, they essentially vacated the field of community 
development and collaborative engagement on the ground. The result was a failure to 
keep up with international best practice in community development, which might have 
enabled a more sophisticated approach to the issues involved in the current intervention. 
The additional consequence has been a failure of governance capacity within an already 
overstretched bureaucracy reeling from one policy change after another.  
A plethora of papers and reports has concluded that the institutional arrangements of 
fiscal federalism in Australia are fundamentally flawed and a key driver of Indigenous 
disadvantage, especially in remote regions. For example, the per capita allocation from 
Commonwealth transfers to local government in the Northern Territory makes up just 
more than $20 million of a $1 billion national pool of specific-purpose grants. The 
bizarre result is that the Northern Territory receives less in local government financial 
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assistance than is notionally allocated for the population of Geelong in Victoria 
(Westbury and Dillon 2006).  
The result in the Northern Territory, which covers more than one-sixth of the 
Australian landmass and has an Indigenous population experiencing high levels of 
socioeconomic disadvantage, has been to create huge backlogs in infrastructure and 
services in local communities. These are the very communities now being accused of 
not delivering much-needed basic services to children and families.  
Infrastructure backlogs are not currently addressed by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission (CGC), and the jurisdictional sovereignty of territory and state 
governments means they are not required to expend Commonwealth transfers on the 
Indigenous locations or service requirements against which ‘disability factors’ the 
transfers were initially assessed by the CGC (Smith 1992). As a result of the historical 
under-investment by governments in NT communities, CAEPR has recently estimated 
that to deliver on its intervention promise to spend whatever it takes to ‘fix up’ 
Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory, the Federal Government will need to 
allocate in the realm of $3–5 billion to achieve parity in the next five years in education, 
health, Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) program transitions to 
work and housing alone.  
We have entered a period of policy formulation in which Indigenous culture is 
pathologised by governments and many public commentators in much the same way as 
early missionaries regarded Indigenous culture as contaminating the ability of families 
and children to assimilate. Indigenous culture is portrayed almost as a virus, something 
that will undermine the effectiveness and accountability of organisations and their 
governance arrangements. Accordingly, policy and program solutions increasingly seek 
to quarantine culture to one side. The primary mode of departmental interaction with 
community organisations is one of managerial governance that focuses on compliance 
and grant acquittal. The lesson of history, however, is that Indigenous people will never 
leave their culture to one side; they will not be assimilated into being ‘whitefellas’ and 
their governance arrangements express cultural goals in addition to financial compliance 
and administrative effectiveness. Importantly, the ICG Project has documented 
examples of where Indigenous groups and organisations are using their cultural values, 
institutions and social relationships to positively support their collective efforts to 
rebuild their governing arrangements. In other words, cultural legitimacy can provide a 
powerful mechanism for accountability and effectiveness.  
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By and large, however, governments still do not recognise the positive 
developmental role of good governance, and their efforts to facilitate Indigenous 
governance capacity building at the local level remain ad hoc, uncoordinated, erratically 
funded, poorly implemented and are rarely followed up. The recommendations of 
numerous reports and inquiries on community governance and associated capacity 
building have not been implemented.  
Taken together, these issues produce what Westbury and Dillon (2006) conclude is ‘a 
fundamental failure of the nation state to govern effectively in Indigenous Affairs’. It 
also represents a fundamental failure of the Australian State to invest in Indigenous self-
governance and related capacity, despite the mounting evidence that this can lead to 
significantly improved social and economic outcomes on the ground.  
In many ways, an inevitable conclusion must be that the governance dysfunction 
within government represents at least half of the national emergency currently 
confronting Indigenous communities.  
From Coercion to Collaboration?  
Coercion as a policy instrument has limited developmental power for Indigenous 
families and communities; history has demonstrated that. Government ministers and 
bureaucrats often talk about the importance of developing policies and strategies on 
evidence-based research. The ICG Project is producing convincing comparative 
evidence that suggests that there are several strategies that will facilitate more effective, 
sustained outcomes.  
First, taking genuine decision-making powers and control away from communities 
and organisations, and then handing them back later and expecting Indigenous people to 
assume ‘ownership’ of models and rules they have had no say in developing, will not 
work. In this respect at least, the ICG Project’s research suggests that Noel Pearson is 
wrong. He has argued (Pearson 2007) that there are three policy phases to the Federal 
Government’s decisive action: the first is unilateral intervention on the ground; the 
second is radical reform and innovation; the third is retreat by government and transfer 
of ownership to Indigenous organisations and leaders.  
In fact, Indigenous self-governance and good governance lie at the very heart of 
positive development outcomes. Governments urgently need to provide enabling policy 
and legal frameworks, and integrated program guidelines, to actively promote 
Indigenous governance capacity and authority. Building Indigenous governance 
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institutions and capacity should be built into any new interventions—right from the 
start.  
Governments also need to urgently put some implementation backbone into the 
policy rhetoric of ‘whole of government’, especially in relation to funding. At the macro 
level, fundamental reforms to federal fiscal institutions need to be made, as they affect 
funding transfers to and expenditure by state and territory governments on services and 
programs for Indigenous people. These transfers must be allocated to the areas of 
substantial community need, on the bases of which they were initially determined by the 
CGC. Associated infrastructure/capital backlogs and cost shifting by governments to 
Indigenous local governments and small community organisations must be addressed at 
policy and institutional levels within government. Also, the CGC should be requested to 
include a new category that assesses Indigenous community infrastructure/capital needs 
(Westbury and Dillon 2006).  
If we can have decisive action in Indigenous communities, presumably the same is 
possible within government. At a micro level, there is arguably an urgent need for the 
mandatory integration of program funding across departments that is relevant to 
community governance and capacity building. The stories presented at the beginning of 
this chapter and the case-study evidence of the ICG Project indicate that there are 
communities, organisations and leaders who want decisive action from government, but 
in partnership and with reform on both sides.  
In conclusion, our case-study research clearly demonstrates that building governance 
institutions and capacity needs to be placed at the forefront of any proposed intervention 
from the very start, not as an afterthought. ‘Governance building’ should be made an 
integral part of every policy and its implementation on the ground. Simultaneously, the 
reform of governments’ own governance dysfunction and bureaucratic capacity in 
Indigenous affairs has to be a fundamental component of any solution. Without these 
two parallel strategies, it is likely that the current ‘decisive action’ will exacerbate 
problems, not alleviate them.  
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Notes: Paper 3 
1. For more information on the bilateral agreement, the process and history of the NT 
local government regionalisation in West Arnhem Land, see Smith (2005, 2007). 
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Paper 4: D.E. Smith, 2001. ‘Valuing native title: Aboriginal, statutory and policy 
discourses about compensation’, Excerpt pp: 1-21, CAEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 222, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The 
Australian National University, Canberra. 
Paper 5:  D.E. Smith, 2005. ‘Indigenous families, households and governance’, in D. 
Austin-Broos and G. Macdonald (eds) Culture, Economy and Governance in 
Aboriginal Australia, University of Sydney Press, Sydney, pp. 175-86. 
Theme Three lies at the heart of this thesis by publication. Papers 4 & 5 draw on 
over 35 years of fieldwork research in remote, rural and urban Indigenous locations to 
unpack the distinctive cultural moorings, scales, order-generating mechanisms and 
modes of power and agency at work in the Indigenous field of governance.  
A particularly important contribution of the two papers is to rectify the common 
assumption that Indigenous society is so culturally heterogeneous and egalitarian that 
individual governing agency and shared general principles of governance do not 
operate. While the thesis papers certainly document Indigenous diversity, their 
collective ethnographic depth and comparative breadth has enabled underlying cultural 
and social conditions of governance to be discerned. The thesis asserts there is a 
remarkable commonality to these conditions across Indigenous Australia which enables 
us to theorise the existence of an identifiable field of Indigenous governance having 
distinctive parameters, complex formations and cultural geographies. These key 
parameters are summarised below.   
Another important contribution of the two papers is to document and analyse the 
dense interconnections and direct relationship operating between the layered social 
organisation of Indigenous life, and its dispersed and networked mode of governance. 
Indigenous governance is not something that sits above or beyond Indigenous 
mechanisms of sociality. On the contrary, the papers collectively demonstrate that 
governance is embedded within and intimately shaped by that sociality; at all scales.  
Importantly, the collective thesis papers also show that when Indigenous people are 
required to engage with externalities, such as matters of service delivery, government 
funding and policy implementation, negotiations under statutory frameworks, mediation 
with external stakeholders and the like, they habitually call upon (often assertively so)  
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the wide variety of their networked governance capital and resources. These lie within 
and across their extended families; linked households, peer groups, ceremonial, social 
support and exchange circuits; their local and regional organisations and enterprises; 
and dispersed leadership. In this manner, different issues and events are responded to by 
Indigenous people activating (and internally contesting) different permutations of their 
networks, for the purposes of governance. 
The two papers in this theme (supported by the corpus of papers in the following 
themes) documents several of these different networked, governance formations, and 
the different kinds of governance capital and institutions that are activated in order to 
practically address different matters. In doing so, the field of governance is shown to be 
both affect and affective of complex Indigenous considerations and interactions by 
actors concerning the most appropriate governance formation that should take 
precedence or priority in respect to a given matter at any given time. 
The Cultural Logic of Indigenous Governance 
The ethnographic evidence presented in the two papers (supported especially by 
Papers 7 & 8 and the wider corpus of publications listed in Appendix A) enables the 
distinct specificity — the cultural logic — of the field of Indigenous governance to be 
identified. This field can best be described as a spatially dispersed system of self-
organising network formations which have powerful nodal points of social rule and 
agency, internally structured by relationships of power, hierarchy and dense forms of 
governing capital. These networked formations are connected by intersecting relational 
pathways which are themselves given shape by dense interstitial spaces of cultural 
meaning and value.  
An abstract visual depiction of this governing pattern or logic is set out in Figure 1. It 
resonates strongly with the networked logic spoken of by Dundiwuy 2 Mununggurr, and 
also rendered by David Mowarljarli in his drawing of the continent of Australia as an 
embodied network (see Frontispiece).  
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Figure 1. A simple Indigenous network with five nodes (red). Each node is shown 
as a sphere, and connections are shown as straight lines (yellow). Each node can 
trace a connection to every other node. Connections can be understood as a 
relation of different kinds. Nodes are also connected to a shared interstitial dense 
cultural space (cross-hatching). 
 
Source: The backdrop graphic for this diagram is from part of a painting by Debra Wurridj, 
entitled Lorrkon Hollow Log, from Maningrida, Arnhem Land, Northern Territory. 
The thesis papers document many ethnographic examples of the different order of 
network formations that underwrite governance. For example, Paper 5 draws upon a 
considerable evidence base to analyse the scaling outwards of individual actors’ kin and 
social affiliations to produce dense expanding networks of extremely connectivity (see 
also Paper 8 and Smith 2007). Examples of these networked formations include 
Indigenous extended families and their linked households, clans, ceremonial groups, 
moieties and ‘skin’ groups, congeries of outstation residents, fringe camps and pastoral 
station dwellers, and alliances (formal and informal) of Indigenous organisations and 
leaders.  
What they all share in common as networks are a set of social and other relationships 
and ties among a group of people and entities which can take on a persistent pattern of 
connections, structures and practices. Importantly, these network formations operate 
within (and across) various social, economic, geographic and political scales. They are 
multi-dimensional. From the local, they ooze outwards, creating networks of networks 
(such as peer groups of leaders, regionally linked organisations, marriage associations 
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reinforced over time, companies of “owners” and “managers” of sites, rituals, 
songlines). Paper 5 also documents how Indigenous local networks can scale down into 
sub-networks (such as factions, gangs, and gendered domestic units such as widows’ 
and single men’s/women’s campsites, and initiates age grade groups). Theme Four 
demonstrates how such networks also penetrate into Indigenous organisations, locking 
them into wider circuits of relatedness.  
In other words, governance per se does not reside in one, and only one, scale or 
formation of network. A significant contribution of the papers in this Theme is to 
demonstrate the multi-dimensionality of governance, as an ever-present negotiable 
process (with outcomes and consequences) whose form is tied to human calculation, in 
which ‘networkedness’ is the primary calculus.    
In Indigenous networks, nodes are real, not virtual. They consist of individual 
leaders, senior family members, a peer group of elders, an organisation or committee, 
and operate as potential points of power, intentionality and hence agency. Indigenous 
nodes commonly occupy several relational positions that extend into different networks 
for different purposes. Networks are thus able to connect with other networks via their 
nodes. 
The connecting lines or pathways of Indigenous networks are its conduits or arteries 
and have specific properties. The papers document relational connections (formed by 
ties of kinship, marriage, age-grade and gender, land ownership), but also 
socioeconomic, historical and political ties between nodes. While nodes can be thought 
of as autonomous actors, the pathways of Indigenous networks insert the balancing 
weight of interconnectedness and interdependence.  
A network of enmeshed ties represented by short-distance (“close”) relational 
pathways is associated with thick webs of social responsibility and obligation that 
generate a high degree of social boundedness and collective identity. Also people value 
some connections more highly than others at different times. Paper 4 shows how such 
variables result in Indigenous networks having clustering effects that generate core-
peripheral, close-distant dimensions. 
Both papers also document the critical role of the interstitial space between nodes 
and their connecting pathways. These are not empty space. As Paper 4 demonstrates, 
they are cultural constructs comprising the ontological heartland of a network, the 
source of a ‘theory of existence’ (Myers 1986: 49) popularly referred to as ‘The 
Dreaming’. These dense spaces are intimately woven into the fabric of human networks, 
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acting as the cosmological foundation of Indigenous Law and a powerful authorising 
environment for particular kinds of personal agency. 
The ethnographic evidence in the two papers indicates that Indigenous nodal 
networks have high internal coherence and meshed connectivity; that is, a ‘measure of 
self-similarity’ (Fuchs 2001: 157). Such networks link people into structured layers of 
socioeconomic organisation and clusters of intimate interdependence. Consequently, 
they also link people into conflict or factionalism that is potentially extremely 
debilitating by virtue of its very closeness. 
This is a deeply embedded model of existence that mediates Indigenous 
understanding and ordering of the world. All the thesis papers confirm that networked 
relationality is a model that retains high value amongst Indigenous people in rural, 
urban and remote locations; albeit with differing content to its spaces and pathways. For 
example, Paper 4 examines the sophisticated consideration of network parameters — 
the ‘burden of interpretation’ — that people undertake when they must deal with 
conflicts or disruptive events whose impacts radiate through their network and require 
the restoration of social order and/or compensatory action. A number of the thesis 
publications also confirm that the intense relationality of Indigenous mesh networked 
formations gives rise to competing twin trajectories; for example, between individual 
autonomy and collectivities. It also means that close-up sociality can degenerate into 
close-up conflict; with exponential and sometimes long-term repercussions for people. 
The implications for governance are that it must operate across a complex multi-
dimensional field of relations, formations, and modes of power and agency. 
Governing Through Nodal Networks 
The research evidence presented in the two papers indicates that the particular 
systemic and cultural facility of Indigenous nodal networks enables a distinctive field of 
‘law and order’ to be generated. Its form is qualitatively different from the networked 
federalism and bureaucratic and policy networks of the Australian state’s field of 
governmentality.  
The social vantage point of any node within a network is initially dyadic, creating 
spatial distance between itself and other nodes which, as Paper 4 indicates, is 
‘measured’ or understood by people not only as relational distance but also as spheres 
of power and influence.  
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While Indigenous networks are egalitarian in their ethos, some connections and 
nodes are more equal and more highly valued than others. The published papers 
document many examples of particular individuals, families, organisations and places 
considered to be more powerful or influential than others.  This can be literally observed 
where certain nodes are positionally more powerful than others, having developed 
multiple thick connections within and across networks, including to other influential 
nodes. 
The thesis papers report such individual nodes performing a governing role which is 
its own cultural institution; one that is recognised and valued by other nodes in their 
network. Leaders or ‘bosses’ (e.g. of families, clans, ceremonies and organisations) 
accumulate forms of governing capital such as valued knowledge, experience in 
mediating disagreements, oratorical skills, and personal reputation and qualities. These 
can be deployed to facilitate the organisation of order. A governing node is a source of 
agency; a person or entity within a network who can mobilise people, resources, 
relationships, capabilities and information to mould consensus, manage a course of 
action, or achieve a desired outcome. 
Paper 4 examines the particularly important source of governing capital accrued by 
certain men and women as a result of their elite connection to the dense ontological 
spaces of their network. They are able to call upon its Law-given power and order, and 
provide a performative co-presencing of the Dreaming and its power for others. For 
example, when ‘bosses’ are painted and dance as an ancestral creator figure, they 
literally embody that presence into the here and now. In these and other ways, particular 
people concentrate and eventuate the deeper meanings of culture. This potent 
connection provides them with what Annette Weiner (1992: 4) calls ‘cosmological 
authentication’; a form of certified knowledge and sanctioned power to act.  
The radiating density of networked sociality ensures that such powerful people 
remain highly influential in the everyday life of their close networks. Paper 4 notes that 
significant and ‘sometimes dangerous burden of interpretation is imposed’ (ibid: 10) 
upon such influentially connected people. 
The thesis papers report governing nodes drawing upon several encultured modes of 
power derived from their: personal renown and situational potency; relational authority; 
structural position within networks; acquisition of diverse forms of capital; and their 
close connections to a metaphysical world of power. Today, these sources now also 
include forms of power and influence found in the wider governance environment (see 
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Theme Two), as well as those associated with their positions in incorporated Indigenous 
organisations (see Theme Four). On the bases of this ensemble of governing capital and 
power, other people concede authority to them.  
But this is a limited concession, not a delegation or relinquishment of any other 
person’s individual autonomy. For governing nodes are themselves embedded within 
the relational grip of their networks. Like David Mowarljarli’s map, they are spatially 
embodied — attached to tangible things (a ‘country’, an extended family, set of linked 
households, a dispersed community of identity, a physical office in an organisation). 
There is a craft and an art to networked governance. 
Superstructural Governing Nodes 
The papers in this Theme indicate that governing nodes cluster. For example, 
individual leaders within a network may be directly linked to leaders in other networks 
through their shared historical and work experience, participation in important events, 
and shared roles and responsibilities for particular ceremonial practices and knowledge. 
The leaders of organisations are also embedded within this wider network of leaders 
(see Appendix B).  
These governing clusters can be conceptualised as a jural circuitry, the backbone 
within a network — the part that carries the heaviest communication traffic, and the 
heaviest load of order-organisation that helps hold a network together and connect it to 
others. This circuitry of governing nodes constitutes its own superstructural node, 
bringing together individuals who can marshal significant collective authority and 
influence in order to direct processes, concentrate resources and coordinate their 
respective members for joint or desired end purposes.30 But they do so without 
permanently integrating or amalgamating the various networks of which they are a part.  
Moulding and Mobilising Consensus 
In polycentric relational systems such as Indigenous networks, governing nodes are a 
way that agency becomes centred and concentrated. In such systems, decision making is 
an occasioned agreement rather than an ongoing, unchanging state; a matter of 
moulding consensus as a form of ‘generalized expectation’ (Fuchs 2001: 139-49). For 
example, Paper 4 describes decision making in the context of compensatory events as 
the creation of ‘chains of cooperation’ (Macy 1991: 745); that is, the result of parallel 
multiple interactions in which each member of a group or participant in an event takes 
into account what others are doing and saying. Importantly, the chain of a consensus can 
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be moulded and harnessed into cooperative action by governing nodes when they insert 
their own reputational influence, governing power and thick relationality into network 
processes. 
Nevertheless, as a network’s linkages shift, as its boundedness expands and 
contracts, so too does consensus mutate and readjust, and collective action dissipates. 
When the social distance between nodes becomes tenuous, or other networks come into 
play, there is reduced adhesion to consensus and collective action. The strain towards 
localised decision making and autonomy in a network serves as an additional constraint 
upon the extent to which a governing node can sustain the specificity of an exercise of 
power. In other words, the very cultural and systemic features of meshed networks that 
enable the governing agency of nodes, also constrain that agency. 
The Durability and Fluidity of Networked Governance 
Collectively, the papers demonstrate that Indigenous networks and their nodal 
governance have a sophisticated facility for both durability and fluidity. On the one 
hand, network proclivities are not so mechanical or preordained that they are not 
internally contested, contradicted and interpreted through struggle and interaction 
between individuals and between networks. A critical systemic advantage of meshed 
nodal networks lies therefore in its tolerance (and in certain circumstances, active 
promotion) of diverse, aggregated scales and polities in response to the strategic and 
situational agency of people and external conditions. A governing network also 
facilitates dimensionality; its nodal points of power and authority are able to operate as 
horizontal linking pins (egalitarian) and vertical linking pins (hierarchical) within and 
across networks (see organisational examples of this in Appendix C). 
On the other hand, meshed networks are not infinitely fluid and open. The two 
papers document several deep systemic design principles that promote the resilience and 
boundedness of networks. Papers 5 and 8 identify the cultural principle of relational 
autonomy as being particularly influential. It is a unitary concept, not an oppositional 
dualism, highlighting the fact that individual and local-group autonomy is socially 
embedded. The second core design principle identified in the thesis papers is that of 
subsidiarity in decision-making roles and responsibilities across the layers of networks. 
This plays a critical role in enabling order-organisation across the interconnected layers 
of a network.  
The systemic effect of this ensemble of cultural principles is to encourage dispersed, 
but networked layers of polity (see a regional example of  this in Appendix B, and 
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organisational examples in Appendix C). It also serves to create heartlands of core 
durability within a network and, by so doing, to delimit its shifting peripheries where 
some connections and influence peter out. By these means, the centripetal force of the 
powerful nodes, dense spaces and thick pathways of relationality provide the system-
preserving glue which acts to hold networks together over time. Conversely, the vitality 
and fluidity of networks can be seriously jeopardised when such principles are leached 
of cultural meaning, and when governing nodes lose their access to the authorising 
environments of thick relationality, ontological power and governing capital. 
The Legitimacy of Nodal Networked Governance 
A related critical issue for the sustainability and effectiveness of Indigenous 
governance arrangements is investigated by the two papers; one which I have more 
recently termed ‘cultural legitimacy’. Adopting Neil Sterritt’s (2002) approach, 
legitimacy is defined in Paper 1 as the way structures and institutions of governance are 
created and reproduced, how leaders justify, substantiate and make known their actions 
and decisions, and the extent of people’s confidence in and support of them. Legitimacy 
in this sense suggests a collective recognition of institutionalised rules and values about 
governing. When invoked, they ‘measure’ the extent to which leaders and organisations 
comply and are deemed credible and trustworthy, or otherwise. The papers under this 
theme also show that the legitimacy of Indigenous governance arrangements can be 
influentially determined by powerful individual nodes and particular factional clusters 
within networks.  
In other words, legitimacy is not a fixed cultural brand or stagnant collective 
benchmark. In the context of nodal networked governance, the papers demonstrate it to 
be a relational condition that has to be negotiated and sustained over time. For example, 
a leader or organisation may be accepted by a group of people as socially authorised to 
act on their behalf, make decisions, and to interpret information for them in particular 
contexts. But they must continue to perform that role in ways that resonate with people 
as being ‘proper’ and ‘right’. As one Indigenous leader succinctly put it: 
We have to be careful … we got a jury out there … we have to behave 
properly and make our decisions properly so people in our communities can 
see us paying respect and behaving properly (see Paper 8).  
Governing nodes must maintain credibility and reputation with their authorising 
social environment in order to continue mobilising people and moulding consensus.  
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The papers demonstrate that Indigenous assessments of legitimacy focus primarily 
on the relationships and processes involved. People are concerned with the way 
structures of governance are created, leaders chosen and perform, consensus generated, 
accountability performed and resources shared. The layered identities and ties of 
networks are generally viewed by Indigenous people as the legitimate bases for 
identifying the ‘self’ in their ‘self-governance’. From this perspective, legitimacy is 
about the means and the ends.  
Furthermore, the papers suggest that governance legitimacy does not mean having to 
simplistically integrate or juridify one thing (culture) into another (e.g. a new 
organisational structure). There is no quick-fix ‘culturally appropriate’ solution to 
legitimacy. Rather there are cultural design principles of networked governance whose 
effectiveness and resonance can be drawn upon to inform experimentation, which will 
then be strategically assessed by people. The papers highlight that what matters for the 
longer-term sustainability of Indigenous governance is that processes for designing and 
assessing legitimacy be under Indigenous control and agency; a product of informed 
Indigenous choice backed by the practical ability and power to pursue chosen courses of 
action.  
Summary 
The papers under this theme ethnographically document and analyse the radical 
specificity of Indigenous governance as nodal networks which can generate governing 
circuits and superstructural formations. By its very networked condition, Indigenous 
governance must be able to operate as a multi-dimensional field; as a flexible, relational 
system of order-organisation characterised by several distinctive features. The critical 
features of the field of nodal networked Indigenous governance include: its vertical and 
horizontal trajectories of scale and polities; relational and consensus conditions of 
decision making; its facilitation and constraint upon individual autonomy and collective 
action; and its durability through time, including connections back to ancestral networks 
and forward to future generational networks.  
Importantly there is a dispersed subsidiarity of governing roles and responsibilities, 
and a clustering of superstructural circuitries of governance. Governing nodes are able 
to call upon their thick relationality, accumulated governance capital and network 
centrality to concentrate and mobilise governing power and agency, and reinforce 
particular kinds of systemic order. In doing so, they may call upon or activate different 
orders and scales of networked formations, for the purposes of achieving a preferred 
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governance process or outcome. This model of the Indigenous field of governance has 
significant ramifications for Indigenous people’s engagement with other players in the 
wider environment; and, in particular, for their encounters with the governmentality of 
the Australian state. 
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Paper 4:  Valuing Native Title — Aboriginal, Statutory 
and Policy Discourses about Compensation 
D.E. Smith, 2001. 
‘Excerpt’ pp: 1-21, Originally published as CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 222, Centre 
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The Australian National University, 
Canberra. 40pp. 
Introduction 
Writing about compensation for resource development in Papua New Guinea, 
anthropologist Colin Filer (1997: 156) reported that:  
Arguments about ‘compensation’ . . . are not merely the result of conflicting 
evaluations of things which have been lost, damaged or destroyed; they also 
seem to reflect a deeper division over the definition of ‘compensation’ itself, 
and hence the conceptual and emotional relationship between 
‘compensation’ and the other forms of property or value which engage the 
minds of the participants.  
Similar deep divisions and conflicting evaluations engage the mind of parties in the 
Australian arena of native title compensation. Underlying the conceptualisation, 
negotiation and determination of native title compensation lie highly charged issues of 
cultural and legal ethnocentrism.  
In Australia, multiple statutory pathways to securing potential compensation have 
been established under the Native Title Act 1993 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’ or 
‘the legislation’). Some involve negotiation and mediation; others require arbitration 
and court determination. There are also different modes of discourse about native title 
compensation, using languages which often display an incommensurability of meaning 
and practice. Alongside the statutory, there are common law, policy, economic and 
Indigenous discourses, each operating according to its own logic, principles and criteria. 
When these discourses about compensation engage, competing views quickly arise 
about the specificity of such terms as ‘native title’, ‘impact’ and ‘effect’, and related 
matters of scale, duration and degree. A common feature, however, of these disparate 
discourses is that all are grappling with the concepts of property, value, extinguishment 
and loss; concepts which are increasingly subject to investigation by tribunals and 
hearings around the world (see Hann 1998; Jorgensen 1995; Kirsch 2001; National 
Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) 1999; Posey 1990).  
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With such highly charged matters at hand, this paper is a preliminary attempt to 
disentangle some of the threads of incommensurability. Two key modes of discourse 
about compensation—the Aboriginal and the statutory—are examined in some detail to 
draw out their key principles and concepts.1 This serves several purposes. The first is to 
clarify the distinguishing features of the multiple statutory pathways established for 
compensation under the Act—for there remains considerable confusion about them. The 
second is to consider the implications of the statutory and related common law 
procedures for securing practical and just outcomes. The third is to highlight some of 
the key policy challenges and long-standing lessons that will need to be addressed in 
order to secure such outcomes.  
The fourth and perhaps primary purpose is to more fully explicate one discourse 
about native title compensation that seems to have been largely missing from the public 
debate to date, but which is arguably central to it; namely, that of Aboriginal groups in 
respect to their own regimes of compensation sourced in Aboriginal systems of law. For 
that purpose, the paper commences with an ethnographic analysis of Aboriginal 
compensation processes, principles and concepts, and of the related rights, interests and 
responsibilities in land that are embedded within these. The paper considers the value 
systems revealed therein, and their implications for how ‘loss’, ‘extinguishment’ and 
‘just terms’ might be better conceptualised for the purposes of common law 
consideration and the negotiation of compensation.  
An overall objective is to draw together these seemingly disparate threads in order to 
construct a ‘recognition space’ for ‘native title compensation’. It is argued in the second 
half of the paper that native title compensation is, like native title itself, sui generis, or 
unique. Native title compensation will require an innovative jurisprudential approach 
that acknowledges it as a fundamentally new creature, recognisable at the intersection of 
Aboriginal and Western laws. Such an approach will entail the ‘construction of 
emergent principles’ and ‘new rules’ (French 2000: 3). A precondition for that 
innovation will be the creation of a recognition space that ameliorates the legal 
ethnocentrism of the common law, and addresses the intrinsic value to Aboriginal 
people of their lands and waters. Such an approach would need to be based on an 
exegesis of logically probative facts about the Aboriginal value of ‘cultural property’ 
(see below and Kirsch 2001), and about the related compensatory rights and interests 
exercised by Aboriginal people. To assist in that objective, the paper proposes a ‘Heads 
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of Damages’ (Heads) for possible use in the more formal arena of arbitration and court 
determinations.  
The Emerging Discourses and Divisions over Compensation 
An important mode of discourse about native title compensation is carried out in 
statutory and common law terms. In the Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 
(hereafter Mabo No 2) decision, the High Court declared that the common law of 
Australia recognises and affords protection, under certain conditions, to the native title 
rights and interests of Indigenous Australians. The decision also stated that while there 
may be locations where native title has survived intact, there would be circumstances—
past, present and future—in which native title could be impaired or extinguished.  
The Mabo No 2 decision and the subsequent Native Title Act 1993 enacted by the 
Federal Government established the legal principle that compensation may be payable 
to native title holders for specified actions (referred to as ‘acts’ in the legislation) which 
lead to ‘extinguishment’ or to any ‘loss, diminution, impairment or other effect . . . on 
their native title rights and interests’ (ss. 48, 51(1)). An act is said to ‘affect’ native title 
if it ‘extinguishes’ native rights and interests in lands or waters, or is ‘otherwise wholly 
or partly inconsistent with their continued existence, enjoyment or exercise’ (s. 227). 
The historical fiction of terra nullius was thereby replaced with the legal fiction of 
extinguishment.  
What constitutes loss, diminution, impairment or extinguishment—and whether the 
latter may be partial or full—is not yet settled by the Australian courts and is subject to 
ongoing debate (Bartlett 2000; French 2000; Neate 1999). The statutory framework 
prescribes as an overriding measure that an entitlement to compensation is ‘an 
entitlement on just terms’ (ss. 51, 53). Compensation on ‘just terms’ seems a governing 
issue—the way in which ‘just terms’ is defined is at least as important as defining what 
‘compensation’ might mean.  
In Australia, the debate about how to conceptualise and value native title 
compensation is linked to the fundamental question of what constitutes native title. 
Native title is broadly defined in the legislation to mean:  
• the ‘communal, group or individual rights and interests in relation to land or 
water’;  
• where those rights and interests are possessed under ‘traditional laws 
acknowledged, and traditional customs observed by’ Indigenous Australians;  
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•  where people, ‘by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land and 
waters’;  
• those ‘rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia’ (s. 
223(1)); and  
•  it is specified that native title includes hunting, gathering and fishing rights and 
interests (s. 223(2)).  
The legislation has left many critical issues and concepts open for practical 
resolution. The specific details remain to be worked out between parties in negotiation 
or in the courts. With regard to compensation, there is considerable uncertainty about 
the following key issues.  
• What are the native title rights and interests that have been, or might be, affected 
by an ‘act’ of government or a third party?  
• What is the nature of the act’s impact on those native title rights and interests?  
• How is loss, impairment or extinguishment to be determined?  
• Who is entitled to compensation and on what basis?  
• Who pays compensation and on what basis?  
• How is the extent of compensation to be measured and its form determined?  
A range of opinions are expressed by stakeholders. To date, proposed solutions have 
largely been dominated by legal and land valuation discourse, often pursued within 
highly charged contexts of resource development or court litigation (see, in particular, 
Gardner 1998; Sheehan 1997, 1998). Not surprisingly, many parties are looking for the 
elusive Holy Grail of a formula or standardised procedure for the calculation of 
compensation.  
However, a practical way forward is made difficult by a number of factors. Common 
law recognition of native title is in its infancy in Australia. Described as a ‘moveable 
feast’ (Edmunds & Smith 2000: 4; see also French 2000), it is developing case by case, 
not always in a consistent manner, and in circumstances where the traditional laws and 
customs from which native title is ‘solely derived’, are ‘incompletely known’ and 
‘imperfectly comprehended’ (Mabo No 2).  
Another challenge is the complexity of the statutory framework. Different potential 
types of statutory compensation have been created with multiple pathways by which 
they might be secured; and each pathway invokes distinctive processes, principles and 
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criteria. Amendments to the legislation made in 1998 also generate a greater degree of 
intersection between certain pathways, enabling more flexible combinations of 
processes to be activated, but also adding to the overall complexity.  
Furthermore, the term ‘compensation’ is used differently throughout the legislation, 
and nowhere is it defined. Also, it is used interchangeably with other terms such as 
‘condition’, ‘consideration’, ‘payment’, and ‘trust amount’. In effect, native title 
compensation can be negotiated, mediated, arbitrated or determined via different 
statutory procedures which invoke differently defined categories of native title parties. 
In a number of instances compensation can be secured at the same time that other 
‘conditions’ apply which, in turn, have a compensatory character.  
These complex permutations arise because the legislation not only establishes 
procedures for the common law recognition and protection of native title, but also for its 
legal extinguishment, forced taking, and loss. It also affords statutory entitlements 
which allow native title rights and interests to be traded by way of negotiated consent. 
The High Court has declared that the rights of negotiation are ‘valuable rights’ which 
enable applicants to ‘protect’ their claims and may result in them ‘obtaining a 
commercially beneficial settlement’. The legislation thereby provides ‘claims of native 
title [with] an economic as well as a spiritual and physical dimension’ (McHugh at 253, 
259 in North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 135 ALR 225). 
In a number of contexts, these tradeable statutory rights are being used as bargaining 
leverage to secure compensation, not only as a consequence of temporary impairment or 
diminution, but also as a straightforward means to revenue sharing. In many of these 
cases, extinguishment simply has not been an issue.  
To add to the statutory and common law complexity, there is an Indigenous 
discourse about compensation. Culturally-based criteria and values are held by 
Aboriginal people about the nature, purpose and means of determining of compensation. 
Many groups across the country continue to exercise compensatory rights, interests and 
responsibilities that are derived solely from Aboriginal law and custom and that are 
directly relevant to native title over land and waters. Like the Native Title Act 1993, 
Aboriginal regimes of compensation have multiple pathways, principles and criteria, 
and outcomes that are subject to negotiation in the shadow of the law.  
Importantly, Aboriginal people bring the values, behaviours and logic grounded in 
their own culturally-based compensation processes with them into the native title 
negotiation and litigation arena. The Aboriginal discourse about compensation is not 
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always compatible with Western legal principles or market valuation models. Nor is it 
always comprehensible to other parties or institutions involved in negotiating or 
determining compensation under the legislation.  
Inevitably, whichever statutory pathway is pursued, parties confront deeper divisions 
that unfold as they attempt to translate the different discourses of compensation. The 
languages of these discourses often display an incommensurability of meaning.  
If ‘just’ and sustainable outcomes are to be secured, an innovative jurisprudential and 
policy approach is required that acknowledges native title compensation as a 
fundamentally new creature: the combined product of several modes of discourse that is 
recognisable at the intersection of Aboriginal and Western laws. Such an approach will 
entail the ‘construction of emergent principles’ and ‘new rules’ (French 2000: 3), and 
the development of enabling policy frameworks to facilitate agreement-making and 
settlements.  
Aboriginal Regimes of Compensation 
In this section a cross-section of ethnographic literature is reviewed and combined 
with the author’s field research experience in urban, rural and remote communities over 
a period of 27 years, in order to elucidate the general features of the compensation 
regimes operating within Aboriginal societies. The constituent principles, criteria, 
values and processes are drawn out, and their embeddedness within an overarching 
system of rights and interests in land and waters is described. The outcomes pursued by 
Aboriginal people from their own compensation processes are highlighted.  
This review is preliminary and is not an exhaustive coverage of the available 
literature. There are obvious gaps in time periods and locations; especially for areas of 
settled Australia where the historical and ethnographic record is often thin. It is not the 
intention here to promote a culturally static or reified account of Aboriginal 
compensation regimes; the social organisation and land tenure systems which underlie 
them are dynamic and so, therefore, are compensation processes and mechanisms. 
Furthermore, there is considerable diversity in the forms of social and economic 
organisation evident across the country, so that constituent rights, interests and 
responsibilities in land will vary between groups. Compensation processes and 
mechanisms similarly respond to these variations. Furthermore, as Sutton (1981) 
perceptively argued over a decade before the native title legislation existed, Aboriginal 
people in settled Australia continue to exercise a sense of Aboriginal identity—they 
retain the ‘bones of the culture; that is, the principles of things such as socialisation of 
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children, family life, their role as kin, modes of conversational interaction, systems of 
rights and responsibilities, and so on (see also his subsequent detailed ‘updating’ of that 
argument in Sutton 1998b). I would further argue that they continue to retain and 
exercise, to varying degrees, forms of distinctly Aboriginal compensation processes, 
principles and criteria. Accordingly, as Sutton argued in 1981, Aboriginal groups in 
settled Australia can justifiably demand land rights and compensation for territorial 
dispossession.  
Like native title itself, the specificity of rights, interests and responsibilities exercised 
under Aboriginal compensation processes will vary on a case by case basis; but also, 
like native title, there are arguably core compensatory principles and values derived 
from the underlying system of Aboriginal law and land title which is common across the 
country. These core structural traits can usefully be extrapolated to a general level of 
applicability to Aboriginal groups. It is precisely because of that general applicability 
that parties in negotiation about any matter involving compensation with different 
Aboriginal groups across Australia, find themselves encountering the same modes of 
interaction, logic, expectation and discourse. The following analysis attempts to draw 
out the core traits of Aboriginal compensation processes. 
Aboriginal Law: The Grounds for Compensation 
Aboriginal groups in many parts of the country continue to possess and exercise 
compensation rights, interests and responsibilities that are derived under their extant 
traditional laws and customs.  
Aboriginal law operates as a whole system underpinning personal property and 
communal title, and establishes what some refer to as the ‘right road’ for people to 
follow. It is not a bundle of accidental principles or isolated relations (Keen 1994; 
Williams 1986, 1987). But neither does it resemble Western law in its structure, first 
principles or processes. It has its own notions of precedent and ancient moral authority, 
externalised into the Dreaming. As Myers notes (1986: 49), the Dreaming and system of 
law derived from it ‘constitute the ground or foundation of the visible, present-day 
world’; it is a ‘theory of existence’ in which everything, including land, water, persons, 
customs, and resources originates.  
Concepts of personhood, group identity and human agency are inextricably linked to 
the law and to land.2 With its origin in a religiously framed creative epoch, the law 
constitutes a source of permanent cultural values for Aboriginal societies. It is the 
repository of law-given precedents and moral authority which is perceived as having no 
 153 Indigenous Governance 
arbitrariness. It provides what Weiner (1992: 4) calls, ‘cosmological authentication’—
that is, an authority lodged in the sacred and religious domains which transcends the 
mundane and impermanent aspects of social life, but which nevertheless dictates in 
daily affairs how material resources and social practices link individuals, groups and 
land. Conceived as such, ‘the law’ drives much of customary legal behaviour across 
different domains; for example, in areas of property rights and responsibilities, marriage 
and kinship, daily family life and socialisation, economic production and exchange; 
ritual and ceremony, and so on (Keen 1994; Maddock 1984; Sutton 1988; Williams 
1986, 1987). Dreaming-derived law provides certain people, places and processes with a 
powerful legitimating force and value.  
The paradox (and achievement) of the Dreaming is that it facilitates personal 
creativity and individual autonomy within an ontological framework that disguises the 
process of change under a consciousness of permanence and the veneer of conservatism 
(see especially Morphy 1997; Myers 1986; Weiner 1992). On the one hand, individuals 
deny unilateral personal agency regarding the law, whose foundation and reproduction 
are externalised into the Dreaming. Nevertheless, within a spiritually sanctioned view of 
the law as unchanging, in everyday life there is a fluid ‘here and now’ quality in which 
behaviour and events are actively interpreted, negotiated and manipulated in the shadow 
of the law (Merlan 1998; Myers 1986). As a consequence, human assessments and 
decisions about circumstances that might require a compensatory response are not 
necessarily predictable. But when made, they will be framed by recourse to the law.  
As a theory of existence and value, the law provides the grounds for people thinking 
about and practicing compensation. The legitimacy and enactability of rights, interests 
and responsibilities that comprise Aboriginal compensation processes are constituted by 
laws that are part of a system of like laws which form an interrelated whole. Aboriginal 
law governing compensation is based on locally recognised codes of behaviour and 
shared values regarding what is termed ‘wrong-way’ and ‘right-way’ behaviour. It is 
expressed in public processes for applying sanctions, punishment, redress and 
restitution. ‘Wrong-way’ behaviour is responded to and enforced by representatives of 
social authority, differently constituted according to their age, kin relatedness, 
ceremonial seniority, power, gender and so on.  
Aboriginal conceptualisations of compensation are therefore complex, and correlated 
to a fundamental relationship posited between the individual, group, land and the eternal 
law of the Dreaming. As a theory of existence and value that assists groups to actively 
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assimilate and respond to change, and that legitimises change as continuity, the law 
affords a crucial adaptive mechanism for contemporary Aboriginal societies across the 
country. Processes of compensation derived from contemporary Aboriginal law and 
custom are extant amongst many Aboriginal groups who continue to negotiate their 
exercise of related rights, interests and responsibilities. In the following sections the 
nature of those processes, rights, interests and responsibilities are further explored.  
Events and Behaviour that Provoke Compensation Processes 
Aboriginal compensation is about property—that is, property as defined in terms of 
what Hoebel (1966: 424) referred to as its essential nature; namely, the network of 
social relations that governs the conduct of people with respect to the use and 
disposition of things. As Gray (1994: 192–4, citing Justice Douglas’s decision in the 
Sierra Club case) and Hann (1998) have well understood and clarified for different 
audiences, the most important ‘property’ in any resource is the right to participate in the 
selective exploitation or prioritisation ‘of its various forms of value’. To be recognised 
as having the right to ‘speak for’ an asset, to have a ‘dispositive voice’ in dictating the 
terms of its circulation, access, utilisation and distribution, is to command ‘an intensely 
significant component of “property” in the resource’ (Gray 1994: 193). The social 
conditions for compensation are first activated when the distribution of entitlements to 
access, use and distribution are called into question or put at risk.  
There are certain behaviours and incidents in the Aboriginal domain that may put 
such entitlements at risk and initiate the need for some form of compensatory 
assessment and action. A preliminary review of the ethnographic literature (see 
references) suggests such behaviours and incidents include those listed below.  
1. Actions against bodily property, including committing a personal injury and 
wounding (accidental or otherwise); committing murder and homicide; 
‘accidental’ death (in a world where individual agency is disguised, many deaths 
are perceived to involve religiously-based causation).  
2.  Theft of objects (including land, ritual paraphernalia, designs), or of power (for 
example, in the form of knowledge), or of sexual rights (such as by adultery).  
3.  The failure to resolve indebtedness or respond to reciprocal obligations and 
demands (whether they be economic, social or ritual), and the refusal to honour 
contractual obligations (such as for bestowal and marriage). 
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4.  Committing a transgression or offence against persons in authority, especially by 
younger to older senior people.  
5.  Verbal trespass (for example, given that speaking for land is an act which 
confirms and asserts one’s rights of ownership of that land, then talking for 
country which is not one’s own, or publicly declaring restricted words, constitute 
important verbal trespasses upon the rights and interests of others).  
6.  Economic trespass (including the taking of resources from another person’s 
country without permission or reciprocity).  
7. Various acts of religious trespass and sacrilege (including breaches of religious 
obligation and behaviour, breaches of taboo associated with sites and ceremony, 
breaches of restricted knowledge; grievances arising from sorcery; and failure to 
safeguard and manage spiritual resources).  
8.  Physical trespass onto the geographic space of a dangerous and restricted location, 
or onto country that is not one’s own, for illicit purposes.  
9.  Committing damage (including accidental or deliberate) to land and sites, to 
totemic flora or fauna, as well as the related failure by an individual or group to 
safeguard and protect land and its environmental resources.  
This range of behaviours and events can all be characterised as constituting forms of 
trespass in its widest meaning. That is, they are perceived by Aboriginal people to be 
examples of unlawful acts which cause injury to, and improper inroads upon, other 
groups’ or individuals’ property, presence, authority, rights and resources. They may be 
deliberate or accidental, actual or implied, short or long-term in their duration. But as 
forms of trespass they will be interpreted as an intrusion, transgression or offence, and 
so deemed to require a compensatory response.  
Construing the Effect of an Action or Event 
The nature of effect (its quality, scale, duration and so on) is directly related to the 
type of causative action or event involved. For each action or event such as those listed 
above that is construed negatively as trespass, the effect of transformation and loss 
confronts people. For example, an action may challenge the distribution of social 
relations or potentially sever them, infringe rights in the use and disposition of things, 
jeopardise principles of authority, or make vulnerable the legitimising force of the law 
and Dreaming. In other words, the extent of effect has many dimensions, and these are 
subject to interpretative construction by individuals and groups.  
 156  Theme 3 
The ethnographic literature makes it clear that Aboriginal landowners will 
investigate the nature and possibility of effect across a range of domains, including on:  
• the land and sea, and sites within them;  
•  people’s possession, access, use and enjoyment of land and sea;  
• individuals, families, groups and their social relations;  
• an individual’s physical and psychological health and wellbeing;  
• the environment and its natural resources;  
• religious life and the law itself;  
• the systems of knowledge related to the above; and 
• on group authority over all the above.  
It can be generally argued that, within the Aboriginal worldview, effects are not 
easily quarantined. Rather they are seen to be contagious, easily spreading from one of 
the above domains to others, and they may have multiplier effects that potentially 
escalate conflict in the process (see e.g. Chase 1980: 283–5; Sutton 1995: 42, 46, 57; 
Williams 1987). The logic used by people to interpret this contagion emphasises the 
effect of an action or event on both the visible and invisible worlds. An intimate 
interdependence is perceived to exist between these worlds; for example, conception, 
foetal nurturing, birth, the bodily wellbeing of humans, and their eventual death are all 
regarded as being spiritual as well as physiological processes and, above all, are 
causally linked to the spiritually embodied land (see Morphy 1997; Munn 1986; Smith 
1981). Land not only contains the bodies and spirits of past ancestors who have ‘gone 
down’ into it, but it also incubates the spiritual essences from which foetuses are created 
and babies ‘come up’ (Smith 1981). Its geographical features also represent the 
metamorphosed forms and imprints of the Dreaming creator beings. All these essences 
of spiritual signification are regarded as exercising an active agency in the real world—
an agency which can directly affect individual physiological development and physical 
wellbeing. For example, a person may bear certain telltale birth marks on their body that 
were put there by a particular Dreaming; they may display physical mannerisms or 
personal idiosyncrasies from an ancestor associated with their spiritual conception; or 
evince an attachment to a particular story or totem because they were conceived or born 
at a related site (see Brady 1999: 166–7; Smith 1981: 181–8). It is not surprising then 
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that the effect of actions may easily spread from the personal, to the social, to the land 
and law—and vice versa.  
An important and sometimes dangerous burden of interpretation is imposed upon key 
individuals and groups regarding the type of transformations created by an act, in and 
across these domains. Ongoing assessments will be made of the extent of effect in 
respect to its scale, duration, and the degree of social and religious repercussions. The 
gravity of the offence, the motivation and mental state of the perpetrator, the harm done 
to those people and things at the hub of effect, the prevalence of the action, and the need 
to uphold the law through deterrence, are all factors taken into account in the complex 
process of interpreting effect and thereby determining a compensatory response.  
Evaluations of the nature of the effect may be carried out publicly. Williams (1987: 
49–66) describes the holding of clan ‘moots’ as a mechanism of dispute settlement 
amongst the Yolngu (see also Berndt & Berndt 1952; Chase 1980; Elkin 1931: 191; 
Memmott 1979: 97–103). This involved intervention and management by persons with 
political authority, the gathering and checking of information, obtaining admissions of 
culpable acts, confirmation of action to be taken, and the application of sanctions. But 
when the effects of actions and incidents fall squarely within the realm of sacrilege and 
breach of religious taboo, consideration of similar issues will be restricted to closed 
group of religious authorities and dealt with summarily and without public declaration.  
A critical factor in evaluating the nature of an effect in order to determine the form 
compensation should take, is the need to identify the social boundaries of groups 
involved.  
Identifying the Social Boundaries of Perpetration and Impact 
As Weiner (1992) and Kirsch (2001) have noted, loss is a manifestation of the 
process of social relations. For Aboriginal groups, acts of trespass invariably require the 
interpretation and assignment of social interests and social responsibility.  
An act or event which provokes a compensatory process can most easily be 
construed as a central point of energy from which radiate a series of repercussions; 
rather as a stone which, on falling into water, creates concentric waves whose energy is 
progressively depleted at the outer margins. In the same way, an act or event will 
produce a radiating social ‘field of perpetrators’ and a social ‘field of impact’ (see also 
Maddock 1972: 165, who refers to ‘fields of guilt’; and Sutton 1995: 42, who refers to 
the ‘politically responsible group’ making decisions and asserting rights and interests). 
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The size and spread of the relevant social fields inevitably depends on the extent of 
transformation and loss created by the impact of the relevant action or event (see Sutton 
1995: 42, 46) The ethnographic literature suggests that identification of these social 
fields will be based upon an interpretive reading of a mix of factors. The concept of 
‘distance’ has multiple connotations and appears to provide a broad framework within 
which possible factors are considered. There is a sociology and geography of ‘distance’ 
which can be ‘measured’ in terms of kin relations, and economic, ceremonial, political 
and ownership rights, interests and responsibilities (Maddock 1984; Myers 1986, 1989).  
Possessory and managerial distance 
Individuals and groups have multiple and overlapping ownership and management 
rights and responsibilities for particular tracts of land, water, sites, and totemic 
affiliations. Religious, political and economic interests in sites and estates are not 
exclusively held by their core or primary owners (see especially Sutton 1995). Even 
persons ostensibly belonging to the same corporate group have ‘different ancestries and 
life histories and, thus, only sometimes share identical “countries”’ (Sutton 1995: 33). 
These degrees of rights, interests and responsibilities will be measured on the basis of 
people’s possessory and managerial distance from the property (be that an object, place, 
relation or process) that has been affected, and will be taken into account by people at 
the hub of effect.  
In places where land ownership is intimately connected with Dreaming tracks and 
travelling ceremony, then the patterns of associated rights, interests and responsibilities 
are extremely complicated (see Sutton 1995: 54–7). Dreamings interpenetrate and 
connect people together. For example, different groups of people may own or have 
responsibility for managing the sites, songs or ceremonies associated with an extended 
Dreaming track crossing a number of their different ‘countries’. These groups may all 
be regarded (and regard themselves) as being directly affected by an impact that occurs 
at a particular site on one section of that track. For example, Peterson (1993: 77) reports 
that the beneficiaries of cash payments arising from a gold mining agreement included 
people who had important ceremonial links to the country on which the mine was 
located, but who themselves resided some 300 kilometres away from the mine site. 
Furthermore, as Sutton’s (1995, Ch. 1–8) analysis of Aboriginal boundaries and land 
ownership across the country indicates, Dreamings, powerful sites, ceremonies and 
stories are of different types and can engage different numbers of people.  
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The institutional relationship between Aboriginal ‘owners’ and ‘managers’ involves 
a relationship between senior persons that entails notions of compensation, in the sense 
that it is based upon mutual responsibilities to safeguard places and ritual processes, and 
a corresponding obligation to ‘pay’ when mismanagement occurs (Merlan 1982; Trigger 
1989: 18–23). Accordingly, the specific persons undertaking the reciprocal set of 
ritually-based rights and duties to land, referred to in many areas as ‘owners’ and 
‘managers’, may be included as members of the group affected by the damage to a 
natural object or site, or the breach of a religious obligation by either owners or 
managers.  
If an action or event is deemed to have significant transformative and multiplier 
effects, then the inclusion of people in both the fields of perpetration and of effect will 
likewise be expansive. Sutton (1995: 42) reports, for example, that if a decision is made 
about ‘allowing a major development that will transform a whole region, many groups 
may . . . be involved, even where the development site itself may be wholly on one 
small clan estate’. Josif (1988: 11, cited in Cooper 1992: 232) noted that custodians of 
the Bula sites at Coronation Hill, which were subject to possible mining activity in the 
early 1990s, were anxious because ‘Aboriginal people from other groups share spiritual 
ties with the Sickness Country . . . and may consider that Jawoyn were not performing 
their proper role as custodians’. Some Bula custodians feared ‘payback’ or sorcery if it 
was decided they had not protected sites properly. In Cape York Peninsula, people who 
own and perform the same ‘dance style’ for land that may be affected by an adverse act 
may be regarded as members of the social field of effect (Chase 1980). Dixon reported 
how the Aboriginal actors involved in the negotiation of the Glen Hill mining 
agreement in Western Australia conceived of the social extent of groups affected by the 
mine in terms of the traditional system of exchange, called wunan. The wunan 
connected distant groups with rights to participate under Aboriginal law, and functioned 
as criteria for including them in the social field of effect (Dixon 1990: 83–4).  
Genealogical distance 
All Aboriginal action and interpretation of events takes place within the ‘rubric of 
relatedness’ (Finlayson 1991; Martin 1993; Myers 1986: 117; Sutton 1998b). For the 
purposes of compensation, distance will also be measured according to degrees of social 
and kin relatedness. Persons may be excluded from the field of effect by being classified 
as ‘too far away’ in terms of their kin relation to the people at the hub of impact. 
Conversely, on the basis of the ‘logic of expansiveness’ initially applied by people 
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(Myers 1986: 166), those persons who live far away from an act or event that has 
occurred, but who are ‘close kin’, will be regarded as experiencing the same effect as 
their family at the centre of the effect.  
By the same measure, genealogical ‘outsiders’ who reside with the group at the hub 
of effect might be vulnerable to inclusion in the field of perpetrators. They may choose 
or be required to make themselves geographically distant in order to avoid sanctions or 
punishment. The closer the genealogical relationship of people identified as the 
perpetrators of an action, the more immediately fraught becomes the process of 
assessment, and the more urgent the need to clarify the extent of inclusion and to 
resolve the situation by way of compensatory settlement.  
Reading the intimacy and value of social relations is a difficult, potentially vexatious 
matter. Memmott (1979: 99) reports that an important part of ‘squareup’ proceedings 
carried out after the death of a person was for the immediate family to ‘reassure’ certain 
others that they are not suspected in the person’s death. Chase (1980: 193) reports that 
every conflict situation encountered in his research in east Cape York meant that some 
people ‘were caught with divided loyalties’. These people were in fact referred to as 
kuuntyi yi’atyi (‘middle’ relations) and were expected not to take sides, but rather to 
attempt to prevent violence.  
Geographical distance 
Residential distance from the thing, country or person affected by an act or event 
combines with other factors to help determine the identity of groups involved. 
Geographic distance often has complex permutations. For example, residential 
closeness to the centre of impact of an act will tend to constitute a criteria for inclusion 
in the field of effect; unless it is counteracted by genealogical distance. As noted above, 
people who are regarded as genealogically or ceremonially ‘close’ to the people at the 
centre of an effect, but who nevertheless live a long geographical distance away, will 
tend to be included in the field of effect. For example, certain kunmokurrkurr groups in 
the Coopers Creek area of western Arnhem Land characterise themselves as being in a 
long-distance ‘company’ relationship which can link them in to shared consideration of 
compensation and the circulation of royalty payments (Kesteven & Smith 1983).  
There will also be a mundane geographic logic by which people can assert that other 
groups are simply ‘too far away’ to worry about their feelings or rights. The physical 
characteristics of the actual area subject to an effect may also mean that the 
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geographical mapping of effects will be perceived to radiate out many kilometres in one 
compass direction, but be geographically restricted in another. For example, people with 
country located along the Coopers Creek in western Arnhem Land form a ‘riverine 
alliance’ referred to as ‘Marryalayala’ or ‘one creek’, so that the effects of some acts 
are considered to follow groups along the river, rather than travelling inland from it 
(Kesteven & Smith 1983: 123–5, 140).  
Distance as degrees of spiritual power 
Within the Aboriginal landscape, places, things and people vary radically in their 
importance. The relationship posited between people and ‘country’, and the law and 
Dreaming, imbues certain mundane things with a numinous character and relative 
degrees of ‘power’ or sacredness. There are particular people, places, objects, elements, 
behaviours and procedures which are regarded as directly expressing transcendent value 
and power. Some objects and sites accrete power and powerful memories over time, or 
by association with powerful substances (for example, particular trees which have 
birthing blood or umbilical cords buried by them, mortuary sites for powerful persons, 
sites representing metamorphosed creator beings, sites where ceremony is conducted or 
important disputes have been resolved, etc). These visible signifiers of power are 
variously described in Aboriginal English as being ‘big’, ‘number one’, ‘boss’, ‘poison’, 
‘sacred’ or ‘dear’.  
The consequences of an act on something ‘big’ may be seen as apocalyptic and can 
be transmitted through arterial flows of spiritual power to connect different groups (see 
Cooper 1992: 227). Some significant sites can be said to generate waves of 
repercussions that flow outwards to affect a much wider area of country and larger 
groups of people. For example, in one case, disturbances at related sites were stated as 
being sensed by Dreaming beings at the main site, and custodians were concerned about 
exploration activity up to ten kilometres from it (Merlan & Rumsey 1986 cited in 
Cooper 1992: 227). An effect which may appear insignificant in daily life may be 
interpreted differently in circumstances where powerful sites are involved. Arndt (1962: 
304, 306) noted that in the close vicinity of one such site, sufficient disturbance may be 
as little as the careless kicking of a rock or stick, or the making of excessive noise (see 
also Cooper 1992). An effect on ‘big’ things radiates across land and people, invoking a 
much bigger social field of perpetration and effect, and requiring the imposition of 
heavier sanctions and recompense. Small local sites with less transcendental 
signification may invoke a more tightly defined set of kindred and field of effect.  
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Temporal and personal dimensions of perpetration and effect 
The gender, age, and seniority of persons involved in committing an act, or 
experiencing its effects, are factors taken into account when people measure degrees of 
social inclusion or exclusion. Other factors are the sentimental forms of attachment by 
individuals to places and objects which act as memory maps of personal and group 
histories.  
Assessments of the social, physical and spiritual boundaries of effect and 
perpetration have to be carefully negotiated as they involve cross-cutting attachments, 
allegiances, politics and enforcement of the law. As Williams (1982: 146) perceptively 
comments about processes of demarcating the physical limits of country: ‘reticence to 
locate precise boundaries may . . . [reflect] concern about the consequences of doing so, 
(and conversely)’. The same concern for consequences influences the assessment of 
social boundaries for the purposes of compensation. As a consequence, the process of 
evaluating social inclusion and exclusion will often continue in parallel with, and 
continue after, the actual process of settling compensation.  
The contagion and interpretation of current events is also replete with temporal force. 
Williams’ (1987: 65) statement that, for the Yolngu, ‘nothing ever really ends’ is 
applicable to most other Aboriginal societies. Old tensions and unsettled grievances 
from earlier incidents—some occurring generations ago—resonate through present-day 
social relations and are criteria for considering the motivation behind an action, and the 
extent of its effect. For example, Williams (1987: 67) reports on her inquiry into charges 
of sorcery, made after the death of a senior man in 1969. One explanation was that it 
began in events occurring at least 30 years earlier, and ultimately involved a large 
number of people. Memmott (1979: 102) reports that before a proposed dance festival 
commenced at Doomadgee in late 1974, the several different groups attending spent the 
first day participating in ‘square-up settlements’ so that ‘old grievances could be settled 
and . . . not interfere with [its] success’.  
By implication then, while the effect of an action may in time recede or stagnate, if it 
is not appropriately resolved, it will be revived at a future date. The potential is that old 
grievances and their effects become construed by later generations as compounding or 
creating new grievances. In other words, the duration of an effect is not necessarily 
discrete, but may be scattered across time.  
In considering effect, custodians of land and close kin bear the burden of what Gray 
(1994: 195) refers to as the ‘principle of stewardship’: ‘Under this principle, ownership 
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or possession of land is viewed as a trust, with attendant obligations to future 
generations as well as to the present’.3 The ethnographic literature indicates that 
Aboriginal stewardship entails ‘looking after’ country, people and the law in the present 
and for future generations, and transmitting the rights and responsibilities of 
stewardship to them (see Myers 1986; Smith 1981). Both individuals and groups may 
be held accountable to others for their stewardship. The concepts of ownership, 
stewardship and effect are underpinned by the notion of a ‘community obligation’ to 
preserve over time the collective entitlements to ‘equitable property’ and ‘non-
commodity values’ (Gray 1994: 202; see also Gray 1991). From this perspective, if land 
is the property of Aboriginal people, then people are a property of the land.  
The Forms of Aboriginal Compensation 
Aboriginal compensation mechanisms reveal social values and preferences. For 
Aboriginal people, compensation is primarily about social process and prioritising 
certain relations, and can be enacted in a variety of ways. Invariably, people, the land 
and the Dreaming are placed at the hub of agency. The need for human action—in the 
form of sanctions, ‘pay back’, ‘squaring up’, recompense, retribution, or exchange—is 
framed as a necessary stabilising expression of the law.  
Compensation can consist of material recompense to the aggrieved person and group. 
For example, at ‘house opening’ ceremonies in Cape York conducted some time after a 
death to ‘open’ up the deceased’s dwelling and ‘free’ it from spiritual contagion, 
payments of food and household goods and other capital items are ‘paid’ by the 
widow’s family to the family of the deceased husband (Martin 1993). Cash is a medium 
of social exchange, and payments of cash may be required by the aggrieved from 
persons identified in the field of guilt. For example, Peterson (1991: 75) noted the use of 
cash payments as a ‘compensatory mechanism’ in the case of a person paying a relative 
who had rights to their hair (for ceremonial purposes) when they had a haircut without 
that relative’s knowledge or permission. Access to valued resources may similarly have 
to be met by the return of gifts to the owners (for example, as an equivalence, in the 
form of an artefact made from those resources (Myers 1986)). A person of eminence in 
the law who performs as a ‘witness’ to validate another’s claims to pre-eminent 
ownership rights and responsibilities for an area of land or a specific site, may 
subsequently demand and have to be paid cash as compensatory exchange for their 
testimonial comment.  
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Aboriginal compensation also takes many non-material forms. For example, it may 
take the form of ‘an apology’ from people or from the government. It may consist of the 
conduct of ritualised ceremonies or highly orchestrated fights of reconciliation. These 
are widely reported across place and time, and include those described amongst the 
Pintubi by Myers (1986: 171); by Elkin (1931: 190–91) in the formal kopara exchanges 
held by the Lakes groups of South Australia; in East Cape York by Chase (1980: 192); 
in the Lardil ‘square-up fights’ described by Memmott (1979: 99–103); and in the 
peace-making ceremony (magarada) described in Arnhem Land by the Berndts (Berndt 
& Berndt 1952: 116). In instances of serious inter-group conflict over certain actions, 
settlement has been reported in the form of a series of exchanges of small areas of 
territory between particular groups. The transaction indicated a resolution of conflict, 
and involved not so much a transferral of ownership of land as a confirmation of 
continued access and shared rights to exploit resources (Kesteven & Smith 1983: 133). 
Compensation may be enacted through the application of sanctions and retaliatory 
punishment of the perpetrator(s). These mechanisms may be socially enacted (including 
suppression of social interaction, temporary ostracism or permanent expulsion from the 
group). They might be physical (including warfare, regulated civil revenge, and death). 
They might also be enacted through sorcery and the direct intervention of the spiritual 
domain. Once included within the field of perpetrators, the persons or their close 
relatives may be expected to allow themselves to be punished, either forcibly by means 
of spearing, or by offering their body to physically receive another’s injury punishment, 
or by physically replacing the thing itself (for example, a wife may be ‘given’ to another 
person in the deceased husband’s family).  
Individual autonomy has its bounds. People who repeatedly act against the social 
order eventually bring the action of their aggrieved kin upon themselves. In the past this 
may have resulted in them being put to death (Chase 1980: 190; Smith 1981: 170–3).  
The law is said to be ‘hard’, and in certain circumstances the law will intervene of its 
own accord to punish breaches of religious taboo; for example, in the form of serious 
illness, death, sorcery or religious revenge. There are religiously empowered enforcers 
amongst people (and animals) who can instigate sorcery and mete out death. When 
offended, the spirits of deceased ancestors can punish relations by sending physical and 
environmental ills. For example, failure to observe requirements for ‘looking after’ and 
respecting the graves of close kin ‘could bring punishment from the spirit to those who 
desecrated the physical remains’ (Chase 1980: 186). Through sorcery, certain people 
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may also invoke the particular qualities of a site to bring about physical and 
environmental calamity on others (for example, by ‘sending’ swarms of flies and 
mosquitoes, illness, rain and fire, and causing reproductive failure of people, plants and 
animals). It is the author’s experience that in many contemporary negotiation situations, 
Aboriginal people feel keenly that their decisions, if determined to be wrong by close 
kin or their own law, may result in their punishment by ill-fortune and ill-health.  
The form that compensation takes is directly linked to the nature of the provoking 
action or incident; to people’s reading of the type and extent of effects; and to the 
criteria of social distance involved. In summary, forms of compensation enacted may 
be:  
• action oriented and physical—in the form of punishment and sanctions involving 
regulated civil revenge, injury or death;  
• socially based—as in processes of ostracism, expulsion or self-imposed absence;  
•  material and monetary—as in processes of exchange of cash, food, services or 
commodity goods;  
• religious and spiritual—via religiously empowered enforcers of punishment, the 
conduct of cleansing ritual, or through religious ostracism or expulsion; and/or 
• symbolic and performative—through apology or highly orchestrated reconciliation 
fights or planned confrontations.  
Aboriginal Compensation as Value System and Process 
The Aboriginal semantic domain of compensation appears to be broader than that 
allowed for by Western economic and legally-based approaches. It is more akin to the 
Macquarie Dictionary definition of the verb ‘to compensate’, as: ‘to counterbalance 
variations; offset; recompense; to adjust or construct so as to produce equilibrium; to be 
an equivalent; to make amends’. The dictionary definition recognises the essential 
plasticity of the concept, and resonates with Aboriginal views where compensation is: 
• a process (the act of compensating and the state of being compensated);  
• a realm of valuation (for comparing and estimating the worth of a thing);  
• an entitlement and responsibility (the kind of compensation given or received as 
an equivalent for debt, loss, suffering, etc); and 
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• an outcome (assessed by the extent to which recompense, equilibrium and amends 
have been secured).  
Perhaps the critical feature of Aboriginal compensation is that it is essentially a 
process-based system in which the relationship between people, the land, law and the 
Dreaming is paramount. The mechanism of compensation is used to affirm the value of 
that connection: to achieve defined social purposes; to reaffirm relationships of mutual 
equivalence and demand sharing; to bind individuals into groups; and to confirm 
ownership of the land (see e.g. Chase 1980; Elkin 1931: 191; Kickett 1999; Maddock 
1984: 184; Martin 1995: 8; Memmott 1979: 97–103; Peterson 1991: 75, 1993).  
Compensation processes reveal realms of value with multiple referents. For example, 
in evaluating an effect for compensatory purposes, people closely consider:  
• the utility value of the thing and relationships involved;  
• the extrinsic value as a means to something desirable;  
• the inherent social value;  
• the moral and authoritative value derived under law;  
• its economic value, and so on.  
People strategically canvass these aspects of a thing or relationship’s ‘total value’, in 
order to come to some accepted understanding of the extent to which it is seen to have 
value, and the form of compensation that will correspond to that value. Underlying all 
forms of compensatory response is a notion of equivalence, the value of which has 
many dimensions. At its heart is the desire to restore sociality and reaffirm relationships 
of authority and the illusion of cultural permanence. The measure of that balance is in 
the form of what has been referred to as ‘egalitarian mutuality’ (Maddock 1984: 184) or 
‘assertive equalitarianism’ (Martin 1995: 8). That is, the outcome should restore the 
expectation and satisfaction of reciprocity and ‘demand sharing’ (Peterson 1993), and 
acquit individuals and groups of indebtedness entailed by their inclusion in the field of 
perpetrators.  
Another measure of balance is expressed in the desire to secure a ‘levelling up’ or 
‘squaring up’ (pers. comm. P. Memmott and P. Sutton) based on a core principle of 
‘equivalent injury’ (Stanner 1953). To secure that end, the principle of proportionality is 
applied. However, the outcome sought is not measured as an exact equivalence (in the 
sense of reducing one thing to another), but in the sense that the form of compensation 
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must be judged as proportional to the loss or damage sustained, and capable of enabling 
a reinstatement of perceived total value. But restoring sociality and mutual 
responsibilities is not necessarily about equity. As noted above, some things and people 
are more ‘equal’ than others, more powerful, more senior. Accordingly, the balance 
sought through compensation may be asymmetrical and hierarchical in nature (such as 
in restoring the relationship of authority between senior and junior generations). People 
will make subjective judgments as to when the equal ‘total value’ of an effect has been 
obtained.  
Broadly then, a compensation process may be used to:  
• restore and maintain environmental productivity and reproductive capacity;  
• safeguard the health and reproduction of people and the land;  
• re-establish economic exchange relationships;  
• restore and safeguard religious rights, interests and responsibilities; and/or  
•  confirm the authority of groups and individuals for areas of land and water.  
The preferred primary outcome of all forms of compensation is to secure the 
semblance of finality in social and temporal domains, by acquitting individuals and 
groups of any perceived indebtedness and guilt entailed by their inclusion in the field of 
perpetrators. 
Inalienable Possessions: Valuing the Invaluable 
Just as compensation reveals value, so too competition over the products of 
compensation reveals that which has been lost, most lost, and its value.
4
 The discussion 
of Aboriginal regimes of compensation so far has indicated that some things are more 
highly valued than others. This section reviews some ethnographic sources to consider 
what those things might be, and how that higher value might be construed.  
Drawing upon Myer’s erudite ethnography of Pintubi sentiment, place and politics, 
Weiner (1992: 101) notes that the Dreaming-derived law encompasses ‘vast inalienable 
possessions that are authenticated by the very cosmology under which they are 
produced’. In an important analysis of the nature of exchange and social reproduction, 
Weiner examines the creation and core meaning of what she calls ‘inalienable 
possessions’—those things (be they land, sites, names, body designs, songs, stories, 
knowledge, ritual practices or paraphernalia) which become imbued with the intrinsic 
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and ineffable identities of their owners, accreted with history and memories, repositories 
of genealogies, and are transferred by their owners from one generation to another.  
As Weiner (1992: 42) notes, what gives inalienable possessions their power and 
potency is their authentication by an authority perceived to be outside the present. As a 
consequence, they act as the stabilising force against loss and impairment, and are 
critical to the reproduction of group identity and social relations through time. To that 
extent they are seen as timeless, outlasting their owners who must nevertheless bear the 
responsibility for recreating their social value over time. Such possessions bestow 
responsibilities of stewardship, out of which evolve many different levels of authority 
and relationship. Control over their meanings and transmission from one generation to 
the next are thus strictly circumscribed, and accords authority and legitimacy to 
successive owners.  
Inalienable Aboriginal possessions are dense with signification, whereby their value 
is seen to lie in their very inalienability. They have infinite utility and absolute value. 
They are said by the Anangu people to ‘come in front’. Such value is translated in 
Aboriginal English as ‘big’, ‘dear’, ‘precious’. For Aboriginal groups, land is cum 
grano salis—the incomparable inalienable possession. It is a ‘value carrier’; that is, it is 
‘value as such, the immovable ground above and beyond which real economic activity 
[is] carried out’ (Weiner 1992: 33). Such possessions become invaluable precisely 
because they are beyond commodification.  
As Gray (1994: 161) notes, it is inevitable that all ‘property’ referents have about 
them an ‘utterly interdependent quality’. This is precisely the case with respect to 
Aboriginal conceptualisations of land. For example, not only does an individual trace 
kin relations to other individuals and groups, but to tracts of country and religious 
paraphernalia which may, in turn, be related to each other as kin (Keen 1994: 110–24). 
Aboriginal land is an extension of the person and the group— rights in rem and in 
personam are at the same level and centred within a spiritual framework (Sutton 1998a). 
It constitutes what Radin (1982) has called ‘property for personhood’. In other words, it 
is an object that is part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal 
entities in the world; an analogy very close to Weiner’s notion of inalienable possession.  
In presenting an argument for the repatriation of the Elgin Marbles, Moustakas 
(1989: 1185) extends Radin’s concept in order to include group rights in cultural 
property—what he calls ‘property for grouphood’—which ‘expresses something about 
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the entire group’s relationship to certain property… [and is] essential to the preservation 
of group identity and group self-esteem’.  
Writers including Kirsch (2001), Coombe (1993), Janke (1997) and Pask (1993) have 
more recently adapted these ideas to propose the centrality of ‘cultural property’ as a 
term encompassing both the loss of property as ownership of an object, and loss of 
property conceived as a sense of belonging or way of knowing. For Aboriginal 
Australians, land and its various manifestations in song, dance, knowledge, sites, ritual, 
names and so on, is more than ‘thin air’ (Gray 1991); it is cultural property for 
personhood and grouphood.  
Such inalienable possessions of personhood and grouphood can not be easily 
substituted; they are not fungible. Their value will not be not realised in free market 
exchange. Rather they accumulate a subjective and cosmological value which sets them 
beyond a reinstatement value. Such valuation defies the philosophy of possessive 
individualism and market exchange that defines Western legal categories of property 
(see Coombe 1993, drawing on MacPherson 1962). How then is the loss or impairment 
of such a possession construed and valued by its owners?  
When the locus of an inalienable possession’s authenticity is interfered with, then its 
absolute value declines, sometimes rapidly (Weiner 1992: 102–3). But more 
fundamentally, ‘taking a possession that so completely represents a group’s social 
identity as well as an individual owner’s identity and giving it to someone outside the 
group is a powerful transfer of one’s own and one’s group’s very substance’ (Weiner 
1992: 104). The loss of inalienable possessions diminishes the person and by extension, 
the group to which the person belongs.  
Coombe (1993: 279) argues in the Canadian context, that the ‘commodification of 
Indian spirituality is understood to pose the threat of cultural dissolution’. Moustakas 
(1989: 1185) takes the implications of ‘property for grouphood’ to its logical 
conclusion. He suggests that such property should not be alienated ‘because future 
generations are unable to consent to transactions that threaten their existence as a group, 
and that commodification and fungibility are inappropriate ways to treat constitutive 
elements of grouphood’.  
From a legal perspective Radin (1982: 1014–5) argues that, where property is ‘for 
personhood’, there is a prima facie case that it is a property right that should be 
protected against invasion by government and against cancellation by conflicting 
fungible property claims. This case is strongest, she concludes, where ‘the claimant’s 
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opportunities to become fully developed persons … would be destroyed or significantly 
lessened, and . . . where the personal property rights are claimed by individuals who are 
maintaining and expressing their group identity’. Such a case is routinely voiced by 
Aboriginal people in respect to their invaluable property for personhood and grouphood. 
The following sections examine the extent to which native title rights and interests in 
land and water—as clear examples of inalienable possession—are afforded protection 
against invasion by government and cancellation by conflicting fungible property 
claims; and how their extinguishment and loss might be, if they should be, valued for 
the purposes of native title compensation.  
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Notes: Paper 4 
1. The reference to ‘Aboriginal’ rather than ‘Indigenous’ is intentional as the paper 
focuses on the ethnographic literature relevant to Aboriginal groups and their 
compensation processes. Conclusions presented here should not be taken as being 
applicable to Torres Strait Islander peoples who may exhibit distinctive cultural 
differences. 
2. In most cases where ‘land’ is used in this paper it can be taken as an abbreviation 
for ‘land and sea’. For coastal-dwelling people the one is the continuation of the 
other.  
3. Gray (1994: 204) further acknowledges that: ‘This gathering [legal] perception of 
stewardship emulates something of the greater humility expressed in the 
Australian Aboriginals’ orientation towards land resources’.  
4. I would like to thank Peter Sutton for suggesting the significance of contemporary 
Indigenous competition over compensation as a mechanism which reveals that 
which is ‘most lost’, and hence most fought over in the native title arena.  
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Paper 5:  Indigenous Families, Households and 
Governance 
D.E. Smith, 2005. 
Originally published in D. Austin-Broos and G. Macdonald (eds) Culture, Economy and 
Governance in Aboriginal Australia, University of Sydney Press, Sydney, pp. 175–86.  
Introduction  
This paper is part ethnographic, part quantitative, and part reflection as I tease out 
whether there are connections between the concepts of ‘family’, ‘households’ and 
‘governance’. The paper probably raises more questions than it answers, but that has 
been its value. First, I discuss first some of the insights about contemporary Indigenous 
family and household formation and domestic economies in Australia that have arisen 
out of 30 years of field research in a range of communities — rural, urban and remote. I 
especially draw on more recent work carried out as part of a team research project on 
the delivery and impacts of welfare payments made to Indigenous families.1 Some of 
the findings presented here will be familiar, others do not necessarily conform to our 
sometimes taken-for-granted understandings. Next, I describe the nature of extended 
family formations and their collective identity, in the households in which they reside. 
The role and impacts of mobility, parenting and child-rearing; household developmental 
cycles, social and economic support networks; and ‘linked’ or ‘connected’ households 
on family formations and identity are described. The paper argues that extended 
families are the fundamental structures that have to be reproduced in order that 
Indigenous cultural and socioeconomic reproduction as a whole can take place. 
From there I attempt to make a grander leap, to consider the place of Indigenous 
extended families and their linked households, in the cultural and sociological 
geography of contemporary Indigenous governance. Can extended families be said to 
have what we would call governance? If they do, then does that mode of governance 
connect to larger-scale levels of organisational governance and political representation? 
And if so, how are the connections made? And what are the implications for families 
and for community governance arrangements?  
Families and Their Households  
The concepts of ‘family’ and ‘household’ in Indigenous societies have long been 
critically assessed among anthropologists and other social scientists, both within 
Australia and internationally (see Bender 1967; Daly and Smith 1996, 1999; Finlayson 
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1991; Netting et al. 1984; Peterson 1978; Rowse 1998, Smith 1980; Smith and Daly 
1996; Sutton 1998; Yanagisako 1979). As Yanagisako points out, as early as 1913 
Malinowski contended that ‘careful investigation of the facts of family life in Australia 
was urgently needed’, because of the problematic attribution of ‘European 
characteristics to the Aboriginal family without adequate investigation of the details of 
actual family relationships’ (1979:161). 
But despite its apparent centrality in Indigenous social and economic organisation, in 
recent years there seems to have been decreasing research into Indigenous family 
formation, not an increased focus. The ‘sexier’ and perhaps more tangible imperatives 
of land rights, native title, economic development and national politics seem to have 
taken research precedence. One also wonders whether researchers today are less willing 
to spend the longer, intimate time on the ground with families that is needed to convey 
the dynamic environment of their daily life — relying instead on summarising and 
critiquing the work of others who remain active in the field. 
The important exceptions in the past decade include the research (and publications) 
on families and households of Julie Finlayson (1991), which remain the best 
ethnographic accounts of family life in Australian anthropology, along with the field-
based research of Chris Birdsell (1988), Annette Hamilton (1981); Peter Sutton (1998) 
and Smith (1980, 2000), and the more recent work of younger researchers such as 
Yasmine Musharbash (2000). The research in which I have been involved indicates that 
the terms ‘family’ and ‘household’ require nested operational definition, in order to 
even begin to capture the temporal, spatial and socioeconomic processes at play in their 
formation and reproduction. 
The notion of ‘family’ has long been recognised as the ‘central ordering principle’ 
within Indigenous society (Daly and Smith 1996; Finlayson 1991; Smith 1980; Sutton 
1998). Invoked in almost every context and in every discussion, it is the key unit, at 
both an actual and conceptual level, in Indigenous social and economic life. While the 
nuclear or elementary family is important, it is not the most common residential or 
structural form. Rather, each individual’s investment in family relationships is widely 
distributed in expanding waves of classificatory and consanguineal relatedness. The 
residential and sociological result is the centrality of extended family formations, 
variously referred to as ‘mobs’, ‘one family’, ‘all family’, ‘company’ and so on. 
Membership of these extended structures is open to interpretation and negotiation over 
time, expanding and reducing through consociate ties born of historical association, 
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friendship, political alliances and engagement in processes such as native title and land 
rights.  
Fig.1: Extended family household No. 36, Genealogy: age and gender, Nov 2000.  
 
At its most basic, the term ‘household’ is usually taken to refer to a co-residential 
unit — a group of people who live in the same dwelling and share economic resources. 
But amongst Indigenous Australians, households — even those occupying a single 
physical space — are compositionally complex. At any point in time they comprise 
extended family units which are commonly multi-generational, and have larger numbers 
of residents and more youthful dependents than the national average (see Figure 1). 
Case study surveys conducted by the author and the CAEPR research team (see 
Smith 2000; and project publications listed on the CAEPR website) at the community 
level report between 50-60 percent of households having three or more generations 
present, and the average household having 6.5 members compared with the Australian 
average of 2.7 persons (Henry and Smith 2002:4; Smith 2000). In two surveyed 
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communities, 43 and 48 percent respectively of residents were under the age of 16 years 
(Smith 2000). Indigenous families are big, and reproducing young families at a greater 
rate than non-Indigenous families. Over time, factors such as mobility, the operation of 
shared parenting and child-care, support networks and patterns of resource 
redistribution, give rise to a sophisticated process for the reproduction of the collective 
identity of extended families. In the next section I will briefly consider these factors and 
their impacts.  
The Impact of Mobility on Families and Their Households 
A key factor in the composition and viability of Indigenous Australian households is 
mobility. Our recent survey research indicates that we have taken a view too simple of 
this complex process. Mobility takes on different forms and rates in different 
communities and households. Yes — some adults and children are highly mobile within 
and between their communities where they make use of a series of ‘usual’ home bases. 
But, as I discuss below, there are often invisible areas of stability and continuity within 
families and their households. 
On the side of dynamism, our research in communities reports that household 
composition may change daily. For example, approximately 59 percent of one 
community survey respondents stated there were other places in the local area they 
sometimes stayed, and 58 percent had done so in the past four weeks (Smith 2000). 
Children travel with and without their parents and siblings, and this flow is 
unpredictable. Fifty percent of children in the same households sometimes resided in 
other places in the same community. 
In another community, a research ‘census’ was taken nightly of members staying 
overnight in particular households (Musharbash 2000). Over the course of a fortnight, in 
one four-bedroom house, the composition of residents was recorded. During that period, 
there was an average of 21.9 persons staying at the house per night, with an average of 
13.7 adults and 6.8 children. However, that ‘census’ also documented the actual 
individuals who slept there over the full fortnight. This ‘flow’ of people presented a 
much more complex picture of actual household composition. There were, in fact, 27 
different related adults and 15 different children sleeping at this house over the 
fortnight; that is, a total of 42 different individuals passed through the house. At a 
bigger-picture level, a survey of household membership conducted in another 
community over three years reported that one out of every two persons recorded in the 
first survey wave had moved: either into or out of one of the households (Henry and 
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Smith 2002:8). The changes over three years in the family members resident in one 
household are set out in Figure 2. 
In such contexts, the concept of ‘visitor’ is often inappropriate — newcomers and 
strangers are ‘familiarised’ through their incorporation into kin relatedness and become 
household members when they take up residence, no matter how briefly. In the context 
of high rates of mobility, many people have multiple home bases. This rate of mobility 
has the potential to have a significant impact on the reproduction of family identities, 
and on the economic viability of households. How then do families survive as collective 
units and identities in the face of such mobility?  
Fig. 2 a), b) and c): Genealogy of changing household membership No. 07, 
Kuranda, 1999, 2000 and 2001. 
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We have identified one crucial factor; namely there is a relatively stable ‘core’ of 
family members at the heart of many households. In the census referred to above, there 
were in fact eleven persons (seven of the adults and four of the children) who slept at 
the house for the entire period. In one community surveyed, the core of family 
membership was extremely stable — respondents had been living in their houses for an 
average of 7.3 years (Smith 2000). In other words, not all Aboriginal people are mobile; 
and some family residents of households are particularly immobile. The stable family 
members often appear to be senior adult kin. 
There are significant differences between flow, average and ‘core’ household data 
about membership that tell us some important things about household composition and 
family formation. Apart from the obvious impact of mobility, these data also tell us a 
story about an enduring core of family members who provide stability and a critical 
source of familial cohesion and mutual support. 
There are longer-term consequences of these flows of people through households. 
The households of many families are characterised by a complex life cycle of 
expansion, contraction, disintegration and re-formation. These developmental cycles are 
not ad hoc phenomena, but are subject to the regulating influence of social relatedness, 
the influence of a core of stable members, and the strong imperative to protect and 
reproduce family networks and identity. Mapping these developmental cycles and the 
changing family formations within them enables us to begin to see just how complex 
and dynamic the concept of ‘household’ is over time. But it also attests to the role of 
particular family members over time in maintaining family networks and identities and 
ensuring the ongoing economic viability of their households.  
Parenting for Social Reproduction  
Sutton has noted that focal individuals in families ‘often make strenuous efforts to 
keep as many of their descendants as possible under their own descent group identity 
while they are alive’ and that there may be competition between descent groups as to 
‘which way the kids will go’ (1998:66). Not only that, an extensive system of personal 
responsibilities and rights are established as a result of adult participation in ‘looking-
after’ and ‘growing-up’ young descendants. A critical factor in the reproduction of 
extended family collective identity is the social and economic distribution of parenting 
(Smith 1980).  
In both the qualitative and quantitative research I have carried out with the CAEPR 
research team, a high proportion of Indigenous children have been found to be living in 
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households where they have either no biological parent or only one resident, but where 
other relations, such as a person of the grandparental or parents’ siblings’ generation 
looking after them. For example, three-quarters of households in one rural community 
had children resident who were the biological children of non-resident adults. In another 
remote community, 40 percent of the female respondents surveyed were looking after 
the children of other relatives. Of the surveyed households in one rural community, 82 
percent had only a single adult parent (genitor or genitrix) and their biological children 
in residence, or children in residence without their biological parents (Smith 2000). 
The strategy of distributed parenting and shared child-care is one that is critical to 
enable people to deal with the economic difficulties of the high childhood dependency 
burdens encountered by many households. Perhaps more fundamentally, it not only 
facilitates the ongoing inclusion of children within the descent group, but the social 
relations of child-bearing and rearing have significant direct impact on the transmission 
of important territorial, property, naming, and economic rights. The nurturing of 
children within extended families allows for particular connections and identities to be 
confirmed or emphasised, and thus for particular cultural continuities to be constructed 
and reproduced over time (Smith 1980:384-397). 
However, not all family members act cohesively and inclusively. There are children 
who do in fact receive marginalised care (Smith 1980). They may, for example, have 
both parents absent, receive erratic care from a sole parent, or reside in households 
where family members have precarious economic viability. Virtually every international 
study of the wellbeing of families shows that children who spend their lives in 
households that are poor are more likely to lack adequate nutrition, quality housing, 
residential stability and other critical resources (see for example, Annie E. Casey 
Foundation 2003; Moore et al. 2002). This early deprivation has significant 
consequences for children’s later lives. 
The end result of unstable and periodic nurturing is to create potentially 
marginality as an adult in making acceptable claims to family identity and 
support, and lead to territorial and political marginality, severely 
circumscribing a person’s ability and perceived ‘right’ to make successful 
claims over things and other people (Smith 1980). 
A recent analysis by Daly and Smith (2003) suggests that Indigenous children also 
continue to be amongst the most economically disadvantaged in Australia. There is 
every indication that the transmission of reliance on welfare and high levels of 
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unemployment are inter-generational, placing some Indigenous children at risk of future 
economic marginalisation and poverty. In these circumstances, family cohesion and 
viability may be under considerable pressure.  
Linked Households and the Family ‘Safety Net’  
Indigenous households ‘ooze’ — that is, they have porous social boundaries whereby 
their membership extends beyond the physical dwelling. Families which extend beyond 
a single dwelling create fundamentally important social and economic linkages to close 
kin living in other households. Support networks for sharing child-care, and for 
redistributing resources and cash, similarly ‘ooze’ along the same relational pathways, 
extending beyond the boundaries of discrete households, across to kin-related clusters of 
households. The extent of these networks is considerable and are set out in Figure 3 for 
a group of households in one community. In effect the discrete household is not the 
basic economic unit for families. Rather, linked households are instrumental in the 
economic survival of many families, and serve to reinforce patterns of relatedness at the 
heart of extended family identity. 
This safety net constitutes a resilient source of social and cultural capital for families 
and their households. Its operation helps to keep families financially afloat, creates a 
reservoir of support for the care and socialisation of children at risk, and makes an 
invaluable contribution to the well-being of families under stress. For example, over 50 
percent of household respondents in one community survey we have carried out said 
that a close relation regularly helped them pay for food and clothing for their own 
children. Many older women in households provide the backbone of financial and 
domestic care for their grandchildren and the children of other relatives.  
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Fig. 3: Movement of family members between households, 1999-2000. 
 
Source: R Henry and D.E. Smith, 2002: 11. 
From Families to Governance? 
The experiential location of the domestic economy and of family identity for the 
majority of Indigenous Australians lies beyond discrete households, in extended family 
formations residing across linked households. These cognatic descent groups are 
identified, first and foremost, by surnames. Sutton has called these formations ‘a 
distinctive form of social organisation that has emerged in urban and rural areas of most 
of Australia’ and which shows ‘some remarkable commonalities across the continent’ 
(1998:55, 57, 62). Members of such extended families might reside in several linked 
households scattered around a city neighbourhood or a rural town, in a regional set of 
small communities, or in a community and its satellite outliers. Today, the members of 
some extended families also reside further afield, in different States. 
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In light of the centrality of extended families in articulating preferred forms of 
Indigenous social, territorial and economic organisation, the second part of this paper 
turns to the question of whether they have a role in community governance. And if they 
do, at what cultural and sociological levels is it manifest?  
In early fieldwork carried out in Cape York over 25 years ago, I noted that ‘just as 
relationships within the family are expressed within the idiom of nurturing, so too are 
notions of attachment to, use and ownership of land couched in that idiom’. People are 
said to be ‘boss for’ and have a duty to ‘look after’ land in the same way that they are 
‘boss for’ and must ‘look after’ and ‘work for’ the members of their families (Smith 
1980: 395-397). These concepts lying at the heart of personal relationships and familial 
authority are the same concepts that form the basis of power and authority more 
generally in Indigenous societies. They inform perceptions about the nature of 
continuity, autonomy and relatedness; the operation and value of hierarchy; and the 
moral basis of power and leadership. 
Sutton is right in referring to these extended formations as ‘families of polity’ 
(1998:55), for they are not simply visible as residential and economic units, they are 
also jural constructs of ‘enduring and central importance to the conduct of Aboriginal 
business’ (1998: 60). That business includes not only the duties of care and 
responsibility for family members, and engagement in networks of support, but also the 
transmission of land ownership, leadership, cultural property rights, group knowledge 
and collective identities. 
If ‘governance’ (Smith 2005) is taken to mean the processes, relationships, 
institutions and structures by which a group of people collectively organise themselves 
to represent and negotiate their rights and interests, and make decisions about:  
• how they are constituted as a group;  
• how they manage their affairs and negotiate with outsiders; 
• who has authority within their group, and about what; 
• how they ensure that authority is exercised properly;  
• who enforces the decisions they make;  
• how their decision-makers are held accountable; and 
• what arrangements are required for implementing their decisions. 
Then extended families can arguably be said to have ‘governance’.  
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‘Families of Polity’ and Community Governance  
Perhaps more importantly, today the site of that familial layer of governance is not 
restricted to domestic matters, duties of care and networks of support. Today, families 
of polity form the backbone of communities and of many incorporated organisations, 
thereby linking familial descent group identity to organisational identities and forms of 
political representation. In other words, extended families not only have a form of 
internal governance, they also ooze into other layers and aggregations of governance at 
the community and regional levels, and outwards. Furthermore, the demographic and 
resource success of particular families appears to be related to their relative influence 
within communities. In other words, not all families are born equal; some are more 
equal than others, and some of their senior members are more influential sources of 
authority than others in community life. 
The term ‘community’ can be defined as a network of people and organisations 
linked together by a web of personal relationships, cultural connections and identities, 
networks of support, traditions and patterns of behaviour, shared socioeconomic 
conditions or common understandings and interests. Communities include discrete 
geographical locations, as well as ‘communities of interest’ and ‘communities of 
identity’ whose membership might be residentially dispersed, but nevertheless they 
share a collective identity or objective. 
Communities are more than just interpersonal networks, residential locations or 
shared collective identities. They take on social patterns, roles, functions and 
organisational structure, and assume particular identities through interaction with their 
populations, other communities and surrounding environments (political, economic and 
cultural). Many Indigenous communities are the constructions of colonisation: places to 
which different Indigenous groups migrated and were sometimes forcibly relocated. But 
they have also become, as Peters-Little writes, ‘an integral part of … people’s heritage 
and are fundamental to Aboriginality’ (2000). 
Many Indigenous Australians have come to identify their extended family ties, 
histories, and identities with particular communities. And particular communities have 
come to be associated with particular named families. Furthermore, in the contemporary 
arena of native title, land rights and resource agreements, coalitions of families are 
exercising their rights to participate in and build social and territorial organisation on a 
larger scale; for example, in the form of what Sutton called the new ‘corporate tribes’, 
through ‘nation building’ and the negotiation of regional alliances. 
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The overall ‘governance environment’ of communities is characterised by complex 
organisational relationships and political networks, but there is also a sociology to 
Indigenous community governance. Over the last 30 years, Indigenous Australians have 
been prolific in establishing incorporate organisations, under both Federal and State 
legislation. These organisations have provided a mechanism through which Indigenous 
leadership and political representation has been carved out and exercised at community 
and regional levels. Indigenous families have played a prominent role in the 
establishment and running of these local organisations, with particular families coming 
to be associated with particular organisations. 
Sometimes the activities of organisations are fiercely competitive, having become 
silos of factional family power. Powerful families are associated with powerful 
organisations, and influential family leaders are often board members of multiple 
organisations at regional, State and Federal levels. In these ways, families of polity are 
more than just a larger version of non-Indigenous family structures (Mantziaris and 
Martin 2000:170) — they play a central role in community politics, in the initiation and 
resolution of local disputes about authority and legitimacy, and in defining community 
governance arrangements and outcomes. In these ways they are a crucial component of 
the local governance environment.  
Indigenous Principles for Governance and the Place of Families  
How do ‘families of polity’ negotiate their engagement in other layers and 
aggregations of Indigenous governance? This paper suggests that two key Indigenous 
principles appear to play a determinative role: 
1. Relational autonomy 
2. Subsidiarity 
Relational autonomy  
Indigenous interests in land, in forms of inalienable property such as knowledge and 
group identity, have always been characterised by a complex layering of rights and 
interests across different groupings. The history of Indigenous political development to 
date has also demonstrated a cultural preference — albeit difficult to sustain — for what 
could be called ‘connected localism’ or the ‘relational self’ (Nedelsky 1989). The 
‘relational self’ is not a social isolate, but constituted by interaction and 
interdependency with others; especially, in the case of Indigenous Australians, within 
extended families. The parallel preference for personal autonomy is marked by a 
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tendency towards a localism of family self-interest. But this momentum towards 
‘atomism’ and autonomy at the level of individuals and their extended families, is 
balanced by the equally compelling strain towards connectedness, relationship and 
interdependence — in other words towards wider social aggregations and circles of 
relational autonomy. 
The emphasis within Indigenous extended families is, first and foremost, on locally-
based interests and a strong preference for direct control and participation at the local 
level. But with the growing attachment of families to organisational politics, the strain 
towards local autonomy has increasingly seen a growth in multi-family connectedness 
and family engagement in regional representative structures. 
The traditional organisational principle of relational autonomy has always seemed to 
stress the ‘relational’ as much as the ‘autonomy’, a point which some researchers, in 
their haste to argue that small-scale local organisations are somehow more culturally 
appropriate, seem to have forgotten. The implications for governance is that systems of 
political representation can be decentred and dispersed (just as extended families are), 
but they must also accommodate inter-dependent social layers. Indigenous ‘families of 
polity’ evidence just such a principle of relational autonomy in their linked households. 
The Indigenous tradition of decentralised confederations, or ‘bottom-up’ federalism, 
suggests that no single institutional or organisational layer will suffice as the sole or pre-
eminent unit of Indigenous governance and political representivity. But it also suggests 
that families of polity distributed across their linked households, constitute an important 
foundation for larger-scale systems of political representation and participation. This 
has indeed been the case in some regions in recent years. Indigenous people are skilled 
at operating across multiple social, economic, spiritual and political domains. 
Individuals and ‘families of polity’ interact within a complex set of overlapping rights, 
interests, relationships and alliances. These connections are fluid, subject to strategic 
negotiation, and enable different groupings of people to constitute themselves as the 
‘self’, at different scales and for different purposes - from the local to the regional, state 
and national levels. 
The normative framework within which familial relationships are reproduced places 
a strong emphasis on institutions of kin support, demand sharing, reciprocity, age and 
gendered authority, and consensus decision-making. These norms are carried with 
families as they establish organisations and negotiate representative politics in 
community governance. This sometimes leads to volatile ‘developmental cycles’ of 
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organisations, in much the same fashion as it does with household developmental 
cycles.  
Subsidiarity  
Subsidiarity is a principle suggesting that issues should be handled by the most 
competent and appropriate possible authority. This means that no higher centralised 
level or scale of political aggregation should undertake functions or tasks which can be 
performed more effectively at an immediate or local level. Conversely, centralised 
forms of government should undertake initiatives which exceed the capacity of 
individuals or communities acting independently. 
Subsidiarity is ideally, or in principle, one of the features of Australian federalism. 
Arguably, subsidiarity also adheres to forms of traditional Indigenous political, social 
and economic agency. In other words, there is a cultural geography and sociology to 
identifying the politically responsible group for decision-making, participation and 
representation in communities and regions. 
In Indigenous societies, certain scales of social aggregation are associated with the 
‘proper’ exercise of authority and decision-making about particular kinds of matters. 
For example, religious, economic and political interests in land are not held exclusively 
by primary land-owning groups of families. Rather, patterns of rights and 
responsibilities overlap and are dispersed across a range of people and interests. 
Extended families deal with particular domestic matters and localities and constitute 
corporate organisational identities. Larger sets of extended families may come together 
for particular economic activities and land management activities. Clan groupings meet 
across regions for ceremonial and dispute-resolution purposes; and responsibilities for 
the conduct of particular ceremonies are distributed between different kin categories. 
Particular riverine and drainage basin systems have been reported to provide a basis 
for the production of regional cultural identities and ‘company’ relationships over long 
distances for the purposes of economic exchange. The consequences of something ‘big’ 
or important happening with respect to land, sites and important resources can draw 
together larger groups of people who, in other circumstances, might not commonly form 
a decision-making or residential grouping. 
Furthermore, there are important political and ceremonial circumstances where the 
autonomy of individuals and small groups is limited under traditional law. And there are 
gender and age variables which influence how subsidiarity operates with respect to 
 196  Theme 3 
access to, and distribution of, knowledge and law. All these are prime examples of 
traditional Indigenous modes of ‘governance subsidiarity’ (Smith 2004). 
Today, this same traditional propensity for subsidiarity is evident in Indigenous 
people’s active engagement in forming local and regional organisations for service 
delivery and political presentation. This usually occurs at the same time as people also 
assert an apparent preference for small-scale residential localism. 
If there is any preferred principle or emerging ‘tradition’ of Indigenous governance 
in Australia, it might well be one based on the Indigenous propensity for a dynamic 
form of subsidiarity. Coombs labelled this phenomena ‘bottom-up federalism’ 
(1994:131–43, 174–82, 220–30). It occurs when autonomous local groups (including 
extended families and organisations) form regional federations or coalitions for the 
shared purpose of political representation and service delivery, and attempt to do so 
without significantly sacrificing important areas of their local autonomy. Other writers 
have subsequently proposed similar strategies (see Sanders 2004; Smith 2002; 
Westbury and Sanders 2000; Yu 2002). At the heart of these local and regional 
Indigenous organisations lie families of polity and their linked households.  
Conclusion  
In responding to the question: ‘Who is the “self” in Indigenous self governance and 
self-determination?’, extended families arguably play a fundamental role in governance 
arrangements at the local level. The twin concepts of relational autonomy and 
subsidiarity help us to understand better how Indigenous Australians families engage 
and interact with other organisational layers of Indigenous society. The concepts also 
help elucidate how families and their senior members attempt to balance the pull 
towards residential localism and family autonomy with a desire for larger-scale 
expressions of identity and forms of representation. 
While aspects of Indigenous political representation can be centralised, residential 
preference seems to remain decentralised, and the desire for local family autonomy in 
certain areas of decision-making remains strong. Contemporary Indigenous governance 
arrangements at larger regional levels will need to explore mechanisms of subsidiarity 
and strategies for ‘bottom-up federalism’. Just as linked households comprise 
interlocked layers of extended families, so too might governance need to be built up as 
interlocked layers or aggregations with corresponding negotiation of roles and 
responsibilities across those layers. 
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‘Household’ and ‘family’ are not mere structures, but are social and economic 
categories that have important implications for the cultural reproduction of Indigenous 
identity. In this paper, I suggest that they are also political categories which have 
important implications for Indigenous governance arrangements at the local and 
regional levels. Importantly, they play a particularly important role in the developmental 
agenda within communities and regions aimed at reforming welfare, education, health 
and economic participation amongst Indigenous Australians.  
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Notes: Paper 5 
1. The research project was carried out at CAEPR by a team of researchers including 
Dr. Anne Daley (economist), Dr. Julie Finlayson (anthropologist), Dr Rosita 
Henry (anthropologist), Ms Yasmine Musharbash (a PhD scholar) and myself. The 
project was carried out over a three-year period, with a large number of families 
and their households being surveyed at two separate communities. The project 
resulted in a series of publications which can be found on the CAEPR website. 
The research methodology, conceptual and definitional issues, and a detailed 
presentation of the first year of community surveys and policy contexts are 
provided in Smith (2000). 
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Overview of Theme Four: A Society of Organisations? 
Paper 6:  D.E. Smith, 1995. ‘Representative politics and the new wave of native title 
organisations’, in J. Finlayson and D.E. Smith 1995 (eds) The Native Title 
Era: Emerging Issues for Research, Policy and Practice, CAEPR Research 
Monograph No. 10, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The 
Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 59–74.  
Paper 7:  D.E. Smith, 2008. ‘The business of governing: Building institutional capital 
in an urban enterprise’, in J. Hunt, D. Smith, S. Garling and W. Sanders 
(eds) Contested Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous 
Australia, CAEPR Monograph No. 29, ANU E Press, pp. 205–32.  
The anthropology of organisations has developed slowly, tending to focus on 
business, management, policy making and, more recently, the organisational face of 
state governmentality.31 Less attention has been given to the anthropology of 
Indigenous organisations, although in Australia the work of anthropologists at CAEPR 
has made a significant research contribution.  
Since 1984 I have written a large number of research publications and reports on the 
governance histories, structures, arrangements, legitimacy and effectiveness of a variety 
of Indigenous incorporated organisations — including organisations that focus on 
service delivery, the statutory recognition and management of land rights and native 
title interests, administration of royalties; enterprise, tourism and business development; 
employment and training; social welfare and community development; arts and crafts; 
local government; as well as national, state and community representation of Indigenous 
people.32 The two papers selected for this Theme were written thirteen years apart and 
draw upon the insights of that broader body of work to investigate the positionality (the 
place and standing) of incorporated organisations within the field of Indigenous 
governance,  and at the frontline of intercultural encounters with the Australian state.  
An important contribution of the thesis papers under this theme, which is further 
drawn out below, is the analysis of the thick overlapping connections and allegiances 
between layers of Indigenous sociality — ranging  across extended families and linked 
households, communities of interest and identity — in which a wide range of types of 
organisations have become an intrinsic feature of the political economy of Indigenous 
governance.  
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Indigenous organisations now act as influential governing formations in their own 
right. But perhaps more importantly, they are intimately locked into the broader 
landscape of Indigenous networked polities. The papers provide concrete examples of 
the many varied ways in which organisations also act as a source of intercultural 
penetration by Indigenous networks and cultures of governance into the very heart of 
the Australian state’s governmentality of Indigenous Affairs; and vice versa. Not 
surprisingly, many of the thesis papers document the position of organisations and their 
leaders as sites of very public contestation amongst Indigenous people, as well as with 
the state. 
A Society of Organisations? 
Under a policy of self-determination from the 1970s onwards, the Australian state 
actively facilitated the incorporation of Indigenous organisations, across a wide range of 
cultural geographies and scales. The result has been an efflorescence of organisations; 
there are currently an estimated 5,000 incorporated under different state, territory and 
national legislation. This suggests approximately 30-35,000 Indigenous men and 
women are serving as the governing leaders of organisations. Given the propensity of 
Indigenous leaders to sit concurrently on the governing boards of several different 
organisations, the overall number of governing members is likely to be less. This still 
constitutes a high level of representative responsibilities amongst adult Indigenous 
people. 
This organisational growth has partly been the result of government departments 
actively encouraging and funding the creation of Indigenous organisations. In some 
cases, incorporation has been undertaken by Indigenous groups because it is a 
government requirement for receiving funds, holding assets and delivering services. The 
growth has also been the product of Indigenous agency and choice, as small, localised 
groups and their leaders have sought the autonomous conduct of their affairs through 
the establishment of their own organisations.  
The papers document several consequences of this incorporating zeal. Firstly, for 
many Australians, organisations and their leaders have become the contemporary public 
face of Indigenous governance. Secondly, for many Indigenous people, organisations 
have come to concretely express their collective, community and regional polities and 
identities; organisations are the new ‘corporate tribes’ (Sutton 1995). Thirdly, an 
important parallel trend has been the penetration of Indigenous organisations into the 
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institutional arrangements of the Australian state’s field of governmentality in 
Indigenous affairs.  
Today, the integration of Indigenous organisations into the daily life of their own 
communities is such that, as the title of this theme suggests, we can validly invoke 
Charles Perrow’s (1991: 725–62) insight about the growing organisational persona of 
north American society, to highlight a trajectory for Indigenous Australia as A Society 
of Organisations. That trajectory has considerable implications for future Indigenous 
governance. 
Issues of Organisational Autonomy, Scale and Capacity 
The two papers in this Theme describe some of the great variety of kinds of 
organisational structures and their governing arrangements that operate at different 
scales across Indigenous Australia. (Appendix C depicts more of these organisational 
formations, and Appendix A lists related publications that provide the supporting 
ethnographic documentation and analyses.) 
Papers 6 and 7 demonstrate the many ways in which organisations and their 
governing leaders are tightly embedded within the surrounding Indigenous networks 
and culture of governance (see also Papers 5 & 8). Indeed, as Papers 6 & 7 report, 
some organisations come together into formal federations and informal alliances, 
creating networks of organisations connected across communities and regions. These 
networked organisations constitute another kind of superstructural governing node in 
Indigenous society.  
Indigenous organisations are also the site for a growing specialist bureaucracy (both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous) working as managers, administrators and staff. They 
constitute an influential sub-field whose professional capacity and own networked 
connections (both to their Indigenous networks and to networks within government 
department and political parties) have considerable influence on the effective 
governance of organisations.  
The papers highlight that the leadership and governance of organisations are subject 
to the same systemic conditions underlying Indigenous mesh networks. For example, 
their governing members are subject to the same push-pull trajectory of relational 
autonomy that prioritises ‘looking after’ local and familial rights and interests, while 
still having to represent their organisation’s broader membership. Decision making by 
leaders of an organisation is influenced by their personal place and standing within the 
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broader hierarchy of leaders in the community and region. Organisations possess and 
distribute a wide range of resources and governance capital. Not surprisingly, 
individuals and groups seek access to them by asserting rights based on their network 
connections (see also Smith 1997, 1998). 
One consequence of the embeddedness of organisations within these network 
dynamics is that they can come to operate as silos of factionalised power, thus 
undermining decision-making and the effectiveness of organisations in their dealings 
with both members and external stakeholders. This is exacerbated by the fact that many 
local organisations are often of such a small scale that continuity of knowledge, and 
sustained administrative, management and staffing capacity within them are hard to 
achieve.  
The thesis papers argue that the governance arrangements and performance of 
Indigenous organisations are now also tightly bound to the extent of their dependence 
on government funding. This makes organisations vulnerable to unpredictable changes 
in government programs and policy agenda. Perversely, another consequence is to 
produce a replica of the state’s institutional architecture within Indigenous organisations 
whereby their planning, administration and decision-making processes mirror the 
timeframes, cycles and priorities of different government departments and Ministers. 
An increasing number of organisations are similarly dependent upon private-sector 
and royalty agreement monies, and their governance is directed by the legal conditions 
of agreements, contracts, and special legislation. Some organisations, such as the 
Yarnteen Corporation described in Paper 7, are working to overcome the conditions of 
financial and governance dependency. But all are susceptible to the impacts of 
unpredictable changes in the state’s field of governmentality.  
Representation, Accountability and Legitimacy 
Given the intercultural positioning of Indigenous organisations, there are Indigenous 
and external dimensions to the assessment of their governance legitimacy and 
accountability. The papers in this theme identify some critical hot-spots where 
organisations are revealed to be particularly vulnerable in this regard. 
Paper 6 analyses the representative politics of native title organisations established 
by the Australian Government to provide native title services to Indigenous people 
under the newly enacted Native Title Act 1993. The paper was written in the context of a 
highly charged public debate in Australia about the legal recognition of Indigenous 
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rights and the statutory creation of these regional representative organisations across the 
country. It analyses the pressure routinely brought to bear by governments and the 
private sector on such organisations to demonstrate greater ‘certainty’ in their decision 
making, ‘stability’ of their leadership, and ‘inclusiveness’ in their representation.  
In meeting external demands for accountability and ‘good’ governance, organisations 
also have to address and balance the Indigenous demands implicit in their networked 
positionality; i.e. for local accountability, subsidiarity of decision-making, recognition 
of relationality as the bases for governance, and for the leaders of organisations to 
operate in ways that are perceived to be culturally legitimate by their own members. 
These competing pressures raise weighty and competing challenges for organisations.  
Both papers point to areas of significant incompatibility between the Indigenous 
governance and statist governmentality regarding their criterion for judging 
representation, accountability and legitimacy. In the eyes of the state, the benchmarks 
are oriented towards compliance with legislative and corporate regulations, financial 
accountability and efficient service delivery. In Indigenous society, the benchmarks are 
oriented to the extent to which an organisation’s governance is judged to align or 
resonate with the cultural values and principles of Indigenous nodal networked 
governance. This implies a cognitive orientation by people, leading to their attitudinal 
approval and behavioural consent or opposition.  
Organisational Cultures of Governance 
Paper 7 looks at an urban ‘family of organisations’, highlighting an underdeveloped 
area of research into Indigenous organisations; namely, the institutional and cognitive 
aspects of their governance (see also Paper 8).  
The term cognition (from the Latin cognoscere, ‘to know’, ‘to conceptualise’ or ‘to 
recognise’) refers to the human faculty and processes of understanding and reasoning 
involved in the ability to apply knowledge and adapt to a certain environment (Lycan 
1999). In Paper 1, ‘institution’ is defined following Shabbir Cheema (1997: 13) to 
mean the cognitive, normative and regulative systems, structures and processes that 
provide stability and meaning to behaviour.  
In his analyses of Native American Indian governance, Stephen Cornell (2002) 
describes institutions as the rules of the game; the way things are and are to be done (see 
also Walker, George & Zelditch 1991: 6). Paper 7 identifies the central importance for 
the governance of Indigenous organisations of the normative and cognitive orientation 
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of its people (leaders, managers, staff) to the enactment and reproduction of their order-
generating values and rules of the game.  
The internal culture of any organisation is created routinely, and draws upon the 
cognitive and rules-based dimensions of behaviour, shared values and standards (verbal 
and non-verbal). These are modelled (or not) by its leaders and managers concerning 
how people within the organisation are expected to behave, what is valued and given 
priority, and what people have to do to fit in, be seen to do their job well and be 
rewarded.  
The two papers in this theme describe Indigenous organisations as having distinctive 
internal cultures to do with their shared cultural institutions and cognitive orientation to 
networked governance, and their advocacy of Indigenous interests and priorities. Paper 
7 examines the development of Yarnteen Corporation, an urban ‘family of 
organisations’ involved in economic development and business ventures.33 It documents 
the ways in which a robust internal governance culture was proactively embedded by 
Yarnteen’s leaders in the organisation’s modus operandi. This was done to promote its 
legitimacy and effectiveness and create a system of incentives and constraints for board 
members, management and staff.  
For Yarnteen Corporation, its shared institutions and cognitive orientation created a 
form of governance capital that was perceived to be distinctly ‘Indigenous’ in character, 
and so strongly supported across the organisation. That internal culture contributed 
greatly to the stability of the organisation’s governing body and workforce. But Paper 7 
also describes how contradictory representations of ‘family’ and ‘community’ can be 
used (by both Indigenous people and the state) to adversely judge the legitimacy and 
accountability of an organisation’s governance. Some cast it as fundamental to the 
organisation’s ‘good’ Indigenous governance and economic success; others as being 
antithetical to those. The Australian state has vacillated from one view to the other in its 
approach to Indigenous organisations, depending on its own changing narrative about 
the role of Indigenous culture. 
The thesis papers show Indigenous organisations increasingly experimenting with 
their governance arrangements and giving more focussed attention to building strong 
internal cultures of governance. However, in the context of intense scrutiny by the state 
and private-sector funders, and their calls for greater certainty and stability of 
organisational governance, there is little external tolerance for experimentation.  
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Organisations as Brokers and Boundary Riders 
Indigenous organisations and their leaders operate at the front stage of intercultural 
engagement with the Australian state. The thesis papers investigate various events and 
consequences associated with such encounters.   
A distinctive feature of Indigenous organisations noted in several papers is their 
position as intercultural brokers of information, meaning, resources and processes 
between the Indigenous people and the state.34 In this role, many show a sophisticated 
ability for what Arturo Escobar (2008: 268) calls ‘articulatory politics’ where they act 
as advocates manoeuvring across Indigenous networks as well as the wider governance 
environment. Many Indigenous leaders of organisations also operate individually as 
‘boundary riders’ (Nowotny 2005); working to maintain the perceived integrity and 
distinctiveness of the Indigenous field of governance and mediate or contain the impacts 
of the state’s governmentality.  
This positionality entails its own ambiguities and pressures for organisations and 
their leaders. But for some Indigenous leaders, the intercultural position of their 
organisation becomes the source of additional power from the wider governance 
environment. This position can be used as the basis for strengthening their authority 
within Indigenous networks, and concurrently promoting greater credibility and power 
with the state and the private sector.  
The thesis papers also demonstrate that even in the most commendably effective 
organisations, their field of governance is made subservient to the regulatory and 
statutory powers of the state, and by the workload of mundane bureaucratic procedures 
required of them. A particularly dense site of intercultural brokerage and contestation 
for organisations is therefore their upward accountability to the state, and downwards 
accountability to their members, for their use of resources and funding.  
The papers also demonstrate that while the state has the weight of sovereign and 
funding power on its side, it also seeks traction and support from Indigenous 
communities and organisations for its own policy goals and practice in Indigenous 
affairs. For example, the state routinely seeks greater organisational engagement in the 
mainstream economic ventures and the delivery of specialist services (although the 
state’s reliance on Indigenous organisations has decreased in the last decade owing to its 
outsourcing of service-delivery to the private, NGO and church sectors). In the 
representative gap left after the abolition of ATSIC, the state has increasingly sought 
Indigenous peoples’ engagement in developing ‘new’ forms of representative 
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governance in communities, so as to provide it with a ‘one-stop shop’ for consultations 
and negotiations. This further promotes the organisational persona of Indigenous 
society, but with the noticeable difference that new governance arrangements fostered 
by the state are overwhelmingly ‘advisory’, with few substantial decision-making 
powers.  
 
Summary 
Today, the thick overlapping connections and allegiances between the different 
orders of networked formations — from extended families, local congeries, clan and 
community through to organisational, regional, companies and confederations of 
networks — are an intrinsic feature of the political economy of the field of Indigenous 
governance. Indigenous organisations now play a central and critical role — for better 
and for worse — in the Indigenous politics and calculations whereby different 
governance formations are activated and contested in dealing with the Australian state.  
Organisations act as influential governing and sometimes superstructural nodes 
within Indigenous governing circuitries. They also act as powerful intercultural brokers 
and a source of penetration by Indigenous networks and cultures of governance into the 
very governmentality of the Australian state. But this intercultural front is also one of 
heavy insertion by the state of its own preferred values and institutions into the 
governance of Indigenous organisations. This mutual penetration makes such 
organisations the site of very public contestation in Indigenous affairs. 
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Paper 6:  Representative Politics and the New Wave of 
Native Title Organisations 
D.E. Smith, 1995.
1
 
Originally published in J. Finlayson and D.E. Smith 1995 (eds) The Native Title Era: 
Emerging Issues for Research, Policy and Practice, Research Monograph No. 10, 
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, The Australian National University, 
Canberra, pp. 59-74.  
Introduction 
The Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) has resulted in the statutory determination of a 
number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations now referred to as Native 
Title Representative Bodies (NTRBs).2 These organisations are arguably the linchpins 
of the NTA. They are empowered by statute to represent native title claimants and 
holders in a variety of circumstances and are already promoting themselves as the key 
inter-cultural brokers between native title interests and all other parties. Indeed, if it can 
be said that the High Court decision in Mabo v Queensland No. 2 and the passage of the 
NTA have fundamentally changed the nature of the relationships between Indigenous 
peoples and the Australian government, then the progressive establishment of a 
nationwide framework of NTRBs constitutes a similar, potentially fundamental 
development in Aboriginal political organisation. This paper explores, in a preliminary 
way, how that change is being constituted in the Indigenous and wider environment, and 
examines the politics of representation within which NTRBs are beginning to effect 
their presence. 
Subsequent to the passage of the NTA, there has been considerable debate over the 
‘right’ to represent native title clients and over the very meaning of ‘representativeness’. 
As these matters are being negotiated in the Indigenous domain, NTRBs are seeking to 
assert a regional approach to native title matters and a wider interpretation of the 
representative responsibilities assigned to them under the Act. This paper describes the 
current and emerging roles of NTRBs, and the nature of the politics of representation 
which are moulding their operation. It is argued that their future position is linked to, 
and constitutive of, an emerging regionalism that is being organisationally formalised 
within the Indigenous polity. 
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The Current Status of Representative Bodies 
At August 1995, twenty-one NTRBs have been determined by the Commonwealth 
Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs under s.202 of the NTA. 
Several more are expected to be determined in the near future. Some are statutory land 
councils with jurisdictions and functions established under Commonwealth and State 
land rights legislation. One is an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC) regional authority with pre-existing, broader responsibilities. Some are non-
statutory land councils of long-standing; others are well-established Aboriginal legal 
services. A number of the smaller NTRBs in Western Australia and Queensland have 
only been very recently established. The differing legislative and operational histories of 
these organisations (especially across States), as well as the variation in their estimated 
populations and geographic coverage all underscore the disparity evident in their 
approaches to representing native title interests. 
The viability of the NTA will ultimately depend on these organisations being able to 
fulfil their statutory roles effectively. It is not surprising, therefore, that issues 
associated with their roles and responsibilities, organisational and staffing structures, 
and funding levels already loom large. At its November 1994 meeting, the ATSIC 
Board of Commissioners agreed that a ‘consolidation review’ should be undertaken of 
their effectiveness, and the appropriateness of native title funding arrangements (Altman 
and Smith 1995: iii). That review was conducted from late April to the end of August 
1995 with a final report published in September (see Altman and Smith 1995).3 During 
the review period, I participated in extensive, minuted consultations with the NTRBs in 
each State, with aspiring NTRBs, with some claimant groups, the National Native Title 
Tribunal (NNTT), ATSIC State and regional offices, and with key Federal government 
stakeholders including the Office of Indigenous Affairs in Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
the Department of Finance, and Attorney-General’s Department (Altman and Smith 
1995: 102-4).4 
During the consultation process, a number of differing viewpoints were put forward 
by Indigenous organisations as to the current and likely future role of NTRBs, in which 
‘representativeness’ and ‘representation’ emerged as crucial underlying issues. 
Legislative Functions 
 215 A Society of Organisations? 
Sections 202 and 203 of the NTA establish criteria for the determination of NTRBs 
by the Minister, define three main functional areas of responsibility, and propose a 
broad funding framework. The organisations are empowered to assist Indigenous people 
to make and present claims to the NNTT; represent them in negotiations and 
proceedings in relation to acts affecting native title and the provision of compensation; 
and in any other matter relevant to the operation of the Act. 
Importantly, the statutory framework does not give NTRBs mandatory or exclusive 
functions, and it specifically allows the Minister to prescribe more than one in relation 
to an area. Whilst they are positively enabled to represent native title parties if 
requested, they are not obliged to undertake these responsibilities, nor are claimant 
groups or the NNTT required to utilise their services. The statute is vague as to the 
extent that they can initiate negotiations and proceedings and conversely, the extent to 
which they are reliant upon instructions from claimants and native title holders. This 
ambiguity in their representative authority was partly a reflection of State Government 
lobbying to avoid the establishment of a statutory-based land council regime across the 
entire continent. It was also partly based on the reluctance of development interests, at 
that time, to have to conduct negotiations through such representative organisations, 
preferring to deal directly with native title claimants and holders under the assumption 
this would prove more cost and time effective. And some Indigenous groups opposed 
the formation of a national land council system. The result is that NTRBs have been 
established with a poorly defined representative status. 
The early reluctance to encourage a national coverage of NTRBs with strong 
jurisdictional powers was perhaps short sighted, but is giving ground as they begin to 
establish their representative effectiveness. The implementation of the ATSIC review 
will further consolidate their position through its recommendation that they assume sole 
jurisdictional representation of native title interests within their regions, and have 
explicit functions and mandatory areas of accountability laid out initially in regulations. 
Importantly, the review also recommends that early consideration be given to 
formalising these roles and responsibilities by statutory amendment. 
Emerging Roles 
As the process of native title claim determination is revealed to be time consuming 
and complex, with a multitude of Indigenous, government and private parties 
marshalled into the mediation process, NTRBs are becoming involved in a wide range 
of duties on behalf of native title parties. While some of these duties are identified in 
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s.202 of the NTA, others are being undertaken as the organisations assume broader roles 
in advocating Indigenous land interests. NTRBs may be ‘oiling the wheels’ of the Act 
as Pearson argues but, as the review report notes, they are also ‘clearly the workhorses 
of the native title regime’ (Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 324; Altman and Smith 
1995: viii). Their current range of native title responsibilities, as assessed by the review 
committee, include: 
• the establishment and management of offices: 
• the development of professional expertise in native title and other land-based 
matters; 
• research and preparation of claimant and compensation applications; 
• coordination and conduct of meetings with native title and other Indigenous 
interest groups; 
• native title mediation; 
• responding to non-claimant and future act applications; 
• site recording, clearance and protection; 
• negotiations with resource developers and other non-Indigenous parties with an 
interest in land; 
• negotiations with Commonwealth, State and Territory, and Local Governments; 
• negotiations for s.21 and other regional agreements; 
• liaison and coordination with other NTRBs; 
• educational and information roles; and 
• court litigation in respect to native title matters. 
NTRBs argued to the review committee that native title is not just about claiming 
land and accordingly, are adopting a wide perspective of their representative role. An 
emphasis is being placed on regional coordination of the native title activities listed 
above, with other land issues. The organisations variously stated to the review that they 
are ‘representing the interests of potential native title holders’; ‘working to get native 
title land’; operating as ‘local level translators and educators’; ‘uniting Indigenous 
people in their region and State’; ‘providing grass roots organisation’; as well as 
‘lobbying government’ and ‘driving the native title process’. 
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Interestingly, these broad roles are almost identical to those foreshadowed by Justice 
Woodward (1974: 68-9) over 20 years ago for the newly established Northern Territory 
Land Councils. Woodward argued that the Northern Territory Land Councils would 
carve out new directions, including possible future responsibilities of: 
• developing Aboriginal policies on matters relating to land; 
• representing Aboriginal people in negotiations with government and development 
interests in relation to land; 
• protecting the interests of traditional owners concerning the use of land; 
• making representations about priorities in expenditure for land purchase and 
management; and 
• conciliating disputes. 
Indeed, over a period of 20 years, the Land Councils progressively assumed such 
responsibilities. Influenced perhaps by the experience of the Northern Territory and 
New South Wales Land Councils, it has taken most NTRBs very little time to come up 
to political speed in asserting similarly wide, land-based responsibilities on behalf of 
their constituents. 
Overwhelmingly, there is a realisation among the organisations that the sometimes 
limited offerings potentially available as claimable native title land nevertheless provide 
significant leverage in dealings with government and development interests. If handled 
astutely, this leverage will reinforce their political standing as they become involved in 
commercial transactions, resource agreements and related policy discussions with 
government. At this early stage in the implementation of the native title process, this is 
already apparent. A number of NTRBs are playing an instrumental role in facilitating 
consultations and agreements between native title, government and development 
interests. 
For example, the Queensland State Government has sought to negotiate with 
prospective native title claimants via the Goolburri Land Council to secure the progress 
of the south-west Queensland and the Blackall to Gladstone gas pipelines. Funding from 
the Queensland Office of the Coordinator-General has enabled Indigenous interests 
along the pipeline route to begin holding meetings, identifying traditional land interests 
and sites, and conducting research and training programs. These negotiations are 
occurring under the auspices of the Land Council without any native title claim before 
the Tribunal. The Land Council has indicated that this process has enabled it to obtain 
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detailed land tenure histories for the area under development (a welcome breakthrough 
in that State) and to establish working protocols between potential native title holders 
and the State Government to secure future dealings. Further north, the Cape York Land 
Council is negotiating the basis for a regional agreement encompassing conservation, 
mining, tourism and cattle industry interests, covering land in Cape York Peninsula only 
part of which is subject to native title claim. 
Similar examples of NTRB involvement in native title negotiations are evident in 
Western Australia. In Broome, Aboriginal groups with affiliations to land in the region 
of the town have, under the auspices of the Kimberley Land Council, set aside long-
standing differences to form the Rubibi Working Group. That Group is undertaking 
strategic negotiations with developers and the Broome Shire Council, utilising the 
leverage of a series of claims to unalienated Crown land in and around the town to 
secure agreements relating to future coastal zone and sea management, town planning, 
site protection, and land designated for Indigenous economic development. 
In the Northern Territory, the Northern Land Council has recently negotiated what it 
regards as a ‘milestone’ agreement between native title claimants of the former St 
Vidgeon’s pastoral lease and CRA over land subject to a native title claim. The so-
called ‘Walgundu Exploration Agreement’ gives the company the right to explore over 
a period of 25 years and commits the parties to entering into negotiations for future 
mining, with criteria to be used in that case. It provides claimants with compensation 
provided at 5 per cent5 of CRA’s costs of exploration per year, covers site protection, 
and Aboriginal employment during the exploration phase. The agreement ensures that 
CRA will not oppose the native title claim; that claimants will not litigate against CRA 
due to the failure of the Northern Territory Government to follow the future act 
procedure laid out under the NTA; and that it will be valid regardless of whether the 
applicants succeed in their native title claim. Importantly, the agreement took only three 
months to negotiate and is also being hailed by CRA as an example of the very positive 
role which NTRBs can play in facilitating comprehensive consultations with 
prospective native title parties and securing widely accepted agreements 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1995: 1484-99). 
Clearly, while State and Territory Governments and the mining industry have 
previously opposed any enhanced role by NTRBs, the views of some mining interests 
are changing as they come to recognise the importance to economic development 
prospects of having credible, professionally-run representative organisation on the 
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ground, which can ensure thorough, but relatively speedy consultations and negotiations 
with the correct native title parties. 
The Politics of Native Title Representation 
The assertion by NTRBs of a more encompassing representative role is being played 
out against the backdrop of contention over the meaning of ‘representativeness’ itself. 
The right to represent and the conditions upon which representativeness is constituted 
within the Aboriginal public domain is, in fact, a long-standing issue in Aboriginal 
affairs. Successive inquiries into the operation of the National Aboriginal Consultative 
Committee, the National Aboriginal Conference and ATSIC, have continued to raise 
matters related to the cultural bases and effectiveness of such representative structures 
and their decision-making processes (Coombs 1984; Martin 1995a; O’Donoghue 1985; 
Weaver 1984). Of particular concern has been the societal level at which organisational 
forms of self-determination can be constructed (especially via government legislation) 
which will be accorded legitimacy by Indigenous peoples. Issues now being debated 
about the ‘representativeness’ of NTRBs are firmly located within the historical debate 
over these matters, and within Indigenous politicking and action about them. 
Under the NTA, the Commonwealth Minister must not determine a NTRB unless he 
or she is satisfied that it ‘is broadly representative of the Aboriginal peoples or Torres 
Strait Islanders in the area’. It is unclear what ‘representative’ in s.202 actually refers to 
and how it is assessed in order for an organisation to be legally determined. Presumably, 
given their proposed functions in native title matters, an organisation must be able to 
demonstrate that it has substantial support from a wide cross-section of Indigenous 
land-owning groups - the prospective native title holders after all - within their proposed 
region of jurisdiction. That is, it should have marshalled a sufficiently ‘representative’ 
Indigenous constituency, thereby securing an informally delegated ‘endorsement’ or 
authority to act for, and speak on behalf of, that constituency. But perhaps more 
importantly, once determined to be a NTRB, it should certainly proceed to represent and 
serve the native title interests of that constituency. Inevitably, these organisations are 
expected to be all representative things to all people. Both government and Indigenous 
people expect them not only to ensure equitable, ‘democratic’ access to their services, 
but to do so in a manner that is also culturally authorised from within Indigenous 
society. 
However, there has been contention within some regions as to whether particular 
NTRBs have managed to secure the endorsement of a broadly representative 
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constituency, and whether that is reflected in their membership. Some have been 
criticised for selectively representing the interests of particular groups, or of doing so in 
an overly adversarial manner (Altman and Smith 1995). To assist in alleviating these 
tensions, the ATSIC review recommended steps be taken to formalise accountability to 
native title interests in their areas, to clearly define their functions and powers, and to 
develop systematic consultation and grievance procedures. Underlining the pressure on 
NTRBs to be widely representative of native title interests in their regions, is the extent 
to which Indigenous expectations for access to their services can be met. There are 
strong arguments put by NTRBs that the most equitable resolution to such access issues 
will occur by having native title management and funding coordinated regionally, rather 
than for a series of claimant groups to be separately and directly funded. Indeed, 
regional coordination allows for the representation of reasonably large cultural 
groupings, provides sufficient population and geographic coverage to generate 
economies of scale, enables ongoing mediation of debilitating conflicts within some 
claimant groups, and the development of strategic approaches that will be beneficial to 
the widest number of Indigenous people. 
Conversely, some claimant groups have argued for access to direct funding, by-
passing NTRBs, and for greater control of their claims under the native title process. 
There was clearly an intention in drafting the NTA that Indigenous native title parties 
should have choice in selecting the representation of their interests. That view was 
actively encouraged by the Prime Minister, in his second reading speech for the Native 
Title Bill, where he noted that NTRBs ‘will not have a monopoly on representing native 
title claimants; individual claimants or groups of claimants can go elsewhere’ (Hansard 
16 November 1993: 2881). These comments inferred that NTRBs would have to 
compete with other organisations (including private law firms) for the right to represent. 
Debate on the issue of the right to representation, and the ‘representativeness’ of 
NTRBs raises long-standing issues about self-determination; in this case, whether self-
determination is necessarily equivalent to each claimant group being directly funded to 
be its own representative organisation. If it is, then one must ask, to what societal level 
should funded representation be delivered: to claimant groups that are separate language 
or cultural blocs; to communities; to clans; local descent groups; ceremonial associates; 
small family groups; to every individual with competing claims? Within the Indigenous 
domain there is unquestionably a social momentum towards the value of localised 
identities and towards small congeries of people attached to core locales. This pull 
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towards localism, or ‘atomism’ as Sutton describes it, is nevertheless engaged by a 
‘collectivism’ which brings small-scale groups together by employing wider regional 
connections (social, historical, ceremonial and so on) to land as its basis (Sutton 1995a; 
see also Martin 1995b). It was precisely such a collectivist approach that was apparent 
in the Pitjantjatjara peoples’ successful efforts via the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 
1981 passed by the South Australian Government, to have their land returned en bloc as 
part of a regional settlement, rather it being disaggregated to component Pitjantjatjara 
groups being allocated separate titles (see Toyne and Vachon 1984). 
The same ‘atomist-collectivist tension’ Sutton (1995a: 1) notes at work in the 
problem of group definition and cohesion in native title claims, also operates at the 
organisational level of Indigenous politics. It is much in evidence in the politicking to 
do with access to funding, decision-making processes and competition over 
organisational jurisdictions. It is also apparent in the processes by which small groups 
seek and accept a wider organisational expression of their particular objectives (whether 
those be about health, legal assistance, service delivery or native title). But such an 
organisational approach to outcomes is precisely what many Indigenous groups have 
enthusiastically pursued over recent decades. There are now over 2,400 incorporated 
Indigenous associations in Australia, creating what Sutton aptly calls the ‘new corporate 
tribes’ (Sutton 1995b).6 This form of mainstream organisational expression within the 
Aboriginal domain is entirely legitimate, especially given the demands of contemporary 
governments for financial accountability, performance indicators and indeed, for legal 
incorporation as a precondition of funding. As well, in many cases, the bases of 
incorporated associations often reflect critical culturally-based parameters within a 
community or region, especially those concerning ties to country and particular locales, 
and the pivotal role of certain family groups. Overlaying these community and 
regionally-based incorporated organisations (and their often overlapping membership) 
is now the ATSIC regional framework. 
Clearly then, alongside the pull of atomism, there is also a persistent and strong 
assertion of Indigenous interests via larger-scale organisations. In spite of this, there is 
still an inclination to see Indigenous representative legitimacy and self-determination as 
most appropriately based on small-scale local groups, and certainly to see social justice 
and equity issues as residing in the a priori cultural ‘rightness’ of such localism and 
diversity. However, the continuing amalgamation of Indigenous groups via legal 
incorporation requires this view to be reassessed. Arguably, self-determination can also 
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lie in the process of groups developing an organisational platform from a regional set of 
native title interests. 
Evidence gained from the NTA process over the past two years indicates that a 
‘micro-representative’ approach oriented to the local level (in this case, to every 
prospective claimant group), while seemingly equitable, may in fact diminish equally 
legitimate Indigenous aspirations to mobilise the greater political experience and 
regional effectiveness made possible through organisations such as NTRBs. In spite of 
some notable attempts to form breakaway land councils, the experience under the 
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) overwhelmingly 
supports the argument that land-based rights have been successfully protected and 
advanced by the developing professionalism and political astuteness of the larger land 
councils (see Altman and Dillon 1988; Altman and Smith 1995; Martin 1995a). 
NTRBs further argue that a micro-representative approach positively counteracts the 
accumulation of professional expertise in native title matters. Experience of the native 
title process confirms that adopting an open-ended ‘micro’ approach on representation 
has had unforseen cost consequences (in particular, soaring legal bills), mitigated 
against the lodgement of well-researched claims and has actively fuelled fragmentation 
within and between potential claimants. The approach has also encouraged the pursuit 
of narrow, legally based considerations on the part of some private law firms who focus 
attention on their immediate clients, rather than on considerations of inclusiveness and 
the dynamics of Indigenous land ownership. Poorly prepared claims can result in 
protracted mediation, potentially costly litigation and limited short-term outcomes for 
claimants. 
In the end, it is likely that NTRBs will be seen, by the present Commonwealth 
Government at least, as the preferred option for the most equitable and efficient 
management of these matters. More recently, some key mining interests have also noted 
that the Northern Territory model of land councils with clear statutory functions and 
responsibilities, is now an ‘extremely attractive’ one for them under the NTA. Realising 
the enormous complexity in identifying potential native title holders, and the need to 
have thorough, expert consultations carried out for the purposes of negotiating resource 
agreements, companies such as CRA are recognising the benefits of having NTRBs 
‘sort out’ these problems (Wand 1995: 1493-94)7 But this does not solve the issue of 
what constitutes representativeness; rather it focuses that aspect squarely on to the 
organisations in question. 
 223 A Society of Organisations? 
In fact, none of the NTRBs currently determined are ‘representative’ in the sense of 
using the democratic electoral procedures employed by ATSIC. Nor do the majority 
have organisational structures that can be said to be based on Indigenous principles of 
land-based authority. If such a structure is indeed possible, it has been most 
approximated by the Northern Territory Land Councils in their attempts over 20 years 
to fashion governing structures that incorporate the major community-based, land 
interest groups in their respective regions. NTRBs are not based upon traditional 
authority structures, even though they are being required to establish their public 
legitimacy partly in terms of being able to speak for, and on behalf of, land-owning 
groups. First and foremost, they are a new class of legislatively created institutions 
located at the interface between Indigenous land values and aspirations, and those of the 
wider Australian political and economic system. They occupy an interstitial political 
position where they translate and negotiate issues between native title and other 
stakeholders. To perform this role they will not only have to be representative, but also 
continue to deliver the support of their constituency. To do this they need memberships, 
decision-making processes and governing structures that reflect — in more than just 
appearance — the major native title interests in their regions. 
However, there will be limits to representation that such organisations can afford; 
limits that are both justifiable and necessary. The Commonwealth’s seeming initial 
endorsement of a micro-level view of self-determination is being rapidly tempered by 
the realities of funding.8 Simply put, there will never be enough funds to enable each 
claimant group to be its own NTRB, nor even for NTRBs to concurrently proceed with 
all potential native title claims within their regions. Pragmatic representation will 
clearly be in order. The organisations will be required to make decisions about priorities 
between claims based upon equitable criteria, available resources and strategic 
assessments of how best to advance Indigenous native title interests. Given resource and 
staff limitations, this will mean that some claims or compensation proposals will be 
judged of lower priority than others so that, for example, some individual interests may 
be placed below those of wider land-owning groups. 
Moreover, as advocates for their constituents, it may be the case that some, having 
greater land-based credentials than others, will be more consistently or effectively 
represented in native title claims. While it is reasonable to expect a NTRB to fully 
investigate all asserted native title claims in its region, it is not realistic to expect it to 
finally represent all those asserted interests. In fact, one could argue that to do so would 
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be eminently ‘un-Aboriginal’. For if the ‘representativeness’ of some NTRBs is an 
issue, then surely so is the ‘representativeness’ of the groups and individuals proposing 
themselves as claimants. Some will be recognised within the Indigenous domain as 
owners of particular areas; others will not be. The range of connections to land are 
multiple, overlapping and subject to being performed and witnessed within the 
Indigenous arena. These land-based ties are actively explored, constructed and redefined 
over each individual’s lifetime. The preparation of a native title claim will involve these 
same processes of assertion, negotiation, and confirmation or denial of ownership 
interests. 
In this actively-constituted Indigenous domain, NTRBs must not only be well 
informed of the variety of native title rights and interests being asserted, but be able to 
recognise and act upon the fact that some claims to land are regarded as more central 
and legitimate, while others are regarded less highly, or as entirely spurious. The non-
Aboriginal preoccupation with equity and appeals procedures should not pre-empt 
Indigenous decisions about these matters by requiring the inclusion of individuals into a 
claimant group who are deemed to have no rightful or legitimate claims according to 
Aboriginal criteria (whether those criteria look to Aboriginal law, historical association, 
succession, ceremony, marital affiliations and so on), or by requiring NTRBs to 
represent all proposals put to it. That said, NTRBs must be able to put forward good 
reasons for not representing a particular claimant proposal, or for placing it at a lower 
level of priority than others. In the native title arena, the politics of representation are 
squarely located within family and community politics, the regional politics of land 
ownership and management, and the wider politics of funding. For these reasons, 
NTRBs should be legislatively required to fully consult with all potential native title 
interests in such matters, and to take instructions from native title claimants. In this 
regard, the ATSIC review recommends that NTRBs be responsible to their clients in a 
manner consistent with s.23 of the ALRA which aims to build legal protections to 
ensure land councils’ powers are not abused. 
Native Title Representation and Political Regionalism 
In 1994, Noel Pearson explained to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native 
Title the Indigenous politics of representation as he saw them applying to the NTRBs, 
arguing that: 
We cannot have 320,000 incorporated organisations. There has got to be a 
point at which people surrender their jealous control to more rational 
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regional service delivery ... at the end of the day if we are going to fuel the 
fantasy that we need to give absolute local control to people, and you are 
just giving everybody five bucks each, that is not going to result in good 
administration of important legislation like this. 
There has got to be a point at which people of a region have to understand that, if 
their interests are going to be protected under legislation such as this, then they need to 
put aside their local differences, to get behind and have membership of a regional 
organisation (Commonwealth of Australia 1994: 324-5). 
In the midst of this politicised arena of representation, many NTRBs are positioning 
themselves as influential regional voices. Their managers help constitute the regional 
and national Aboriginal leadership, and many are linked to networks of Indigenous 
stakeholders and to key individuals in government agencies. Almost all have focused 
their operations at a regional level minimally matching that of an ATSIC regional 
council, or to a series of major cultural blocs. Despite the lack of defined functions, they 
are already utilising the NTA as leverage to further the political and economic interests 
of people in their regions. Ongoing issues to do with the adequacy of their 
representativeness will be moulded by their success in securing significant gains for 
their constituents. There are real dangers though, that NTRBs could lose credibility if 
they do not move quickly, through strategic use of the claims process, the right to 
negotiate provisions, and the leverage currently available through the outstanding issue 
of native title on pastoral leases, to get some tangible outcomes for their regional 
constituents.9 As noted earlier, some are seeking to advance these matters by 
negotiating land-related regional agreements which could be linked to wider native title 
resolutions in the future. 
Relationships with regional councils will be critical. A number of NTRBs have 
extremely close links with ATSIC regional councils — in some cases, ATSIC 
councillors and commissioners are executive members of NTRBs. The ATSIC elected 
Indigenous structure, and especially its regional council system, is held out by the 
Commission as the key to its future development. The Commission has a statutory 
responsibility to devolve budgetary decision making to regional councils which have, in 
turn, gained substantial control over ATSIC funding at regional levels. From 1995, they 
have full delegations to approve regional projects for funding that previously they only 
endorsed (ATSIC 1995: 3). The influence in ATSIC of a regionally-oriented policy 
perspective is evident in the pressure by some regional councils to emulate the 
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‘authority’ model of the Torres Strait Regional Authority; that is, to transform the 
councils into more financially independent regional authorities.10 
While ATSIC’s own version of regionalism is being actively constituted as a form of 
Indigenous political authenticity, criticisms have been made as to whether regional 
councils serve and speak for the range of Aboriginal interests in their regions. That is, 
the very same issue of representativeness impinges on the legitimacy of ATSIC regional 
councils as it does with NTRBs. Sullivan (1995) reports that in the Kimberley region, 
some organisations (including the Kimberley Land Council) have well-established 
memberships which feel disempowered by the ATSIC regional council system. In 
seeking to resolve this issue, the Kimberley Land Council has moved to consider ways 
in which a ‘partnership’ between ATSIC and ‘key community based representative 
organisations’ might better advance regional agreements in respect to service delivery, 
and the development of regional Indigenous ‘self-governing structures’ (Yu 1995a: 
52).
11
 In other regions, ATSIC councils and NTRBs are already closely aligned. In the 
Murchison-Gascoyne region, for example, the ATSIC regional council has been 
instrumental in establishing and providing substantial funding to the Yamatji Sea and 
Land Council in the absence of monies from ATSIC’s national allocation, and the 
Yamatji Council has received determination as a NTRB. 
The future relationship between the NTRBs and ATSIC regional councils could be 
critical, especially with the possible transition of ATSIC councils into regional 
authorities, and in the context of negotiations for both land-based and service delivery 
regional agreements. The politics of representation, focused on the development of a 
regional polity, may involve NTRBs and ATSIC regional councils vying for leadership 
of a regional constituency. On the other hand, with strategic cooperation between 
NTRBs, ATSIC regional councils and other Indigenous organisations, representational 
politics could prove to be a powerfully unifying device in which NTRBs constitute a 
‘further evolution’ in the ‘realignment and renegotiation of the ... structural relationship 
which exists between governments and Aboriginal people’ (Yu 1995b: 13). 
Beyond Representativeness 
Beyond the immediate issue of establishing representative credibility, NTRBs are 
developing, at varying rates, into a national network of strong, professional 
organisations with a decisive input into the native title process and related policy 
considerations. Already there are working coalitions of NTRBs within States which 
meet to formulate strategic approaches on the full range of native title issues. There are 
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moves afoot to establish a national coalition. These organisational extensions of the 
NTRB framework will in themselves raise important policy issues that will need to be 
responded to by State, Territory and Commonwealth Governments. One of the major 
dilemmas for government in the early debates about native title legislation was to find a 
national organisation capable of representing Indigenous land interests. At a time when 
key individual Aboriginal leaders were being publicly criticised for not being able to 
speak on behalf of a broad enough constituency, ATSIC played a significant role, 
delivering national Aboriginal support based on its elected regional councils (ATSIC 
1994: 22). Increasingly, NTRBs will assume this role, especially at the regional level, 
but also at the wider State and national level if they continue to amalgamate into larger 
political coalitions. 
As they become influential power brokers within regional Aboriginal politics and 
regional economies, NTRBs could assert a growing impact in State and Federal political 
and policy arenas. For example, they are quickly becoming key players in the critical 
pressure points in native title relations between the States and the Commonwealth, 
especially in States such as Western Australia where the government is actively 
obstructing initiatives by both NTRBs and some elements of the mining industry itself 
to get on with the native title process. The fact that NTRBs are actively seeking to 
negotiate regional agreements with resource and other development interests will force 
State and Federal Governments to clarify their own policy approach to regional 
agreements and to formulate a preferred process for government involvement. 
NTRBs will play an important role acting on behalf of native title claimants in 
relation to potential amendments to the NTA, providing government with a crucial 
consultative option at the regional level. Under interim regulations, they will have an 
important role in relation to Prescribed Bodies Corporate and native title holders 
regarding land use and management. These regional responsibilities link directly into 
critical land-related issues at the national level. For example, the Indigenous Land 
Corporation will need to consider directing its land purchase and management strategies 
according to native title outcomes dependent on the activities of NTRBs. 
As NTRBs gain in professional experience and negotiating skills, and as their 
representative base strengthens, there may be increased tension between them, the 
NNTT and State counterpart Tribunals over jurisdictions and appropriate roles. The 
organisations will undoubtedly argue for the centrality of their role in ascertaining the 
views and acting on behalf of their Indigenous constituency. It will be critical for the 
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NNTT and State Tribunals to realise that their own areas of expertise do not lie in the 
Indigenous domain, and to recognise NTRBs as legitimate and increasingly effective 
organisational representatives of native title interests. Indeed, such recognition can only 
serve to help develop such effectiveness. If the political lessons of the land council 
system in the Northern Territory hold true for NTRBs (see Altman and Dillon 1988; 
Martin 1995a), especially in a post-native title claim period, their position will be 
consolidated as influential advocates for Indigenous land-based rights and interests. In 
the meantime, there are clearly a number of important matters that remain to be resolved 
if they are to become effective. In particular, all are in need of a stable regime of 
sufficient funding to undertake their native title responsibilities; representativeness does 
not come cheaply. They are also in need of an enhanced statutory framework which 
clearly defines mandatory areas of responsibility and accountability to their Indigenous 
clients. While the Commonwealth continues to be reluctant to take this step, key mining 
industry spokespeople are already arguing its likely benefits.
12
 
ATSIC will need to quickly and efficiently respond to their needs, not simply for 
program funds, but for corporate and administrative assistance. If NTRBs can establish 
themselves on a sound representative and management footing, there is every possibility 
that this emerging national institutional framework could mark a decisively new stage in 
Aboriginal politics. In particular, these organisations will become powerful political 
voices for a constituency, some of whom will have substantial decision-making powers 
over economic development. As such, they will generate a regional, land-based 
politicism with which ATSIC regional councils, governments and developers will have 
to contend. 
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Notes: Paper 6 
1. I would like to thank Jon Altman, Hilary Bek, Julie Finlayson, David Martin and 
Neil Westbury for helpful comment and criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper. I 
nevertheless take full responsibility for any errors and the views expressed. 
2. These are commonly called Representative Bodies and are abbreviated to NTRBs 
throughout the paper. While it is slightly cumbersome to have the abbreviation 
appear too frequently, it is used to avoid the more boring repetition of 
‘Representative Bodies’. 
3. The recommendations of the review committee were accepted by the ATSIC 
Board of Commissioners in September and ATSIC is establishing a separate 
branch in central office to proceed with implementation of the report. Cabinet has 
noted the report recommendations and has agreed to adjust ATSIC funds so that 
NTRBs will be able to effectively perform their functions and facilitate the 
operation of the NTA at this crucial, early stage. 
4. I participated in consultations in Brisbane, Tin Can Bay, Toowoomba, 
Rockhampton, Bundaberg, Mackay, Townsville, Cairns, Thursday Island, Mt Isa, 
Burketown, Adelaide, Alice Springs, Darwin, Broome, Derby, Port Hedland, 
Perth, Kalgoorlie and Canberra. I also attended a Canberra workshop of NTRBs 
conducted by the Native Titles Research Unit of the Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, at which Professor Jon Altman and I 
conducted sessions with NTRB staff on the review recommendations. I did not 
attend the New South Wales and Victorian consultations with NTRBs which were 
carried out by another group from the review committee. The review committee 
was chaired by the ATSIC Commissioner Mr Guy Parker and included Mr Murray 
Chapman (Assistant General Manager, Land, Heritage and Culture Branch, 
ATSIC), Mr Neil Westbury (Assistant Secretary, Native Title Special Projects 
Branch, Office of Indigenous Affairs), Professor Jon Altman (Director, Centre for 
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Australian National University) and  
myself, Ms Diane Smith (Research Fellow, Centre for Aboriginal Economic 
Policy Research, Australian National University). 
5. This is the same percentage as applies in respect of exploration agreements under 
the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (Northern Territory) 1976. The agreement also 
ensures that compensation may be received in any form, including the provision of 
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benefits to the local Ngukurr community, with Aboriginal people making final 
decisions as to the form compensation takes. 
6. These numbers are approximate and provided by the Registrar of Incorporated 
Associations, ATSIC, Canberra. They include associations established under 
Commonwealth legislation only. 
7. Mr Paul Wand, Vice-President, Aboriginal Relations, of CRA further argued to 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Native Title and the Indigenous Land Fund 
(PJC) that CRA ‘strongly endorse the need to have provisions in the NTA that will 
give standing and authority to the relevant Land Councils or regional councils 
[that is, to the NTRBs] to enter into agreements that will be legally binding and 
enforceable for the duration of those agreements’ (CRA Submission to the PJC, 
see Commonwealth of Australia 1995: 1515). 
8. It is also being tempered by the realisation amongst claimant groups that they 
should more appropriately organise themselves to be Prescribed Bodies Corporate. 
These are the incorporated associations able to be established under the NTA 
(ss.55-60) to hold native title rights in trust for native title holders. The native title 
holding members of Prescribed Bodies will have substantial decision-making 
powers over their particular areas of native title land. There appears to have been 
no initial statutory impediment to a NTRB also becoming a Prescribed Body 
Corporate, but subsequent regulations passed for the latter on 20 December 1994 
seem to actively preclude this possibility. 
9. The same comment can be applied to the NNTT. 
10. See for example, Sullivan 1995; Menham 1995. 
11. See also similar comments about the need for a partnership between NTRBs and 
ATSIC at the regional level by Daryl Pearce, Director of the Northern Land 
Council made at the same seminar (Pearce 1995). 
12. CRA have recently called for a clearer statutory basis for NTRBs that ‘will give 
standing and authority’ to them, arguing that it would serve to make agreements 
and negotiations that legally binding upon both the NTRBs and the native title 
parties they represent (see Commonwealth of Australia 1995: 1515). 
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Paper 7:  The Business of Governing: Building 
Institutional Capital in an Urban Enterprise  
D.E. Smith, 2008. 
Originally published in J. Hunt, D. Smith, S. Garling and W. Sanders (eds) Contested 
Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia, CAEPR 
Monograph No. 29, ANU E Press, pp. 205–32. 
In the wider community, people who have a business idea and the means to 
develop their idea can develop their own enterprise at their own initiative. It 
is not as straightforward in Aboriginal communities. This is because 
Aboriginal people are invariably members of wider family groups and 
communities, and individuals are not completely free to undertake private 
enterprise … Similarly, opportunities are frequently seen as communal 
assets—belonging to clan groups or to communities, not to individuals … 
Indigenous social and cultural imperatives often result in the creation of 
decision-making and ownership structures that make enterprise ownership 
and management inefficient, unwieldy, impossible … Indigenous decision-
making structures are about social and political representation, whereas 
optimum business decision-making should be about expertise, experience, 
knowledge and talent (Ah Mat 2003: 6). 
The notion that all Indigenous communities are the same is another of the 
myths or misunderstandings that has made its way into the policy and 
psyche of successive governments. Indigenous communities are diverse … 
Diversity is not only in terms of language groups, clans or country, it goes 
further. Some communities may see economic growth as their primary goal, 
while others may accord more importance to cultural richness and taking 
care of country. It is important that differing Indigenous traditions and 
values be recognised and accommodated in a way that contributes to 
building strong communities rather than undermine them (Armstrong 2007: 
75–6). 
Introduction  
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Behind the interest in Indigenous community governance lies a concern for the 
improved socioeconomic well being of Indigenous people. International research has 
found that there is a ‘development dividend’ (see Kaufmann 2005) attached to what is 
commonly referred to as ‘good governance’, and that it applies to quite poor countries 
and Indigenous societies (see Cornell and Kalt 1990; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
2005). In Australia, Indigenous communities are familiar with the cycle of business and 
economic development failures, and there is evidence that weak governance capacity is 
a contributing factor (Hunt and Smith 2006, 2007). In other words, Indigenous 
economic development is a governance issue.  
The prime issue addressed in this chapter is whether there are particular kinds of 
organisational governance that might facilitate Indigenous economic success. The 
governance factors that impede Indigenous economic success have been extensively 
documented in Australia, to the point where there appears to be a public fixation on a 
deficit model of Indigenous economic development (see Dodson and Smith 2003 for a 
summary). This chapter focuses on the forms of organisational culture, governance 
representation, institutional frameworks and decision-making that facilitate rather than 
undermine economic success. This concern goes to the heart of ‘who’ should be the 
relevant Indigenous actors in the governance of economic initiatives, and the extent to 
which ‘governing for business’ should reflect Indigenous cultural values, relationships 
and systems of authority.  
In Australia, these are hotly contested matters. The Indigenous commentators whose 
quotes open this chapter highlight one of the biggest challenges for Indigenous 
Australians in their governance arrangements today—namely, mediating the 
considerable tensions, expectations, and contemporary myths surrounding the role of 
‘community’ and ‘family’ in Indigenous societies and their economic development. 
Many stakeholders agree with Richard Ah Mat above, that the social and cultural 
imperatives which are part of Indigenous family and community life are problematic for 
the kind of governance that is thought necessary for generating successful businesses 
and other economic development outcomes. Others identify ‘family’ and ‘community’ 
as potential sources of social and cultural capital, but ones that need to be strategically 
managed and ‘balanced’ within an organisation’s governance arrangements and 
business objectives.  
Indigenous organisations attempting to operate businesses seem to be particularly 
vulnerable. Their viability as businesses can be quickly eroded, not only by divisive 
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conflicts created by community and family politics, but also by the unrealistic demands 
of government and the private sector, which hold their own ideological views about the 
role that ‘community’ and ‘family’ should and should not play in governance and 
economic development. For urban organisations and leaders engaged in business 
enterprises, key areas of vulnerability and challenge include:  
• negotiating what constitutes ‘the community’ and ‘family’ in the light of historical 
resettlement, ongoing high rates of mobility, and the often tangled web of urban 
relationships and land-ownership rights;  
• negotiating processes of representation and decision making that support their 
economic goals, at the same time as building the internal and external legitimacy 
of their governance;  
• responding to the diverse views and cultural values that Indigenous people have 
about their community, families and their governance needs;  
• balancing Indigenous calls for more inclusive ‘community’ participation in, and 
access to, the services and benefits provided by organisations, alongside the hard-
headed decision making and corporate governance required for economic success;  
• responding to government pressure for ‘whole-of-community’ participation and 
representation, in circumstances where the community may be heterogeneous or 
fragmented; and  
• negotiating the funding labyrinth of governments, and their underlying 
assumptions that ‘urban communities’ have ‘easier’ access to mainstream services, 
infrastructure, employment and economic opportunities.  
This chapter looks at the establishment and operation of an urban Indigenous 
organisation in Newcastle—the Yarnteen Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 
Corporation (YATSIC)—and how it has tackled the challenges of ‘governing for 
business’ within a complex community and economic setting. Yarnteen Corporation has 
a reputation for outstanding business and service delivery success that has been 
sustained over a 20 year period. Its Indigenous leaders have instigated specific strategies 
in respect to ‘family’ and ‘community’ when designing a governance model for the 
organisation. The paper proceeds by first unpacking the two social institutions of 
‘family’ and ‘community’—in both their broader Indigenous and Newcastle specific 
contexts—and then examines the corporation’s governance solutions to these.  
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Importantly, Yarnteen’s leaders have consciously constructed an internal governance 
culture and institutional environment to support its economic functions and goals. The 
organisation’s economic success is directly related to these strategies. Specifically, 
Yarnteen has built up a foundation of institutional and governance capital that invests it 
with resilience, practical capacity, and business flexibility that is ‘paying a development 
dividend’. It appears to have done this without forsaking its cultural identity as an 
‘Aboriginal organisation in the Newcastle community’. This is a considerable 
achievement given the difficulties highlighted by Richard Ah Mat, which seem to have 
contributed to the failure of so many other Indigenous community organisations and 
businesses.  
The Problem with ‘Community’ and ‘Family’?  
The concept of the ‘Indigenous community’ remains fuzzy and confusing. It 
continues to be associated with discrete geographical settlements, where it evokes ideas 
of a shared, idealised culture and a unity of purpose and action among its members (see 
Peters-Little 2000). In this way, ‘community’ and a homogeneity of culture and 
interests have come to be conflated in the public mind.  
But this is not the case. A ‘community’ can be defined as a network of people and 
organisations that are linked together by webs of relationships, cultural identity, 
traditions, rules, shared histories, or simply common interests and goals (Hunt and 
Smith 2006, 2007). Indigenous communities are diverse in their cultures, historical 
experiences, governance histories and location. In Indigenous Australia, communities 
include not only discrete remote locations and rural settlements (of which there are over 
1000; see Taylor 2006) but also ‘communities of identity’ whose members share a 
common cultural identity but are residentially dispersed across a region or set of 
locations. There are also Indigenous ‘communities of interest’ comprising different 
groups who unite for a common purpose, but may have different cultural identities and 
rights (see Hunt and Smith 2007: 4; Smith 2005: 24–5).  
Today, approximately three-quarters of Indigenous Australians live in urban areas, 
with 30 per cent residing in major cities (Taylor 2006). While some are permanent 
residents of particular towns, many others are periodic urban dwellers who travel 
between towns and their hinterland rural communities, where they make use of a series 
of ‘usual residences’. The high population turnover associated with this pattern of 
movement between cities and rural communities ‘is such that Indigenous people in the 
city are not just similar to those in country areas—to a large extent they are the ‘same’ 
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people spatially displaced at different stages of their lives’ (Taylor 2006: 3). In other 
words, reference to ‘urban Indigenous communities’ needs to be qualified in terms of 
their mobility, cultural heterogeneity and contemporary social complexity.  
Many Indigenous Australians have built up strong historical attachments to particular 
urban residential ‘hubs’,1 which have become an integral part of their contemporary 
identities. The resident Indigenous ‘community’ in such locations is not homogenous. 
More often, it comprises a mixed constituency of large extended families and related 
individuals, who come and go. These families form social networks within their urban 
location that stretch outwards to connect to other family members and ‘communities’ in 
surrounding regions (see Macdonald 2000; Peters-Little 2000: 412; Smith 2000; Sutton 
1998). As a consequence, there are usually many ‘communities’ within a community, 
and extended families invariably form the foundations for these.  
The governance of these fluid and compositionally complex urban communities is 
extremely challenging. A contributing factor has been the tidal wave of organisational 
incorporation that has occurred over the past 30 years. Today, there are an estimated 
5000 incorporated community and regional organisations across Australia, with an 
estimated (minimum) 30 000 governing board members at their helm.
2
 To some extent, 
this growth has been the result of a large number of government agencies taking an 
interest in Indigenous corporate affairs and socioeconomic outcomes. However, it has 
also been the product of Indigenous agency and choice, as small urban Indigenous 
groups, and more recently regional alliances of urban organisation and communities, 
have sought greater autonomy and control in the conduct of their community affairs, 
delivery of services, and business and enterprise development.  
While there have been important practical, political and funding advantages to 
incorporation, some organisations have become silos of factional power in 
communities, competing with each other for members and local legitimacy, as well as 
scarce funds, resources and staff. The well documented result is that community 
organisations can find themselves subject to debilitating internal conflict, poor 
governance and financial management, and are sometimes at odds with their own 
membership and each other.  
This situation has been exacerbated by the lack of national policy clarity about who 
these urban organisations are supposed to represent and how they are to be governed. 
Are different governance arrangements needed for organisations that deliver community 
services, as opposed to those operating business enterprises? As Leah Armstrong 
 239 A Society of Organisations? 
highlights in the opening quote to this chapter, an overly simplistic view of 
‘community’ has become entrenched in government policy, program and funding 
frameworks, where it is equated with the expectation that there should be a collective, 
community-wide basis to service delivery and the distribution of any benefits flowing 
from government funding. This has flowed through to expectations about the 
governance of organisations which have been tagged by governments as being 
‘community organisations’. These are subject to idealistic expectations that they will 
have ‘community representation’, ‘community participation’, engage in ‘community 
consultations’ and so on.
3
  
Governments and the private sector commonly prefer to deal with local organisations 
that are ‘representative’ in this manner. They then look to these organisations to speak 
for and make decisions on behalf of ‘the community’, when this is invariably a highly 
fluid, mixed set of sub-groups. Even organisations set up to represent a specific 
location, or sub-group within a location, are still expected to treat their members as a 
community of like-minded people with similar interests, goals and priorities. Under 
such institutional conditions, governments have promoted the ‘community’ as a 
benchmark for fair representation, equitable distribution of resources and benefits, 
proper consultation, the source of legitimacy, and the rightful recipient of ‘downwards’ 
accountability.  
Hand in hand with the murky concept of community goes that of ‘family’. While the 
important role of extended families in the domestic economies and social systems of 
Indigenous communities is well documented (see Finlayson 1991; Macdonald 2000; 
Smith 2000; Sutton 1998), it is not clear to what extent (or how) they might provide a 
positive basis for governance and economic development. Indeed, it is commonly 
asserted that Indigenous family relationships are highly problematic for good 
organisational governance and undermine economic development outcomes. The family 
is viewed according to a dysfunctional, deficit model, not as a form of contemporary 
social and economic capital.  
Yet the notion of ‘family’ has long been the central ordering principle within 
Indigenous Australian societies, both in their traditional and contemporary modes. 
Invoked in almost every context and in every discussion, ‘family’ is the core unit, at 
both an actual and conceptual level, in Indigenous social and economic life (see Smith 
2005; Sutton 1998). In particular, the extended family is the primary residential form, 
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with each individual’s investment in family relationships widely distributed across 
expanding networks of relatedness.  
Today, families of polity (cf. Sutton 1998) form the backbone of Indigenous 
communities and many local organisations, thereby linking an extended family group 
identity to organisational identities and forms of political representation. In this manner, 
extended families not only have a form of internal governance, they are also embedded 
into other layers of governance at community and regional levels, and outwards.  
So, why is it that family participation in governance and the business arena is seen so 
negatively? Increasingly, Indigenous families in communities have come to be 
associated with images of organisational nepotism and corruption, disputation and 
violence, debilitating factionalism, self-interested decision making, insular thinking and 
low business expertise. The transformation of the Indigenous family from a positive to a 
negative symbol has a long history in Australian colonialism.4 In recent times, its image 
has further deteriorated under public and media criticism of family violence and 
dysfunction in some communities, and their role in poor organisational management 
and governance. In regard to the latter, a report by the Office of the Registrar of 
Aboriginal Corporations (ORAC)
5
 found that:  
The matter that Indigenous people make the most complaints to ORAC 
about is ‘nepotism’ within Indigenous corporations. Unmanaged nepotism 
has many adverse consequences, including high disputation, and will 
undermine an otherwise functioning program and corporation. It is a risk 
that funding agencies need to manage well. A key to managing it is 
understanding what it means and agreeing when action by the funding 
agency is necessary. Nepotism is widely understood to mean advantages 
obtained through family relationships, and is not necessarily illegal (ORAC 
2004: 19).  
The involvement of families in enterprise and commercial projects is seen as 
especially problematic. The Indigenous family lies at the heart of values of reciprocity, 
mutual responsibility and obligation. Because of this, it is argued that these institutional 
rules of family life cannot be trusted in the world of capitalism, business management 
and profit making. The family has thus become positioned as the antithesis of 
accountability, transparency and fairness; a form of ‘cultural virus that infects economic 
development’ (Ah Mat 2003: 3). For many stakeholders, ‘community’ is posed as the 
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preferable unit for a more legitimate, inclusive form of governance, and for generating 
economic development.  
There is certainly a plethora of evidence documenting the negative impacts of family 
politics on organisational governance, community life, and business success. But is that 
the whole story? Does family involvement in economic development initiatives and 
governance arrangements have to operate as a deficient cultural institution? Do core 
Indigenous values and relationships have to be entirely excluded from the governance of 
economic development initiatives in order for them to be successful? Can the two be 
reconciled? The experience of Yarnteen Corporation provides evidence for some 
alternative conclusions and options.  
Community and Organisational Governance in Newcastle  
With a population of 146 000, the industrial town of Newcastle on the central coast 
of New South Wales (NSW) is the second largest town in the state. According to 2006 
Census results, around two per cent of its residents are Indigenous. The Aboriginal 
‘community’ largely comprises families who resettled in the town several decades ago, 
who have strong, continuing cultural ties both to the town itself and to surrounding rural 
communities and families across NSW (Ball 1985; Hall and Jonas 1985; Jonas 1991; 
Smith 1996, 2005). There is also a small group of Torres Strait Islanders living and 
working in the town, who have links to Islander communities in northern Queensland 
and the Torres Strait. An early survey of Indigenous households in the town carried out 
in the mid 1980s by the local Awabakal Cooperative reported that 75 per cent of those 
households were from outside the area (Hall and Jonas 1985). This movement into 
Newcastle created an estimated 700 per cent increase in the city’s Indigenous 
population over the twenty years between 1971 and 1991 (Arthur 1994).  
Importantly, amidst this flow of people there is a stable core of family members who 
have called Newcastle home for over four decades. These ‘immigrant’ families were 
instrumental in establishing the early Aboriginal service delivery organisations and 
local Aboriginal land councils in the town and surrounding region. Recent assertions of 
a local native title claim by an Indigenous family in the town, as well as the 
proliferation of traditional owner groups in the larger Newcastle-Hunter Valley region 
in recent years, have inserted issues of ‘land ownership’ versus ‘historical’ residence 
into the wider community dynamics. To date, there has been no native title land 
returned in the Newcastle town area.  
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The Aboriginal ‘community’ of Newcastle is therefore compositionally complex, 
comprising numerous extended family groups who have their Indigeneity in common, 
but who have family histories and relationships that link them to different resettlement 
phases, different cultural identities, and different regional communities. The so-called 
Newcastle ‘Indigenous community’ is in fact a network of dispersed nodes of 
governance in the form of organisations, senior leaders and key families. Some strands 
of the network are more closely connected than others.  
It is not surprising then that there is no single ‘community’ governing body. Rather, 
the Indigenous residents in Newcastle are represented by an extremely large number of 
organisations based in the town and surrounding Hunter Valley region.6 Some 
organisations are required to be widely representative under their statutory rules, while 
others are associated with particular families or service needs. There are community 
tensions that occasionally erupt into disputes over services and the governance of 
organisations, and which spill into attempts by different groups to ‘take over’. At the 
same time, there are also positive relationships between a number of the families and 
organisations whose senior leaders meet regularly at forums and community events, 
forming an influential peer network in the town. A number have worked for decades at 
regional, state and national levels on Indigenous political, governance and policy issues.  
The formation of the Awabakal7 Aboriginal Co-operative Ltd in 1976 was a pivotal 
event in creating a sense of Aboriginal identity in Newcastle. ‘The co-op’ was 
established as a response to the unmet service and employment needs of the growing 
number of Aboriginal people who had migrated to the town in the 1960–70s. It focused 
on community development initiatives and started several long-standing housing, 
health, welfare, economic and training initiatives.  
The co-op also played an extremely important role as the incubator of other 
organisations that play an important role in the town today. Because some ‘younger’ 
organisations have been incubated out of older, apical organisations there is, in effect, a 
‘genealogical connection’ between groups of organisations who support each other’s 
work and goals. Yarnteen is an influential node in this urban network.  
Yarnteen—A Quiet Economic Success  
Yarnteen Corporation has a long-standing reputation for both its business success 
and community development outcomes on several fronts. It successfully runs a major 
bulk warehousing and bagging facility for grains, protein meal and fertiliser—Port 
Hunter Commodities—which commenced trading in 1994. This venture commenced 
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with one warehouse and bagging plant, and now has three state-of-the-art warehouses 
with storage capacity for 70 000 metric tonnes. It succeeded in gaining accreditation 
from the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service to conduct ‘cleaning’ of non-
compliant imports, making it the only warehousing operation to do so in the port area.  
In 1992, the corporation was one of the first urban organisations to operate a 
Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme, and it provided a 
range of social and cultural services and economic development opportunities for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander residents of the town and the wider Hunter River 
region (Smith 1996). It was one of a small number of CDEP organisations to 
subsequently participate in 2001–02 in the Australian Government’s Indigenous 
Employment Centre trial,8 successfully placing 20 people into full-time work and then 
going on to become a fully-fledged Indigenous Employment Centre.  
Subsequently, Yarnteen received a CDEP ‘Achievement Award for Innovation’ from 
the Australian Government in recognition of the advances it made in the use of 
technology to network CDEP organisations.9 More recently, the organisation has 
consistently been on the front foot in responding to the recent radical changes to the 
CDEP scheme.  
From the beginning, an integral part of its economic and employment initiatives has 
been the provision of in-house training, professional development and case management 
support to individuals. The corporation recently established the Indigenous Creative 
Enterprise Centre. This enterprise addressed the ‘digital divide’ by offering the 
Indigenous community in Newcastle access to computers and technology for skills and 
small business development. It has provided financial support and professional 
mentoring to the Arwarbukarl Cultural Resource Association. This is a dedicated 
cultural organisation whose main activities are ‘protection and continual practice and 
teaching of our culture and the revival of the local Awabakal language’ (YATSIC 
2005). More recently, Yarnteen has expanded activities into small business training 
functions.  
In 2006, Yarnteen extended its business portfolio by opening a car wash business in 
Port Macquarie. It aimed to capitalise on the growing demand to conserve water in areas 
under restrictions and provide a customer friendly car wash service. It sought the most 
recent technology—this time from the United States of America—to develop ‘green’ 
water recycling processes.  
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Yarnteen Pty Ltd was also created to operate as a property investment vehicle that 
enables the corporation to build an asset base for future investments. It currently owns 
land and warehouses at the Newcastle Port, 100 acres at Wollombi that it operates as a 
cultural and conference camp accessible to all Newcastle’s Indigenous residents, and 
major residential property and buildings in town and interstate.  
Yarnteen’s Governance History  
Different institutional elements (such as norms, values, policies, regulations and 
routines) evolve as a product of the unique governance history of each organisation. 
These internally sourced institutions govern the behaviour of an organisation, its leaders 
and staff.  
Not surprisingly, the governance history of Yarnteen Corporation has both urban and 
rural influences. Like many other Aboriginal organisations in the Hunter region, 
Yarnteen had its beginnings in the Awabakal Co-operative. An early internal review by 
leaders of the co-op led to several of its functional programs being ‘farmed out’ to 
organisations that were set up to take on the program roles. These organisations were 
incubated and mentored by the co-op until they became independent service delivery 
organisations in their own right.  
Yarnteen was one such incubated organisation, becoming incorporated in June 1991. 
The leadership of the Awabakal Co-op stayed closely involved in mentoring the early 
development of Yarnteen and its emerging leadership. This process of organisational 
mentoring and incubation has in turn become a signature feature of Yarnteen’s 
development.  
While the corporation’s purpose and objectives evolved over the years in keeping 
with its growth, there has always been a strong focus on economic development at the 
heart of its operations. Reflecting back on the organisation’s governance history, 
Yarnteen leaders identify several ‘key factors that influenced [its] governance structure’ 
right from the beginning (pers. comm.; see also YATSIC 2005). The two founding 
leaders (one Aboriginal, the other Torres Strait Islander) say they were particularly keen 
to make an enduring change for the better in the economic circumstances of their 
families. They wanted greater economic independence for their own families and, in 
that way, to act as an economic role model for the wider Indigenous community: ‘From 
the first, our organisation stressed its desire to become a full agent in our own 
development’ (YATSIC 2005).  
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In order to do this, the leadership felt strongly that: 
the governance structure was … an important strategy to achieve the long-
term objectives and economic self sufficiency of the organisation. Our 
number one priority was to have a governance structure that was sensitive to 
and compatible with the culturally [sic] diversity and interests of our 
community, but importantly that offered stability and contributed to good 
governance rather than undermining it (Armstrong 2003).  
In particular, we aimed to create a balance between economic and social obligations 
for greater community capacity building … Our goal to empower Indigenous 
individuals and organisations to achieve self-determination is being achieved through 
our governance structure (YATSIC 2005).  
From the beginning, a first-order consideration in designing Yarnteen’s 
organisational governance was a recognition amongst the founding Awabakal and 
corporation leaders ‘that the Indigenous community around Newcastle area is made up 
of many different family and clan groups … who have resettled in the region in search 
of better employment opportunities’ (YATSIC 2005). They wanted to avoid the 
problems that other organisations had experienced with open-ended, amorphous 
community participation leading to unwieldy representative structures, and to focus on a 
core group of families with whom they had well-established connections. They had also 
witnessed first hand the debilitating effects of community politics on the governance of 
earlier NSW co-operatives and Local Aboriginal Land Councils. These organisations 
were regarded as having ‘lost’ valuable financial assets and economic ventures because 
of factionalised disputes over membership, representation, and community access to 
benefits.  
The organisation’s leaders also wanted to create ‘a balance between economic and 
social obligations for greater community capacity building’. However, they also ‘held 
the view that focusing only on the social aspects of people’s lives may not produce 
lasting changes to individual families or communities’ (YATSIC 2005). They clearly 
‘recognised the importance of business in supporting a healthy community’ (cf. Jonas 
1991: 12).  
This positive assessment of the potential role of family, in tandem with their 
reservations about a ‘whole of community’ approach to business, and a desire to secure 
a strategic balance between cultural, social and economic goals, has set the tenor of 
Yarnteen’s governance and institutional operations since 1991.  
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Yarnteen’s Governance Model  
Yarnteen’s founding leaders believed that culturally-based decision making 
processes could form an effective basis for governing arrangements, but within a tight 
representative model. The leaders identified a core set of large extended families with 
long-term ties to Newcastle as the organisation’s main membership group. They 
proceeded to establish the organisation’s system of governing representation, decision 
making and membership around this particular subset of the wider community.  
Given the problems, expectations and misunderstandings associated with the notion 
of family representative models in organisational governance, it is useful to examine 
how Yarnteen managed the potential negative impacts and built upon the positives in its 
governance for economic development. And furthermore, how it addressed the external 
pressure for wider community participation and access to its economic success.  
The organisation stresses that it does not purport to represent the whole Aboriginal 
community of Newcastle. It did not feel bound to seek its board representatives from 
across the diversity of groups residing and travelling through the town. It did, on the 
other hand, see itself as having a broad community development remit in many of its 
service delivery functions, several of which are accessible to all Indigenous residents. 
These functions are not seen as necessitating the inclusion of the whole community into 
its representative structure. As a senior leader on the board noted: ‘It’s ok to have one 
group of people cooking the cake, if everyone else eventually gets a slice of it’. 
Yarnteen’s leaders saw their commitment to deliver particular cultural, employment and 
training services to the wider community as part of their ability to spread some of the 
benefits of their economic success more widely, but without jeopardising their business 
viability.  
These seemingly contradictory strategies — the one business, the other 
community/cultural — have been operationalised within the organisation’s governance 
and institutional environment. In 1991, a Yarnteen Management Committee was 
established which represented four major extended family groups who had resettled in 
the Newcastle-Hunter region and ‘adopted’ the town over several decades. At that time, 
the organisation acknowledged that the traditional landowners of the region were the 
‘Awabakal’, even though when it was first established none were thought to remain. 
The Management Committee started with 10 members, and is now called the Yarnteen 
Board. New representatives on the board are nominated and selected from the core 
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member families. The board oversights the business and some of the cultural initiatives 
of Yarnteen, but these functions are differently structured.  
The corporation’s governance model for board representation and ‘membership’ for 
its economic ventures is tightly circumscribed to the core group of extended families. Its 
community development initiatives, on the other hand, are more inclusive and focus on 
its wider community ‘constituency’, which is the wider Newcastle Indigenous 
population. These residents can access and benefit from a range of ‘community’ 
initiatives and services provided by the organisation. The ‘community’ services operate 
out of separately incorporated organisations, under the umbrella of Yarnteen 
Corporation. The boards of these organisations also have a wider set of representatives 
on their governing boards.  
In effect, Yarnteen’s leadership designed separate approaches to its ‘membership’ 
and its ‘constituency’. The organisation’s members are the core families, and they stand 
at the heart of board membership and are the beneficial members of the economic 
ventures. Its constituents are drawn from the wider community, and are the people to 
whom cultural, employment, training and other social services are directed. This 
distinction appears to have been extremely beneficial in helping to quarantine the 
economic arm of the organisation from its other functions.  
However, as a consequence of the tight governing structure created for its business 
ventures, the organisation has been seen in some quarters of the Newcastle Indigenous 
community and by some government departments as being ‘exclusive’, unrepresentative 
and ‘not a community organisation’. But in light of its transparent governance strategy 
for economic success and its diverse delivery of community services, this is clearly not 
the case. However, these assertions highlight the considerable pressure that 
governments can apply to Indigenous business organisations to be ‘whole-of-
community’ and how they equate this with ‘good governance’. It also highlights the 
pressures that arise from within the wider Indigenous community when some groups 
feel that a local organisation should distribute its economic benefits more widely to all 
residents of the community. Neither of these expectations is applied to non-Indigenous 
private sector businesses in Newcastle.  
The tight family representative model appears to have directly contributed to 
remarkable stability within the governing board. Eight out of the current 10 people are 
foundation members of the organisation. There have been significant benefits for the 
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organisation as a result of this representative stability. One important advantage appears 
to be the creation of considerable governance ‘capital’. For example:  
• board members have been able to build a strong shared commitment to the 
organisation’s long-term economic vision;  
• the board is seen to have considerable legitimacy in the eyes of its members and 
staff;  
• a solid foundation of trust and openness has been progressively developed within 
the board;  
• there is a collegial relationship of partnership and honesty between the board and 
senior management (many of whom are also long-term employees of the 
organisation);  
• a decision-making process has developed over time that is familiar and reliable; 
and  
• board members can fall back on their history of consensus-building and 
experience of having resolved problems.  
Stability is not only a feature of the governing board, but also of management and 
staff. Several senior staff members have been employed for as long as the original board 
members. Of the 37 people employed full-time in 2003–04 (YATSIC 2005), 29 were 
Indigenous and eight non-Indigenous, which is evidence of a very high level of 
Indigenous participation and employment. This figure includes 24 males and 13 
females—with women represented in management as well as office staffing areas.  
With such stability of leadership and staff an organisation could easily settle into a 
convenient comfort zone in its governance and business initiatives. Yet Yarnteen seems 
to have been able to avoid the associated pitfalls of insularity, narrowing expertise, 
failing performance, and resistance to change. It has also designed a set of effective 
buffers against potential family factionalism, disputes and self-interested decision 
making, which have been evident in other organisations with tight family-based 
representative models. The implementation of a four-pronged strategy appears to have 
been influential in achieving these outcomes, and includes the development of:  
• structural flexibility and diversification; 
• a strong, internal governance culture; 
• diverse and deep institutional capital; and 
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• accountable, professional leadership. 
Structural Flexibility and Diversification  
Over the years as Yarnteen has grown, it has retained operational flexibility by 
routinely reviewing its strategic direction and diversifying its structure to respond to 
changing economic and commercial conditions. The corporation adopted an ‘incubation 
strategy’ to facilitate the establishment of offshoot organisations, which have taken over 
specific functional parts of its operation.  
For example, in 2004, Yarnteen undertook an internally instigated review of its 
governance, organisational structure and functions. As a result, it decided to minimise 
possible risk to its business enterprises, whose assets were identified as being open to 
potential ‘social stripping’ by broader community constituents, and to the risk of the 
potential failure of any of the organisation’s more community oriented services. As a 
result of that review, the corporation set up two separately incorporated organisations 
with their own boards—Youloe-ta Indigenous Development Association and 
Yamuloong Incorporated Association—to deliver their community-based employment 
and training services.  
Youloe-ta now manages the original Yarnteen CDEP scheme and operates the 
Indigenous Employment Centre. It also runs a conference facility, an Aboriginal bush 
foods centre for school groups, and training and employment mentoring services. At 
one stage, along with Yamuloong, it was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Yarnteen.  
Yamuloong Association was established as an Aboriginal Registered Training 
Organisation to provide nationally accredited training in business administration, small 
business mentoring, and information and technology training. It was subsequently re-
incorporated into Youloe-ta after another Yarnteen-initiated review determined that it 
required better corporate support.  
These separately incorporated bodies have continued to retain close links with the 
corporation. This group of organisations refer to themselves collectively as the 
‘Yarnteen family of organisations’ or ‘the Yarnteen group’ (see Fig. 8.1) and includes 
Port Hunter Commodities Pty Ltd, Riverside Car and Boat Wash, Indigenous Creative 
Enterprise Centre, and Yarnteen Pty Ltd as wholly-owned subsidiaries, plus the 
incubated offshoots. 
Over the course of its operations, Yarnteen has also assisted Newcastle Aboriginal 
residents with business start up, operational advice and mentoring. These incubated 
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enterprises have included: an Indigenous housing construction company, a transport 
company, cultural tourism accommodation, and a plumbing business. These operate as 
self-employed businesses.  
This alliance of organisations comprises a networked governance model. Yarnteen 
Corporation acts as a ‘hub’, maintaining a valued relationship of mentoring, 
management support and financial advice for the incubated offshoots. At the same time, 
as mentioned  
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above, it has legally quarantined its economic ventures from potential financial liability 
and stripping by retaining them as wholly-owned subsidiaries. The incubated 
organisations have separate boards on which there is representation from the Yarnteen 
Board, but a majority of other community members.  
This strategy of ‘planned organisational devolution’ and ‘strategic incubation’ 
reinforces the demarcation of Yarnteen’s economic pursuits alongside its partnership 
approach to community service-delivery and cultural goals.  
It is noteworthy that the cultural metaphor of ‘family’ has been used as a model for 
developing this form of devolved, networked governance. A major advantage of this 
model lies in its flexibility, its tolerance of a diversity of identities, its capacity to extend 
close working relationships to new components, and the benefits of inter-dependency—
in much the same way as extended families do in Indigenous communities.  
The relationship between the incubated organisations and the ‘mother’ corporation is 
seen by both staff and leaders as being flexible and egalitarian. The groups cooperate 
for particular purposes, but each regards itself as undertaking valued functional roles 
and responsibilities over which it has autonomy. This type of networked governance 
operates like a close coalition of autonomous parts and appears to be well suited to 
undertaking business in parallel with separate community functions.  
A Durable Governance Culture  
Yarnteen has exceptionally good corporate governance. The organisation is accorded 
legitimacy by external stakeholders and regulators—it has passed government-
instigated reviews and financial audits, and continues to receive favourable assessments 
from the private sector. An annual report is published each year, and has been since its 
inception. Its administrative systems and planning processes are kept straightforward 
and are understood by staff and governing members, and management and staff are 
qualified in a range of skills and professional in their conduct.  
The Chair of the Yarnteen Board convenes well run, minuted meetings, and board 
members say they are properly provided with clear information and considered advice 
by the Executive Director and Chair. There appears to be consistent attendance at 
meetings by board members. Their collective view is that there is a proper focus on the 
big issues during meetings, and that individual members come along prepared to do 
their job. A factor in the effectiveness of the board’s decision making is that the 
members are confident in the accuracy of the financial information and strategic 
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business advice they are provided. Board members ensure they understand the complex 
financial matters brought before them by consistently asking questions of management, 
and discussing potential business risks and options.  
A primary factor in building these governance skills for business has been the 
provision by the Executive Director of ongoing, in-house training for board members on 
issues including their financial roles and responsibilities, business planning, risk 
management, consensus decision making, and board practice. In collaboration with the 
Executive Director, the board has developed a ‘Board Values Statement’ that seeks to 
promote the members’ shared commitment to transparent, honest decision making, 
fairness, and internal and external accountability. As a consequence of these internal 
professional development initiatives, the board is familiar with strategic financial 
planning and their business transitions appear to be well managed (see Smith 1996, 
2006).  
The separation of powers between the board and Executive Director is generally 
understood and implemented, contrary to many Indigenous organisations. But 
importantly, the Yarnteen approach to this ‘good governance’ prescription remains a 
flexible one. There is a close working relationship of mutual support between the board 
and senior management. Individual board members also collaborate with staff on more 
operational tasks, and staff members periodically contribute to strategic planning and 
goal setting for the organisation. In other words, the governance arrangement could 
more accurately be described as ‘separate, but working together’.  
This ‘governance partnership’ is somewhat contrary to the standard principle that 
proposes a much stricter division between the roles and responsibilities of boards and 
management. Yet Yarnteen’s approach seems to enable it to make better combined use 
of its knowledge, skills and experience across the layers of the organisation. This has 
promoted resilience and a strong shared commitment within the organisation.  
Board members and senior management espouse a joint approach to balancing the 
need for both business innovation and stability—a philosophy that has been described 
by the Executive Director as ‘restless self-renewal’. In these diverse ways, the 
organisation has developed a valuable reserve of corporate governance capital to sustain 
its economic goals, which can be called upon in times of planned internal transition or 
externally instigated change. Perhaps more importantly, though, alongside this 
corporate practice, Yarnteen’s leaders have actively created a broader and durable 
‘governance culture’ within the organisation, its subsidiaries and offshoots.  
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An organisation’s ‘governance culture’ can be defined as the system of formal and 
informal traditions, collective values, and culturally-shared mechanisms for behavioural 
accountability, incentives and censure that direct staff, management and leaders to 
conform to the organisation’s policies, vision and goals (see Bresser and Millonig 2003; 
Cornell and Kalt 1995; Hunt and Smith 2007). The formal components of an 
organisation’s governance culture may include its written policy documents, dispute and 
appeal procedures, vision statements and strategic plans. Its informal aspects are 
typically unwritten, but nonetheless prevail in people’s behaviour and interaction within 
the organisation; they tell individuals how to do things and how to relate to each other.  
In practice, a great deal of what happens in organisational governance falls into this 
informal area. Informal governance works at the level of individuals, through processes 
such as how conflicts and appeals are mediated, praise and reward given, behavioural 
sanctions applied, collective identity reaffirmed, and through the style or personality of 
decision-making and management.  
The leaders of Yarnteen have embedded a pervasive ‘governance culture’ within the 
organisation which actively promotes a particular set of norms. These include fairness, 
mutual respect, the value of personal contribution, accountability and teamwork in the 
work environment, and a shared commitment to the organisation’s long-term success 
and autonomy. Importantly, these values are promoted in a manner that reinforces 
collective support for the style of governance as being distinctly Aboriginal and 
therefore legitimate.  
This collective support is further reinforced by the prevalence of Aboriginal humour, 
a decision making style that resonates with Aboriginal consensus and conflict mediation 
processes, and the perception that all members of the organisation—from board 
members to young staff—are ‘one family’. These characteristics are regularly 
articulated by people as valued qualities of the organisation’s ‘cultural identity’ 
(Armstrong 2007: 75). And board members emphasise their desire to maintain this style 
of governance:  
We make decisions like a washing machine. First we just push it all around, 
everything round and round and have a good talk about every part of it. 
Then we come to a decision. Once a decision is made, board members think 
it is important to stick to it … then we agree as one. Once a decision is 
passed, that’s it, it’s finished. Then we’re under one agreement, we get on 
with it (Yarnteen Corporation Board member).  
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This governance culture does not simply sit at the top with the Yarnteen Board and 
Executive Director; it has been seeded by the leadership throughout the management 
and staff, and the family of organisations. At the heart of this governance culture lies a 
process of institution building that has been deliberately embedded in Yarnteen’s modus 
operandi.  
Building Institutional Capital  
Institutions can be defined as the ‘rules of the game’, the socially and culturally 
legitimated behavioural expectations that can be rewarded if followed, or sanctioned if 
violated. Rules and their related processes are the organising tools of governance. They 
tell the leaders, staff and members of an organisation how it should work, what 
decisions are made on behalf of members, and who may make them. Effective 
institutions are those that are capable of regulating and channelling both individual and 
collective behaviour.  
Institutional weakness has been highlighted as a critical factor in the poor 
governance of many Indigenous organisations and governments (Cornell 1995; Hunt 
and Smith 2007; Sterritt 2002). In the case of Yarnteen, its leaders have created and 
sustained a range of governance institutions. These provide a system of incentives, 
rewards, constraints and limits, which direct the board, senior management and 
individual staff members to behave and perform in ways that support and strengthen the 
organisation’s economic and service delivery objectives and strategies. Following Hunt 
and Smith (2007) and Oliver (1997), the richness or depth of this system creates a form 
of ‘institutional capital’ for Yarnteen.  
In the context of economic development, institutional capital can be defined as the 
specific conditions in an organisation’s internal and external institutional context that 
allow the formation of sustained business success and competitive advantage in the 
commercial arena (see Bresser and Millonig 2003: 225–2; and Scott 1995: 35–9). Scott 
(1995) and Bresser and Millonig (2003) distinguish three interacting components or 
pillars of institutional capital: regulative, normative, and cognitive. Each of these is 
applicable and evident in Yarnteen and its offshoot organisations.  
Regulative institutions focus on rules (more often formal than informal) that are 
monitored and sanctioned in the case of possible corruption, bias, violation or poor 
corporate performance. To this end, Yarnteen’s leaders have designed and implemented 
customised written policies, conflict resolution and appeals processes, procedures for 
the periodic review of individual performance, and regular internal reviews of its 
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economic portfolio and community development functions. Senior and executive 
management participate in regular updates to monitor the organisation’s commercial 
and corporate performance in respect to these.  
These internal regulations are overwhelmingly seen as beneficial within the 
corporation, and so act as a source of institutional capital. Externally imposed 
government regulative mechanisms (such as mandatory government audits, 
departmental reviews, and financial and program reporting procedures) are invariably 
seen as overly burdensome and a source of erratic, but coercive pressure. The 
perception within Yarnteen is that the extent of regulatory scrutiny by government 
undermines its resilience and focus, rather than enabling its governance. The board and 
senior management of the organisation do give considerable attention to fulfilling their 
external compliance and financial responsibilities, but as the Executive Director notes, 
‘best practice organisations look to achieving this themselves and do not rely on 
external organisations to regulate or enforce this through external controls’ (Armstrong 
2003: 7).  
Yarnteen’s normative institutions comprise the norms and values which define the 
types of behaviours that are considered desirable, appropriate, and correct. The fact that 
these are uniformly seen as culturally legitimate by staff, management and board 
members means that they have deep acceptance and influence within the organisation. 
As a consequence, individual compliance with the organisation’s codes of conduct, 
vision statement, the board’s value statement and corporate responsibilities, and 
individual performance milestones, is considered to be both a behavioural and cultural 
obligation. The adoption and practice of a code of ethical values by the board is taken 
seriously as an example of the standards to be maintained by people throughout the 
organisation (see Armstrong 2003).  
These normative institutions assist Yarnteen’s leadership to modify structures, 
routines and business strategies as necessary, and so help to ameliorate potentially 
adverse affects that might arise from long-term board membership and employment of 
particular staff. Another influential aspect of the normative environment within the 
organisation is the expectation that members of the staff, management and board will 
routinely activate their networks into the wider business and public sector, and with 
regional Aboriginal communities. This further assists in preventing insularity of ideas 
and thinking.  
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The third element of Yarnteen’s institutional environment is its cognitive capital. 
This relates to the ways in which individuals perceive and interpret their work and 
community life; a reality that is always a social and cultural construction. The cognitive 
institutional component of an organisation can be defined as the sum understanding of 
its internalised values and norms; that is, all the aspects of institutions that are taken for 
granted at a subconscious level.  
Compared to the normative dimension, the cognitive component emphasises 
subjective assumptions, expectations and pressures. In this realm, Yarnteen has 
developed considerable collective cognitive capital shaped around its members’ close 
identification with its history, governance, goals and operation as a distinctly 
‘Aboriginal organisation’, with Aboriginal values and behaviours, and ‘family’ 
relationships between the organisations. Within the corporation, these relationships and 
shared understandings are seen to positively facilitate success rather than undermine it.  
The institutional strengths of the Yarnteen—regulative, normative and cognitive—
are thus multidimensional and comprise both internal and external dimensions. 
Particularly influential institutions appear to be those that have been generated and 
embedded internally by the organisation’s own leaders and staff, not those developed 
and imposed from outside.  
These institutional strategies have taken time and commitment to implement. For 
many organisations they are the first things to go by the wayside when resources and 
people are stretched. Yet Yarnteen’s rich institutional environment has generated 
considerable governance and economic benefits. Because they are shared and routinely 
followed by staff, management and board members alike, they become the vehicle for 
collective goal setting and action. The staff of Yarnteen say they feel part of this 
strategic institutional and governance approach and, as a consequence, a culture of 
teamwork and loyalty to the organisation has taken root. Not surprisingly then, in 
comparison with many other organisations, Yarnteen has had a very low turnover of 
employees and board members. Overall, its institution-building efforts are a form of 
capital that acts to buffer and neutralise the potential disadvantages of long-term board 
membership, select family representative structures, and debilitating external demands 
and pressures.  
Leadership for Economic Development  
The leadership of Yarnteen has been the catalyst for building the organisation’s 
governance culture and institutional capital. In 2006, I carried out interviews and 
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informal discussions with board members, the executive, managers and staff on the 
issue of leadership (see Smith 2006). The qualities of Aboriginal leaders seen to be 
necessary include:  
• ‘humility’; 
• ‘being part of the Aboriginal community’; 
• ‘having a passion for helping their community not just themselves’; 
• being ‘selfless’; 
• ‘having a vision of what’s possible’; 
• ‘experience in politics’; 
• being ‘able to mentor younger people’; 
• ‘able to talk to all kinds of people, and listen well’; and 
• ‘able to get agreement and consensus’. 
Yarnteen’s leadership is of a very high quality and has been a critical factor in the 
success of its governance for economic development. Its leaders are both male and 
female. They have strong links into the local and regional Indigenous community, and 
extensive networks into the state and national leadership. Several have national 
experience on representative organisations, councils and boards. They are extremely 
well qualified in their management, governance and financial expertise.  
The Executive Director and Chair of Yarnteen have an extremely sophisticated 
understanding of governance best practice and strategies. The concept is frequently 
discussed in board meetings. Governance training has been provided in-house; senior 
managers have participated in external leadership workshops; several board members 
and senior managers have presented conference and workshop papers on the topic; and 
the Executive Director has undertaken the Australian Company Directors’ Course. The 
combined effect is to ensure that the board is not easily swayed by any particular subset 
of family or factional interests, and takes considered economic risks. Single, strong 
voices cannot prevail against the board’s collective assessment of issues, and there are 
robust guidelines for fair governance that members actively attempt to meet.  
Leadership succession is currently an issue on the table for the organisation and it is 
starting to trial different strategies. The resilience of Yarnteen’s governance culture and 
institutional capital is intimately associated with its current senior leadership. A future 
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test for the organisation will be the extent to which its institutional capital assists it to 
weather the turnover of any key leaders.  
Conclusion: The Business of ‘Governing for Business’  
How do we live at this ‘place’ where the two worlds meet and remain 
Indigenous? Indigenous people want to participate in the wider economic, 
social and cultural lives that are enjoyed by other Australians. But they will 
not be successful and cannot be expected to succeed as long as they are 
denied the opportunities and the tools to enable cultural integrity and 
community survival (Leah Armstrong 2007: 75).  
Yarnteen is an example of an organisation with effective, legitimate governance for 
economic development. It operates in a complex urban community environment and 
national context, where the challenges facing Indigenous businesses are substantial, and 
their corporate governance and financial failure is common. The Yarnteen family of 
organisations has an extremely high reputation in the wider private and public sectors, 
where it is seen to be a model for other organisations, and a sound investment 
opportunity. Its economic and strategic success is durable, and raises several important 
implications for other Indigenous organisations attempting to develop robust 
governance for sustained enterprise and cultural development.  
First, the cultural ‘self’ in Yarnteen’s governance is a complex pastiche that is a 
product of the Aboriginal history of Newcastle and its early organisations. This history 
is one of regional mobility and resettlement, long residence in the town by a core group 
of extended families, continuing strong cultural identities, and the incubation of a 
network of service delivery organisations in the town and surrounding region. The 
corporation’s governance strategies and tactics have been based around understanding 
and managing both the constraints and benefits of that community environment and 
cultural identity.  
Second, Yarnteen’s leaders have adopted a deliberate and effective strategy to 
insulate the organisation from debilitating community conflicts and jealousies, by 
keeping its representative structure tight and sticking to its core enterprise development 
goals at the same time as ensuring that the organisation positively contributes to wider 
community cultural and social goals. In this way, the organisation manages to maintain 
a delicate balance between ‘family’ and ‘community’. Alongside these structural 
strategies, the strength of its internal culture and institutional capital has enabled the 
corporation to create a set of workable limits and constraints on individual self-interest 
 260  Theme 4 
and family factionalism. Other organisations might consider the benefits that seem to 
flow from establishing a legal and structural demarcation between business and 
social/cultural initiatives, and from developing their governance representation and 
membership to support that distinction.  
Third, fundamental to the organisation’s economic success has been its internal 
governance culture and institutional capital. Effective governance is a prerequisite for 
mobilising other forms of capital and provides better conditions under which that capital 
can be developed and sustained. An organisation’s institutional environment is a major 
driver of competitive commercial advantage. The leaders of Yarnteen Corporation have 
actively managed both their internal and external institutional contexts, and 
progressively built up deep reserves of regulative, normative and cognitive capital that 
have enabled it to remain proactive in assessing, taking up and managing economic 
opportunities.  
And fourth, organisational leadership is essential if well designed governance and 
economic success are to be developed and sustained. Effective leaders are the 
fundamental drivers of institution building within an organisation. Without their 
commitment and demonstrated practice in this fundamental area, an organisation will 
lack the institutional environment that promotes flexibility, resilience and collective 
performance.  
There is little doubt that it is the combination of governance, leadership, 
organisational flexibility, and institutional strength that has sustained this 
extraordinarily successful urban enterprise. Furthermore, in achieving this success the 
organisation has not had to turn its back on its cultural identity, its community and 
family relationships. Yarnteen not only works in an Aboriginal way, but also meets 
external demands for effective corporate governance, business standards and financial 
accountability.  
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Notes: Paper 7 
1. Sometimes these ‘hubs’ are discrete communities. But they also include pastoral 
stations, fringe camps, and suburbs and neighbourhoods within towns and cities 
that have a long historical association by particular Indigenous groups and 
families.  
2. Approximately 2500 Indigenous organisations are incorporated under the 
Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (CATSIA), each of 
which is encouraged to have a maximum of 12 directors (see Office of the 
Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations 2007). In addition, 
there are approximately an equal number of Indigenous corporations incorporated 
under state and territory incorporations laws.  
3. See for example, the long list of reports from government reviews and inquiries 
over the last three decades; perhaps most prominently set out in various reports by 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee into Indigenous Affairs.  
4. See Edmunds (1990) for an account of the impacts of colonisation on Indigenous 
family life and socialisation practices; Smith (1991: 5–6) for a summary of some 
of the key colonial interventions in Indigenous families and the increasingly 
negative portrayal of family life and relationships; and also Daly and Smith 
(2003), in which the ‘deficit’ and ‘asset’ views of families are considered in 
respect to their impact on the well-being of Indigenous children.  
5. As of 1 May 2008, this Australian Government office is now called the Office of 
the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC).  
6. The Arwarbukarl Cultural Resource Association Inc (which operates out of 
Yarnteen) recently produced a ‘Directory of Indigenous Organisations and 
Government Services in the Hunter’ that listed over 60 different Indigenous 
service delivery organisations, see <http://www.arwarbukarl.com.au/default.aspx? 
id=27>.  
7. ‘Awabakal’ is the spelling of the name for the traditional land-owning group of the 
Newcastle area, which was used by the founding leaders of the co-operative when 
it first formed in 1976. At that time, it was thought that no representatives of the 
original traditional group remained. The leaders of the co-operative adopted the 
name as a mark of respect for the traditional lands and culture of that group. 
Recently, a native title claim has been made by extant members who are asserting 
 262  Theme 4 
traditional ownership, and a contemporary linguistic orthography has developed 
that spells the same name as ‘Arwarbukarl’.  
8. See Champion (2002) for an account of these employment trials.  
9. Under a prestigious partnership it negotiated with Microsoft Australia, Yarnteen 
developed an innovative website to assist networking and best practice exchange 
between CDEP organisations.  
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Overview of Theme Five: Governance and 
Governmentality in the Intercultural Space 
Paper 8:  D.E. Smith, 2008. ‘Cultures of governance and the governance of culture: 
Transforming and containing Indigenous institutions in West Arnhem Land’, 
in J. Hunt, D. Smith, S. Garling and W. Sanders (eds) Contested 
Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia, 
CAEPR Monograph No. 29, ANU E Press, pp. 75–111. 
In her 1998 Wentworth Lecture, Indigenous educator and leader, the late Dr 
Raymatja Marika, drew attention to a Yolngu word that had informed their rebuilding of 
governance for local education at Yirrkala in East Arnhem Land: 
Ganma is the name of a lagoon where salt and fresh water meet. Water is a 
symbol of knowledge … and the metaphor of the meeting of two bodies of 
water. It’s a way of talking about the knowledge and governance systems of 
two cultures working together … The terms ‘both ways’ and ‘two ways’ are 
now used more or less interchangeably, and have come to indicate the 
acceptance of a mixing of western and Indigenous knowledge systems, 
including about governance.  
... The water circulates silently underneath, and there are lines of foam 
circulating across the surface. The swelling and retreating of the tides and 
the wet season floods can be seen in the two bodies of water meeting 
(Marika 1998). 
Theme Five examines the intercultural space that Raymatja Marika alludes to in the 
concept of ganma; as both affect and affective of the Australian state and Indigenous 
people encountering each other through their distinctive fields of governance and 
governmentality.  
Paper 8 investigates the two tropes posed in the title of this thesis, drawing on my 
extensive fieldwork research carried out with leaders, organisations and families in 
West Arnhem Land over more than thirty years. The paper is complemented by the 
collective thesis papers, but especially the ethnographic analyses of Papers 2, 3 and 4, 
which also address the intercultural space.  
The paper addresses the ways in which the Indigenous field of networked governing 
power and agency are interpreted, negotiated and represented in the context of often 
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high-pressured demands for both continuity and change. The paper analyses a complex 
chain of governance events involving Indigenous leaders negotiating with government 
to establish a regionalised form of local government for West Arnhem Land. The 
process was carried out within a rapidly changing policy environment, and drew the 
state and Indigenous leaders into close and sustained proximity for several years.  
A particular contribution of this paper is its analysis of the motivations and strategies 
of the Indigenous leaders involved in persistently reasserting their governance agency, 
priorities and values into the negotiation process. Another contribution of the paper is its 
analysis of the cultural and institutional dimensions of the intercultural encounters 
occurring. Importantly, while some governance events and intercultural relationships 
were conspicuous by their contestation and mutual resistances; others were 
conspicuously more benign and enabling.  
Turbulence and Emergence 
Raymatja Marika’s eloquent description of the inherently turbulent, metamorphic 
condition of the intercultural resonates with the ethnographic analyses of Paper 8. It 
shows the intercultural to be a highly nuanced, dynamic space where things are 
happening — emerging, changing, in transition — where turbulence can be observed. 
From this perspective, the intercultural is a contact zone of heightened externalisation, 
essentialisation and incommensurability.  
The chain of governance events examined in Paper 8 were rife with intercultural 
turbulence where ‘large changes can have negligible effects and small ones can have 
significant ones’ (Bryant 2007: 129). Consequences were unpredictable and open to 
attenuation and amplification by particular individuals; not only powerful Indigenous 
leaders and senior bureaucrats, but also by the range of advisors on both sides. Given 
that the intercultural is not a bounded place, the paper describes how turbulence is 
generated by contestation over governance and culture. This produces ripples of 
consequences that emerge across Indigenous networks as well as the wider governance 
environment.  
Patterns of Articulation 
Paper 8 indicates that the articulation and penetration of governance and 
governmentality is not uniform, but rather erratic, multi-directional and characterised by 
surges. Different agents, institutional instruments and processes from each field 
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encounter each other at different points in time and space, invoking different 
motivations, rules and values.  
We should not lose sight, however, of the implications of the comments noted in the 
thesis by Dunduwuy 2, David Mowarljarli and Raymatja Marika. They remind us that 
turbulence and emergence are productive of underlying, durable patterns. This analytic 
approach introduces insights from chaos and complexity theories; that is, what at first 
may appear to be an absence of regularity, structure and relations in a system is in fact 
more ordered and patterned than previously understood. It can be explained, though not 
predicted and controlled.
35
 The thesis papers identify deep cultural patterns of order-
organisation in both fields of governance and governmentality; patterns which the state 
and Indigenous people insert into their encounters with each other.  
But as suggested by Ulf Hannerz’s metaphor of ‘cultural flow’ and Raymatja 
Marika’s ‘ganma’, even as one perceives structure and pattern, it becomes fluid and 
‘entirely dependent on ongoing process’ (1992: 4). The patterning of intercultural 
articulation therefore encompasses both recognisable relationships, events and 
conditions, as well as their inherent unpredictability and potentially multiple 
trajectories.  
Revealing Value and Power 
One predictably unpredictable aspect of intercultural encounters between Indigenous 
people and the state has to do the pattern of value and relative power that is revealed 
when the two fields articulate. Paper 8 identifies the issues of representative leadership, 
decision making, accountability and discourses about ‘law and order’ as particularly 
high-value points of intercultural contestation. During the governance events described, 
particular realms of sanctity (or high value) are protectively obscured from the 
interfering gaze of the Other. Those realms include the sacred Dreaming and restricted 
ceremonial knowledge of Indigenous Australians; the Ministerial cabinet-in-confidence 
discussions of the Australian state; the policy making processes of departments; or the 
commercial-in-confidence data of mining companies.  
In other words, the intercultural space reveals ‘no-go’ or exclusion zones where 
boundaries are reasserted, just as much as it opens up interfaces and contact. The paper 
argues that these mutual exclusion zones are areas where Indigenous and statist sources 
of power are most concentrated, and therefore potentially most at risk of loss or 
diminution from the uncontrolled intervention of the Other. These zones also act to 
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reinforce Indigenous people’s perception of there being separate and different 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous ‘domains’ of governance and culture. 
Another pattern revealed in the state’s encounters with Indigenous governance is that 
of the modes of concentrated power and the forms of capital they bring to bear. These 
include not only the state’s physical instruments of intervention, facilitation and 
coercion, but also its statutory, jurisdictional, economic, cultural, symbolic and 
institutional capital (Bourdieu 1999: 57–67). These can be said to constitute a form of 
meta-governance capital through which the Australian state exercises considerable 
relative power over Indigenous cultures of governance.  
But the pattern of state power is not always experienced by Indigenous people and 
their organisations as ever-present, overwhelming or uniform. Indeed, Paper 8 indicates 
that when wielded via the agency of government departments and bureaucrats, the 
state’s power may be just as situational and difficult to sustain, and subject to 
Indigenous assessments of its motivation and legitimacy. On the bases of those 
assessments, Indigenous people and organisations activate their own articulatory politics 
of governance.  
From this standpoint, Paper 8 reveals that in the context of a power and resource 
imbalance that clearly favours the Australian state, the intercultural articulation of the 
two fields creates a pattern of shifting interdependency between them. The fact that 
Indigenous networks are deeply embedded within the state’s governmentality of 
Indigenous affairs, and their organisations heavily reliant upon state financial largesse, 
could be taken to suggest that Indigenous Australians need the benefits of a relationship 
with the state more than the state does. However, Paper 8 reveals an important 
dimension of intercultural articulation that tends to be overlooked; namely encounters 
are two-way penetrations of power (albeit of different kinds and magnitudes), not 
unidirectional.  
In certain governance events, the state is rendered vulnerable and dependent in 
exercising its power as a result of the agency and tactics of Indigenous people as they 
assert their preferred modes and values of governance. The state finds itself having to 
respond to the cultural dimensions of Indigenous nodal-networked governance, even 
while remaining highly ambivalent about these. In such ways, the Indigenous 
penetration of the state undermines the latter’s naturalised assumption of a dominant 
position of power. 
 273  The Intercultural Space 
Intercultural Representations 
The pattern of intercultural articulation between the fields of state governmentality 
and Indigenous governance is shown in Paper 8 to be particularly influenced by a set of 
‘Self-Other’ representations that are co-dependent. These play a vital part in 
determining the patterns of power and agency mobilised by both sides. For example, 
when experiencing the state in its mode of unilateral intervention and regulation, 
Indigenous leaders deploy tactics of subversive agency and the ‘art of not being 
governed’ (Scott 2009).  
On such occasions, the intercultural space is experienced by both the state and 
Indigenous Australians as an arena of alienating mutual aversions and essentialisms. For 
example, the state is represented by Indigenous people and their supporters as punitive, 
cunning and evasive. Indigenous Australians are represented by the state and its 
supporters as poorly governed and nepotistic, and their culture as problematic for ‘good 
governance’. This set of mutually averse representations then serves to further embed a 
pattern of contested power and agency. This is perhaps the more common scholarly and 
public media accounting of the intercultural articulation. 
However, Paper 8 also documents an under-researched aspect of the articulation 
between fields of governance and governmentality; namely, when wariness and 
cynicism are mutually suspended in the context of more personalised pattern of face-to-
face engagement, which is positively characterised by both sides as constructive and 
beneficial. In this pattern of encounters, the state is represented by Indigenous people as 
enabling, ‘working with us’ as a facilitator of a ‘two-way’ process. Indigenous 
Australians are represented by the state as ‘working with us to develop strong 
governance’. The intercultural turbulence generated in this mode of encounter is 
actually productive of mutual accommodation, condoned innovation and realignment. 
The role of individual agents in both fields is shown to be pivotal in creating such 
intercultural moments of trust and common ground.  
Summary 
Theme Five draws out a more nuanced approach to the intercultural articulation of 
the fields of governance and governmentality. It is a zone of contact and exclusion 
characterised by turbulence and emergence. This generates a complex patterning of 
asymmetrical interdependence that often generates conflict and incommensurability, but 
can also be productive of mutual engagement and accommodation. In other words, there 
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is a continuum of modes of articulation, each associated with particular kinds of ‘Self-
Other’ representations, a shifting interdependency, and different modes of power and 
agency. Some of the articulatory politics that come to the fore are debilitating in their 
outcomes; others leave room for strategic negotiation and accommodation.  
In all cases, the articulation around the fields of governance and governmentality 
reveal areas of high cultural value and boundary exclusion. To that extent Indigenous 
governance and governmentality operate as culturally distinctive formations, alongside 
their complex intercultural entanglement.  
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Paper 8:   Cultures of Governance and the Governance 
of Culture: Transforming and Containing Indigenous 
Institutions in West Arnhem Land  
D.E. Smith, 2008.  
Originally published in J. Hunt, D. Smith, S. Garling and W. Sanders (eds) Contested 
Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia, CAEPR 
Monograph No. 29, ANU E Press, pp. 75-111. 
You can’t make people good by Act of Parliament (Oscar Wilde, A Woman 
of No Importance, Act 1). 
We’ve had all our meetings and we had to be professional. We had to do our 
governance properly. We had all that governance training—now we’re 
good! But the government people who pushed that ‘good governance’ idea; 
they aren’t here. Where are they? They want us to govern, then they should 
let us govern  (West Arnhem Shire Transitional Committee member). 
Introduction  
In the 40 years since the 1967 referendum in Australia
1
, governments have developed 
legislation, policies, and a multitude of institutional mechanisms in their attempts to 
govern the Indigenous population and address its entrenched socioeconomic 
disadvantage. These interventions into Indigenous lives by the state have been primarily 
predicated on western values, institutions and beliefs about what constitutes ‘good 
governance’ and, accordingly, what Indigenous Australians should do to develop it.  
Implicit in these government strategies has been a deep-seated lack of confidence in 
Indigenous ‘culture’ itself, exacerbated by contradictory underlying assumptions. On 
the one hand, the hope of policy makers is that if they can only unlock the ‘da Vinci 
Code’ of Indigenous culture they will somehow be able to design more ‘culturally 
appropriate’ government programs and service delivery, thereby more effectively 
securing government policy objectives. On the other hand, Indigenous culture is often 
pathologised by politicians, bureaucrats, the public, and the media. It is viewed as a 
form of inherited virus that will inevitably contaminate and undermine western 
standards of ‘good governance’. So, ‘Acts of Parliament’ and the often unilateral 
imposition of the state’s sovereign powers are deemed to be necessary to ‘protect’ 
Indigenous people from the governance disabilities of their own culture. At such times, 
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the Australian state reasserts its own ‘culture of governance’—that is, the set of shared 
values, government institutions, powers, laws, modes of behaviour and norms—in an 
attempt to direct and mould Indigenous cultures and their systems of governance into its 
own democratic likeness.  
This chapter poses two symbiotic concepts—the ‘governance of culture’ and 
‘cultures of governance’—as tools to analyse the nature of the tangled engagement 
between contemporary Indigenous and non-Indigenous ‘cultures of governance’ in 
Australia. Points of interaction focus on the institutional and practice level of 
governments, and Indigenous communities, their leaders and organisations.  
Institutions are the glue of governance; they are the ‘rules of the game’, the formal 
and informal ways in which things get done. As such, institutions are pre-eminently 
about power and who gets to exercise it. In the intercultural context of post-colonial 
governance in Australia, institutions represent a rich site of visible interaction and 
contestation between the Australian state and Indigenous peoples.  
Employing these two concepts, this chapter first examines how the Australian state 
attempts, through its policy, statutory and bureaucratic institutions, to govern 
contemporary Indigenous cultures and their different systems of governance. The same 
concepts are then used to explore the ways in which Indigenous people use their 
culturally-based institutions to buffer and reassert the legitimacy of their governance 
arrangements and decision-making authority. In doing so, Indigenous governance 
institutions are being re-imagined, recreated, transformed and constrained—both from 
within and without. But the institutions of the Australian state, in the arena of policy and 
implementation, are also being affected. Both sets of mutual transformation and 
containment are investigated.  
The analysis focuses specifically on a case study conducted over the last five years in 
West Arnhem Land. There, Indigenous people (referred to as Bininj in the local 
Kunwinjku language) and the Northern Territory (NT) Government have been involved 
in planning the establishment of a regionalised form of local government, for the 
purposes of delivering essential municipal services and infrastructure to the region as a 
whole. Some of the Bininj leaders involved are relatives of families with whom I 
worked over 25 years ago when employed by the Northern Land Council to map land-
tenure systems in West Arnhem Land.  
In the course of working towards their goal of a strong regional organisation, several 
Bininj community organisations and their elected leaders have attempted to build 
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elements of a new ‘culture of governance’. To do so, they have used a range of 
techniques and tools to design innovative governance institutions and structures, and to 
imbue them with practical capability and legitimacy.  
In this chapter I examine the design techniques and their points of intersection with 
government processes, and consider the implications for both the Bininj and government 
parties. Not all the initiatives and solutions are seen as legitimate or effective by the 
state, or by some Indigenous community members. How the disjunctions between the 
two cultures of governance are contested and negotiated forms a large part of the 
analysis. Whether the process has led to the desired (and different) practical outcomes 
sought by the Indigenous and non-Indigenous (or Balanda in Kunwinjku language) 
participants involved, and whether there has been any growth in their mutual 
comprehension are considered by way of conclusion.  
The Research Process  
The research on which this paper draws is ethnographic, multi-sited, and aims to 
make both a practical and a policy contribution, and so deserves a brief account. Over a 
25 year period I have undertaken sporadic field based research with Indigenous families 
and groups in West Arnhem Land on their traditional land tenure patterns and social 
organisation. This work has included mapping clan countries and sacred sites, assessing 
the socioeconomic impact of mining and other resource agreements, and reviewing the 
operation and performance of Indigenous organisations. An integral part of the research 
has been analyses of the wider government policy, legal and funding environment 
within which Indigenous rights, interests and institutions have been recognised or 
limited.  
My research frequently ventured into the cultures of government bureaucracy and 
departments. Most recently, between 2003 and 2006, I was engaged as a part-time 
policy researcher by the NT Government’s Department of Community Development, 
Sport and Cultural Affairs (DCDSCA) under contract with my employer, the Centre for 
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) at The Australian National University. 
During that period, I provided research analysis, evaluation and advice to the 
Department regarding the effectiveness of government policy, projects and 
implementation regarding Indigenous governance, community development and 
regionalisation.  
In 2004, I was invited by two of the department’s Community Development Officers 
(CDOs) to work with them on planning and implementation for a specific regional local 
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government initiative in West Arnhem Land. Shortly after, I was asked by the 
Indigenous members of the newly-formed West Arnhem Land Regional Authority 
(WCARA) Interim Council representing the communities and organisations involved, to 
continue this work with them and attend their meetings. This, in turn, further engaged 
me in departmental (as well as inter-agency and cross-government) meetings about the 
local government reform over 2004–06.  
In late 2006, after my contract with the Department had finished and I returned to my 
university, the Interim Council requested that the WCARA process become part of the 
national Indigenous community governance research that I was jointly involved in 
conducting. Subsequently, I have continued to work in the capacity of researcher and 
‘special advisor’ to the Indigenous members of this West Arnhem regional committee.  
These overlapping professional roles enabled me to experience first hand the 
different government, bureaucratic, and Indigenous culturally-based perspectives, 
strategies and agency at play in the regional initiative. Whilst it was by no means 
inclusive of all the parties involved, and on occasions problematic, the multi-sited 
research generated an unusually broad set of insights into the complex and rapidly 
changing intercultural process.  
Seeing Governance Like a State  
Perhaps no people ever had more rudimentary rules of law and government 
than those savages … with hardly any government over the wandering clan 
except the undefined authority of the ‘bully’ of the tribe (Tylor 1894:150). 
… in many Aboriginal communities, social organisation has completely 
broken down. The people have shown they are incapable of governing 
themselves. There is no point in consulting them about the creation of 
authority; authority has to be created for them. Their lives will then better 
match our own (Hirst 2007). 
How we see governance makes a difference. As the commentators above suggest, 
from colonial settlement through to today, Indigenous governance has often seemed 
invisible, unknowable, and underdeveloped to non-Indigenous Australians. It has been 
treated as a kind of ‘gubernare nullius’2, a tabula rasa onto which could be written the 
language, norms and institutions of western liberal statecraft and control.  
In Seeing Like a State, James Scott (1998: 3) argues that efforts to permanently settle 
highly mobile sub-populations like nomads, gypsies, vagrants, and hunter-gatherers has 
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been a perennial project of the modern state, underwritten by strategies to standardise 
and simplify ‘what was a social hieroglyph into a legible and administratively more 
convenient format’. In Australia, British colonists similarly went to considerable lengths 
to make the alien social and institutional ‘hieroglyph’ of Indigenous governance and 
leadership legible to themselves.  
In the early days of the colony, Indigenous groups were perceived to be acephalous, 
lawless and unruly. Metal ‘kingplates’ and ‘queenplates’ were bestowed on favoured 
elders—hung around their necks to make them visible to the British authorities. People 
were often forcibly relocated from their lands and centralised into artificial communities 
where ‘councils of elders’, ‘chiefs’, ‘kings’ and ‘queens’, ‘princes’ and ‘headmen’ were 
created by missionaries and government reserve managers as part of an arsenal of 
techniques to govern and immobilise people. This naming of Indigenous governance 
was about state surveillance and control.  
Today, western democratic concepts, structures and governance institutions continue 
to be imposed through such devices as legislative and policy frameworks that require 
the incorporation of social groups into organisations; the ordering concepts of 
democratic elections and voting systems; the asserted primacy of individual citizenship 
over collective rights; and via the statutory naming of newly-created categories of 
people on whom are bestowed specified decision-making rights, responsibilities and 
authority by the state.  
The allocated mark of condoned authority is still used by governments. There are 
now legal categories of people—such as ‘traditional owners’, ‘authorised claimants’ and 
‘native title holders’— who have to be registered and certified, and ‘councillors’, 
‘chairpersons’, ‘bodies corporate’ and ‘governing boards’ who are required to operate 
under legal and constitutional guidelines.3 
Government’s own ‘culture of governance’ in Indigenous affairs is based on 
institutionalised forms of policy, program and grant funding that are supported by the 
tools of financial compliance and accountability, service delivery outcomes, 
administrative review, and technical audits. These tools are activated by the ever-
changing face of government departments, agencies and committees, which work to 
defend their relative influence, functional ‘territories’ and budgetary power.  
Aligned to departmental territories are vast bureaucratic networks where influential 
senior officers formulate policy frameworks and devise implementation strategies for 
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government consideration. In doing so, they create their own internal language for the 
operation of Indigenous affairs.4 
For most public servants, the face of Indigenous governance is incorporated 
community organisations, of which there are an estimated 5000 across Australia. Even 
in the most well-intentioned policy approaches, the governance of Indigenous 
organisations is invariably made subservient and overwhelmed by the workload of 
mundane bureaucratic procedures and financial reporting that they are required to 
undertake.  
As public servants are increasingly centralised and work behind the key-coded 
locked doors of departmental offices, they become further distanced from the practical 
realities of Indigenous community governance. The overall effect has been a growing 
field-based disengagement of bureaucrats from Indigenous communities, and a 
widening misalignment between government policy and departmental practice.  
For Indigenous communities and their organisations, the state does not exist ‘up 
there’, at a disembodied remove from them. The sovereign governing power of the state 
is plain for Indigenous people to see on a daily basis. They experience it in the form of 
visiting public servants, the ever-changing rules of service delivery and funding, the 
deluge of information gathering by governments, and the burdensome routine of 
meetings and consultations.  
In the local interaction between the state and Indigenous people, there are mutual 
blind spots where government policy rationales and decision-making processes are just 
as opaque and confounding to Indigenous people, as Indigenous governance processes 
and institutions are to governments and their officers.  
But amongst the spaces of mutual unintelligibility of each other’s ‘social 
hieroglyphs’ (cf. Scott 1998), some individual government field officers do make the 
room to develop personal relationships of trust with leaders and organisations, and so 
are better able to negotiate with them, provide credible advice, and undertake 
community development work. Similarly, some Indigenous leaders and organisations 
look for room to build relationships with particular public servants and, through them 
negotiate the conditions under which they can better exercise their own authority, make 
decisions and mobilise action. They do so, however, in an environment of seemingly 
constant policy change and containment by the state. In the process they occasionally 
transform aspects of their own governance cultures, and subvert the techniques and 
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institutions by which the state seeks to govern their culture and deny their self-
governance.  
This institutional interplay between ‘cultures of governance’ and the state’s goal of 
‘governing Indigenous culture’ is fully evident in the West Arnhem Land process of 
regionalising local government.  
The NT View of Governance  
Northern Territory Government discussions with Indigenous leaders from West 
Arnhem Land about establishing a regional local government began in late 2002 under 
the reform agenda of the Building Stronger Regions, Stronger Futures (BSRSF) policy. 
Since then, the progress of the West Arnhem initiative has been subject to a constantly 
changing policy environment within the NT Government. The impacts of this have been 
exacerbated by equally tumultuous policy reforms at the national level.  
The collaborative phase  
The BSRSF policy was one in the long line of efforts by both the NT and Australian 
Governments to create various kinds of representative and administrative ‘regions’ over 
the Indigenous population.5 In the NT, its antecedents lay in the previous Government’s 
policy initiative known as the Reform and Development Agenda (RADA). This policy 
sought to amalgamate the existing 65 local governing bodies6 into around 20 ‘larger and 
more sustainable’ councils, ‘ideally representing and delivering services to at least 2000 
people’. A key goal of RADA was the creation of ‘Indigenous governments with 
legitimate authority’ (Coles 2004).  
The BSRSF policy similarly sought the voluntary amalgamation of community 
councils into large-scale local governments, which were to be called Regional 
Authorities, with 20 expected to be established. The policy vision was to enact ‘a radical 
transformation in the method of service delivery and regional Indigenous governance’ 
(Ah Kit 2002; see also Ah Kit 2003: 2–3) in collaboration with community councils and 
their leaders.  
The rationale was the perceived parlous state of local government councils in the 
Territory, characterised by one NT Minister as constituting a ‘stark crisis’ of 
governance that included widespread ‘organisational bankruptcy’, ‘institutional 
incapacity’, ‘ineffective service delivery, fraud and corruption by staff and leaders, a 
high turnover of key non-Indigenous staff’, and an ‘historical legacy of poor 
governance’ (Ah Kit 2002: 1).  
 282  Theme 5 
Evidence for that view came not only from lurid media accounts, but also from 
DCDSCA audits and compliance reviews of community councils. Those reported 
indicated that close to 50 per cent of local government bodies were either ‘highly 
dysfunctional’ or ‘at risk’ in terms of their financial management, service delivery and 
governance.  
A critical factor underlying this failure rate has been the issue of scale. The average 
population serviced by Indigenous community and association councils is 670 persons 
(Local Government Association of the Northern Territory (LGANT) 2003: 4). In other 
words, many small, isolated community councils simply do not have the population 
size, economies of scale, resources, administrative systems, personnel or management 
expertise to adequately meet either their existing or potential service delivery 
obligations (Tapsell 2003).  
In launching the BSRSF policy, the NT Government argued that ‘effective and 
legitimate frameworks for regional governance [would be] the foundations for any 
regional development strategy that will be sustainable over time’ (Ah Kit 2003). The 
policy intention was that regional authorities would:  
● have jurisdiction and powers as regionalised forms of local government under the 
Local Government Act 1978 (NT);  
● be established by ‘voluntary agreement’ between councils and require a 
‘substantial majority of residents in favour’;  
● be able to undertake ‘regional decision making to determine priorities, establish 
service delivery policies and allocate resources’; and  
●  ‘provide for decision-making structures that meet the needs of the communities to 
be governed and, where applicable incorporate strong relationships with cultural 
decision-making arrangements and particularly traditional owners’ (Ah Kit 2003).  
The policy emphasis was to be on the flexibility of structures and timeframes, and the 
development of culturally-based representative and electoral arrangements.  
A review of the Local Government Act 1978 (NT) was proposed to provide a better 
statutory foundation for regionalised local government.
7
 
In mid 2004, at the end of the policy’s first year of implementation, the Australian 
Government abolished the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). 
ATSIC had been a statutory-based national forum for Indigenous Australians, based on 
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the election of representatives from every state and territory. Its abolition, and the 
attendant dismantling of the regional council structure, left a major representative 
vacuum in the NT, as elsewhere. So, while one form of statutory regionalism was being 
abolished, the proposed regional local governments came to be seen as a possible 
alternative in the eyes of some in the NT and Australian Governments, and of some 
former ATSIC regional councillors as well.  
To cement what became a fortuitous convergence of policy directions, support for 
regional authorities was included in a bilateral Overarching Agreement on Indigenous 
Affairs negotiated between the NT and Australian Governments in mid 2005. A 
schedule to the agreement set out shared goals for the two Governments, which included 
working together to ensure:  
●  ‘effective and legitimate representation’; 
● that ‘the establishment of Regional Authorities involves voluntary amalgamations 
of community councils based on extensive and effective consultation to ensure 
constitutions reflect local aspirations, and have cultural legitimacy’; and  
● that the ‘amalgamation of community councils into Regional Authorities 
effectively addresses current problems of scale, improves service delivery, reduces 
staff turnover and ensures greater coordination and continuity of interest in 
community economic and social development’ (see Schedules 1 and 2.3 to the 
‘Overarching Bilateral Agreement on Indigenous Affairs’, 2005).
8
  
However, little more than 18 months later, in late 2006, the BSRSF policy 
framework was dramatically reformed by the NT Government and replaced with what 
was named the New Local Government policy.
9
  
What had happened? The sudden demise of the BSRSF policy owed much to the 
ideological dissatisfaction and implementation difficulties experienced by government 
bureaucrats in trying to accommodate Indigenous ideas about ‘regions’ and 
representation for local government, and their consensus modes of decision making 
about these matters. Discussion and decision making took time, internal negotiation and 
sensitive facilitation—all of which challenged the capacity, commitment and resources 
of both the NT and Australian Governments. The political imperative for fast results 
chaffed at the more measured pace of voluntary regionalisation, and in the meantime, 
several NT community and association councils had collapsed owing to poor financial 
administration and governance.  
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Reverting to coercion  
The New Local Government policy framework attempted to contain the inherent 
slipperiness and flexibility of Indigenous governance institutions and decision-making 
processes. The policy did away with any formal recognition of culturally-based 
processes for determining local government regions, and effectively turned a blind eye 
to the potential for using Indigenous governance systems and issues of cultural 
geographies as the basis for the shire model.  
Regionalisation was still the goal, but it was to be mandatory and meet government-
imposed deadlines. To signal this major policy turnaround, Regional Authorities were 
renamed ‘Shires’. There were to be only nine in total, and their boundaries would be 
determined by government.  
Indigenous input was corralled into newly-formed ‘Transitional Committees’ created 
by government to provide it with ‘advice’ about the establishment of each shire. 
Government, private sector and non-Indigenous stakeholders were able to participate on 
these committees, widening the range of parties and views. An ‘Advisory Board’ was 
established to support the implementation process and provide recommendations to the 
Minister for Local Government. Its members and the Chair (an experienced Indigenous 
leader) were appointed by the Minister.  
The new policy proposed that the shires: 
will be democratically elected by the people, just like everywhere else in 
Australia. All councils including the municipals will have a minimum of six 
and a maximum of twelve councillors … [and that] All Territorians who are 
registered on the electoral roll will have a say in who will represent their 
community by voting at the council election (DLGHS 2007).  
A ‘one-size fits all’ approach was applied. The shires would have a single common 
governance structure, each with the same cap on the total numbers of representatives, 
and each sharing a single model constitution designed by the DLGHS and Parliamentary 
Counsel. All would deliver the same mandatory set of ‘core’ local government services, 
to be identified by government and set out in the new legislation.  
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In the early days of this NT policy reversal, in June 2007, the Australian Government 
responded to a damning report on child abuse in NT Indigenous communities (Anderson 
and Wild 2007) and, without notice to the NT Government, initiated a unilateral 
intervention to takeover the administration of some 60 remote Indigenous communities, 
including those in the West Arnhem region.  As part of the intervention, the Australian 
Government would compulsorily acquire leaseholds for discrete Indigenous settlements 
for an estimated minimum period of five years. All communities located on Aboriginal 
inalienable freehold land under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976 (ALRA) would have their permit systems revoked, and legislation was drafted and 
passed to enact changes to this Act.  
Australian Government administrators (to be called ‘government business 
managers’), answerable to the Emergency Response Taskforce comprising Australian 
Army and Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and 
other government officials, were placed into ‘priority’ communities. Their job was to 
oversight mandatory health checks on children and to coordinate the intervention 
requirements in each community.  
In late 2007, national elections were held and the Labor Party was elected as the 
Australian Government. In the early phase of its first term, it committed to evaluate the 
implementation of the NT intervention, whilst continuing with its basic strategies.  
Regionalisation in West Arnhem Land  
In the context of this hyperactive policy environment—with its extreme swings from 
collaboration to coercion and intervention—the Indigenous organisations and leaders 
involved in the West Arnhem initiative were forced to cope with several major, imposed 
changes of direction.  
The collaborative phase  
Indigenous leaders from West Arnhem community organisations became involved in 
the regionalisation process in mid 2003 as part of what was referred to as the ‘Top End 
Triangle’ (TET), comprising representatives from the Pine Creek, Coomalie, 
Kunbarllanjnja, Warruwi, Minjilang, and Jabiru local government councils. In 
December 2003, at a meeting of TET representatives, members of the Minjilang, 
Warruwi and Kunbarllanjnja Community Councils split from the other representatives 
in the TET group. They perceived there to be a lack of communal purpose between the 
Bininj and Balanda organisations, and felt that priorities were weighted to the latter.  
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The West Arnhem Land representatives began to see the potential for an ‘Indigenous 
Regional Authority’ and to work towards the establishment of what they eventually 
called the ‘West Central Arnhem Regional Authority’ (WCARA).
10
 At this stage, the 
nearby Jabiru Council stayed out of the process, and the Coomalie and Pine Creek 
Councils decided to proceed together in a separate initiative.  
The initial leaders of the WCARA process were Bininj elected representatives from 
three community councils and two outstation resource organisations, including:  
● Kunbarllanjnja Community Government Council; 
● Warruwi Community Incorporated; 
● Minjilang Community Incorporated; 
● Demed Outstation Resource Association Incorporated; and 
● Jibulwanagu Outstation Resource Association Aboriginal Corporation. 
Together with their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), up to three representatives 
from each organisation began meeting every six to eight weeks and, in August 2004, 
formed the WCARA Transitional Council with the goal of progressing discussions 
about amalgamation into a single regional authority. Representatives from the Local 
Government Association of the NT (LGANT) and the Commonwealth Office of 
Indigenous Policy Coordination also attended these meetings.  
Interim Council members initially talked about the regionalisation policy both as an 
opportunity to secure greater authority and control for Bininj people over the things that 
mattered to them, and to exercise greater influence over government funding and 
service delivery to the region:  
We will get to say what we want in our communities, we will set the 
priorities … We have control over this project … We will create policies 
and strategies that achieve more local employment and better services … 
We will have a much stronger voice speaking as one to government … The 
government always has a hidden agenda; we want our say from the word go 
(Members of the WCARA Interim Council).  
The proposed area for the regional authority was approximately 25,000km2—all of it 
inalienable Aboriginal freehold land under the ALRA. The area encompassed several 
inter-related language and landowning groups, three large discrete community 
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settlements (two of which were on islands), and numerous small dispersed outstations 
(see Fig. 4.1).  
The process was substantially facilitated by DLGHS and particularly through the 
efforts of two of its CDOs. From 2003 onwards, this male/female team travelled 
extensively throughout West Arnhem Land, disseminating information and holding 
discussions with community leaders and organisations about the BSRSF regionalisation 
policy. In doing so, they developed a large network of contacts with senior leaders and 
family groups, and built up strong relationships and considerable personal trust with 
local Indigenous residents. Through this community development approach, they 
facilitated the formation of the Interim Council and subsequently were asked to act as 
the secretariat for their meetings.  
Fig. 4.1: The proposed region for the West Central Arnhem Regional Authority, 
under the BSRSF policy.  
 
In mid July 2005, a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ signed between the 
Department of Local Government, Housing and Sport (DLGHS) and the participating 
organisations formally committed all parties to support the decision-making work of the 
Interim Council to establish a regional authority for West Arnhem. A timeframe of 
December 2005 was proposed for its establishment.  
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Over that early period there was scepticism amongst community residents and 
Interim Council members about the extent of the NT Government’s commitment to full 
Indigenous participation in regionalisation. Fears were expressed that the Government 
would simply impose a solution rather than negotiating with residents and their elected 
representatives.  
Despite these reservations, the WCARA Interim Council met regularly between 
2004–06. The workload was intensive for both the members and the departmental 
officers involved, as they navigated a complex organisational and legal transition. The 
proposed regional authority structure meant that the three existing community councils 
would have to be entirely dissolved as local government organisations11. New election 
processes would also have to be designed and held for regional councillors, and the 
local government assets, functions, staff and administrative systems of the separate 
councils would have to be transferred across to the new authority. The BSRSF policy 
sought cost-sharing and resource efficiencies, so a rationalisation of some staffing 
positions was also proposed.  
During this phase, the WCARA Interim Council made a number of collective 
decisions about the authority’s governance and organisational structure, administrative 
arrangements, business planning, its system of representation, external boundaries, 
election procedures, headquarters, and service delivery roles (see Fig. 4.2).  
Fig. 4.2: Proposed representative structure for the West Central Arnhem Regional 
Authority. 
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During 2005–06, the Interim Council participated in regular governance capacity-
building sessions at their meetings, and spent considerable time developing a culturally-
based constitution with a unique Preamble. A vision statement for the regional authority 
aimed: ‘To develop safe communities for families, provide real jobs for local 
Indigenous people, and promote economic development through strong legitimate 
governance’.  
Considerable work was involved in developing this constitution, designing a ward 
system for voting that was based on a Bininj cultural geography, and documenting a 
business plan for the authority. The process required considerable time and commitment 
from senior government bureaucrats, extensive community development work, as well 
as legal, funding and administrative support from both the NT and Australian 
Governments. To coordinate Government efforts, the DCDSCA convened a Project 
Management Group with officers from the NT and Australian Governments and 
LGANT. This inter-departmental group met every six to eight weeks over 2005–06.  
But after the NT Labor Government was re-elected in 2005, its restructuring and 
renaming of the DCDSCA (which became the DLGHS) had significant consequences 
for the regionalisation process. In particular, the participation of government officers 
changed frequently on the Project Management Group for WCARA. Nevertheless, the 
group drafted a transitional funding framework for the region, considered mechanisms 
for streamlining the transitions to regional programs, and held interviews to employ a 
Transitional Manager to steer the administrative amalgamation of staff and community 
council resources.  
Over three years had passed since the TET group first met. The Interim Council 
anticipated the establishment of the regional authority within just a few months. In late 
2006, however, rumours abounded that the NT Government was contemplating changes 
to the BSRSF policy. In early 2007, a New Local Government policy was fully 
formulated by DLGHS and a detailed implementation plan put to the NT Cabinet for 
consideration. It required several NT Cabinet meetings in the first half of 2007 for the 
new policy to be officially endorsed. The policy was immediately implemented by 
DLGHS.  
Coercive implementation  
What did this mean for the WCARA Interim Council and participating community 
organisations, perched, as it were, on the brink of establishing their own authority?  
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First, the WCARA Interim Council was told by the Department that it would now be 
required to include Maningrida community and Jabiru township. The new ‘region’ was 
thereby extended to cover approximately 32,200km
2
 and an estimated total population 
of some 5000–6000 people (see Fig. 4.3).  
Fig. 4.3: The required region for the West Arnhem Shire under the New Local 
Government policy. 
 
This larger shire involved an even more complex set of organisational and 
governance transitions. Like Kunbarllanjnja, the Maningrida Community Council is a 
local government under the Local Government Act 1978 (NT), and so would have to be 
entirely dissolved as a local government organisation and its relevant functions 
transferred to the new shire. Additional discussions would be needed with the 
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Bawinanga Aboriginal Corporation, which provided services to numerous outstations, 
and with Jabiru town and its Council.  
The mandatory inclusion of Jabiru confronted the WCARA Interim Council with a 
challenging issue—until then the proposed regional organisation included only Bininj 
communities and organisations, and covered inalienable Aboriginal freehold land. 
Jabiru’s inclusion extended the region beyond the boundaries of Indigenous-owned 
land, which meant the Indigenous members of the Interim Council would have to 
accommodate a non-Indigenous town, its residents and elected representatives, and its 
different cultural values and priorities. In other words, a very different kind of regional 
local government was being proposed under the new NT policy.  
Second, Interim Council members were extremely angry that their collective 
decision-making role had been usurped. They were told by the Department that they 
would henceforth be referred to as a ‘Shire Transitional Committee’ and have an 
identified consultation and advisory role. They would be required to provide their 
suggestions to the Advisory Board that serviced the NT Minister for Local Government, 
who would make all the final decisions about their organisational structure.  
Decision-making power about the management, staffing, financial status and 
business plans of the new shire was abruptly reclaimed by government bureaucrats. A 
CEO was hired for them through a DLGHS process in which the new Transitional 
Committee had little involvement. A Transitional Shire Manager, who was an officer 
from the Department appointed by the Minister, became the legal face of the shire 
delegated to act as its decision-making Council, until such time as members were 
elected.  
One committee member summarised the impact of the changes in these terms: 
the NT Government is thinking ahead of us before we get to make our own 
decisions. It’s running ahead of us. It’s not even talking to us first about 
these things—so we are just talking about things that the government has 
already decided. We are already cooked—the cake has already been cooked 
by the government. We’re not involved in making that cake; the government 
has made the decisions ahead of us (WCARA Interim Council Member).  
Third, the Council was no longer seen by government to be ‘representative’ owing to 
its requirement that members from Maningrida and Jabiru should be included. A West 
Arnhem Shire Transitional Committee (WASTC) replaced the WCARA Interim 
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Council, and a cap was put on the total membership by the Department. This meant that 
the number of representatives on the old Interim Council had to be cut down in order to 
include new members. Consequently, it was a smaller core of senior leaders from the 
Interim Council who moved across to the new committee.  
Maningrida and Jabiru were initially unhappy to be told to enter into a regional 
process in which, until then, they had chosen not to participate. Not surprisingly, it took 
their representatives some time to familiarise themselves with the issues and decisions 
already made. Initially, they felt marginalised from what had become a very united team 
of representatives on the WCARA Interim Council.  
From the point of view of the Interim Council members, they felt they were being 
told to start all over again, having to reconsider issues and decisions that they had 
already considered and made. They also realised that it would mean a considerable 
delay in the establishment of the new organisation.  
Fourth, the culturally-based institutions that the WCARA Interim Council had 
designed, such as their constitution and preamble, were effectively thrown out. Also 
tossed aside was their solution for ward representation, which had sought to balance a 
Bininj nomination process for the single traditional-owner representative, alongside 
Balanda election procedures for three other representatives.  
The overall effect was to relegate the Interim Council and its new Transitional 
Committee guise to a consultative, advisory role. The sense of disempowerment was felt 
keenly by all members:  
Those foundations [for the regional authority] were built four years ago, and 
then they just get knocked from under us by the government. The horse 
hobbles are still there on us. That government just like a stockman sitting on 
the fence, they put the hobbles on us to keep us tied down. We’ve been put 
in the paddock and we’ve eaten every bit of grass. When our hobbles get 
rusty and we look like we might get out and free to eat some new green 
grass, someone just comes in and puts a new set of hobbles on us (WCARA 
Interim Council member).  
But what was extraordinary at this point was that the WCARA Interim Council 
members decided to continue to participate in the process. The fact that they did is 
testimony to the significant headway they had made in working together as a team, and 
the effort they had put into designing their own governance institutions and making 
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consensus decisions. As a consequence of this, they had developed a strong 
commitment to each other and to a shared vision of a future regional forum through 
which they hoped to exercise greater self-governance. They had also developed a 
significant sense of trust in the two CDOs working with them, whom they felt would 
continue to provide them with frank and robust advice about the new policy demands of 
government.  
In order to stay engaged in the radically reshaped process, the Indigenous 
participants had to use every opportunity to strategically and persistently reinsert their 
own governance priorities and goals. This has included grappling with a non-Indigenous 
culture of governance within their meetings and negotiating a space for the development 
and exercise of their own institutions and values.  
Re-imagining Indigenous Governance  
The Bininj leaders involved in this regional governance process have used their 
traditional rules, values and system of social organisation to re-imagine their 
contemporary governance needs and solutions. An important driving force behind this 
has been the desire to create a regional organisation that will better reflect Bininj 
cultural values and institutions: ‘We will have a council that respects and works with 
our culture’.  
Some of this re-imagining has been highly formalised; some has been spontaneously 
informal. Meetings of the Interim Council (and then the WASTC) were an important 
catalyst for designing workable governance structures and institutions, and highlighted 
the differences between Bininj and government expectations and concepts.  
The ‘glue’ (cf. Cornell and Kalt 2000) of Bininj governance lies in its institutions; 
that is, in its own ‘rules of the game’, the way things should be done. These give 
legitimacy to practice, and include laws, kinship and marriage systems, behavioural and 
gender norms, family values, religious beliefs and moral system, principles of land 
ownership, ceremony and ritual, and so on (see Kesteven and Smith 1984; Smith 2007). 
Not surprisingly then, the creation and transformation of governance institutions 
became a focus for innovation, containment and contestation by Bininj and government 
bureaucrats alike.  
Constructing the region  
The tools and concepts employed by the state to construct the new local government 
‘region’ diverged greatly from those of Bininj. The NT Government emphasised the 
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need for an ‘efficient’ scale of population for local government and to have boundaries 
precisely mapped:  
Half of the existing Territory councils are too small to provide and pay for 
the services that communities should expect to receive. Many of the 
councils are too small to attract experienced senior staff to run the services 
… The shires will be big enough to negotiate with the Territory and Federal 
Governments on behalf of their communities (McAdam 2007).  
Rather than employing the cultural-community blocs recommended by the WCARA 
Interim Council, voters were to be congregated by requiring them to officially register 
against their place of residence as the basis for voting in particular wards. In the early 
phase of the BSRSF policy framework, Bininj leaders employed a ‘cultural geography’ 
in their construction of the new region. Their primary criteria for creating the external 
regional boundary was about ‘who’ should be included and excluded from the new 
region, on the basis of dense layers of traditional land-owning relationships and 
networks. In other words, the region and its boundary was, first and foremost, a 
negotiated interpretation by leaders of who legitimately constitutes the regional Bininj 
‘self’.  
In the second policy phase of regionalisation, this internal reading of the cultural 
boundaries of relatedness was forced to expand as a result of the above-mentioned 
mandatory inclusion of the Maningrida and Jabiru communities—neither of whom was 
initially included under Bininj criteria for the proposed region.  
To this extent, the new, larger shire boundary has been an evolving compromise 
between Bininj concepts of what is the culturally relevant geography for the region, and 
the NT Government’s consideration of what constitutes the best scale to secure its goal 
of greater cost and service delivery efficiency. In this instance, the legal and policy 
powers of the state enforced a major constraint on the re-imagined Bininj regional ‘self’.  
Nevertheless, throughout the process, Bininj leaders continued to generate a 
correlation between their core cultural metaphor of ‘one family’ and the proposed 
region:  
We need to stick together and look after each other … It [the committee and 
proposed regional shire] has brought families together in the region … We 
have had to work hard and we have become one big family (WCARA 
Interim Council members).  
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The overarching Bininj metaphor of ‘one family’ denotes a core institution that 
underlies individual and kin-group identity. It has been used frequently by members of 
both the WCARA and WASTC to invoke the values of mutual support and reciprocity, 
loyalty, and shared work efforts that are seen to lie at the heart of Indigenous ‘family’ 
life. Its use in the regional context seeks to imbue the proposed shire and its governance 
arrangements with the cultural legitimacy derived from the concept of ‘family’.  
This metaphor also has a domesticating power. The leaders on the earlier WCARA 
Interim Council have continued to invoke it during WASTC meetings in order to extend 
the ‘ties that bind’ to the newly included communities of Maningrida and Jabiru. Their 
purpose has been to ease the transition of the new committee members from the status 
of ‘strangers’ or ‘outsiders’ to being part of the close family that is forming a new 
‘collective self’ for regional local government.  
At every point of engagement in this convoluted and complicated process, the Bininj 
leaders have denied the ordering power of the NT Government’s approach to creating 
boundaries for the region and its composite wards. During a discussion about the newly 
imposed external boundaries, one leader succinctly expressed an opinion that was 
common within the earlier Interim Council:  
In the Balanda word that will be a boundary there. But it’s just a service 
line. It’s just a line for the government. You see this line? It’s not there. 
We’re not going to trip over that boundary line when we’re walking out on 
our country. This line is local government, it’s not for traditional owners’ 
land—we know our own land, every little place; long time, from start’ 
(WASTC member).  
The Bininj members of the Council/Committee are themselves traditional owners and 
have consistently argued that regionalised local government should not impinge on their 
cultural and legal rights under the ALRA. From the start, they have been keen to ensure 
their decisions do not undermine those primary rights, or exacerbate tensions over land 
ownership. For that reason, they initially decided there should be no mapped internal 
boundaries for the proposed electoral wards. These were to be kept deliberately 
invisible so that they could continue to be managed under the Bininj system of 
knowledge and control of country. However, the current policy requires that all shire 
internal ward and external regional boundaries be mapped and made visible.  
In the Bininj-government interplay that continues over the issue of boundaries, the 
Bininj representatives continue to reinforce the importance of locally relevant cultural 
 296  Theme 5 
geographies as the foundation for their governance solutions. They strategically use this 
ordering mode to resist the externally imposed institutions of government, which work 
to re-group and re-order Bininj people into neatly bounded geographies:  
We said to people [out in communities] don’t be worried about that line out 
there. That’s a service line. They think it will cut them off from everyone 
else. But it’s not a line for Bininj land. Your right cannot be disturbed by 
that idea (WCARA Interim Council member).  
Seeing the pattern of Indigenous governance  
The pattern of traditional Bininj governance, visually reproduced in much of their art, 
ceremony and ritual can be understood as a ‘nodal network’. This type of network is 
formed by the interconnectedness and interdependence of essentially autonomous units 
and actors (each constituting ‘nodes’), where the constituent linkages can facilitate or 
inhibit the functioning of the overall system. A ‘governance network’ then refers to the 
interconnected distribution and exercise of a group’s decision making and leadership to 
achieve their collective goals.  
Bininj governance networks in West Arnhem Land comprise clan groups, inter-
related by complex webs of kinship, land-ownership identities, marriage systems, 
historical alliances and ceremonies (see Kesteven and Smith 1984; Smith 2007). In 
these networks there are ‘nodes’ or points of individual agency and decision making, 
where particular male and female leaders who have respect and influence are able to 
mobilise people and resources to create order and collectively get things done. In highly 
decentralised systems of social organisation like those in West Arnhem Land, 
governance nodes such as leaders and organisations enable decision making to coalesce 
and be implemented. In this system, nodal leaders constitute the circuitry of governing 
order and authority that enables things to be achieved over time.  
Bininj networked governance in West Arnhem can be deciphered, although it is often 
invisible to outsiders. It has its own culture or world view—a way of thinking about the 
matters that need to be governed, and ways of reproducing the patterns of 
interconnectedness that underlie the networks needed for governance. It has a set of 
technologies, powers and processes for exerting influence and power, and for prompting 
action amongst people. It is able to marshal resources via nodal leaders and 
organisations. And it employs a set of institutions, or rules, which enable nodal leaders 
to legitimately activate governance networks.  
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The Bininj members of the WASTC are part of nodal leadership networks that stretch 
across West Arnhem and well beyond. They have striven to create a representative 
structure for the regional authority, and now the shire, that is based on their governance 
culture of nodal networks. Much of their effort and motivation has not been 
immediately intelligible to Balanda in the region, or to government officers. And when 
they have become intelligible, Bininj proposals are not always acceptable to Balanda, 
who have different ideas of what constitutes ‘good’, ‘effective’ and ‘legitimate’ 
governance.  
The NT Government and its departmental officers insist that a democratic standard 
be applied to the future number and election of shire representatives. Representation, 
they assert, should properly be based on the total population of each constituent ward in 
the region: ‘Under New Local Government, councils will be democratically elected by 
the people, just like everywhere else in Australia’12.  
As one NT Government officer stated at a WASTC meeting: 
The next complexity factor for us [government] is, this is a democracy and 
everyone should have a vote—one person, one vote. Another challenge is 
remoteness and the dispersed nature of the population, plus the cultural 
groupings of small communities. These can’t be the basis for wards and 
representation. We don’t want loose cultural groupings, but we want bigger 
wards so that we keep the total number of representatives to ten or twelve.  
Bininj members of the committee see this interpretation of democracy as being 
fundamentally at odds with their own governance institutions. They feel it to be unfair 
and unequal. From their perspective, representatives are seen as:  
people who have got picked by their communities and elders in their area. 
They didn’t just come for nothing. It’s each council and elders who picked 
those people to represent their people. When we first started off we wanted 
everyone to be equal (WASTC member).  
The Bininj view of ‘equal’ is based on each main cultural-community bloc having an 
equal number of representatives for each ward, irrespective of the population or 
geographic size of the ward:  
Our main issue is that it is ‘all equal’, so we don’t upset people. We have to 
be very careful. Every person out there knows we are working together on 
this—we got a jury out there. When we go back to our community we have 
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to behave properly and make our decisions properly so people in our 
communities can see us paying respect and behaving properly.  
… We decided we wanted three reps for each ward because they are the 
right people; not on a population basis. Remember we talked about that [i.e. 
representation] three years ago, and we said each ward should get ‘equal 
vote’, ‘equal number’; that’s fair for everyone’ (WASTC members).  
There is disquiet about this view of equality amongst some Balanda CEOs on the 
WASTC who work for councils in the communities that have a large population. They 
too stress the democratic benchmark of ‘one person, one vote’. But at several committee 
meetings about the issue, the Bininj members—including those from the communities 
with large populations—reconfirmed their strong preference for having an equal number 
of representatives for each ward. They also pointed out to government officers that the 
Bininj approach was in fact similar to that of the Australian Senate in its representative 
arrangements.  
Bininj leaders continued to apply the same logic of ‘all equal’ to representation for 
the proposed shire; that is, each major community with its participating council and 
outstation organisation would have an equal number of representatives regardless of 
population size (see Fig. 4.4).  
Fig. 4.4: The proposed representative structure for the West Arnhem Shire under 
the New Local Government policy. 
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Negotiations about this are continuing between committee members and 
departmental officers. The Advisory Board is attempting to operate as a go-between for 
the WASTC, putting their views forward to the Minister and supporting the value of 
their cultural logic.  
This is an important issue for committee members who are attempting to reconcile 
the two different cultures of governance operating in the process, at the same time as 
striving to arrive at a culturally legitimate solution that will gain the backing of their 
community members. Bininj members prefer to take major governance issues back to 
their communities for further consideration. This has meant considerable discussion and 
negotiation within the committee and the participating organisations.  
Governing ‘two-ways’  
An early activity of the Bininj committee was to design a logo13 for the WCARA. 
The logo is a visual map of the regional Bininj ‘self’ (see Fig. 4.5). It depicts two 
turtles—one saltwater, the other freshwater—to indicate the inclusion of people from 
the coastal and island communities, as well as the inland communities of West Arnhem. 
The turtles allude to the ancient interaction between two mythological creatures, and 
‘the two coming together’ to resolve their differences. The logo also depicts Bininj and 
Balanda hands clasped together, to symbolise the two collaborating for the benefit of all 
residents of the region. This vision was expressed by one committee member as 
‘working two-ways’.  
Fig. 4.5: The proposed logo of the West Arnhem Shire Transition Committee and 
the former regional authority . 
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The WASTC readily adopted the logo as being a positive symbol of how Bininj and 
Balanda could work together as a shire. As one senior member of the committee 
explained:  
This is how we are working two ways. We are using our Arrarrakpi 
[Bininj/Indigenous] concept and using it with this Balanda concept.  
The WCARA constitutional preamble drafted by the Interim Council also embedded 
this ‘two-way’ approach, stating that:  
This Preamble is grounded in the traditional Aboriginal law, language and 
systems of self-governance for the region. It brings this view to the 
implementation of local government administrative systems that provide 
service delivery to all peoples of our area.  
The WASTC adopted the preamble, confirming their intention to continue to use 
Bininj traditional systems of culture and governance in order to:  
strengthen the legitimacy of the Regional Authority [shire], and use the 
[shire] to strengthen traditional systems of governance. Through this vision 
and commitment we seek to maintain observance and respect for traditional 
values, and to join the responsibilities and structures of traditional authority 
with those of local government to achieve a high quality of life and a wide 
range of opportunities and choices … We are developing our own rules that 
include our culture. In our own culture we have our own rules that are very 
strong and we are bringing this into the [regional local government].  
The logo and preamble subsequently became important devices for positively 
accommodating Jabiru Town Council and its largely Balanda population. As one 
committee member noted: ‘It’s [the logo] a good one because the handshaking now 
takes in Jabiru as well. It includes Balanda as well’.  
The principle of ‘working two ways’ to develop governance solutions for the new 
shire has, at its core, a Bininj process of innovation and active adaptation. A consistent 
benchmark has been the Bininj committee members’ need to ensure that the process has 
internal cultural legitimacy.  
This process was contested by government. For example, a component of the new 
policy was the NT Government’s requirement that all shires adopt a single common 
constitution. This effectively meant that the WCARA preamble and constitution were 
no longer relevant. Over several meetings, however, the newly formed WASTC Council 
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negotiated through the Advisory Board that the preamble could become part of the 
shire’s business plans (which were being developed by departmental officers). They 
also began compiling a Governance Reference Manual of their draft policies and 
decisions to guide future elected shire representatives and managers. They subsequently 
gained departmental agreement to have the preamble and governance manual included 
as an official document in the shire’s strategic development plan. These were significant 
breakthroughs.  
Transforming institutions  
Over the four-and-a-half years of their operation, a number of formal and informal 
governance institutions (rules) have been generated by the Interim Council and 
Transitional Committee. This ‘rule innovation’ often occurred in the course of their 
meetings. It was there that members attempted to create workable solutions to some of 
the challenging problems caused by the disjunctions that kept arising between the two 
cultures of governance.  
The litmus test at meetings was that Bininj-generated rules needed not only to be 
seen as culturally legitimate, but to be immediately useful. If they were, then committee 
members adopted them quickly. For example, in the middle of one committee meeting 
when new members had arrived, the chairperson announced to all participants:  
I don’t like to say people’s name. Bininj way, I can’t say that name. So 
when you move and second a resolution can you please say your name out 
loud yourself so you can have your name put down on the minutes.  
The chairperson effectively resolved what might otherwise have been an awkward 
situation for himself by designing an impromptu procedural rule that enabled him to 
continue directing the passage of resolutions in the formal Balanda style, without having 
to forgo his observance of an important Bininj etiquette rule that restricted his public use 
of people’s personal names. The new rule was immediately acted upon as everyone 
could see its practical benefits for themselves as well as for the chairperson.  
At the beginning of another meeting, before the commencement of business, a 
committee member made an announcement:  
Before we start with that agenda I just want to say something about my 
cousin sister’s boy over there [referring to a young man sitting across the 
table who had recently been chosen by his community council organisation 
as a representative on the committee]. Well, Bininj way, that boy can’t look 
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at me or talk to me—nothing. He shouldn’t be sitting here in this room. I 
talked to his mother last night and we decided that for these meetings he can 
talk to me and he can speak up. He comes here, he’s got to do his job. That 
means he might have to talk to me and I gotta listen to him talking about his 
idea. But Bininj way he would get into trouble if he does that. So, just for 
these meeting here, we making a new rule: he can talk and look at me. But 
only here, not for outside; that still Bininj way out there.  
In response to this statement, the other committee members at the meeting (both 
Bininj and Balanda) made supportive comments and agreed to the new rule.  
In this instance, a senior leader and his close relative had designed a new rule that 
had the hallmarks of the cognitive tool of compartmentalisation. This process enables 
people to organise things (ideas, events, relationships) into discrete units or categories, 
each of which has its own properties of boundedness and isolation, at the same time as 
having some form of limited or controlled relation with the other parts (see Spiro and 
Jehng 1991; Strauss and Quinn 1997). Cognitive compartmentalisation is a particularly 
useful tool in intercultural contexts. It means that seemingly contradictory ideas or 
behaviours can be observed and held, without either being undermined or elevated over 
the other.  
In the example above, a new rule was created for a specific context, which addressed 
a widely recognised kin-based behaviour that required certain kinds of avoidance and 
deferential behaviour to be observed between two classes of relatives. Failure to observe 
the avoidance rule would incur family and public censure, and perhaps, retribution. The 
new rule enabled the WASTC members who stood in such a kin relationship to each 
other to effectively suspend the accepted customary rule of kin avoidance and so behave 
differently in the meeting. Outside the room, at breaks in the meeting, the norm of 
avoidance behaviour quietly reasserted itself.  
By compartmentalising this ‘meeting behaviour’ under a new rule, the potentially 
negative consequences were not only ameliorated for the individuals concerned, the new 
behaviour was also disambiguated. That is, it was made collectively comprehensible to 
all the other members of the committee, and able to be assessed by them as being 
culturally legitimate owing to the fact that it was a derivative of the more fundamental 
customary norm. This became an accepted process of rule transformation at the 
meetings.  
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An important effect of this process of cognitive compartmentalisation is that the 
cultural authority of underlying customary institutions is buffered from the potentially 
negative impacts of contradictory new rules by those contradictions being contained and 
nullified. Compartmentalisation also enables the Bininj worldview of the continuity and 
inalienability of their laws to be maintained, at the same time as allowing condoned 
institutional innovation to occur.  
Other examples of rule innovation have occurred at meetings in the more formal 
context of governance capacity development and training sessions. These sessions have 
been conducted with Bininj representatives from the very beginnings of the regional 
initiative, and have been provided by the same male and female team of CDOs from the 
DLGHS, with personal input from my governance research (see Evans, Appo and Smith 
2006; Smith 2007).  
The training sessions focused on a wide range of governance issues including 
governing roles and responsibilities, the concept of separation of powers, systems of 
representation, organisational models to support regionalisation, policies for codes of 
conduct and conflict of interest, meeting procedures, human resource management and 
employment contract conditions, communication with community residents, and so on.  
In each session, the Bininj committee members discussed the non-Indigenous 
concepts and values, alongside their own. They raised a range of cultural issues that 
might potentially undermine the legitimacy and enforcement of new governance rules. 
They tested proposed rules against potential community and cultural scenarios, and 
revised them to enhance their workability and legitimacy.  
Members often shared ideas about how they might collectively and individually 
enforce their governance policies and rules. Each session culminated in the committee 
drafting new governing institutions, for example, in the form of written policies, agreed 
procedures and resolutions. Through this process, the Bininj leaders on the committee 
steadily developed a growing confidence in their capacity to work together as a team, 
and to make and enforce collective decisions, policies and other rules.  
In these situations, committee members have been creating shared meanings about 
their expected and actual behaviour, roles and responsibilities, which then provide the 
groundwork for forming new governing rules. The rules that work most effectively are 
those which appear to fit four fundamental criteria.  
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First, they give priority to people’s pre-existing cultural knowledge, norms, systems 
of authority, and experiences. Second, they have been designed collectively and in a 
practical governance context. Third, they can be put to immediate practical use; and 
fourth, they can continue to be adapted to suit changing governance needs.  
As Spiro and Jehng (1991: 163–205) have noted, this calls for considerable cognitive 
flexibility at both an intra- and inter-personal level. It suggests that a Bininj culture of 
governance is created and maintained through interaction and practice. This enables 
nodal leaders to act as instigators of new and old meanings, and to mobilise consensus 
and action around those. That is, nodal leaders are able to tailor concepts and social 
value to create new institutions in ways that have legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of 
the network. Importantly though, Bininj innovation and practice are firmly located 
within an intercultural frame. Legitimacy and effectiveness are judged and shaped as 
much by the concepts and institutions of the state as those of Bininj people.  
Conversely, when governance institutions are imposed from the outside and have no 
grounding in the pre-existing meanings and experience of Bininj culture, those rules 
have a weak hold on people’s values and behaviour. Such externally generated rules 
cannot be easily compartmentalised and so can undermine existing cultural institutions 
of governance. They also tend to have less cognitive flexibility and therefore cannot 
easily be customised or reassembled by Bininj to meet changed circumstances.  
Conclusion  
In the second phase of its policy reform agenda, the NT Government sought to 
reassert its own culture of governance in an attempt to contain, mould and rename 
Indigenous systems of governance and their attendant institutions, and in an effort to 
hasten the process of regionalisation. In the course of working to achieve their goal of a 
strong regional organisation, Bininj community organisations and their elected leaders 
have attempted to design elements of a new ‘culture of governance’. To do this, they 
have used formal and informal techniques and tools to create innovative governance 
institutions and structures, and imbue them with legitimacy and practical capability.  
At its heart, the intercultural contest occurring within the West Arnhem initiative is 
over power and authority itself:  
They don’t trust us to make our own decisions. There has been a lot of 
terminology that has been used in the history of this shire, and that term is 
democracy. Can you define what democracy is for us? We keep hearing 
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about it, but we don’t get to do it. We don’t get to make our decisions about 
these things.  
… I don’t see any democracy—you just get told what to do: lump it, or do it 
… What kind of message do we take to our people? Do we just tell them 
that in two years down the track we will have the power maybe; that 
sometime in the future we will get to make the decisions? Poor bugger 
blackfella that’s what we are (WASTC members).  
Committee members overwhelmingly see this intercultural contestation as more than 
just a struggle for regionalised local government. It is a process by which they hope to 
secure greater self-governance and control over the longer term. It remains to be seen 
whether regionalised local government delivers on its promises and expectations in 
West Arnhem. In the meantime, there is much that can be learned from the process to 
date.  
The new NT Government policy framework states that its: 
intention in seeking [its latest] fundamental reform of local government is to 
create certainty and stability through strong regional local governments that 
will have a similar capacity to that of the municipal councils … The need is 
for orderly transitional and implementation arrangements (McAdam 2006).  
But policy implementation has been anything but orderly. This is more than simply a 
consequence of the real world complexities of implementation catching up with the 
policy vision. The local government reform process has been wracked by problems 
created by the institutional failings of the government’s own culture of governance, 
including differences of political opinion within the government and cabinet. Several 
NT Ministers have appeared reluctant to commit to the New Local Government policy, 
preferring the more flexible and culturally-inclusive approach laid out in the BSRSF.  
In 2008, erratic government commitment to its own policy led to the NT Cabinet 
allowing non-Indigenous residents in the Litchfield region west of Darwin to opt out of 
regionalisation, while still requiring Indigenous residents in other regions of the NT to 
continue. As a consequence, some of the Indigenous communities who were told in 
early 2007 that they had to amalgamate into larger regions are now questioning why 
they should continue to be involved, or why they need to rush to meet a government-
imposed deadline of the middle of 2008.14 
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Another recent Government decision to set an unusually low cap on the rate 
payments from pastoralists and the mining sector caused considerable disquiet within 
the bureaucracy and amongst several members of the WASTC.
15
 In this highly charged 
environment, in mid 2008, the NT Minister responsible for oversighting the New Local 
Government policy and two senior departmental officers resigned. These officers were 
centrally involved in the West Arnhem Shire process.  
The WASTC has not been surprised by the erratic governance of government, with 
all its policy reversals, changing implementation rules, and rapid turnover of 
bureaucratic faces at their meetings. The nub of contention for committee members has 
consistently focused on whether they actually have genuine decision making powers or 
not. This issue has especially arisen in the context of departmental reassertion of its 
decision making powers under the New Local Government policy. Consequently, 
implementation of that policy has been transformed and contained by its engagement 
with persistently asserted Indigenous governance institutions and agency.  
Today, a growing number of Indigenous Australians are re-imagining what 
constitutes legitimate representation, decision making and leadership for their 
community governance arrangements. They are doing this at different societal scales 
and experimenting with models of governance. More specifically, the West Arnhem 
case study describes the ways in which principles of networked governance, nodal 
leadership, institutional innovation, and the cognitive tools of compartmentalisation are 
being used—both consciously and unconsciously—by Bininj people as interpretative 
instruments with which to design new governance arrangements that suit larger scale 
cultural geographies and retain cultural legitimacy.  
Indigenous leaders play a pivotal role in mobilising deep-seated cultural 
understandings and imperatives in order to do this. When their transformations and 
experiments have resonated with their peer network of leaders and with their members 
(their ‘jury’), and are judged to be ‘fair’ and ‘equal’ in Indigenous terms, then the new 
rules and structures have gained internal legitimacy. In this way, it has been the nodal 
leaders and their networks who have created an internal culture of governance, but it is 
the ‘governed’ (the ‘jury’ of community members) who have enabled new governance 
institutions to be implemented and sustained.  
To be imbued with legitimacy, new governance institutions have to be tested and 
proven useful in the real world. If new rules and ways of looking at governance prove 
workable and legitimate—not only in the Indigenous arena, but in the wider 
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intercultural arena of government policy—then they may receive endorsement within 
the policy implementation processes. But if governance rules are imposed by external 
agents, or if they cannot be enforced without damaging fundamental Indigenous cultural 
values and ways of behaving, then those governed will inevitably deliver a verdict of 
failure and resist the application of the rules.  
There are limits to the extent to which Indigenous Australians can currently 
transform and reassemble their institutions of governance. One set of constraining 
factors lies within Indigenous cultures of governance themselves. In West Arnhem 
Land, the Indigenous cultural drive towards localism and small-scale autonomy acts to 
impose social limits to political aggregation. When internal legitimacy and trust waver, 
the group to be governed tends to default back to small localised networks of close kin.  
As a consequence, there can be significant difficulties in sustaining the horizontal 
social spread of new governance institutions. Indigenous networks—especially those of 
leaders—can facilitate this horizontal extension, in particular to the regional level. But 
transforming and deepening the legitimacy of Indigenous institutions to enable larger 
scale cultural geographies of governance requires time, facilitation and ongoing 
discussion in order to generate the wider consensus and support needed at the local 
levels.  
New governance institutions that appear to preference the rights and interests of 
some groups or individuals over others, or which diminish valued group norms, do not 
generate sufficient cognitive or cultural traction to sustain their ordering power. Nor 
will they be sustained if they are unable to accommodate the layered and networked 
nature of power and decision making in Indigenous societies. Institution building that is 
based on the flexible reassembly of pre-existing Indigenous norms and ideas about what 
is ‘equal’, ‘proper’ and ‘fair’ appears to have greater effectiveness, both in meeting the 
challenge of new situations and in winning the support of the members of a community 
or organisation.  
Another significant factor limiting Indigenous transformation of governance 
institutions arises from the external environment. Contemporary Indigenous governance 
initiatives are embedded in, not separate from, the institutions and power of the state 
and its culture of governance. In Australia, the state exercises overwhelming 
jurisdictional, institutional and financial powers through which it governs Indigenous 
culture and seeks to make Indigenous governance and people ‘good’ in western terms. 
As one member of the WASTC summarised this relative power imbalance:  
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We Bininj have small power, only little backstop, just one backstop. 
Whitefellas, government, got plenty backstop behind them. They can come 
in any time and tell us what to do. They got the power.  
But Indigenous processes of institutional transformation have the power to subvert, 
contain and modify the agenda of the state’s own culture of governance and its efforts to 
govern Indigenous culture. This partly explains why, in Australian Indigenous affairs, 
policy implementation inevitably becomes disorderly and uncertain, leading to 
processes and outcomes on the ground that are often entirely different from those 
originally intended. This has been the case in West Arnhem Land.  
Indigenous societies do not exist frozen in time as outdated ‘cultural museums’ (cf. 
Vanstone 2005). They have a long history of highly sophisticated innovations in their 
governing institutions. Furthermore, Indigenous leaders are often adept at connecting 
into non-Indigenous policy, bureaucratic nodes and political networks in order to 
achieve their own priorities. Astute government officers who pay attention to, and build 
relationships of trust into, those networks are themselves better able to act as 
intermediaries between the two cultures of governance, and to carry out community 
development work to support governance initiatives at local and regional levels.  
From this it is clear that in order for contemporary institutional transformation of 
Indigenous governance to be effective and sustainable a number of conditions must be 
met. First and foremost, new governance institutions must be initiated by Indigenous 
people themselves on the basis of their informed consent. Second, the role of trusted and 
respected leaders is critical to institution building. Third, it must be undertaken in ways 
that resonate with community members’ views of what is considered to be culturally 
legitimate and practically workable. Fourth, external coercion and the imposition of 
governance institutions have little traction in changing behaviour or building 
commitment and responsibility. And fifth, the facilitation and community development 
work of trusted government officers can make a major contribution to the 
implementation of enabling policies about governance.  
But it appears that in these matters the state is a slow learner; or rather, in the case of 
West Arnhem regionalisation, its desire to retain decision-making power and control 
appears to have inhibited its learning and outcomes. In some ways, the state has been 
less innovative than Bininj in designing effective institutions to carry out its governance 
objectives. In the end, the state seems to have failed to recognise the value and benefits 
of Bininj decision making, to see that Bininj leaders can resolve complex governance 
 309  The Intercultural Space 
problems with innovative strategies, and that their solutions can actually facilitate 
government policy implementation. In the end, it may well be that regardless of the 
power differential, the Bininj understanding of the state’s governance culture is greater 
than the state’s comprehension and control of Bininj governance culture.  
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Notes: Paper 8 
1. The 1967 referendum made two changes to the Australian Constitution. These 
changes enabled the Commonwealth Government to make laws for all of the 
Australian people by amending s. 51 of the Constitution (previously, people of 
‘the Aboriginal race in any State’ were excluded); and to take account of 
Aboriginal people in determining the population of Australia by repealing s. 127 
of the Constitution (formerly, Indigenous people had been haphazardly included in 
the census, but not counted for the purposes of Commonwealth funding grants to 
the states or territories). 
2. The word ‘governance’ is derived from the Latin word gubernare meaning 
‘rudder’, conveying ‘the action of steering a ship’. The word was first used in 12th 
century France, where it was a technical term designating the administration of a 
bailliage (the jurisdiction or district of a bailiff; bailiwick in English). From 
France, it crossed the channel and in England came to designate the method of 
organising feudal power (see de Alcantara 1998; Kooiman 2003; and Plumptre 
and Graham 1999 for a definitional autobiography of the concept). Just as the 
British legal concept of terra nullius was used to usurp control over the lands of 
Indigenous Australians, the related idea that they had no government, no chiefs, 
and no enduring form of authority, law and order was used to justify the 
imposition of British jurisdiction and the common law over Indigenous lands and 
people. 
3. This categorisation for the purposes of making Indigenous people visible and 
susceptible to external control is not restricted to governance. It is especially 
apparent in the history of the census enumeration by Australian governments, 
where people are renamed and so transformed into ‘households’, ‘household 
reference person’, ‘nuclear families’, ‘visitors’ etc. (see Morphy 2007). In 
resource negotiations with private sector companies, people are renamed and 
transformed into ‘stakeholders’, ‘land owners’, ‘historical peoples’, 
‘beneficiaries’, ‘affected groups’ etc. (see Holcombe 2005; Howitt and Suchet 
2004; Smith 1995). In the social security system they are renamed and 
reconstituted as ‘sole parents’, ‘welfare dependents’, and people ‘in breach’ (see 
Smith 1992). 
4. In contemporary Indigenous Affairs, public servants have created powerful policy 
names such as ‘coordination’, ‘whole-of-government’, ‘joined up government’, 
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‘mainstreaming’, ‘normalisation’, ‘transparency’, ‘mutual obligation, ‘partnership’ 
and so on. 
5. See Behrendt et al. (2007), Sanders (2003, 2004) and Smith (1995, 1996, 2007) 
for a review of some of the different phases and forms of regionalism in 
Indigenous affairs. 
6. These include six municipal councils, 31 community government councils that are 
incorporated under NT legislation, and 28 association councils that are constituted 
under Commonwealth legislation. Approximately 80 per cent of these councils are 
situated on Aboriginal inalienable freehold land and so must operate within the 
statutory context of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
(ALRA), which provides protection and recognition for the rights and interests of 
traditional owners in matters of land access, use, planning, and management. 
7. This review was never carried out. A new Local Government Bill was eventually 
introduced to the NT Legislative Assembly in February 2008; it was debated in the 
mid year sittings and enacted in the second half of 2008. The Bill implements the 
radically changed ‘New Local Government’ policy that was commenced in 2007, 
not the BSRSF policy launched in 2003 
8. The Overarching Agreement On Indigenous Affairs Between the Commonwealth 
of Australia and the Northern Territory of Australia 2005–2010 and associated 
schedules are available at: 
<http://www.facsia.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/via/Indigenous/$file/Indigenou
sAffairsAgreement.pdf> [accessed 5 May 2008]. 
9. See ‘Local Government Reform’ on the DLGHS website at: 
<http://www.localgovernment.nt.gov.au/ new> [accessed 5 May 2008]. 
10. See Smith (2007) for a more detailed account of the West Central Arnhem 
regionalisation process during the WCARA phase, and the traditional patterns of 
land-tenure and social organisation involved. 
11. Kunbarllanjnja is a local government under the Local Government Act 1978 (NT) 
and so will be entirely dissolved; whereas Warruwi and Minjilang are Association 
Councils that are treated as if they are local governments by the NT Government 
for the purposes of receiving relevant government funding. They can maintain 
their organisational incorporation for other community purposes, but must transfer 
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their local government type functions and funding to the new authority. Note that 
Kunbarllanjnja spelling was chosen by the Community Local Government Council 
as its name; Gunbalanya is the older form of spelling for the entire settlement. 
12. See DLGHS website, ‘Governing’ at: 
<http://www.nt.gov.au/localgovernment/new/ministers_update/governing> 
[accessed 5 May 2008]. 
13. The logo for the WCARA was chosen from a regional design competition. The 
winning design was created by Mr Ahmat Brahim, an Indigenous man with 
traditional ties to the region, and whose father has been a member of both the 
WCARA Interim Council and the WASTC. The transitional committee later 
affirmed their choice of the logo for its new shire. 
14. A media release by LGANT (2008) noted that following this decision ‘other 
councils are asking about the Government’s processes and timetable for bringing 
in the reforms … The Government’s action in abandoning the Top End Shire 
proposal has set a precedent which is leaving councils with an emerging feeling of 
mistrust, of being led to believe one thing only to find it has changed dramatically 
to something else. They say they are losing faith in the Government’s plan since 
the resignation of the previous Minister and since the change was introduced’. 
15. LGANT estimates that the regional local governments in the NT will lose between 
$14–18 million in foregone rates from pastoral and mining industry as a result of 
the NT Government decision. 
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Conclusion: Towards a Conceptual and Theoretical 
Framework  
The research content of each publication together with the thematic overviews and 
analyses provide a solid research platform from which to now synthesise their 
theoretical implications into a new overarching meta-view. This will enable a more 
integrated orientation to the cultural conditions and intercultural articulation of the 
fields of Indigenous governance and statist governmentality to be developed.  
Along with Jan Pronk (2008: 72), I am inclined to believe that ‘a comprehensive 
normative theory of governance is neither possible nor desirable’. What is needed, 
however, is an understanding that has internal consistency in its parts, and demonstrates 
a high degree of external consistency with the long-term field observations and 
ethnographic evidence presented in the thesis publications. Accordingly, in this 
Conclusion, a set of more highly abstracted comprehensions are designed. On a more 
pragmatic level, the Conclusion also highlights the significance of the newly abstracted 
meta-framework, for the ongoing relationship between Indigenous Australians and the 
state, and their practices of governance and governmentality.  
Theorising Governance 
The analyses of the papers collectively build on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Loic 
Wacquant and Michel Foucault, enabling governance and governmentality both to be 
theorised as encultured fields. In other words, they are relational and enacted forms of 
order-organisation that are internally structured around distinctive modes of power, 
agency and leadership. These fields draw upon and reproduce particular institutions (i.e. 
the ‘rules of the game’) and valued forms of specialist governance capital (i.e. personal 
qualities, communication and skills, modes of power, expertise, resources and 
knowledge). Individuals and entities strategically accumulate and deploy different forms 
of governance capital in order to achieve desired outcomes.  
Governance and governmentality are thus squarely posed as being as much about 
people as they are about structures and systems. In particular, the published papers 
demonstrate that such fields should be understood as being more dynamic and chaotic 
than perhaps envisaged by Bourdieu and Foucault, but also as being more patterned in 
their cultural formation and intercultural articulation (1993, 1999). This elaborated 
concept recognises the capacity of fields to generate distinctive conditions and qualities 
relative to each other (thus enabling similarity and/or difference to be asserted and 
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contested). It also identifies the fact that fields may internally generate sub-fields which 
can demonstrate marked disjunctions and differences from each other. In this way, the 
concept of field moves beyond an either/or analytic approach to issues of cultural 
difference and domain versus the intercultural. 
Governance is comprised of a multiplicity of interconnected dimensions, actors and 
interests (public, private, market and political). These are entangled and interdependent, 
not neatly separated systems generating different kinds of order and power. And the 
power to act is not uniformly distributed or accessible amongst people and entities. Such 
a conceptualisation highlights the blurring of boundaries and power between actors, and 
the fact that a field or sub-field of governance may or may not persist over time and 
space. In this way, the concept alerts us to power relations of dependence, 
interdependence and asymmetry. Governance is therefore theorised as being more than 
simply the organisation of collective order through the ‘rules of the game’. It is also 
about the perceived legitimacy of the game itself and its consequences in real time for 
real people.  
Culture Matters 
The second theoretical insight generated by the collective papers is that culture must 
be treated as a phenomenon to be documented, explained and re-integrated into an 
understanding of the Australian state and its governmentality, and not simply relegated 
to an Indigenous exotica. Culture underpins the raison d’etre (doing) and d’etat (being) 
of how Indigenous people govern themselves, and how the state constructs its 
governmentality and governs itself. Culture therefore matters as an explanatory variable 
for their intercultural encounters and contestation, and for their potential points of 
common ground.  
As encultured fields, Indigenous governance and the state’s governmentality each 
has distinctive, internally-structured power relationships and hierarchies, modes of 
agency, institutional standards, forms of capital and valued ways of organising conduct. 
Importantly, governance and governmentality are shown to not only encompass their 
own systemic imperatives towards particular forms of stability, regulation and 
resilience, but also towards particular modes of contestation, innovation, breakdown and 
realignment. The particular contribution of the thesis is in its exposition and modelling 
of the specificity of this epistemic condition in each field; albeit with a greater focus on 
the field of Indigenous governance. 
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This understanding emphasises culture to be consequential; a thing of power and 
agency affecting weighty individual and collective issues. These issues include 
contested representations of ‘culture’ itself. This theoretical understanding should not be 
reduced to naive cultural relativism or determinism. Rather, it argues there are 
developmental patterns and cycles that are separately perpetuated in each field, with 
different cultural turning points and trajectories associated with such systemic 
mechanisms. Furthermore, people and entities activate and manipulate these for their 
own purposes; one of which is the exercise of power and authority. 
Theorising Power and Agency  
The third theoretical insight that can be drawn from the collective thesis papers is the 
need to reintroduce the complexity and creativity of group and individual agency back 
into concepts of power, governmentality and governance.  
This understanding views people not just as zombie carriers of culture, but as 
historical animals carrying within themselves acquired sensibilities and habits of social 
order which are the sedimented deposits of their past experiences and ways of doing 
things. It also re-centres the importance of individual agency, where people bring their 
personal judgments, influence, choices and idiosyncratic motivations to bear on 
encultured dispositions and relationships. 
Accordingly, agency in the fields of governance and governmentality must be 
grasped in terms of a more nuanced conceptualisation that encompasses people’s 
predispositions (cognitive orientation and interpretative mechanisms), their ability 
(intention and power), capabilities and capital (skills, expertise knowledge, renown and 
reputation), and willingness (motivation and occasion) to accomplish things in the world 
they inhabit.  
Modes of governing agency therefore have a cultural configuration or pattern that is 
recognisable by individuals and groups, and open to their assessment and manipulation. 
Furthermore, theorising governance and governmentality as encultured fields highlights 
the fact that agency itself is shaped and potentially reconfigured in the intercultural 
space, as a result of the multiplicity of agents and different modes of power at play 
there.  
The combined thesis analyses enable a similar expansion of the concept of power 
beyond being a generalised capacity or right to act in conducting others’ conduct. Barry 
Hindess’s (1996: 143) sympathetic critique of Michel Foucault for ignoring ‘altogether 
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questions to do with the legitimacy of power’ [emphasis added] is not only warranted, 
but arguably also an impediment to understanding and theorising the exercise and 
relations of power within the field of Indigenous governance, and its articulation with 
the governmentality of the Australian state.  
The ethnographic evidence warrants power being theorised as having several 
dimensions
36
 that constitute a repertoire or ensemble; including:  
 (1)  power as personal renown and individual potency in particular situations; 
 (2)  relational power, or the power to shape social interactions and mobilise others into 
action;  
 (3)  strategic power, or the ability to instrumentally shape the conditions, environment, 
and institutional rules of the ‘game’ under which others act; 
 (4)  structural power, or the power to shape the social and cultural field of action, 
condoning or promoting certain behaviours and modes of interaction, while 
restricting or denying others; 
 (5)  symbolic power, or power to shape diverse forms of representations of the world, 
and to mobilise and motivate others in respect to those; and finally 
 (6)  cosmological power, or the power to shape meaning and the understandings of 
people about life-as-such, based on a relationship with a metaphysical world and 
beings.  
This broader theoretical understanding recognises that different dimensions of power 
will be preferred and routinely called upon by actors within the encultured fields of 
governance and governmentality. The insight here is the injunction to consider the 
cultural moorings of both agency and power as ‘injecting a biasing form of 
endogeneity’ (Kahan, Braman & Jenkins-Smith 2010) thereby reinforcing preferred 
values and dispositions about their practice.  
This alludes to how legitimacy can be understood. Specifically, power and agency 
need to be seen to be done (and done) in particular ways if they are to be deemed 
credible and worthy of support by significant others. People’s personal and collective 
understandings are thus critical to creating and assessing the authorising conditions of 
legitimacy — for both governance and governmentality. The intercultural articulation of 
distinctive ensembles of power and agency must be treated as a phenomenon that 
immediately foregrounds contestation over legitimacy. Resolutions to such contestation 
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will lie neither entirely in one field nor the other. This is the case not only in respect to 
encounters between Indigenous people and the state, but also internally within the field 
of Indigenous cultures of governance.  
One practical implication is that when governing arrangements are imposed 
unilaterally on Indigenous people by the state, without taking account of the encultured 
modes of Indigenous power and agency, they are invariably counterproductive to the 
establishment of common ground, let alone workable forms of Indigenous governance. 
Similarly, reified essentialisms about Indigenous agency and modes of power (whether 
by Indigenous people, or the state) serve poorly as the bases for viable governance. 
Furthermore, while Indigenous agency and choice are clearly critical to credible 
innovation and realignments in their ways of governing, Indigenous governance must 
now also be understood as fundamentally encompassed by a wider governance 
environment and the relative  meta-governance capital of the state.  
Theorising the Australian State and Governmentality 
The fourth theoretical element that can be drawn from the thesis analyses concerns 
the Australian state and its field of governmentality. Here a broader understanding can 
be developed wherein the agency of the state extends not only to rendering Indigenous 
society governable, but also to governing its own conduct. 
In the arena of Indigenous affairs, the state is theorised as being a cultural, as well as 
a political and sovereign territorial artefact. The thesis papers challenge the reification 
of the state as unitary, coherent and rational. Rather, it should be understood as 
polycentric and multi-directional, having a cultural logic to its governmentality and self-
governance, and possessing a distinctive ensemble of meta-governance capital 
(including power) that is deployed by powerful individual agents and entities via a 
shifting institutional architecture.  
The thesis papers reveal a distinctive developmental pattern to the state’s 
governmentality in Indigenous affairs; one of oscillating engagement and retreat that 
gravitates around a profound ambivalence to Indigenous culture, family life and  
relationships, and the conditions of nodal networked governance. These are all 
invariably represented by the state as being problematic for Indigenous people’s 
participation in democratic ‘good governance’. 
The current phase of the developmental pattern of the state’s field of governmentality 
can be understood not as one of post-colonialism or post-modernism, but as one of 
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‘liquid modernity’. In 2000 and 2005, Zygmunt Bauman published two books, Liquid 
Modernity and Liquid Life in which he drew upon the mechanics of fluidity to provide a 
metaphor through which to grasp the subtle change in the conditions and experience of 
modernity. He characterised this as a transition from a territorialised nation-bound, 
labour-bound modernity to a condition of liquid modernity characterised by an 
attenuated public sphere, expanding globalisation, the diminution of the citizen, 
reification of change and growth, and the falling apart of effective agencies of collective 
action.  
Zygmunt Bauman (2000: 3, 2005: 147) reflected on Karl Marx’s prediction in the 
Communist Manifesto that ‘All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their ancient and 
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify’ to argue that we are now experiencing life under 
conditions of liquid modernity. Under such circumstances, change, disengagement and a 
lack of solidity become the new constant (Bauman 2000: 13, 120). Bauman identifies 
one change in particular as seminal; namely:  
the renunciation, phasing out or selling off by the state of all major 
appurtenances of its role as the principal (perhaps monopolistic) purveyor of 
certainty and security, followed by its refusal to endorse the 
certainty/security aspirations of its subjects (ibid: 184).  
This insight can be usefully elaborated upon in respect to the current disposition of 
the Australian state. Under conditions of liquid modernity, the state’s field of 
governmentality of Indigenous affairs has been marked by an accelerated trajectory 
towards uncertainty. This is evident in the increased multi-directionality of its policy 
formulation; mercurial swings in program administration; frequent changes in funding 
guidelines and reporting requirements; an accelerated complex restructuring of its 
institutional architecture; adoption of the mantra of user-pays and outsourced service 
delivery. The very apparent consequence is a decline in its ability to implement 
strategies and policies.  
Under these conditions, the bureaucratic wielders of state power have themselves 
become increasingly mobile in their employment positions, effectively becoming the 
new nomads, wandering from department to department, project to project, and 
community to community. Indeed, some bureaucratic employment based in Indigenous 
communities can only be held for short periods of time.37 In this manner, government 
bureaucrats are disconnected from their individual responsibilities for specific 
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outcomes, and the state finds it harder to sustain its own governmental expertise and 
self-governance in Indigenous affairs.  
The consequence of these conditions is that the state now routinely confronts an 
‘unbearable degree of uncontrollability’ in Indigenous affairs (Nowotny 2005), and the 
limits of its power to effect and sustain improvements. The pace of this self-initiated 
change and uncertainty is partly managed by a selective amnesia on the part of 
government bureaucrats, Ministers and departments. In this way, the state is able to 
avoid addressing its own institutional failures and weakened self-governance, and 
instead outsource ‘the problem’ of slow or no progress, onto a pathologised Indigenous 
culture and its field of governance.  
At the same time, the state’s self-representation is nevertheless to convince 
Indigenous Australians and the public that its governmentality is cohesive and 
purposeful, informed by evidence, open to review and negotiation, and intent on 
pursuing ‘participation’ and ‘partnerships’. The gap between this self-representation and 
the reality on the ground is such that the agency of the state in Indigenous affairs has 
steadily become mired in an intractable position. 
For example, as its policy implementation becomes exhausted, and outcomes 
uncertain and contested, the state resorts to bolstering its power by reasserting the 
internal boundaries of secrecy and exclusion; creating what Ulf Hannerz refers to as 
‘unfree cultural flow’ within the state framework (1992: 109). This sees the state 
seeking to arbitrate entire domains of practice and discourse about the conduct of 
Indigenous governance; as it recently did in its interventions into NT communities. 
However, the state’s assertion of unilateral control is increasingly undermined by its 
growing reliance on a multiplicity of third-party actors from the wider governance 
environment, to whom state-like responsibilities of service delivery, administration, 
management and control are outsourced.  
The thesis accordingly suggests that a theoretical understanding of the state must be 
directed not only to its modes of dominant power and agency, but also to what it does 
not and cannot do: to its instances of apathy, indifference, inaction and impasse. From 
this perspective, an integral part of the state’s governmentality can be conceptualised as 
one of entropy. 
The term “entropy” refers to the measure of disorganisation in a complex system 
(Bailey 1990: 49-87). Entropy generates an acute experience of randomness, ennui and 
uncertainty, and loss of meaning, while at the same time the system moves from 
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differentiation to sameness (Schweller 2006). Entropy is liable to increase under 
conditions of liquid modernity that thrive on perpetuating homogeneity. The thesis 
analyses highlight the progressive uncertainty and ennui settling into the 
governmentality of the Australian state in Indigenous affairs. This acts to seriously 
reduce and diffuse its agency.  
However not everything can or should be dealt with by the state in Indigenous 
affairs. Not all things are susceptible to intervention, direction or management. Doing 
something can make matters worse — and there is a long history of failed good 
intentions in Indigenous communities. But history also highlights critical areas of 
entrenched Indigenous disadvantage, where the state has been noticeable by periods of 
extended absence; e.g. in matters of domestic violence, deaths in custody, essential 
services and infrastructure, education and health. And interestingly, even when the state 
is in an interventionist mode, it has remained noticeably reluctant to engage directly 
with nodal-networked governance (see also Smith 2008).
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A related and similarly under-theorised aspect of state entropy is its periodic 
institutional paralysis in respect to its own self-governance. Countless inquiries and 
reviews have documented this internal abrogation, which recently has been criticised as 
constituting a fundamental ‘failure in the governance of governments’ (Dillon and 
Westbury 2007: 208-09). A factor exacerbating the state’s entropy is that under current 
conditions of liquid modernity, the governmentality of Indigenous affairs has become so 
complex and dispersed that it is now difficult for the state to adequately govern its own 
conduct in the arena, let alone that of others. 
This conundrum is especially evident in the growing disparity between the Australian 
state’s policy intention and its implementation ability. The problem with interventions, 
as Jan Kooiman (2003: 221–3) has pointed out more generally, is that they are not 
simply top-down and one-sided. They are multi-sided interactions binding both the 
governed and the state. One intervention thus tends to be followed by another in order to 
combat side effects and unintended consequences. When ‘seen from the point of view of 
specific subjects, these compounding interventions become so intertwined that the 
whole of them becomes over-complex, counterproductive and their effectiveness put in 
doubt’. Decisiveness gives way to administrative anxiety and policy hyperventilation. 
The many arms of the state engage in different modes of articulation concurrently, often 
wittingly and unwittingly exclusive of each other, and demonstrating highly erratic 
capacity. 
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Yet this insight into the ‘state of the state’ in Indigenous affairs is still only partial. 
An important contribution of the thesis is to present a nuanced understanding of state 
power and agency; overcoming a tendency amongst anthropologists and other 
researchers to essentialise the state and its governmentality in pejorative terms, or as a 
homogenous field. The thesis analysis documents events where various agents and 
entities of the state, individually and collectively, engage with Indigenous people in 
ways that can be enabling, capable and committed to finding common ground.  
Furthermore, this insight must also encompass the agency of Indigenous 
functionaries operating within the state’s governmentality, as well as the growing 
bureaucracy (Indigenous and non-Indigenous) employed within Indigenous 
organisations. There are close (if not always constructive) networks of relationship 
between these two bureaucratic fields. This additionally highlights the theoretical 
injunction to recognise the influential agency and impact of powerful individuals (again 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous) within these networks of Indigenous affairs. 
Without this balancing perspective we are liable to fall into the Pythonesque 
dilemma so humorously explored in the film The Life of Brian — that of analytically 
railing against the demon state, whilst refusing to reflect on a more complex reality 
where the state also contributes to the lives of its citizens, including its marginalised 
minorities.39 
For Indigenous people, the state is not imagined and remote, but a real effect of 
everyday institutional practices, discourses, and its multiple agents and modes of 
dispersed power and agency (Sharma & Gupta 2006: 165). The state’s field of 
governmentality is experienced by Indigenous people close to the skin, and their own 
field of governance is influentially shaped through intercultural articulation with the 
state. At the same time, the state’s governmentality has been extensively infiltrated by 
Indigenous people (as bureaucrats, advisors, Ministers and politicians) and their 
articulatory politics. Importantly, the model of mesh network is used by Indigenous 
people as a mechanism by which to bridge intercultural scale, and develop strategic, 
personalised connections into the Australian state itself. The limits of this infiltration are 
to be found at those points where the state’s power is most protected; for example, in 
the formulation of policy and making of high-level political decisions behind the closed 
doors of departments and cabinets. 
The current developmental phase of the Australian state under liquid modernity 
constitutes a precarious governance environment for Indigenous Australians who are 
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hard pressed to keep abreast of changes in state governmentality. The state’s 
outsourcing of decision-making powers over the most mundane aspects of Indigenous 
life means that leaders and organisations are left with ‘strings attached’ to their 
authority and severely hampered governing agency. And despite the state’s current 
interventionist engagement in many communities, it has in fact become increasingly 
harder for Indigenous people to locate the state in respect to its downwards 
accountability. 
While the state and its field of governmentality becomes more elusive and opaque to 
Indigenous Australians, it nevertheless seeks the opposite from them, demanding greater 
accountability, stability, amenability and transparency than it does of itself and its 
agents. Counterproductive feedback loops and ongoing contestation are created under 
such conditions; they serve to diminish mutual understanding and exacerbate 
unintended consequences.  
The Radical Specificity of Indigenous Governance 
The ethnographic evidence of the thesis papers indicates that a theoretical framework 
must address the constraining and enabling dimensions of the patterned relationships 
among social actors within a system (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994: 1418). It must also 
speak to the fact that governance is itself an encultured field operating across multiple 
dimensions, not simply a particular kind of structural mechanism performing a discrete 
function.  
A contribution of the thesis lies in its ethnographic documentation and research 
analysis of the radical specificity of Indigenous governance whose patterned logic as a 
field can be theoretically abstracted as a jural circuitry of influence-saturated nodes 
positioned within self-organising and self-referential meshed networks operating across 
multiple scales and with more and less longevity. Nodal governance carries the heaviest 
load of responsibilities for the organisation of order that helps to hold mesh networks 
together, connect them to others, and get things done.  
The idea of a self-referential system is more commonly used in science to account 
for both the persistence of patterns and the capacity of systems to have effects that take 
off on several different trajectories. Complex self-organisation implies emergent 
properties in which patterned change is created, even in cases where the change is 
dramatic, unintended or temporally and spatially complex (Corning 2002; Goldstein 
1999). This understanding offers an ethnographically and analytically robust way of 
theorising Indigenous governance, enabling some of the research gaps and assumptions 
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in approaches to date to be addressed.  For this purpose, some of the concepts of social 
network analysis more generally are critically extended.  
The limits of social network analysis 
Social network theory and analysis has potential relevance for the subject matter of 
this thesis, but suffers from several biasing restrictions.40 These are briefly summarised 
below and then addressed in the course of modelling Indigenous networks and their 
governance. 
The term network has its own anthropological traditions back to Emile Durkheim 
and Georg Simmel, and includes more recent research (see Borgatti 1992–94; Castells 
2000a & 2000b, 2004; Dousset 2005; Latour 1993, 1987; Mische 2003; Riles 2000). 
Marilyn Strathern (1995: 13–14) has also noted the fixation of anthropologists with 
understanding the networked patterning of kinship relationality in Indigenous 
societies.
41
 However, apart from the recent work of the ICG Project, there have been no 
anthropological analyses of networked governance in Indigenous Australian contexts.42 
Partly this is due to the recent emergence of ‘governance’ as a research issue in 
Australia. It is also due to the overly mechanical and statistical nature of much social 
network analysis, and its illusory sense of rigidity and structure (Wellman & Marin 
2009). 
At its statistical extreme, social network analysis has reduced itself to a form of anti-
humanism, turning persons into dependent variables of a form of structural 
determinism.
43
 Its usefulness has been undermined by over-privileging either the linking 
pathways or the intersecting nodes, leading to an analytic blind spot concerning the 
holes or empty spaces in between.  
The heavily functionalist orientation of much network analysis also tends to ignore 
more dialectical subtleties and forms of (anti-)sociality. A related problem here is the 
unwarranted assumption that people always act rationally. In the context of governance 
research, a more fundamental weakness of social network theory has been its difficulty 
in explaining power, change and continuity.  
Theorising Indigenous Networks 
Indigenous collective identities are multidimensional, overlapping and 
interconnected. The thesis papers provide numerous examples of such collective 
identities, including extended families, linked households, clans, moieties, outstation 
and pastoral communities and incorporated organisations. These can all be theorised as 
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dispersed relational polities with enduring associations between people, place, time and 
space that are both affects, and affective of, mesh nodal networks.  
Indigenous mesh networks are constituted by pathways of close connectivity which 
capture and captivate people in thick ‘strings of filiation’ and common purpose (Austen-
Broos 2009: 141). Here the thesis refills the lost empty spaces of networks, 
conceptualising them as providing the ontological foundations upon which people’s 
visible world and ways of governing proceed; effectively consolidating networks 
through time (see Figure 1).  
Importantly, the thesis papers demonstrate that Indigenous mesh networks display a 
systemic facility that gives rise to a distinctive epistemic condition; namely, one where 
creativity and openness are couched in an ontological framework ‘that disguises change 
under a consciousness of permanence and the veneer of conservatism’ (Paper 4: 7). 
While this condition has been widely discussed in recent Australian anthropological 
research (see, for example, papers in Hinkson & Smith 2005; Merlan 1997, 1998; Smith 
& Finlayson 1997), there has been less elucidation of the actual mechanisms44 involved, 
or analyses of their implications for Indigenous governance.  
This part of the Conclusion lays out a theoretical modelling of how Indigenous 
network mechanisms operate and their implications for governance. In this regard, the 
thesis contributes to answering the question posed over a decade ago by Marilyn 
Strathern who, when noting the headache created for anthropology by the issue of scale, 
raised the issue of the relationship between the systemic effects of scale change on the 
one hand and, on the other, the capacity of systems to retain their features across 
different orders of scale (1995: 15, 1996-7: 3).  
It is argued here that the mesh nodal network is an Indigenous template that enables 
the systemic potential for scale change whilst retaining valued features. Specifically, it 
enables continuous reconnection and reconfiguration around broken, blocked or 
contested pathways. The template also facilitates the strategic activation of social 
boundedness and flexibility — because nodes can jump linkages, activate, reinforce or 
renunciate others, until a preferred social destination or repositioning is reached. This 
epistemic facility helps explain the perseverance and advocacy of local self-interests 
even at larger scales. Its breakdown and epistemic limits also helps explain the rise of 
uncontrolled autonomy and the exercise of unrestrained power by some governing 
nodes and groups, and those occasions when relatedness succumbs to debilitating 
feuding and factionalism. 
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On the basis of the thesis’ ethnographic analysis, the Indigenous systemic potential 
for ‘change as continuity’ and the ‘relational self’ is theorised as being achieved through 
the dialectic mechanisms of bonding and bridging relationality, and homomorphism. 
These have significant implications for how Indigenous governance is conducted and 
sustained, and are more fully laid out below. 
Mesh nodal networks: Bonding relationality 
The close thick lines of relationality creating a mesh network enable people (nodes) 
to live and work closely together in a certain style or way, with a higher expectation of 
being able to coordinate activity, maintain order, and have their mutual needs and 
obligations met. In such ways, mesh networks generate an internal bank of close 
bonding relationality and governance capital. This tight connectivity between people, 
place and collective identity continues to be of high value in rural, remote and urban 
Indigenous locations. 
Of particular relevance here, the thesis papers demonstrate that while Indigenous 
mobility has been well documented (see in particular F. Morphy 2007; Taylor 1998, 
2009), insufficient ethnographic and theoretical attention has been given to the stable 
social cores of mesh networks (see for example Paper 8 and Smith 2001b, 2007, 2008).  
There are closely-coupled cores operating in Indigenous mesh networks. They tend 
to be older people and couples who are comparatively less mobile, more reliable in 
carrying out their ‘net-work’, and who are thickly connected to other senior nodes and 
to the dense ontological spaces of their networks. These closely-coupled cores sustain 
and contribute to a strong sense of internal grouphood over time and space; they are 
more ‘in place’, as Stephan Fuchs would say (2001: 156).  
Not all Indigenous meshed network formations are the same however; and neither is 
the extent of their bonding relationality. Some networks have thick nodal development 
and connections, and dense ontological spaces, which serve to create deep bonding 
relationality and extensive governance capital. For example, some extended families, 
linked households, clans and ‘communities of identity’ are characterised by 
demographic success, high-influence nodes and strong attachments to country on which 
they continue to reside. They benefit from thick bonding relationality. Others such 
networks are quite small, with low-influence nodes, thin bonding relationality and 
precarious governance capital.  
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However, bonding relationality is also dynamic over time. It is susceptible to the 
consequences of demographic change, loss of core nodes, diminution of valued shared 
knowledge, external stress and changing socioeconomic conditions — and with it the 
political, land ownership and economic fortunes of particular networks. There is also a 
dark side to bonding relationality where the characteristic biasing endogeneity of a mesh 
network serves to intensify internal conflict. This can be seen at work in the feuds and 
factionalism that quickly arise and then sometimes endure within families, households, 
clans and communities of identity, especially in circumstances where their relatedness, 
rights and responsibilities are called into questioned; for example, when identifying the 
causes of an ‘unnatural’ death, or under statutory-based externalities such as native title 
and land rights claims, court cases, mining negotiations, royalty distribution processes 
and the like. 
Mesh nodal networks: Bridging relationality 
A dubious argument of social network theory is that strong individual connectivity in 
a network undermines (or even lacks) the capacity to become generalised to larger or 
other networks. The collective analyses of the thesis papers demonstrate that this is not 
the case with Indigenous mesh networks.  
While they display thick, closely-coupled relationality at their core, Indigenous mesh 
networks also demonstrate two other systemic characteristics that are critical to enabling 
them to extend their boundaries and to jump scales. One is the facility for what 
Granovetter (1973) called ‘loose coupling’ (see also Castells 2000b; Emirbayer & 
Goodwin 1994). The other is a facility for what I define as ‘strong’ coupling. The first 
relies on weak ties; the second relies on influential ties and is critical for governance 
(see Figure 2). Both facilitate forms of bridging relationality beyond a mesh network. 
A mesh network comprises tightly coupled cores and extends outwards to more 
loosely coupled, open-ended linkages at its relational periphery. The thesis papers 
demonstrate that Indigenous mesh networks are able to facilitate the strength of weak 
ties. For example, loosely coupled nodes at the periphery of a mesh network may be 
positionally a weak tie, but they can nevertheless serve as a relational pathway (a 
strength) between segments of a network or to entirely different networks (including to 
non-Indigenous networks) (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: The strength of weak or loose coupling, facilitated by ties (the brown 
dash-line) between weak/loosely positioned nodes (brown circles). 
 
Source: D. Smith. 
In this manner, a weakly coupled node can act as a mechanism for bridging 
relationality, overcoming the systemic inclination of a mesh network towards 
boundedness. For example, an adult man or woman who was adopted or ‘grown up 
from’ a young child, by a clan or family (or whose father was) may be considered by 
other members of his adoptive clan/family to have weak internal rights and thin 
connections within that network, but may nevertheless afford them an opportunistic 
link, when needed, to other places and groups from his original ‘own family’.  
Not surprisingly, the legitimacy of asserting these loosely coupled, open-ended 
linkages within a mesh network can become the subject of intense debate and 
contestation when valued rights and resources are in question. In which cases, bonding 
and bridging relationality can sometimes activate a contradictory, push-pull strain 
within a mesh network. For example, I examined such strains and their underlying 
conditions and consequences in an co-edited volume entitled Fighting Over Country: 
Anthropological Perspectives (Smith & Finlayson 1997) for which I also authored a 
paper on the Indigenous politics of representation and negotiation under the Native Title 
Act 1993 (Smith 1997). There I noted the: 
context-related character of group identity, [where] it is often in the very 
process of publicly articulating the complex parameters constituting 
Aboriginal land ownership that the constituency of a native title claimant 
group will arise… and that [even then] the right constituency for 
negotiations may change over time according to the range of native title 
interests called into play; [all of which] are subject to ongoing interpretation 
and construction (Smith 1997: 101-02; and see also examples in Paper 6). 
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Bridging relationality can also be seen at work through influential nodes who are 
strongly-coupled (see Figure 3). These may be senior leaders or powerful organisations 
which can serve as a relational bridge to other influential nodes; whether that be to 
segments of a network or across to entirely separate networks. In this case, the bridge 
may serve as a conduit of especially high-value restricted knowledge, for the broader 
sharing of resources and specialist information; for creating a powerful lobby group, for 
organising a larger regional meeting or ceremony; for developing informal federations 
or ‘companies’ of networks.  
Bridging relationality enables networkedness to ooze out, creating networks of 
networks across expanding social scales and cultural geographies. This facility is 
particularly relevant to Indigenous governance and is further elaborated below. 
Figure 3: The strength of strong coupling, facilitated by ties (blue dash-line) 
between thickly positioned, influential nodes (blue circles). 
 
 
Source: D. Smith. 
Bridging relationality is also dynamic over time. Weak ties may become strong with 
changing circumstances; and vice versa. For example, the thesis papers document the 
relational core of some networks becoming larger and smaller. A set of weak nodes and 
ties on the periphery can be restructured or rotated into the core for a period, or a strong 
node and tie rotated out (in the latter case, especially if a strongly coupled node’s 
legitimacy and effectiveness has been called into question and found wanting by other 
members of their network). 
The critical role of bonding and bridging relationality are documented throughout the 
thesis papers. It can be seen at work in the conduct of large ceremonies; the negotiation 
the resolution of internal conflicts; the identification of collective or individual 
responsibility for payment of compensation; within the domestic economies and 
childcare arrangements of families and linked households; in the formation and 
operation of incorporated organisations within communities and across regions; the 
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identification of group membership for the purposes of land rights and native title 
claims; in negotiations about resource agreements; and the distribution of royalty and 
welfare payments. 
The thesis papers also reveal that relationality is a conduit for potential disunity and 
conflict. For example, Paper 4 describes the internal mechanisms of Indigenous 
compensation, demonstrating how the same facility of bonding and bridging 
relationality for reinforcing and creating networks are mobilised by governing nodes 
and groups in order to assess the social effects of, and blame for, particular kinds of 
harmful or unlawful actions and events: 
An act or event which provokes a compensatory process can most easily be 
construed as a central point of energy from which radiate a series of 
repercussions; rather as a stone which, on falling into water, creates 
concentric waves whose energy is progressively depleted at the outer 
margins. In the same way, an act or event will produce a radiating social 
‘field of perpetrators’ and a social ‘field of impact’ … Such effects are not 
easily quarantined. Rather they are seen to be contagious, easily spreading 
… and they may have multiplier effects that potentially escalate conflict in 
the process (ibid: 10-11). 
This insight enables us to understand that the systemic mechanisms involved in 
reproducing mesh networks can also facilitate the spread of conflict and disharmony, 
not just unity and reciprocity.  
Theorising scale and epistemic condition 
Bonding and bridging relationality demonstrate the capacity of mesh networks to 
deal with scale by turning inwards or outwards. The boundedness of a network is 
relational and context specific. At any particular point in time or place, people can 
choose to maximise flexibility and strategically extend their individual and collective 
social boundaries by reorienting themselves along certain pathways, and not others. 
They can also retract their orbit of potential connectivity back to the cluster of their 
close core ties. Paper 4 documents such processes of boundary negotiation involved in 
identifying group membership for the purposes of determining the liability for, and 
beneficiaries of, compensation payments. 
The theoretical insight here is that the facility of Indigenous mesh networks for 
bridging relationality is what gives effect to the oft-mentioned ‘epistemic openness’ of 
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Indigenous social boundaries and scale  — from core to periphery, closed to open-
ended, and vice versa.  
On the other hand, unrestricted flexibility and openness within a mesh network is 
rarely tolerated at the expense of the viability of its heartland and dense ontological 
space. Here, a mesh network’s facility for bonding relationality around a core of 
relationality and deep institutional values is what enables the reaffirmation of closed 
ranks and boundaries that reproduce the enduring sense of grouphood and the 
organisation of social order at small-scales.  
These twin relational trajectories generate the characteristic push-pull dynamic of 
mesh networks. How is it then, in the context of such epistemic trajectories that the 
collective identities and ontological heartlands of networks endures and dissipates 
across dispersed scales? 
Mesh nodal networks: A system-preserving map  
The answer proposed here is that the model of the mesh nodal network operates in 
Indigenous society as a ‘cognitive generator’ similar to that identified by Gianfranco 
Minati in his investigation of tightly knit communities in Italian Systems Society (2008; 
see also Minati & Pessa 2006), and similar to the self-organising systems discussed by 
Niklaus Luhman (1995) in his account of Social Systems. In other words, the mesh 
nodal network stands as an epistemological device through which people construct and 
interpret the world outside themselves. In this way, the mesh network in Indigenous 
society operates as an epistemic homomorphism; what Pierre Bourdieu would call a 
‘structuring structure’ (1999: 67).  
A homomorphism models phenomena in such a way as to produce instances of 
itself.
45
 A mesh nodal network provides Indigenous people with a system-preserving 
map, a cognitive framework for organising reality and interpreting the world.46 It 
follows then that transformations in the scale of a network will be seen as homomorphic 
when they preserve the underlying cultural logic and design principles that generate the 
mesh of the network; i.e., when iterations of ‘grouphood’ and ‘personhood’ feel familiar 
and credible to people’s mental maps (see Papers 4 & 8).  
The thesis evidence supports a further theoretical insight; namely, that Indigenous 
mesh networks produce homomorphic mapping through recursion. The Macquarie 
Dictionary of Australia defines recursion as a process of repeating objects indefinitely. 
For instance, the effect of recursion is visually apparent in paintings which depict the 
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droste effect of an image within an image.47 Indigenous cross-hatching and dot paintings 
are examples of the droste effect of recursive patterning, and as Dundiwuy 2 points out, 
this is for good ontological reasons. Homomorphic recursion is the networked 
patterning mechanism not only of Indigenous art, but also of Indigenous kinship and 
marriage systems, ceremonial and song cycles, and of Indigenous Law and governance. 
The effect of recursion is to inject a self-referential form of endogeneity into network 
bonding and bridging relationality. The effect is each segment or extension of the 
network points to similar segments and extensions, in an endless series of alignments 
and replications. This mechanism is depicted below in Figure 4. which uses the 
backdrop of an Indigenous painting to visually locate the recursion. 
Figure 4: The recursive mechanism of Indigenous mesh nodal networks. 
 
Source: The backdrop graphic for this diagram is from part of a painting by Debra Wurridj, 
entitled Lorrkon Hollow Log, from Maningrida, Arnhem Land, Northern Territory. 
Indigenous networks are cultural formations whose pattern of ‘node-pathway-
interstitial space’ carries the encoded knowledge, values, behaviours, dispositions and 
meaning upon which a networked way of life is founded. Recursion promotes the 
replication of this pattern across different orders and scales. This does not mean that 
Indigenous mesh networks are static or rigidly bound to a cultural ‘blueprint’ — as early 
anthropologists were prone to think — or that they are devoid of internal innovation or 
immune to externally imposed change. Nor does it mean that one particular level or 
formation is the primary unit or source of governance. Rather, that when such changes 
occur, they are assessed and responded to, within the cognitive parameters of a 
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networked way of life. The sophistication of homomorphic recursion is that it facilitates 
the very epistemic condition of ‘stability with flexibility’, ‘autonomy with relatedness’ 
and ‘change as continuity’ that centrally underlies Indigenous cultures and their 
governance.  
Recursion activates along the twin trajectories of a network’s bonding and bridging 
relationality. In bonding relationality, recursion is evident in the network pattern curling 
or enfolding in on itself. Several thesis papers document examples of this at work; e.g. 
in the reproduction of the valued capacity for relational autonomy within mesh 
networks, in the durability of domestic roles and responsibilities within extended 
families and their linked households, and in the preservation of a sense of grouphood 
amongst residentially dispersed ‘communities of identities’.  
It is also evident in the long-term cohesion of some organisations’ core membership; 
and in the formation and recognition of ‘new but familiar’ sub-groups within a network 
(such as the emergence of gangs and factions within a network). It can also be seen at 
work in the agreed succession of a group or leader assuming stewardship for another’s 
country or ceremonial knowledge; and in the process of interpreting a newly found 
Dreaming song or site as being legitimate and condoned. 
Recursion along bridging relationality is where the network pattern radiates and 
replicates outwards to a foreign or unknown world to create externalised replications of 
its own form which can then be credited as legible and congruent. Several examples of 
bridging recursion are documented in the thesis papers; e.g. in the extension of kin 
categories to totally unrelated strangers in order to reframe them as familiar and so bind 
them in relationality (those outsiders may be Indigenous or non-Indigenous); and in the 
transference of ‘one family’ metaphors to new committees or advisory boards created 
by governments in order to colonise them with the Indigenous obligations of reciprocity 
and support associated with such close networks. 
Bonding and bridging relationality, together with homomorphic recursion, are deep 
cultural mechanisms that enable the reproduction of various collective identities 
associated with mesh networks. This theoretical understanding helps to explain how 
small-scale local groups can jump scale and link horizontally across to other similarly-
scaled groups, or aggregate vertically to form larger-scale collectivities and cultural 
geographies. It helps explain the oft-noted plurality of ‘selves’ and polities involved in 
order-organisation, and the layered subsidiarity of decision-making roles and 
responsibility. It also provides insights into the range of relational and recursive  
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strategies which people draw upon to interpret, incorporate or reject change and to 
transcend or reinforce scale as needed. Most importantly, it demonstrates how the 
homomorphism entailed in these processes contributes fundamentally to the capacity of 
networked systems to retain their encultured features across different orders of scale. 
Theorising Indigenous governance  
These same systemic networked logic and mechanisms lie at the very heart of 
generating and maintaining a distinctive field of Indigenous governance across 
Australia; one that is different to those produced by other societal and political models 
of governance and government.  
Governing agency within a mesh networked systems comes, first and foremost, 
through people and their relationality. Indigenous mesh networks do have enduring 
cores and there are pivotal nodes who are more equal than others in their relational 
power and agency. They form the governing backbone or circuitry of networks and are 
especially influential in activating bonding and bridging relationality across scales and 
orders of organisation. 
In this regard, the ethnographic evidence of the thesis publications presents a 
different picture to that proposed by social network researchers such as Manuel Castells 
(2000b: 15-16) who argues in his seminal work, The Rise of the Networked Society, that, 
by definition a network has no centre. … If a node in a network ceases to 
perform a useful function it is phased out from the network, and the network 
rearranges itself.  
This is not the case with Indigenous mesh networks. Certain nodes are positionally 
prominent, having multiple connections to other nodes, thicker webs of bonding and 
bridging relationships including to other prominent nodes, and a deeper repertoire of 
governing capital (see Figure 5). They occupy a recognised position of primus inter 
pares — first among equals — within their own mesh network. Effectively, they 
constitute an institution of order-organisation within networks. 
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Figure 5: Governing nodes (orange) have thick, closely coupled ties, forming a 
superstructural governing circuitry within and beyond a mesh network. 
 
Source: The graphic version of this nodal network is a painting by Charlie Tjapangati from 
Papunya Tula Artists, Papunya, 2010. 
The systemic and relational conditions of mesh networks generate a dispersed 
subsidiarity of governing roles and responsibilities amongst particular nodes, and enable 
some of them to effectively jump scale and activate links to influential nodes in other 
networks. As a result, governing nodes can cluster to form superstructural circuitries 
across several network formations at different scales; a meta-governing network. We 
can therefore talk about ‘deep governance’ in Indigenous society, in the same way that 
Arjun Appadurai (2002) talks about ‘deep democracy’.  
Theorising Indigenous governing agency and power 
As a consequence of this positionality, governing nodes are able to draw upon 
several dimensions of power identified in the thesis papers and summarised early in this 
Conclusion. Some governing nodes also extend their networked connections in order to 
access sources of power from the wider governance environment, including from within 
the state’s own field of governmentality; for example, via statutory, legal, policy, 
resource and funding avenues. This highlights an interesting symbiosis where the 
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Indigenous field of governance and its leaders not only contest the power of the 
Australian state, but also draw upon that power for their own internal purposes.  
The concept of governance as affect and affective of mesh nodal networks does not 
flatten or collapse the richness of creativity attached to governing nodes, or reduce their 
agency to mere functional determinism. Nor does it imply that the agency of a 
governing node or circuitry is constrained by, and limited to, a single scale of network. 
Governing agency can be purposefully activated to instigate innovative practices, 
identify new knowledge and meaning, or create solutions that can have multiplier 
effects across network pathways. It can be initiated out of personal self-interest as much 
as altruism or collective end purposes. Some individuals and organisations are adept at 
operating vertically and horizontally across the dispersed scales of their relationality. 
Others prefer to restrict their governing agency to the core of a particular network where 
they have their strongest authorising environment. Not all governing nodes are 
themselves of equal influence and power. And there are struggles within the circuitry of 
governing nodes, whereby power and agency are challenged, constrained or activated 
by their negotiation and manipulation of systemic mechanisms of hierarchy, reciprocity, 
relationality and subsidiarity.  
Governing agency may be short-lived and event-specific as the systemic pull of 
relatedness reinstates a node within the bonding demands of their mesh network, and so 
constrains their sphere of action. Unrestrained governing autonomy may be judged by 
other people as being illegitimate and selfish, leading to their withdrawal of recognition 
and support. A node’s legitimacy and authorisation to act is therefore susceptible to 
factional net-politics, their relative power and reputation, and their flair in negotiating 
the principles of subsidiarity and hierarchy relating to representation and decision 
making.  
In such ways the systemic pull towards nodo-centrism, self-interest and individual 
autonomy in Indigenous networks is tempered by the pull towards the bridging 
relatedness of nodes, and vice versa. Accordingly, governing nodes are neither totally 
constrained, nor totally free in respect to their agency. But in all cases, their governing 
agency will be condoned as being legitimate, or not, by the immediate authorising 
environment that is their mesh network. 
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The contemporary condition of Indigenous nodal networked governance 
Earlier, Zygmunt Bauman’s insights into the ‘liquid modernity’ of global society 
were applied to understanding the contemporary condition of the Australian state. That 
metaphor raises a similarly interesting insight in respect to the condition of Indigenous 
networked governance under current national and global circumstances. The thesis 
analysis indicates, however, that the Indigenous condition is not so much one of ‘liquid’ 
modernity as one of ‘viscous’ modernity.  
Viscosity is a measure of a substance's susceptibility to flow and to stabilise. It 
describes the internal friction mechanics of a moving substance that tends to resist 
forces, causing it to flow.
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 For example, viscous materials such as glues, gels, 
polymers, starch, lava, paint, protoplasm have a resilient condition at a fundamental 
molecular level that induces structural order (Karlsson & Carlsson 2007). On the other 
hand they also have a molecular condition that allows shape-shifting, and a certain 
elastic quality that enables reversion and adherence to an original form. In other words, 
viscous materials have potential for both solidity and fluidity of form. 
The metaphor of viscosity arguably has resonance with Indigenous networked 
culture and its contemporary field of governance. It highlights the symbiotic condition 
of its epistemic openness alongside its resilient conversion of the new and the strange 
into the familiar. As a consequence, the Indigenous culture of governance can be 
theorised as a system midway between durable and fluid states.  
The metaphor of viscosity also draws attention to the turning points of internal 
vulnerability which potentially lead to breakdown and loss within mesh networks and 
their nodal governance. For example, when the degree or speed of change surpasses the 
capacity of a network to enact homomorphic recursion, then its governing arrangements 
may break down very quickly. For example, a mesh network is vulnerable to the 
breakdown of too many close relational pathways, the systemic failure of bonding and 
bridging relationality; and the increased involution of small groups into debilitating and 
oppositional factionalised sub-networks. Networked Indigenous governance is also 
vulnerable to the collapse of the dense spaces of cosmological Law, the loss of several 
governing nodes, the dissipation of their accumulated governing capital, the disruption 
of the circuitry of governance to the extent that scale-jumping cannot be activated, and 
the unrestrained dominance of one scale, node or polity over others. 
Such tipping points of vulnerability and loss can be activated and exacerbated 
through intercultural articulation with the Australian state and other agents in the wider 
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governance environment. Once the solid ground of Indigenous networked governance is 
set into turbulent motion, governing nodes can become dis-embedded from their 
foundations of relatedness, and the only thing that then remains constant is change. The 
thesis papers demonstrate that in fraught intercultural contexts, intra-Indigenous 
contestation can increase to such an extent that it becomes difficult to enforce internal 
social order. When the relationality of nodal governance and its circuitry is itself under 
significant stress, Indigenous people find themselves at a distinct disadvantage in their 
dealings with the Australian state. Again the very networked quality of the Indigenous 
field of governance means that negative impacts and changes occurring at one scale can 
have significant multiplier effects across dispersed network formations at other scales. 
There is an Indigenous discourse of cultural loss that specifically focuses on such 
breakdowns and vulnerabilities, and encompasses the absence of senior leadership, their 
perceived loss of authority, and the disregard of younger generations for ‘The Law’. 
This discourse is borne of actual experience of cultural loss and damage. It should be 
given considered weight in anthropological analyses where, more often, the post-
modern inclination is either to see Indigenous culture as undergoing naturalised change, 
and so skirting the problem of loss (Kirsch 2001), or to see culture as irredeemably out 
of step and so needing to be urgently modernised (Sutton 2009). 
Theorising the Intercultural Space 
The fifth element in the grounded theoretical framework proposed in this Conclusion 
addresses the intercultural space. Here, the viscosity of Indigenous nodal networked 
governance articulates with the liquid modernity of the Australian state and its 
governmentality.  
While ‘place’ and ‘location’ indicate stability, ‘space’ is mobile. Raymatja Marika’s 
conceptual frame of the intercultural as ganma, resonates with Bauman’s metaphor and 
Ulf Hannerz’s (1992: 4) concept of ‘cultural flow’:  
When you see a river from afar, it may look like a blue … line across a 
landscape; something of awesome permanence. But at the same time, ‘you 
cannot step into the same river twice’, for it is always moving, and only in 
this way does it achieve its durability. The same way with culture — even as 
you perceive structure, it is entirely dependent on ongoing process. 
The intercultural flow appears similarly enduring. But it is an interactive, turbulent 
space where different velocities and frictions meet, and lines of foam circulate across 
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the surface, swelling and retreating, giving rise to convergence and opposing currents. It 
therefore has properties and patterns that differ from those of the specific fields 
involved; and its properties and patterns change over time and place. This theoretical 
understanding entails a corresponding set of insights.  
Emergent and unpredictable articulation 
Above all the intercultural is an emergent space. The flow of articulation itself 
cannot be predicted; we cannot know the outcome of forces and events beforehand. But 
during the encounter, the habitus of Indigenous governance and statist governmentality 
become hyperactive and vulnerable; open to question. The phenomenon of emergence 
in the intercultural space is one characterised by chaos and entropy, movement and 
congestion. Influential nodes within both fields seek to promote their preferred 
governance values, practice and modes of order-organisation. 
The intercultural is not an openly receptive, homogenous contact zone. The 
governance environment forms a critical part of the intercultural space. It draws a 
multiplicity of wider fields of governance into the orbit of Indigenous governance, not 
just the state’s governmentality. There is no uniform or linear direction of articulation 
because there are a plurality of actors. Some nodes are more powerful than others and 
differently motivated in their disposition to action. Some try to incorporate or advocate 
on behalf of ‘the Indigenous Other’, others to repulse it.  
Following Mary Pratt’s (1987, 1992, 1987) insight into the linguistics of contact, the 
intercultural can be theorised  as a ‘contact zone’; a complex adaptive space of 
unfolding interaction and emerging relationships of power where possibilities and 
turning points open up as the fields of Indigenous governance and statist 
governmentality engage and disengage with each other. The intercultural thus entertains 
possibilities of both change and continuity, contestation and accommodation. It is a 
contact zone of ambiguity where different people and things ‘rub up against one another 
and change [or not] in the process’ (Fay 1996: 243). The distinctiveness and autonomy 
of any field is thus subject to the changing power differentials and representations that 
are activated at the time.  
This means that the intercultural space is both stochastic and nonlinear. It involves 
chance, where unpredictable things happen that cannot be exactly resolved, and where 
the cognitive trajectories and practical consequences permeate outwards in multiple 
directions. The intercultural is not a simple unpredictable process, because the 
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distribution of possible future trajectories depends on past as well as present conditions. 
It is shaped, for example, by people’s personal memories and past experiences, the 
different governance histories of organisations, communities and government 
departments, and by past policy genealogies and political cycles. And in Indigenous 
affairs, the past weighs heavily on people’s present-day expectations and assessments as 
to what any future intercultural encounter will deliver. 
Articulating boundaries and value 
In a further elaboration of Bauman’s metaphor, the thesis papers demonstrate that the 
viscous field of Indigenous governance has its own stabilising points of resilience and 
boundary stickiness. The principles of relational autonomy, interconnected dispersed 
polities, gendered hierarchies of knowledge, subsidiarity of authority and decision 
making, networked nodal governance and Law-given order, are the cultural equivalents 
of molecular resilience. They operate as sticky designators of collective identity and 
social order, and tend either to resist or promote fluidity in accordance with people’s 
assessments of the homomorphic resonance and legitimacy of particular events, 
processes or actions.  
Powerful designators such as these are particularly sticky attractors at times of great 
social stress and external pressure. Then, essentialisms of culture, governance and 
governmentality can all be defensively promoted by people in order to protect the status 
quo and reject change. This reveals the intercultural to be a space of heightened 
internalisation, leading to contested agency over the control of meaning and value. 
Not surprisingly, as fields of governance and governmentality articulate, such deep 
designators are deliberately quarantined and protected from usurpation by ‘the Other’. 
For example, the thesis papers document how the state resolutely protects its control 
over the allocation of funding and resources, regulation of corporate accountability, 
jurisdictional pre-eminence, and its statutory and policy modes of control within 
Indigenous affairs. On the other hand, Indigenous people resolutely protect their control 
over valued realms of gendered and restricted knowledge, ceremonial practice and 
powerful places.  
There is then a reality to the experience of there being a distinctive Indigenous 
cultural and governance domain, and a carefully patrolled boundary maintained by the 
state that restricts Indigenous access to its field of power. Indeed, several thesis papers 
describe how the very perception of bounded domains has itself become the source of 
 347  Conclusion 
yet another set of mutual representations to be tactically deployed by both Indigenous 
Australians and the state in their encounters.  
However, this does not mean that the fields of Indigenous governance and state 
governmentality are radically contradictory or mutually impregnable. There are 
elements of each field that are heavily instantiated in the practice of the other. For 
example: there are ‘government business officers’ living and working in communities; 
auditors and administrators are put into ‘failed’ organisations to manage them on behalf 
of the state; organisations have mandatory government program and financial 
requirements to fulfil; Indigenous boards have legally enshrined functions based on 
democratic procedures.  
Similarly, certain aspects of Indigenous networked culture are heavily embedded in 
the Australian state’s governmentality at all levels. For example: Indigenous cultural 
diversity is enshrined in government policy and service delivery; traditional land 
ownership is enshrined in legislation; and there is statutory recognition of Indigenous 
modes of decision-making for native title purposes. And a particularly significant trend 
in Indigenous people’s articulatory politics with the state has been their insinuation of 
the bridging relationality of their own networked way of life into the state’s own 
governmentality. Today Indigenous nodal networks permeate government departments, 
agencies and bureaucracies, political parties and Ministerial offices.   
Agency — contested and condoned 
The intercultural may be a space of turbulence and emergent consequences, but that 
does not mean those conditions are unauthored. The thesis papers highlight a range of 
purposeful action initiated by Indigenous people within their field of governance, in the 
course of their intercultural articulation with the governmentality of the state. Rather 
than characterising this agency as an affect (or affective) of resistance, hegemony or 
hybridism, the thesis papers point to a more nuanced theoretical account.  
Intercultural turbulence and emergence can lead to essentialised resistances by 
people, and their sedimentation of meaning and positionality. It can lead to greater 
dispersed intensity of dominance and intervention by the state, and localised 
contestation by Indigenous people over the state’s power and agency. And on occasions, 
when the state’s turbulent liquidity surpasses the viscous resilience of Indigenous nodal 
networks or the ability of governing nodes to generate transformative accommodation, 
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then people’s perception and experience of cultural vulnerability and loss of control can 
become dominant and real. 
However, an important theoretical contribution of the combined thesis of papers is to 
demonstrate that there are points of articulation where turbulence and emergence lead 
not to contestation or resistance, but to negotiated common ground and condoned 
innovation. The papers also indicate that certain individuals (within both fields) play a 
particularly influential role in steering intercultural events and processes towards 
common ground. 
Today, powerful Indigenous governing nodes, especially pre-eminent leaders and 
organisations, form superstructural networks and operate as a particularly powerful 
discursive field of interpretation and authorisation in intercultural encounters with the 
state. On occasions, they engineer realignments and interpretations of Indigenous 
governance that are reproductive of prevailing patterns and practices. At other times, 
they initiate significant experimentation and innovation in governance arrangements.  
If such cases of Indigenous agency evoke an Indigenous perception of cultural 
continuity — if they have homomorphic resonance — then they will be condoned as 
being culturally legitimate. The thesis papers document several such consequential 
forms of governing agency. Furthermore, they indicate that the state’s agency is subject 
to the same Indigenous perceptions and assessments. For example, when the state 
externally imposes change without Indigenous consent, it is invariably contested and 
can undermine Indigenous governance capital. However, if transformational agency 
occurring in the intercultural space resonates with deep-seated Indigenous principles of 
networked governance — if it has homomorphic resonance — then it may elicit 
Indigenous assessments of legitimacy. In this case it may generate what could be called 
transcultural common ground.  
The concept of the ‘transcultural’ has received little attention in Australia and so is 
under-developed in the context of Indigenous society. It arises out of Fernando Ortiz’s 
(1995) early influential consideration of inter- and trans-cultural conditions in Cuba.49 
Following Ortiz, I take transcultural to refer specifically to the post-emergent points of 
common ground that develop across statist and Indigenous cultures of governance and 
governmentality. These are points of articulation where shared meaning, 
understandings, agreement emerge. I take the transcultural to also include points of 
common ground that have emerged historically and continue to repeat. 
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The transcultural concept does not imply some form of assimilationist unity or naïve 
commensurability. Nor is the concept employed to suggest a form of mongrelised 
cultural hybridity.
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 Transcultural common ground is itself inherently dynamic, and this 
is especially the case under contemporary conditions of the Australian state’s liquid 
modernity. Shared meaning or a negotiated common practice can break down, and 
sometimes does so easily in Indigenous affairs.  
Theorising legitimacy  
The thesis papers mark the author’s own conceptual journey from ‘cultural 
appropriateness’ to ‘cultural match’ and, in turn, to suggesting that the concept of 
‘cultural legitimacy’ has greater analytic usefulness and ethnographic fit. Within 
Indigenous networks, people’s perceptions and judgements of legitimacy are critically 
important to the sustainability of governance initiatives and the achievement of common 
ground with the state.  
The thesis papers point to a complex reading of legitimacy within the field of 
Indigenous governance and intercultural space. It enables legitimacy to be theorised as 
an interactive condition of communicative, collective consensus about homomorphic fit 
which enables people to assess credibility and worthiness of belief and support. To do 
this, legitimacy draws upon and requires:  
1. attitudinal approval, involving normative mechanisms and responses (e.g. that 
resonate with peoples’ internalised norms of trust, allegiance, relationality, 
reciprocity);  
2. behavioural allegiance, involving instrumental and institutional mechanisms (e.g. 
that resonate with people’s internalised rules, customary practices of ‘looking 
after’/‘working for’, and achievement of desired outcomes);  
3. cognitive resonance, involving orientation and interpretive mechanisms (e.g. 
people’s collective recognition, judgements and assessments of the way things 
should be). 
4. governance capital, involving accumulation, exchange and distributive 
mechanisms (e.g. that resonate with processes and standards for acquisition and 
use of governing power, knowledge, resources, abilities);  
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5. systemic homomorphism, involving replication of, or fit with underlying network 
mechanisms and principles (e.g. relational autonomy, subsidiarity, dispersed 
polities, nodal agency and power); and 
6. cosmological authority, involving agency and order-organisation mechanisms 
(e.g.; that draw on the authorising power, knowledge and creativity of the 
Dreaming and The Law). 
These elements constitute an authorising environment that is activated by people and, 
thereby, are open to bargaining and negotiation. Indigenous people are quick to judge 
some innovations and realignments as acceptable, and others as lacking cultural 
legitimacy and therefore unacceptable. Arguably, innovation within the Indigenous field 
of governance is deemed to be credible and worthy of support when the Indigenous 
authorising environment supports and helps sustain the ‘new’ arrangement as being a 
form of continuity. 
Importantly, this theoretical understanding suggests that for governance innovation 
to be considered transculturally legitimate and sustainable over time, it requires both 
Indigenous and statist cultures to achieve a common ground in their assessment and 
support of its credibility. Secondly, when an innovative alignment has been reached, its 
properties are not a simple hybridised compounding of all the parts added together. 
Some parts may be inherently different — transformed into something that is neither 
fully Indigenous, nor statist. In this respect, the intercultural is a space where the 
‘system effects are different from its parts’ (Urry 2006: 113). This is the affect of 
emergence in a turbulent space. Furthermore, the emergent properties of governance 
innovation and common ground are not epiphenomenal; they have their own causal 
flow-on effects which in turn generate other conditions and constraints which are then 
subject to people’s judgements. 
The asymmetrical interdependence of power 
This leads to an understanding of the pattern of articulation between the fields of 
Indigenous governance and state governmentality as one of ‘asymmetrical 
interdependence’51 (Galtung 1971) in the context of an unequal power relationship.  
Power in the Indigenous context is a condition of an assertively equalitarian society 
where some people are decidedly more equal than others, and recognised as such. There 
is an enduring hierarchy of knowledge, reputation and hence of status; there are leaders, 
bosses and meaning makers. Governing leadership, prestige and capital can be 
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accumulated according to enshrined institutional and organisational pathways. The 
power to act is occasioned, reinforced and maintained through public performance and 
credibility.  
However, the contemporary exercise of Indigenous governance is inseparable from 
the contestation, negotiation and construction of power relationships shaped through 
intercultural encounter with the state. The articulation of fields of governance and 
governmentality is also about the politics and representation of cultural identities, and a 
pathologising of Indigenous governance by the state. This highlights moments when the 
state’s patronage and tolerance of Indigenous governance stops. The state reasserts its 
relative power precisely at the moments when Indigenous people demand to have their 
own field of governance recognised, or when they tread too close to the state’s protected 
realms of power. In these situations, the state’s default mode is to reinforce the power 
dependence of Indigenous people.  
However, the understanding promoted here emphasises that the balance of 
asymmetry does not always favour the state. For example, the thesis papers demonstrate 
that the legitimacy and capacity to get things done does not alone rest on the power of 
the state to command. As a site of radical cultural specificity, Indigenous governance 
poses a substantial challenge to the state’s power and its ability to facilitate common 
ground or impose governance solutions onto Indigenous people. In the face of the 
state’s unilateral intervention, Indigenous people can assert their ungovernability; they 
become absent and invisible. They can also undermine governance innovation and 
transcultural common ground if it erodes their own niche power base within Indigenous 
networks, or is fundamentally at odds with valued cultural principles.  
Conclusion 
The contribution of this thesis lies in its accounting for the Indigenous culture of 
nodal networked governance which, in this conclusion, has been more abstractly 
modelled as a self-organising system of relationality through which individuals and 
groups engage with, organise and understand their world in respect to both its 
internalities and its externalities. Such a systemic logic generates and is in turn 
reproduced by mechanisms of: bonding and bridging relationality; homomorphic 
recursion; and subsidiarity of social organisation that overcome the limits of scale.  
Because nodal networks are built around mechanisms of relationality, under some 
circumstances they may act as conduits of conflict and factionalism as much as 
reciprocity, and generate individual autonomy as well as collective identity. In other 
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words, they generate interlocking formations that can be purposefully activated by 
people and entities, according to the particular need and order of governance issue at 
hand. Importantly, the model of a mesh network both enables and constrains the agency 
of a circuitry of influential governing nodes. And it provides people with a system-
preserving map by which to interpret the governing actions and initiatives of nodes, to 
judge their legitimacy, and act accordingly.  
These conditions and logic are both a source of strength and vulnerability for 
Indigenous mesh networks and nodal governance in their intercultural articulation with 
the Australian state. Indigenous people deploy this model of the world and social order, 
to engage with, understand and attempt to control the effects of the governmentality of 
the state.  
While the fields of Indigenous governance, state governmentality and their 
intercultural articulation can be separated for analytic purposes, they are in fact parts of 
a systemic whole of power relations and order-organisation. The current conditions of 
liquid modernity acting upon such a complex whole, severely challenge the Australian 
state’s capacity for self-governance and sustained intervention. They similarly challenge 
Indigenous people’s ability to engage with the state while maintaining the relationality, 
systemic coherence and agency of their own networked form of nodal governance.  
The intercultural space is now arguably an intensive site of vulnerability and 
contestation for both Indigenous Australians and the Australian state. The limits of the 
state are starkly revealed in Indigenous affairs. There, it labours to secure sustained 
policy goals in the context of the global demise of the long-term, certainty and stability. 
As relational systems, Indigenous mesh networks and nodal governance are particularly 
vulnerable to the current hyper-fluidity of change being experienced and imposed upon 
them by the Australian state. 
Arguably, there is now a fundamentally different phase in the relationship between 
Indigenous Australians and the state. This includes the potential for greater contestation 
and less common ground, as Indigenous people reject the state’s pressure to change 
their cultures of governance along preferred democratic lines; and as the state attempts 
to reassert its unilateral sovereign powers and regulate Indigenous cultures of 
governance. But the penetration of both fields into each other also suggests there is no 
easy retreat back into boundary exclusivity.  
The Indigenous culture of networked nodal governance has a recognisable pattern, 
underlying principles and mechanisms, institutional standards, recognised modes of 
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power and authorised agency. Until the Australian state understands and directly 
engages with these features of deep Indigenous governance, its own governmentality of 
Indigenous affairs will continue to fail. 
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Appendix B: A Regional ‘Governance Environment’ in 
Central Australia 
A region in central Australia demonstrates the complexities of the governance 
environment for Indigenous Australians. The region is remote, serviced largely by a 
network of dirt roads, a weekly air service delivering post, and road delivery of food, 
building, and other goods. There are four major communities with a number of well-
established surrounding outstations. There are three different forms of local government 
incorporation across the communities: two have community councils incorporated under 
the Northern Territory Associations Incorporation Act 1978; another community 
government council operates under the Northern Territory Local Government Act; and 
another council Aboriginal corporation is under the ACA Act. As a result, the 
community councils have different statutory regulations and guidelines applied to their 
constitutions, functions, and membership.  
Each community council has a non-Indigenous town clerk whose task is to deliver 
local government services under the direction of a council board and executive of 
Indigenous people. However, as with municipal councils, the four remote councils and 
their town clerks undertake a much wider range of service functions.  
The councils and their management routinely act as funding channels for a multitude 
of government grants and programs for local organizations, which in turn deliver 
program activities to the same communities and surrounding outstations. On each 
community there exist a number of other incorporated bodies which take on service 
delivery and decision-making roles, but which lie outside the orbit of the council’s own 
statutory jurisdiction. For example, one community with 280 residents has three other 
incorporated organisations under the ACA Act (store, aged-care centre and art 
organisation) apart from their community council, as well as a primary school and 
health service centre provided by Northern Territory government departments.  
Another community with a population of 450 people has six incorporated 
organisations under the ACA Act apart from their community council, including two 
health-based corporations, a store, art centre, women’s centre, and outstation resource 
agency. A primary school operates under the Northern Territory Department of 
Employment Education and Training with an Aboriginal Student Support Parent 
Awareness Committee providing a forum for Indigenous parents’ voice in community 
education. In 2004, Yirarra College (based at Alice Springs) delivered secondary 
services at the school, providing an educational capacity that is not government based. 
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The two other discrete communities in the region each have one incorporated body (the 
store). One also provides a major primary school and health service in the region (under 
Northern Territory government departmental oversight). This is a comparatively modest 
rate of organisational representation at the discrete community level. 
Each community and its surrounding outstations is associated with a number of 
‘named’, extended family groups. Larger families and their senior leaders are also 
closely associated with the historical establishment and running of particular 
incorporated associations. In some instances, certain families are seen to ‘specialise’ in 
the governance of specific service-delivery functions (e.g. one family will be involved 
with health services and organisations, another with education, another with arts and 
crafts). 
These families have genealogical and other linkages to other families in the 
surrounding region, and certain members are highly mobile along regional networks. In 
other words, the governance of each community is internally dispersed across several 
organisations and families of polity, and further dispersed across the region via webs of 
relationships and organisations.  
An added factor which impinges on the effectiveness of Indigenous governance in 
these communities is the role of non-Indigenous people in key management and staffing 
positions, and their own relationships in a community. For example, some non-
Indigenous managers have family members who also occupy key positions in other 
organisations in the same community. There are good reasons why this happens—
communities lack access to professional staff and accept ‘couples’ as a way of getting 
two employees, and there is a lack of adequate housing for single staff members. But 
these arrangements also tend to create webs of non-Indigenous power and politicking 
within a community. This politicking is often focused on community organisations and 
key resources, and there are also influential relationships of patronage—both positive 
and negative—between non-Indigenous staff and specific community leaders. These 
Indigenous/non-Indigenous relationships can have profoundly negative impacts on the 
governance of a community when they solidify factionalism and competition, or begin 
to interfere with the daily management and decision-making of representative 
organisations. 
This complex set of community ‘governance environments’ in one area of central 
Australia is located within an equally complex regional governance and leadership 
environment. The four communities used to lie within an ATSIC Regional Council 
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zone. The elected members of that defunct ATSIC Council have been moving onto the 
governing committees, boards and leadership positions of other regional organisations, 
creating new power niches and often organisational change.  
Indigenous leaders within each of the four communities often simultaneously 
undertake senior positions in different Indigenous and government agencies at regional, 
Territory and Australian government levels. For example, a previous ATSIC Regional 
Council member from one community is also a member of a community council, as 
well as being the chair of another community centre, and on the governing board of 
several other regional organisations. A senior member of another community council is 
also a member of the Central Land Council’s Full Council and a board member of a 
large regional royalty association. A number of council members from the four 
communities are traditional owners whose statutory rights and interests are represented 
by the Central Land Council. There are several leaders across the region with 
considerable organisational, political and policy-making experience. Overall, however, 
the leadership is fractured and operates under considerable pressure and heavy 
workload. 
Some regional organisations are based around specific constituencies having legal 
rights and interests in respect to land and resource development (such as traditional 
owners, royalty recipients). Other organisations target their services generally to 
Indigenous residents of the region (e.g. health, aged care, youth, child-care, women’s 
services). Since the demise of ATSIC, some organisations are vying with each other for 
the status of the governing organisation for the region, amidst a history of efforts to 
create an Indigenous representative government for an even bigger geographic region.  
This ‘re-positioning’ of governance goals is being carried out in a context of the 
complex regional dispersal of Indigenous decision-making and authority across a 
multitude of traditional-owner groups and representative organisations. The main town 
for the region, Alice Springs, acts as the major service-delivery ‘hub’ for a wider 
regional population of approximately 15,000 Indigenous residents at some 260 
communities. The town population (excluding the town camp population of over 973) is 
currently estimated at 3,494. Current ORAC data (2004–05) records approximately 216 
incorporated bodies in the town. This means there is approximately one incorporated 
Indigenous organisation for every 16 Indigenous residents of the town. By any measure, 
this rate of ‘organisational representation’ raises concerns about its impact in 
exacerbating overlapping service delivery and organisational competition in a region 
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which experiences significant shortages in professional personnel, management and 
administrative skills, low levels of human capital and infrastructure. 
This governance complexity at the community and regional level is mirrored by a 
different kind of complexity at the Territory and national levels. Communities and their 
organisations within the region are subject to the policy, regulatory, legal and funding 
regimes of the Northern Territory and Australian governments. There are several major 
government agencies and regional government offices operating in Alice Springs, and 
delivering services and funding to the region, including a new ICC office. Many of 
these departments deliver their services according to their own system of administrative 
‘regions’. Some of these align; many do not. In other words, there are several kinds of 
‘regions’ (cultural, government, administrative, service, political, geographic). To date, 
NGOs have played only a small role in the region.  
All communities in the region are substantially reliant on the welfare economy and 
short-term program funding from public-sector grants that have stringent accountability 
requirements. The changing national and Territory policy environment has led to new 
program and funding initiatives across the region, including the negotiation of several 
Shared Responsibility Agreements (by the Australian government) and a failed process 
of negotiation towards a regionalised form of local government (by the Northern 
Territory government). There are key individuals (both Indigenous and non-Indigenous) 
operating within the wider Territory and Australian governments who are locally 
influential in respect to policy implementation and program funding. Communities in 
the region are visited by a changing array of government ministers and departmental 
officers. As with the community and regional layers of this governance environment, 
the ‘government’ layers are characterised by their own internal tensions, alliances, silos, 
and competing objectives.  
This regional example illustrates the challenges involved in achieving good 
Indigenous community governance in any particular context. Whilst the detailed social, 
institutional and political dynamics, and histories vary from place to place, the layers of 
complexity are present everywhere. 
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Appendix C: Regional Governance Models 
 
Fig. 5: A regional model with representation based on language 
groups, clans or family groups. 
 
 
 
Features: 
1. The region has a cultural geography and is divided according to Indigenous social, 
ceremonial kin or language groupings. 
2. Each grouping selects an equal number of members according to traditional 
decision-making processes and criteria. They may select a different number of 
members if desired according to size/influence of the groupings. 
Example: 
The Thamarrurr Regional Council Structure and logo (above) with 20 clans having two 
representatives, each selected at separate clan meetings, NT 
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Fig. 6: Regional representation via wards based on a combination of 
communities, organisations, and traditional ownership rights . 
 
 
 
Features: 
1. The region is defined by functional and traditional criteria. It is divided into Wards 
based on discrete communities and on organisational representation of a major 
sub-region. 
2. Residents of each community constitute a Ward. They nominate and vote for one 
representative from their own Ward, and select a traditional-owner representative 
through traditional decision-making processes. 
3. Residents serviced by a sub-regional organisation may constitute a Ward. They 
nominate and vote for one representative from their own Ward, and select a 
traditional-owner representative through traditional decision-making processes. 
4. Representation for organisations and communities may be equal or unequal. 
Example: 
West Central Arnhem Land Regional Authority (proposed), NT.  
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Fig. 7: Regional model based on homelands ‘hub and spokes’ 
representation and service delivery. 
 
Features: 
1. The region is comprised of homelands and resident members living on their 
traditional country. They are represented and provided with services from a 
centralised hub organisation that is located in a large community. 
2. The model is both functional and culturally-based. 
3. Certain homelands are more closely affiliated with each others through kin 
marriage ties, forming connubia. These may begin to form additional tiers of 
outlier ‘hub and spoke’ relationships. 
4. Residents of each homeland nominate one representative from their own country, 
selected through traditional processes. 
5  Representation for homeland communities may be equal or unequal. 
6. A smaller core of nominated representatives forms an executive for the centralised 
hub organisation. 
Examples: 
Laynhapuy, Bawinanga, Demed and Jibulwanagu Outstation Associations, NT.  
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Fig. 8: Regional model based on umbrella ‘family’ of organisations 
with family board representation. 
 
Features: 
1. The region is constituted as a functional one comprising clients and families 
serviced by a set of service organisations. The clients may be overlapping; they 
may be distinct according to service’s focus. 
2. The organisations have been incubated out of a ‘mother’ organisation which 
provides an umbrella for financial, administrative and management advice, and 
leadership mentoring. 
3. The ‘mother’ organisation may keep its business arm, enterprise companies and 
trusts in an exclusive legally-based relationship with itself. 
4. The members of the Board of the ‘mother’ organisation are based on extended 
family culturally-based ties. 
5. Those Board members may or may not also sit on the board of the service 
organisations; some or all of the members of the board of the mother organisation 
will probably comprise the board of the enterprise arm.  
Examples: 
Yarnteen Corporation, NSW and Bunuba Corporation, WA. 
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Fig. 9: Regional model based on peak body and confederation of 
community bodies. 
 
Features: 
1. A peak Indigenous body acts as the representative of all constituent organisations 
and their members. 
2. The region covers the combined areas of the constituent community organisations 
which may be formally gazetted via culturally-based rights and interests, or by 
functional service areas. 
3. The constituent organisations and their communities nominate or elect 
representative members, some (or all) of whom act as the executive group for the 
peak body. There may be more detailed tiers of election of representation between 
the community and regional peak body level. 
4. Community representatives may be elected by vote or by traditional processes. 
5. Constituent community organisations may be dissolved or retained; but there will 
be some mechanism of community endorsement for peak body representation. 
Examples: 
Nyirrungulung Regional Authority, NT; Ngaantajarra Regional Agreement Structure, 
WA; and possible variation being discussed for Noongar Regional Peak Body, WA. 
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Fig. 10: Federated bi-cameral model. 
 
 
Features: 
1. The region is comprised of gazetted or determined Indigenous land, and/or other 
areas associated with Indigenous communities of land ownership, identity and 
interest. 
2. Constituent groups of land owners nominate elders or traditional owners to a First 
Chamber. 
3. The First Chamber nominates or preselects the executive for the Second Chamber. 
4. The Second Chamber acts as the functional and administrative governance arm of 
the First Chamber and delivers services to the same members/clients. 
5  The First Chamber continues to represent the cultural and land-ownership rights 
and interests of the communities. 
Example: 
The Miwatj Provisional Government. 
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Notes 
Introduction 
1. The Aboriginal Cultural Foundation was established in 1970 and based in Darwin, 
Northern Territory. Under its constitution, the Foundation operated with a board of 
Aboriginal leaders from across northern Australia to support the Aboriginal 
performing arts and promote recognition of: 
the existence of individual Aboriginal groups with rights of exclusive or 
joint ownership of, and control over their own cultural forms [and with] 
… patterns of legitimate authority within each group (Aboriginal 
Cultural Foundation 1963-69: 2, 4).  
The Foundation partly achieved these goals by convening Aboriginal-only ‘dance 
festivals’ or bungall. The dance festival at Kununurra fell into this category. Over 
70 Aboriginal dancers participated from Port Keats (Northern Territory), Halls 
Creek, and Wyndham and Kalumburu (Western Australia) communities. 
2. In 1963, the Western Australian Native Welfare Department gave approval for an 
area of ten acres on the outskirts of Kununurra to be turned into an Aboriginal 
‘camping reserve’ which became known as the Mirima Reserve. The majority of 
its Aboriginal residents were refugees from surrounding pastoral stations 
following the equal wages decision by the National Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission in 1966. That decision had significant unintended consequences for 
many Indigenous pastoral workers. The short-term disturbance saw them detached 
from their niche position within the pastoral labour force, resulting in waves of 
Aboriginal migration into Kimberley towns. The medium-term disturbance saw 
the lives of Mirriwung-Gajerrong people controlled and fragmented in another 
way, via their consignment to the spatial margins of town camps such as the 
Mirima Reserve (see von Sturmer (nee Smith) 1976: 163). 
3. Field-based staff from the West Australian Government were then referred to as 
welfare officers and subsequently, as employees of the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs, were variously called community advisors, project officers, and 
community development officers. 
4. In 1976, I advocated that a methodological approach should be based on:  
 383  Notes 
• ‘close and systematic observation of actual behaviour and the minutiae of 
social life’ including ‘the composition of Aboriginal groups, and principles 
of group affiliation’, the ‘relationship between spatial arrangements and the 
content of inter-personal relations’, ‘internal resolution of disputes’, ‘work 
and task allocation’, ‘historical factors underlying shifts or modifications in 
residential patterns’, ‘patterns of decision-making within groups’, and 
‘locating the bosses (i.e. leaders)’; 
• focussing ‘on the continuities and shifts that can be detected in those 
domains’; 
• avoiding ‘attempts to reduce complex levels of social reality to a single 
reductionist explanatory’; 
• taking ‘Aboriginal models and explanations into account not simply as a 
counterbalance to western ethnocentric impositions, but as a pathway to 
understanding how Indigenous people perceive their own leadership and 
decision-making processes’; and 
• analytic models being ‘retested and re-presented back to Aboriginal  people 
for further critical reflection and investigation’ (von Sturmer (nee Smith) 
1976: 210–11). 
5. In nineteenth century Australian accounts of Indigenous society, E.B. Tylors’ 
(1893: 150) colourful assertions On Tasmanians as Representatives of 
Palaeolithic Man were the norm, rather than the exception: 
Perhaps no people ever had more rudimentary rules of law and 
government than those savages, with no property in land, but waging 
war to the death against the trespasser in pursuit of game, with hardly 
any government over the wandering clan, except the undefined 
authority of the ‘bully’ of the tribe.  
The pseudo-scientific framework of social evolutionism has not lost its resonance 
in Australian politics and public debate. One need only consider recent comments 
from a senior Australian Government Minister who, to justify a proposed 
government policy of enforced labour mobility, described Indigenous people 
resident on remote outstations in the Northern Territory (NT) as living in ‘cultural 
museums’ (Vanstone 2005). Or the newspaper opinion piece from senior academic 
commentator John Hirst who, in public support of the Australian Government’s 
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recent unilateral intervention into NT Aboriginal communities, argued in 
Tyloresque vein that, 
in many Aboriginal communities, social organisation has completely 
broken down. The people have shown they are incapable of governing 
themselves. There is no point in consulting them about the creation of 
authority; authority has to be created for them. Their lives will then 
better match our own (Hirst 2007 Canberra Times, cited in Paper 3). 
Still more recently in 2009, the prominent Australian anthropologist Peter Sutton 
mounted a public case for a radical ‘cultural redevelopment’ of Aboriginal 
societies, criticising both his colleagues and government policy for having been 
captured by 
an willingness to publicly ignore the profound incompatibility between 
modernisation and [Aboriginal] cultural traditionalism in a situation 
where tradition was, originally at least, as far from modernism as it 
was possible to be. …Traditional culture, as something to be preserved 
even at high cost, has been overrated (Sutton 2009: 59, 65). 
6. Interestingly, my own professional turning point occurred in the context of a 
turbulent, collective turning point for Indigenous Australians: that of the ‘equal 
pay decision’ and its consequences for Aboriginal workers in the pastoral industry. 
Another turning point was occurring around the same time for the state’s own 
governmentality; namely, the establishment in 1973 by the Australian Government 
of the first national Department of Aboriginal Affairs. 
7. For example, in 1973, I joined two other researchers (economist Jill Brown and 
sociologist Rosin Hirschfeld) from the University of Queensland to conduct the 
first interview-based survey of urban Aboriginal poverty amongst residents in the 
suburbs and camps of metropolitan Brisbane (Brown, Hirschfeld & Smith 1974). 
The research was undertaken as part of the national Henderson Commission of 
Inquiry into Poverty which had been instigated by the Australian Government to 
assess the national extent of poverty in Australia.  
After completing that project, I commenced a Masters Degree in anthropology at 
the Australian National University. For that thesis, I undertook an eight-month 
period of intensive field research in 1978. Accompanied by my two-year old son 
Peret, we lived with Kugu-Nganychara people at an isolated outstation, 130 
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kilometres south of Aurukun, Cape York (see von Sturmer, nee Smith 1979, 
1980). At that time, the Queensland State Government had initiated a legal ‘de-
gazetting’ of the Aboriginal reserve of Aurukun, against the wishes of its residents 
and traditional landowners, in order to make the land accessible for mining 
development. I documented that process as one of the many interventions by the 
Australian state which I subsequently investigated across Australia (see Appendix 
A for a list of relevant publications on these research investigations). 
8. All the thesis papers have been published in edited books, disciplinary journals, 
professional conference proceedings, and the Centre for Aboriginal Economic 
Policy Research publication series at The Australian National University. All 
papers have been professionally and independently refereed. 
9. Over 1987-89, I took time out to study furniture design and making at the Institute 
for the Arts at the Australian National University. My teacher, George Ingham, 
introduced me to the aesthetics of design as an exploration into the permutation of 
creative form and function. In many ways, I have taken the same iterative 
approach to my research investigations of Indigenous cultures of governance and 
the Australian state. 
10. I use the term ‘position’ here to capture a double meaning. Firstly, that of position 
as the self-selected ground or point of view which any person or group of people 
might take in a discussion, encounter or controversy. It alludes to underlying 
(sometimes unconscious) principles laid down as the basis for particular ways of 
reasoning and perceiving one's position, and draws close to Pierre Bourdieu’s 
(1990) concept of habitus. The second meaning is that of the condition of being 
steered or emplaced by others, as a ground that is imposed upon a person or group 
by external agents. 
11. The term ‘Aboriginal affairs’ (and later ‘Indigenous affairs’) came into use in 
Australia after the 1967 Referendum when Prime Minister Holt established the 
Council for Aboriginal Affairs as, 
an appropriate administrative agency … a machinery of government … 
concerned with all the functions which might need to be performed for 
a section of the community only (Coombs 1981: 268-9; see also 
Dexter 2008).  
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 With the incoming Whitlam Labor Government of 1972, radical changes were 
made by the Australian state to its expanding governance of Aboriginal affairs. A 
fully-fledged Federal Government Department of Aboriginal Affairs was 
established in 1973 that combined the Council, the larger Aboriginal Welfare 
Branch of the Northern Territory, and the Council of Commonwealth and State 
Ministers for Aboriginal Affairs.  
In the second half of the 1970s, separate Departments of Aboriginal Affairs 
(including Islanders in Queensland) were established in various states, and the first 
National Aboriginal Consultative Council (and then the National Aboriginal 
Congress, 1977) was established by the Australian Government. This was in turn 
followed by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission in 1980 (see 
Altman & Sanders 1991).  
Linked to these developments was the burgeoning of a specialist field of 
Aboriginal affairs bureaucracy — including both non-Indigenous and Indigenous 
officers — who developed specialist expertise and knowledge. Progressively, from 
the 1980s onwards, Aboriginal (and then Indigenous) affairs came to be associated 
(often in a pejorative way) with what is called ‘the Aboriginal industry’. It is seen 
to be comprised of consultants, researchers and advisors working for Indigenous 
groups and organisations, and for governments and private sector interests (see 
Battye 2005; Rowse 1992). 
12. Following Ulf Hannerz (1986, 1992) and Charles Tilley (1999: 407-19). 
13. See in particular, research by Christie 2006, Das & Poole 2008, Gupta 1995, 
Sharma & Gupta 2006: 7, and Steinmetz 1999 who have reintroduced ‘culture’ 
into their investigations of the state. 
14. Between the 1970s-90s, the term ‘domain’ was introduced by anthropological 
researchers into academic and government language, in response to a growing 
recognition of the cultural heterogeneity within Indigenous Australian societies. 
This understanding had significant impact on the state’s governmentality of 
Indigenous affairs, influencing its perception and political representation of 
Indigenous culture and collective identity. The concept of cultural diversity was 
progressively translated into government policy rationales, program funding and 
service delivery frameworks. 
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15. It is arguable, for example, that in Australian society today Indigenous people’s 
very indigeneity is commodified to such an extent that it is partly apprehended as 
a ‘public good’. One consequence is that the Australian state cannot easily afford 
to totally ignore (or be seen to ignore) the visible markers of Indigenous peoples’ 
socioeconomic disadvantage; especially given those conditions are regularly 
measured and reported upon by government itself as well as international 
agencies.  
16. The word ‘descent’ aptly captures the fall into interpretative confusion that often 
characterises the first fieldwork experience of many early-career anthropologists. 
But the phrase can also be understood to play on the presumed apical, removed 
location of the nation-state and the habit of everyday Indigenous life erupting 
through to test both the representations of the state, and anthropologists’ neat 
models. 
Theme 1: Researching Governance and Governmentality 
17. The ICG Project was initiated as an Australia Research Council Industry 
Partnership between CAEPR at The Australian National University and 
Reconciliation Australia, and undertaken over a five-year period (2003–2008).  
The project brought together a multi-disciplinary team of researchers largely from 
CAEPR, as well as from the National Centre for Indigenous Studies at The 
Australian National University, and from collaborating institutions including 
Charles Darwin University, the Centre for Anthropological Research at the 
University of Western Australia, and the Centre for Indigenous Governance and 
Development at Massey University, New Zealand. The Project was supported by 
an international Research Advisory Committee. Financial support was provided 
via research grants from the Australian Research Council, the Northern Territory, 
West Australian and Australian Governments. 
18 The Indigenous Governance Toolkit was officially launched in August 2010 by 
Reconciliation Australia as part of its biennial National Indigenous Governance 
Awards, in Melbourne. See www.reconciliation.org.au/home/projects/governance-
toolkit 
19. Useful overviews of the wider literature are to be found in Kooiman 1993, 2003; 
Mossberger 2007; and Pierre & Peters 2000. Much of the available research 
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literature on Indigenous governance is to be found referenced on the following 
websites:  
•   the ICG Project at: http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/projects/governance.php); 
•   the Reconciliation Australia governance project site at: 
www.reconciliation.org.au/home/projects/indigenous-governance-research-
project; 
•  the Harvard Project on Native American Economic Development at: 
http://hpaied.org/; 
•  the Canadian Institute of Governance at www.iog.ca; and the National Centre 
for First Nations Governance at:  www.fngovernance.org 
20. I documented an early example of this in 1979 on the Kendall River, Cape York 
where Indigenous outstation residents regarded the Europeans they came into 
contact with as all being part of a government bloc and therefore able to ‘exert a 
great deal of unwelcome pressure and interference, having the ‘rightness’ of the 
Australian government behind them’ (von Sturmer (nee Smith) 1979: 50). 
21. For example, anthropologists and other researchers have examined the corporate 
governance of Indigenous organisations, community financial and resource 
management, the role and responsibilities of governing boards, Indigenous 
political representation and accountability, the nature of so-called ‘traditional’ 
Indigenous law and ceremonial leadership, as well as government policy and 
funding frameworks, service delivery and so on. More often than not, however, 
these have been treated as discrete sometimes disconnected topics, or as unique 
location-specific conditions. The papers in this thesis assert they are interrelated 
aspects of a bigger governance picture. 
22. Some recent exceptions have included comparative approaches in various research 
projects undertaken by CAEPR; including: 
•  the ICG Project (see Paper 1 and papers at 
http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/projects/governance.php); 
•  the Indigenous Australians and Mining Project (Altman & Martin 2009);  
•  the Indigenous Population Project (see research papers at 
http://www.anu.edu.au/caepr/projects/mcatsia.php);  
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•  the comparative Indigenous Population Project at 
http://caepr.anu.edu.au/population/index.php; and  
• comparative case studies of Indigenous families and welfare (Smith 2001a, 
2001b). 
23. The Governance Field Manual was primarily co-authored by myself and Dr Janet 
Hunt (Research Manager of the ICG Project), with periodic input from the 
research team. Each year, project researchers wrote detailed research reports 
addressing issues raised in the Field Manual. The reports were then analysed each 
year by myself and Dr Janet Hunt (with assistance from Dr Will Sanders and 
Stephanie Garling), in order to develop an overarching comparative analysis.  
The Field Manual directed each project researcher to document and analyse the 
same comprehensive set of data (in addition to pursuing their unique locational 
issues and research concerns). This included: 
• local issues in research practice; 
• the conditions and dimensions of community governance; 
• the dimensions and impacts of the wider governance environment; 
• the dimensions and histories of organisational governance; 
• concepts, representations, discourses and perspectives of governance in the 
community; 
• the scope and structure of organisational control and power; 
• leadership, representation and succession; 
• who is the ‘self’ in local, community and regional self-governance; 
• issues relevant to governance legitimacy; 
• participation and voice of members; 
• institutional modes of governance; 
• corporate governance and decision-making processes; 
• sources of conflict and dispute resolution; 
• governance of organisational resources and socioeconomic development; 
• overall effectiveness and evaluation of governance; 
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• governance capacity and development; 
• the nature and local impact of the ‘governance of government’, including its 
institutions, policy, funding  role and impact on Indigenous governance; 
• the bureaucratic and departmental environment and its impact; 
• transferable lessons, principles and best-practice; and 
• implications for government policy, funding and service delivery. 
The Field Manual continued to be refined over the course of the Project, as 
research hypotheses and conclusions were tested. 
24. There remains an aversion to the quantitative in much Australian anthropology 
that continues to limit research analyses and insights. A strength of my 
methodological approach has been to include and problematise quantitative 
techniques, as a valuable adjunct to standard anthropological tools (see for 
example; Smith 1991, 1994(b), Smith 2001(a) & (b); Hunter & Smith 2000; and 
also the work of Morphy (2007)). 
25. For example, art and painted body patterns are common Indigenous educational 
and socialisation tools. Young children are taught by adult relatives about their 
spiritual and land-ownership heritage while being ‘painted up’ for dance and 
ceremonial performances. In Aurukun, West Cape York, Indigenous leaders 
carved and painted sculptural representations of their law-based ceremony in 1958 
as a way of educating the visiting Governor of Queensland, Colonel Sir Henry 
Abel Smith when they performed for him (Sutton 2000). In Yirrkala, East Arnhem 
Land, in 1962, Yolngu leaders painted the elaborate Yirrkala Church Panels as a 
proactive educational statement to the local missionaries, as a political statement 
to the wider outside world (from which the Bark Petition can be said to have 
germinated), and also as a statement to Yolngu about the possibilities of a regional 
Yolngu polity (see Morphy 1991 & 2005). 
Theme 2: The State of the Australian State in Indigenous Affairs 
26. This is not only a feature of the Australian state’s governmentality of Indigenous 
affairs, but is also apparent in the state’s wider functional responsibilities; for 
example in the Australian social security system, health, education, economic 
development, and the labour market. 
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27. Interestingly,  Andrew Haldane (2009), Executive Director of Financial Stability 
at the Bank of England gave a speech in the context of the global financial 
crisis which focussed on the idea of the global financial system as a complex 
adaptive system. 
28. Little wonder then that Indigenous people, who see their own Law and ways of 
governing as immutable and rock-like, compare that to ‘whitefella Law’ which is 
denigrated as being like the sand, always shifting, never the same. 
29. The Liberal Coalition Australian Government of the time announced that: ‘We 
believe very strongly that the experiment with separate representation, elected 
representatives, for indigenous people has been a failure’. Federal Government 
plans to abolish ATSIC, ABC Radio PM - Thursday, 15 April , 2004  18:10:00, 
Reporter: Catherine McGrath at www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1088224.htm 
Theme 3: Seeing Indigenous Cultures of Governance 
30. The Yarnteen ‘family of organisations’ in Newcastle, and regionalised 
communities in the West Arnhem Shire in the Northern Territory are both 
organisational examples of such a superstructural governing node. See other 
examples in Appendix C. 
Theme 4: A Society of Organisations? 
31. See Bates 1997; Burchell, Gordon & Miller 1991; Jimenez n.d., 2004; and Wright 
1994. 
32. See Altman & Smith 1994, 1995, 1996; Smith 1984, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995a, 
1995b, 1995c, 1996; and also numerous consultancy reports and conference 
papers which are listed in Appendix A. 
33. I first commenced my research work with Yarnteen in 1995 when it had already 
established a reputation for running a highly successful Community Development 
Employment Project, and as an innovative training organisation (see Smith 1996). 
My field research with Yarnteen, its Indigenous Executive Director and Board 
members became the bases for an ongoing case study of urban organisational 
governance under the ICG Project (see Paper 8 and Smith 2006). 
34. I have examined this intercultural role and its consequences in great detail for 
many different Indigenous organisations; see for example Altman & Smith 1994, 
1995, 1999; and Smith 1995a, 1997, 1998, 2006. 
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Theme 5: Governance and Governmentality in the Intercultural Space 
35. See Bryant 2007; Gleick 1988, and also 
URL:http://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/zd-Ch.20.html 
Conclusion: Towards a Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
36. These dimensions draw upon my diverse field ethnography, and elaborate upon 
Eric Wolf’s (1999, 2001) insightful analyses of power; Kingfisher & Maskovsky’s 
(2008) broader consideration of the term ‘power’ in the context of neoliberalism; 
the implications of Bourdieu’s ‘field’ of power (1991, 1993: 60); and Didier 
Fassin’s (2009) more recent sympathetic consideration of Foucault. 
37. For example, “government business managers” are employed by the Australian 
Government to work in identified communities in the Northern Territory, to 
facilitate programs being implemented under the government’s intervention. They 
are only allowed to remain in the same community for a period of 12-18 months, 
supposedly to ensure that they do not become influenced by local politics, or 
become too attached to local priorities and views. 
38. To the extent that the state does engage with nodal networked governance, it is by 
way of focussing attention on the asserted deficits; for example, the asserted lack 
of Indigenous governing capacity, representative competence, accountability, 
leadership integrity, transparency, and so on. 
39. A scene from the film sets out this quandary. The ‘Revolutionary People’s Front 
of Judea’ meets in secret to discuss its plans for overthrowing the Romans. The 
dialogue goes as follows:  
Reg: We're giving Pilate two days to dismantle the entire apparatus of the 
Roman imperialist state … Show them we're not to be trifled with … 
what have they ever given us? 
Rebel 2:  The aquaduct? 
Reg:  What? 
Rebel 2:  The aquaduct. 
Reg:  Oh yeah, yeah. They did give us that. That's true, yeah. 
Rebel 3:  And sanitation. 
Loretta:  Oh yeah, the sanitation, Reg. Remember what the city used to be like. 
Reg:  Yeah, all right, I'll grant you the aquaduct, the sanitation are two things 
the Romans have done. 
Mathias: And the roads. 
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Reg:  Well, yeah. Obviously the roads, I mean the roads go without saying, 
don't they? But apart from the sanitation, the aquaduct, and the roads… 
Rebel 4:  Irrigation. 
Rebel 2:  Medicine. 
Rebel 5:  Education. 
Reg:  Yeah, yeah, all right. Fair enough … All right. But apart from the 
sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, 
the fresh water system, and public health... What have the Romans ever 
done for us? 
40. Excellent critiques of the research insights and weaknesses of social network 
approaches are provided by Castells 2000a, 2000b; Emirbayer & Goodwin 1994; 
Freeman et. al. 1992; Jessop 2004; Kadushin 2004; and Kooiman 1993, 2003. 
41. In Australia, Peter Lucich (1996), Michael Houseman (1997) and Laurent Dousset 
(2005) have carried out innovative research into the networked pattern of 
Indigenous kinship, marriage and subsection systems. 
42. The reports of the ICG Project may well be the only anthropological study where 
researchers have specifically focussed on elucidating the form and implications of 
Indigenous networks in the context of governance (see especially papers Ivory 
2008; Morphy 2008; Smith 2008). 
43. As for example, Stephen Fuchs (2001: 64) who asserts that persons and actors are 
simply ‘constructs that some social structures produce to do certain kinds of 
cultural work’, or Pauline Rosenau’s (1992: 42) post-modernist assertion that 
‘person’, ‘individual’ and ‘actor’ are somehow ‘unreal’ or ‘dead’. 
44. The exception to this is Francesca Merlan’s (1998) influential exposition of 
Aboriginal place and politics in Katherine, NT, which directly addresses the issue. 
45. The word homomorph comes from the Greek word homos, meaning same or alike, 
and morphe meaning to form or to shape; i.e. the creation of similar in form (see 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com; and  Web Dictionary of Cybernetics and Systems 
at http//pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/indexASC.html.) 
46. Marilyn Strathern’s (1995: 17–18) conceptualisation of the ‘relation’ as 
holographic — and so not affected by constraints of scale — speaks to the 
homomorphic quality of mesh networks (although she was focussing on kinship 
systems). So too does the work of Laurent Doussett (2005), Michael Houseman 
(1997) and Peter Lucich (1996) on Australian Indigenous kinship and marriage 
systems. 
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47. For example, a droste effect occurs in a painting when there is an image that 
depicts a smaller version of the entire image, in a place where a similar picture of 
that image would realistically be expected to appear. This smaller version, in turn 
depicts an even smaller version of itself in the same place, and so on. A process 
may also be recursive; e.g. when a process is commenced and one of the steps of 
the process involves rerunning the process itself. 
48. Complex liquid-solids such as polymers, paints and gels have tipping points; they 
react to external stress and velocity in unique ways. The sudden application of 
force — such as stabbing its surface with an object, or rapidly inverting the 
container holding it — leads to the substance behaving like a solid rather than a 
liquid. More gentle treatment - such as slowly inserting an object — will leave it 
in its liquid state. Trying to jerk the object back out again, however, will trigger 
the return of the temporary solid state (see Karlsson, M. and Carlsson, U. 2007).  
49. The terms ‘intercultural’ and ‘transcultural’ were developed largely as synonyms 
by Fernando Ortiz (1995: 98; see also Gupta & Ferguson 1997) when writing 
about his own country Cuba. He employed them to replace the term 
‘acculturation’ with ‘transcultural’, and to capture the ‘counterpoint’ through 
which change occurred, not simply in a culture, but between and across 
interconnected cultures.  
50. The term hybridity (as a mixture or fusion of various cultural elements) has been 
employed in post-colonial studies to challenge essentialisms of purity. However, 
the ethnographic evidence of the thesis papers suggests the term has limited value 
for understanding the specificities of governance continuity and change in 
Indigenous Australia, or for understanding its intercultural articulation with the 
governmentality of the Australian state. Jonathan Friedman (1997, 1999), one of 
the most outspoken critics of hybridity theory, calls attention to the fact that 
speaking of ‘mixture presupposes the existence of something that can be mixed. 
Cultures were never pure, the argument goes, and the concept of hybridity tells us 
nothing, since all of us are and always were cultural hybrids’ (Friedman 1997, 
1999: 236, 241). The notion of hybridity lacks compelling analytic force for this 
thesis as it ignores issues of relative power, the plurality of sources of agency, 
ongoing contestation over meaning, and the resilience and articulation of certain 
cultural elements, but not others.  
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51. Johann Galtung’s (1971) original concept of ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ was 
developed in respect to cultural imperialism and peace mediation between 
countries, and was later reinterpreted by Straubhaar (1991: 38) as relevant to 
global media relations. It draws attention to the variety of possible relationships in 
which countries find themselves unequal, but nevertheless able to draw upon 
variable degrees of internal power, socioeconomic and cultural institutions. 
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